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Airline alliances have been dominating the air transport industry since the 
1990s and by now the four strategic alliances, in which almost all of the major 
airlines participate, control the 56% of the world RPK. 
The thesis examines the airline alliance phenomenon in its entirety and more 
specifically, it examines the reasons and circumstances that have led to the 
formulation of these alliances and the impact these alliances have had on the 
participating airlines. 
A key parameter airlines use to assess their own performance and that of 
alliances is traffic. Thus, the present research examines alliances impact on 
the traffic of the allied partners by different types of routes (hub-hub, hub-non 
hub and non hub-non hub), different types of cooperation (FFP, code share, 
strategic alliance without and with antitrust immunity) and by the length of the 
route. In addition, the thesis analyses which alliance groupings, which type of 
airline and which geographical area have produced the best results from the 
alliances. 
To achieve these objectives, the thesis is divided into a theoretical and an 
empirical part. The theoretical approach starts with an industry alliance 
overview and then moves to the presentation of airline alliances, by 
discussing the reasons that have led to their establishment, the evolution of 
the regulatory framework around which airline alliances have developed, the 
definition of airline alliances, the different forms they have taken, their 
advantages and disadvantages; and finally, the past and current alliance 
groups. 
The empirical part focuses on the alliance traffic and analyses it around two 
different axes. The first consists of a survey in which the airlines participating 
in alliances were asked to assess their alliance participation and to quantify 
the impact of alliances on several parameters of their operation and 
performance and more specifically, on their passenger traffic. The second 
analyzes this impact on the basis of an econometric model that seeks to 
determine and measure any positive impact on traffic volume generated by 
alliances. 
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The findings indicate that airlines are satisfied from their alliance experience 
as they have helped them achieve the main purpose for which they have 
resorted to alliances, that is to secure increased network coverage with little 
capital investment. Both the survey and the econometric model indicate that 
airline alliances have led to an increase in passenger traffic amounting to 
10%. According to the survey, this traffic increase is mainly registered on hub- 
hub routes while the econometric model indicates that this increase is evenly 
distributed on hub-hub and hub-non hub routes. The benefits result mostly 
from the marketing cooperation and appear within one or two years from the 
establishment of the alliance. Alliances may bring about cost reduction, but 
this depends on the level of integration among the partners. Almost all 
participants agree that alliances are the final stage of airline cooperation and 
that there will be no or very few mergers. 
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The air transport industry sector was the one of the first areas which by its 
very nature crossed borders (after World War 11 and the Cold War) and 
constituted and still constitutes the means that bring together the people and 
peoples of the world. Even today, many years after the deregulation in many 
parts of the world, almost each country's largest airline is considered as the 
It national ambassador", the "flag carrier" of each country - almost all airlines 
use a derivative of the country name and add "airways", "airlines", "air" for 
example, British Airways, United Airlines, Singapore Airlines, South African 
Airways, Aeromexixo, Air New Zealand - and are indissolubly associated, to 
their largest extent, with the country of registration. It is not a chance event 
that most of the airlines use the name of their country of origin in their livery 
and trademark. This is one of the reasons that deregulation and liberalization 
moved much more slowly in this sector than in others (manufacturing, service 
sectors, etc. ), where multinational or more correctly supranational or 
metanational companies have been created and the role of government has 
virtually disappeared. Thus, the sector that pioneered in opening up borders, it 
is at the same time the sector that remains shackled to a dated regulatory 
framework and it is only in the last ten years that has begun to make its first 
steps as an "adult", freeing itself from governmental tutelage. 
Globalisation in most industry sectors, the limitation of widespread war 
conflicts, the fall of the eastern bloc and the improvement of living standards 
of the most part of the world population have all made air travel more 
accessible and affordable to the average person. People have been 
increasingly using airplanes to satisfy their different travel needs -a flight is a 
means to an end - business, visit to relatives and friends or tourism. Thus, the 
airplane has turned from a luxury exclusive means of transport to service 
directly related to the current way of life. The thirst to conquer the globe has 
led to the quest for an ever-spreading network as well as to cheaper fares. 
The answer to this need came from the evolving international economic 
conditions, which have led to a partial, initially, and later on, to a full 
deregulation of the air transport industry, in certain areas of the world, such as 
the European Union. 
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But this evolution was not easy to be achieved. The airlines in their effort to 
fulfill their customers' demand and to circumvent the regulatory constraints at 
the lowest cost risk possible but also in their effort to secure their survival 
have been led at first to the establishment of cooperation on certain routes. 
Thus, alliances between airlines started to emerge one after the other, 
reaching a frenzied peak in the 1990s. Many of them have been disbanded, 
but most of them realizing the need and benefits that could arise from a 
deeper integration that could help them not only better meet the increasing 
needs and demands of their passengers for a wider network and the ability to 
redeem miles, but also increase their own market share, strengthen their 
position and weather crises and to deal with the relaxation of the regulatory 
framework, have moved from marketing alliances to strategic alliances. Thus, 
from the end of the 1990s four alliances - "Wings", Star Alliance, oneworld 
and SkyTeam - have dominated the air transport field holding 56% of world 
RPK. 
Airlines have established alliances to reap the widest benefits possible and 
have stated that alliances have actually generated numerous and multiple 
benefits. One of the basic parameters airlines use to assess the impact of 
airline alliances on their performance is traffic, that is the additional traffic 
resulting from alliances. Thus, the present thesis seeks to examine the 
alliance impact on the allied airlines' performance by focusing on traffic while 
at the same time examining the general regulatory and economic context 
around which alliances have evolved. 
The thesis examines the airline alliance phenomenon in its entirety as far as 
this is possible. More specifically, Part I entitled "Alliances in Theory and in 
Practice" constitutes the theoretical part of the research and it is this 
theoretical approach that sets the theme that will be analysed in the following 
part (Part 11) where a more in-depth analysis of the impact of airline alliances 
is carried out and more particularly of impact on traffic. 
The first chapter entitled "Strategic Alliances" presents in the first section, 
"Why Alliances", a general outlook on alliances by first stating a definition of 
alliances and then presenting the reasons that have led to the formation of 
alliances as well as to the benefits and problems that have arisen from 
alliances in all industries. The second section, "Experiences from alliances in 
other sectors", examines cases of alliances in other sectors such as 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, whose experiences may be proven of 
use for the study of airline alliances and finishes by stating the reasons that 
led to the emergence of alliances in the air transport industry. Finally the third 
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section presents the impact of alliances in the wider aerospace industry, 
which interacts closely with airlines. 
The second chapter "The movement towards Liberalisation" presents in more 
details a very distinctive feature of the air transport industry, the regulatory 
regime and the way this regime has evolved under the market pressures and 
the needs of the air industry. The movement away from the restrictive ASAs of 
the Chicago Convention to bilateral and regional liberalization and to antitrust 
immunity and the projected TCAA proposal is the regulatory framework that 
airlines have had to adapt to. 
In chapter 3 an analysis of airline alliances is attempted, which includes a 
definition, the form of cooperation airlines undertake, the benefits as well as 
the drawbacks alliances entail for airlines as well. 
This first part part ends with chapter 4 which presents first all past global 
airline alliances and then the four global strategic alliances that are 
dominating the current air transport industry. An attempt is made to include in 
this chapter all the latest developments in the industry, a feat quite challenging 
given the volatility of the market and the constant changes. 
The empirical part is composed of a survey and a econometric model. The 
aim of the survey - whose results are exposed in chapter 5- is to measure 
the alliance effect on airlines' traffic in order to evaluate the alliance success 
itself by examining the opinion of the directly involved players, of all the 
airlines (28) - at the time of the survey - participating in global strategic 
alliances. It constitutes a pragmatic approach to the issue of the impact of 
airline alliances on passenger traffic since it focuses on the practical and 
realistic aspects of the issue. 
Chapter 5 is divided in two sections. The first refers to a series of interviews 
conducted with the executives of the airline members of the four global 
strategic alliances and its aim is to formulate an idea about how the interested 
airlines view alliances, thus it includes across the board questions on the 
issue of airline alliances - on the performance of alliances, their evolution and 
eventual mergers. Interviews with the Central Management of Alliances and 
with independent aviation experts were added to give a more objective picture 
of alliances. The second section, the Questionnaire, is a more explicit way of 
approaching the issue, as it focuses exclusively on the analysis of the impact 
of alliances on the performance of airlines and more specifically it puts prime 
emphasis on the impact of alliances on passenger traffic and on a second 
level on several other parameters (cost, revenue, fares). 
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The purpose of the quantitative analysis of the alliance impact on passenger 
traffic, presented in chapter 6, is twofold. First, the econometric work seeks to 
determine whether there is indeed any positive impact on traffic volume and if 
so to measure it. Second, it seeks to confirm the results of the empirical 
survey of the second part, whose findings indicate that alliances do lead to an 
increase in passenger traffic. 
4 
The first part of the thesis presents an across the board and across industries 
overview of alliances to help the reader have a better perspective on the 
issues of alliances. Thus, the general presentation of the phenomenon of 
alliances of the first part, which attempts to explain the growing importance 
and why firms have resorted to this tool, serves as an introduction to the issue 
of airline alliances which is the main focus of the thesis. The other parts will 
address airline alliances per se, and will present the forms of cooperation they 
involve, the regulatory framework within which they have evolved, the benefits 
and problems they entail for the participating airlines and finally, the past and 
present alliances. 
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Chapter I 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Cooperation among firms has grown rapidly as alliances have proliferated in 
one industry after another. At the same time, however, the competition in 
these industries has in many ways become even fiercer than before, but the 
rules of competition have changed as it is by now a "group based competition" 
in which the race is between groups rather than between companies. 
Alliances for all firms across all industry sectors as well as in the air transport 
industry are used to achieve strategic success on a global scale. 
This chapter begins by examining alliance phenomenon in general, and 
discussing the various forms it may assume as firms attempt through this 
mechanism to achieve growth and competitive advantages, what makes 
alliances succeed and what makes them fail. Across industry examples will be 
presented to illustrate what alliances help firms achieve in all sectors as well 
as in the aerospace industry. The specific reasons that have pushed airlines 
to establish alliances will be presented. The last section will discuss the 
alliance background in the other sectors of the air transport industry - aircraft 
manufacturing, airports etc - as well as their interdependent relations with 
airline alliances. Alliances in the air transport industry have created a domino 
effect with such cooperative agreements spreading from one field to the other. 
Section 1.1 Why Alliances? 
In all industries it is the economic pressures towards large size, wider 
marketing spread and globalisation that have resulted in cooperations across 
national boundaries. On the macroeconomic level, the major factors leading to 
alliances have been globalisation, deregulation, technology innovation and the 
resulting specialisation. The global demands on technology and financial 
resources are forcing companies to ally in order to be able to compete at the 
same time that industry boundaries are blurring and new capabilities have 
become critical. Constrained by limited capital and managerial resources, 
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companies have realised that they are not able or cannot afford any more to 
build themselves or buy the capabilities and resources necessary to win in the 
changing global environment; only through teaming with other companies can 
they obtain them. Domestic and cross-country business alliances are 
becoming a competitive necessity for companies of any sector to respond to 
the threats against their very existence and viability by the escalating 
competition, uncertainty, complexity and breathtaking technological evolution, 
the speed of change and the continuous crises. Alliances are the most 
expedient way to obtain knowledge, market access and strategic growth. 
In the first section a summary of strategic alliances will be presented, starting 
with a definition and continuing with the reasons that have led to the 
emergence of this phenomenon and the advantages alliances produce for the 
participants. 
1.1.1 Definition of alliances and strategic alliances 
Any effort to come up with a definition of strategic alliances stumbles at the 
lack of any formally established term that can apply to all industries and 
sectors. An alliance is a still evolving term in a highly volatile business world. 
A separate analysis of the component elements of "strategic alliances" might 
prove helpful. 
According to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary and Encarta Microsoft, an 
alliance is "an association to further the common interests", "an association of 
groups with common aim", that is a close relationship between two or more 
groups, individuals, organisations or nations who agree to cooperate with one 
another to achieve a common goal. Thus, there are two essential elements, 
the agreement to cooperate and the common interests. This agreement takes 
the form of an official document laying down the terms of this cooperation and 
represents the willingness of the parties to work together. 
In a narrower business sense, an alliance is a relationship that is entered into 
for mutual benefit by two or more parties having compatible or complementary 
business interests and goals. The common interests entail that there must be 
mutual benefit, that profits are generated into two directions; or in business 
terminology, there must be a win/win relationship, which means that every 
partner, ally must draw advantages from their participation in the alliance. 
As far as the term strategic is concerned, according to dictionaries "strategic" 
is what serves the ends of a plan or policy in business and enters within an 
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integrated whole or to planned effect. In the business world, alliances are 
"strategic" since they concern the process of planning and directing 
operations into the most advantageous position for the partners. 
Thus, strategic alliances are comprised of separate entities that have come 
together to solve their individual problems in a way that serves the whole 
mutually. Creating an alliance is sharing core competencies that overlap and 
create synergies. According to a definition, a strategic alliance is a mutual, 
two-way interdependence: companies partner to do things together in order 
for everyone to exist, show solidarity rather than be left all alone (Bouayard, 
1996). 
Another definition goes as follows: A business strategic alliance is a long term 
partnership of two or more firms who attempt to enhance competitive 
advantages collectively vis-; ti-vis their competitors by sharing risks and 
resources, market access capability, improving product quality and customer 
services and thereby, improving profitability. In strategic alliances, the 
partners make a long term commitment to cooperate not only on operational 
matters but also on key strategic matters (Oum et al, 2000). 
There are two essential elements of alliances: the allies consent to give up 
their complete sovereignty over certain activities and decision-making and 
coexist in an interdependence and solidarity situation with the other. At the 
same time partners retain plenty of space for autonomy and the ease to exit 
the alliance as each ally sees fit. Moreover, whether partners refer to 
"strategic scope" or "common shared vision", the goal of alliances is to help 
the partners continue their existence, face the market threats, adapt to the 
changes arising through time, increase their profit margin. 
1.1.2 Types of alliances 
There are as many kinds of alliances as the purposes they fulfil. Different 
kinds of alliances are appropriate for different situations. For this reason there 
are several ways of classifying alliances. 
Alliances can be divided into different types according to the kind of linkage 
that unites the allies. An alliance network is a set of linkages between many 
relatively comparable firms. An alliance portfolio is a set of discrete bilateral 
alliances entered into by a firm while an alliance web is a set of alliances that 
are more interdependent than a portfolio but less uniform than a network. 
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These interenterprise collaborative relationships can take two forms: they can 
be commerciallmarketing in which two or more companies agree to jointly co- 
market, co-brand and cross-promote their products and services in a specific 
geographical region or globally, or to share advertising costs (for example: 
agreements between manufacturers and distributors, or among companies to 
go to market together to sell complementary products and services). They can 
also be technological in nature when companies agree to jointly develop 
licenses or patents. 
Alliances can be grouped according to the goals they are trying to achieve: 
there are alliances aiming at acquiring a technological competitive advantage, 
others aiming at sharing the costs of manufacturing and/or distributing, others 
aiming to acquire market share and critical size, others whose main aim is to 
acquire knowledge and/or to gain complementary advantages in scale and 
skills. Therefore, the partnerships contracts may involve R&D and/or product- 
development, whether it concerns the development of a specific solution or a 
whole range of products, manufacturing or distribution/services. 
Another way to categorise alliances is by distinguishing them according to 
whom they are concluded with: there are alliances concluded on the vertical 
axis, such as alliances with one or more suppliers or alliances with one or 
more clients. There are also alliances concluded on the horizontal axis, 
namely alliances with one or more actual new or potential competitors, 
whether new entrants or complementary enterprises. 
What frustrates even more every effort to distinguish alliances into clear-cut 
categories is that the very same alliance may aim to various objectives at the 
same time; all the more, alliances may aim to adapt to evolving objectives in 
the course of time depending on circumstances. Thus, alliances are a 
multidimensional phenomenon as they incorporate several functions, 
commercial, technical or production ones and as they are highly dynamic and 
evolve over time. 
1.1.3 Reasons for the formation of strategic alliances 
Growth is what most businesses want and this desire is behind most strategic 
alliances. The growth sought through strategic alliances building can enter in 
seven general areas: 
e Products 
9 Access 
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" Operations 
" Technology 
" Strategic growth 
" Organization 
" Finance 
The profits they offer range from larger quantities and wider variety of means 
and resources (quantitative and qualitative increase) to more gain in time 
(speed) and from more gain in space (increase in implantations and 
establishment) to more value added offered to clients. 
This is not in any way an exhaustive list and the examples that follow are just 
to indicate the range and variety of the gains sought by partners when forming 
an alliance. 
One of the reasons that have led to the formation of alliances is that an 
alliance helps firms to achieve and exploit economies of specialisation and 
economies of scale, since economies may be achieved in the production 
chain by having each partner specialize in the making of a few parts or 
components. Allies can in this way expand the product life cycle and increase 
the depth of a product line. Economies of scale offer lower product costs and 
economies of specialisation lower operating costs and better quality products. 
Alliances permit companies of different countries to exploit the different input 
prices and nations' comparative advantages, for example, many hi-technology 
products are designed and developed in one country and manufactured in 
another. In this way, alliances permit companies to minimize the unit costs of 
both production and distribution. Consequently, both productivity and 
operating efficiency increase. At the same time they achieve cost savings in 
manufacturing by having shared locations. 
A large majority of alliances develop around the idea of the core 
competencies of the allied firms. Core competencies are an activity or 
capability in which an organisation is better than its competitors but also have 
a competitive advantage sustainable overtime. Allied companies can become 
a better, value-added, lower-cost provider of products to old and new markets 
with a stronger brand name, and so strengthen and maintain their competitive 
advantage. 
Companies form alliances to assemble the necessary know-how, skills and 
resources to achieve the necessary sophistication of products to become the 
first movers in their industry. Alliances can accumulate all the necessary 
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industry information, to secure sufficient education and training to become 
leaders in their sector. Any technological innovation could help them build 
market leadership quickly since being first matters most when the advantages 
that accrue to first movers are substantial (most often because technical 
compatibility needs - what economists call network externalities - leave little 
room for incompatible new solutions once the first one is established on the 
market). 
Alliances offer a way to bypass entry barriers and achieve market access to 
regulated foreign markets without having to establish production plants or 
distribution plants. This increase of market share can take the form of 
geographic expansion, of positioning for future needs. Alliances also offer the 
opportunity to expand business using new or related product innovations and 
service offerings providing additional business for production facilities; they 
create marketing synergism to the consumer through cross promotion and co- 
branding. 
Purely financial considerations that may lead to the creation of alliances 
include financial stability and access to capital. Alliances achieve economies 
of scale with partners sharing facilities, equipment and employees, sharing 
financial risks associated with developing new products and entering into new 
markets. 
An alliance with competitors is one way firms can share the risks and cost of 
large scale R&D and/or investment projects. Alliances can help firms 
specialising in the same field acquire a global brand name and thus capture a 
substantial market share. Alliances with competitors also form baryiers to entry 
to any new player and can even drive out existing competitors. 
Another point that is worth mentioning is that the creation and evolution of 
multimedia products and services has led to the creation of cross-industry 
alliances between for example: communication, computer hardware, computer 
software, Internet and entertainment firms. 
It should be mentioned that most times there are several of the above reasons 
that simultaneously lead firms to form alliances. Firms may seek to forge a 
global brand name and at the same time enhance their members' revenue 
and cost saving opportunities. 
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1.1.4 Phases of an alliance 
There is an evolutionary path that alliances follow, which runs the spectrum 
from external to internal, from vendor transactions to mergers, acquisitions 
and subsidiaries. This evolution of alliances is closely related to the degree of 
integration the cooperating firms achieve. Alliances evolve in relation to their 
structure on the degree of involvement of three variables: risk, use of human 
resources, and cost, on the so-called "Pyramid of Alliances". 
Figure 1.1 
Pyramid of Alliances 
High Risk, Maximum Use of Human Resources, High Cost 
Merger 
Joint venture/Equity 
Research and Development/ 
Technology transfer 
Original equipment manufacture/ 
Licensing/Private label 
Joint marketing/Distribution 
Low Risk, Minimum Use of Human Resources, Low Cost 
@ The Lared Group, 1996 
At the lowest level on the pyramid is the joint marketing and/or distribution 
alliances, which entail the least degree of involvement of the three variables, 
in which one company joins with another company in order to market and/or 
distribute the products of both companies or one company only. They usually 
include two types of agreements: cross-promotion agreements involving co- 
branding that aims at developing marketing power between trusted names 
brands; and industry specific geographical strategic alliances with competitors 
to open new markets, to build an industry, to beat competition, to block new 
competitors. The alliances on the lower level are the most popular form of 
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alliances since they are less risky and require minimum commitment of human 
resources and capital investment. 
At the next level, the private label, licensing and original equipment 
manufacturer alliances are located. In private label cooperation one company 
manufactures a product for sale under another company's label. In licensing 
agreements, one company agrees to provide its know-how to another 
company for the payment of a consideration for a definite period of time. It 
may concern specific technologies, geographic regions and/or applications. In 
original equipment manufacturer alliances one company manufactures 
products to be marketed and sold by another. 
At the next level, there are technology transfer agreements that stipulate that 
one company transfers knowledge of its technology and the right to exploit it 
to another company for cash payment or other value; whereas in research 
and development partnerships, two companies join in a research project for 
the development of new technology and/or products for mutual benefit. 
Companies cooperate to produce new products or to perfect existing 
products. 
At the next level, equity investments mean that one company purchases a 
part of another's company equity for cash, stock or other consideration. In 
joint ventures, two companies cooperate in the creation of a new, separate 
business entity in order to reach mutually compatible goals. 
On the final level, a company completely acquires another company; the 
acquired company considers this move a "merger" while the acquiring 
company regards it as a "takeover". It can be the last phase of an alliance 
relationship. As it is however, a "point of no return", an alliance must go 
through all the previous incremental stages in order to learn about each other 
well, develop working relationships, test their cooperation, see whether it 
actually produces the desired benefits and when proceed to the "big move". 
A. Starting a multilateral alliance 
Companies having established that they need to enter into an alliance, and 
having clearly identified their goals and objectives, then proceed to choose 
partners. Two of the essential elements that the alliance partners need to fulfil: 
Their needs and goals must be complementary and their strengths and 
weaknesses dissimilar; and the alliance arrangement must be such that it 
creates a win/win result for all those who participate in the alliance. 
13 
Cran#eld The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic 
The first element means that an alliance agreement must be concluded 
among companies that are complementary in terms of prod ucts/services, 
production techniques, know-how and clientele. Furthermore, partners need to 
have complementary corporate cultures. Although complementarity in 
service/product is one of the key issues, companies sometimes form alliances 
with direct competitors in order to reduce the level of competition or to prevent 
new competitors from entering the market. 
The second element means that all partners participate equally or 
complementarily in terms of activity and financial contributions, and all draw 
benefits. When the values of the partners align easily, synergies become 
possible, and all partners benefit from the increased effectiveness produced 
by the combined action and cooperation. 
An alliance moves around three axes: the project, the relationships and the 
contract. The project is the reason why the partners have come together, their 
intentions, aims; it presupposes a certain convergence of views. The 
relationships are the relations that bind the partners together, the interaction 
among them. The contract is the formalised framework of the cooperation and 
translates on a formal level the project and the relationships established by 
the partners. 
1.1.5 Advantages of alliances 
There are various and numerous advantages that alliances offer but this 
summary presentation will focus on the two that present the most interest and 
which are the ones that are mostly sought after in the contemporary 
globalised business world. Most gains that alliances offer are not purely 
financial in nature. They are mostly related to the commercial benefits, image, 
geographical implantation, know-how and technology, but they are essential in 
securing the corollary benefits of financial advantages and market share 
increase. 
A. Knowledge 
In order to grow and establish themselves in the marketplace, companies 
need to create or pursue new opportunities involving an element of risk they 
cannot consider undertaking on their own, and so arises the need to learn 
through alliances, both to overcome skill deficits and to acquire new 
competencies. Alliances become the focus for the sharing of privileged 
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information and co-implementation of skills and include both learning and 
international isation of new skills and cross-cultural communication. 
Knowledge becomes the "alliance asset", the "alliance capital" and may 
include information, reputation, and contacts, which are most of the times non- 
tradable. 
"Companies often turn to alliances to win the learning race. These are faster 
and more effective than alternative approaches to learning ... Global 
competitors expose the world to the best available skills and threaten 
companies that do not adopt them. Alliances are a way to tap into the whole 
world's knowledge base" (Doz, 1998). 
B. Value-Creating 
Increases in the rate of technical change and in the complexity of available 
opportunities make alliances a natural response for individual firms (Doz, 
1998). Alliances create value by creating new opportunities through the 
combination of skills and resources. These new opportunities require new 
competencies that alliances build faster than would be possible through the 
internal efforts of each company alone. Thus, alliances achieve co- 
specialisation, which is the synergetic value creation that results from the 
combining of previously separate resources - skills, brand, relationships, 
positions and tangible assets - and knowledge sources. Alliances 
complement the basic strengths of each partner, support their weaknesses 
and improve the overall production capabilities, in other words alliances 
create value in the areas of need of each partner. 
1.1.6. Evolution of alliances 
Once partners have designed and entered into formal commitments, they 
need in order to make the alliance work, to build and explore the common 
ground and to build and maintain ongoing interpersonal commitments. There 
will be negotiations, bargains, compromises and concessions. The success or 
failure of any alliance develops in five vital areas: values, goals, facts, 
procedures and (mis) information. 
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A. Necessary Conditions for Success 
As in any symbiotic relationship, Open communication, mutual respect, 
appreciation, commitment, confidence, mutuality, cooperation, flexibility, 
tolerance are what will determine the success or failure of the partnership. Or 
in other words, partners need to find ways to co-exist and work in ways 
advantageous to all partners. 
Partners must not be too impatient for results; success may take some time. 
Furthermore, an alliance must be able to adapt to the changes arising through 
time. External conditions keep shifting and thus the contributions and benefits 
of the partners will have to change too. Alliances change in the courts of time 
since the objectives, targets of the members change, an alliance is never 
static but in a dynamic state. Success of an alliance means achieving to 
manage it in continuity, and managing it in a way to optimise it to the best of 
its interests always taking into account the interests of the partners. 
In an epigrammatic way, the factors for success are: 
" recognition of the interdependency 
" balanced relations of power and allocation of resources 
" periodical renegotiation of the "bargain" between partners 
reassessment of the value of the options created by the alliance 
resolution of disorders/conflicts 
and above all 
e trust since "trust is the glue that binds alliances" (Segil, 1996) 
B. Problems of alliances 
The statistics regarding business alliances rate of success are highly 
interesting: 55% of all strategic alliances fall apart within three to five years of 
inception. The remaining 45%, the successful ones, had a further life 
expectancy of just 3.5 years (Harrigan, 1989). 
In a survey on alliance failure, the manufacturers and retailers asked cited as 
basic reasons for the failure of alliances: lack of continuous attention and 
planning 72%, unequal contribution/commitment of resources 65%, contrast of 
partners culture style or level of trust 56% (Rigsbee, 2000). 
Another important parameter is that the greater numbers of participants also 
complicate alliance design and governance. The human resources area is 
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where the potential cross-cultural problems reside. In multilateral cross- 
cultural alliances there are bound to be cultural miscommunications and 
mutual incomprehension. Any alliance as an organisation has to come up with 
ways and methods that will oppose the decision-making mechanisms of the 
partners of the alliance or their attitudes, their ethics. The success depends on 
the balancing of power relationships through collaboration and cooperation 
and on the willingness to make the alliance work. 
Section 1.2 Alliances in other sectors 
Strategic alliances were a key part of corporate strategies in the automobile, 
electronics, computer, telecommunications and hi-technology industries long 
before they were seriously adopted by airlines. Since these industries have 
gained a wealth of alliance experience that may be of proven valuable to other 
corporations, it would be useful to describe the experience of strategic 
alliances in these industries before examining the background of airline 
alliances. 
In the first part of this chapter the reasons that have led companies to forge 
alliances were briefly mentioned. In this section some of these reasons will be 
presented again but this time the emphasis is put on specific real-world 
alliance examples from various industries so as to bring out the reasoning 
behind the development of alliances. Alliance examples from different 
industries and business contexts will be presented in an effort to outline the 
reach of alliances. It should be noted that several of the alliances mentioned 
may have broken down or may have moved to a different level. These are 
mentioned here just to support the purposes of this thesis without following 
closely their evolution in time. 
1.2.1 The growing importance of alliances as a management tool 
Strategic alliances are sweeping through nearly every industry and are 
becoming essential engines for growth and a dominant management tool. 
These cross-border arrangements are changing the global business 
environment. Self-reliance is an option few companies are able to afford. 
Previous go-it alone companies - such as IBM, Ford, GE, Philips, British 
Telecom, AT&T - embraced the new reality and moved to alliance building. 
According to some experts a "worldwide restructuring" is occurring in the 
shape of alliances and partnerships. The new reality is that instead of 
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companies competing with other individual companies, it is alliance networks 
that compete with each other. The new era of "co-opetition", (Marculis, 2003) 
based on a collaborative model and the willingness to team and bond and 
thus have alliances predicated on shared risk and shared resources, began to 
emerge. Co-opetition, or competitive collaboration, is the phenomenon of 
companies cooperating and competing with each other at the same time and 
as the figure below indicates it is the path future business development is 
moving along. 
Figure 1.2 
Almost evervone believes Alliances will continue to arow in 
Alliances as source or revenue 
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The proliferation of alliances means that collaboration is now part of the very 
nature of competition in modern industry, and indeed collaboration among 
previously fierce competitors. Alliances between competitors have become an 
essential element of every successful business as Figure 1.3 indicates. In 
almost all industries, the number of alliances concluded among direct 
competitors (the red colour in the figure) is constantly increasing. Former 
head-on rivals now become allies: IBM teams up with Apple, Toyota with 
General Motors, Toshiba with Sony, British Airways with American Airlines. 
And it is in the airline industry that cooperation among competitors is the most 
intense. 
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Apart from inter-corporate strategies, now we also have inter-industry and 
cross-industry agreements that are melting down the borders between the 
different industries. Who could imagine even ten years ago that a 
watchmaker, Swatch, and a car manufacturer, Mercedes, would team to 
design and develop a car, the very successful Smart car. 
The following figure is just an indicative example of the burgeoning of the 
alliance tool. This case brings out, this "co-opetition" idea, that is how much 
cooperation and competition have become intertwined. Toshiba Corp, the 
oldest and third largest of Japan's electronics giants, has set up relationships 
with almost all of its major competitors - Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sony etc. This 
figure also underlines the necessity of the technologies to communicate with 
each other, since the different technologies increasingly depend on each 
other. 
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Figure 1.4 
Toshiba's alliances 
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Toshiba has made strategic alliances a key element of its corporate strategy 
to complement its substantial marketing, manufacturing and research and 
development skills. Since the early 1990s when it contracted to make light 
bulb filaments for General Electronics, alliances have made major strategic 
differences for Toshiba. Strategic alliances have enabled Toshiba to become 
a leading worldwide manufacturer of electronics products - from large power 
plant equipment to complex memory chips. 
Toshiba believes strategic alliances are the only strategy for a high-tech 
company with global ambitions. As its president and CEO, Furnio Sato, has 
said: "it is no longer an era in which a single company can dominate any 
technology or business by itself. The technology has become so advanced 
and the markets so complex, that you simply can't expect to be the best at the 
whole process any longer" (CGCP, 2002). Carefully chosen partners are 
essential to moving quickly and marshalling the company resources needed to 
keep up with the high-tech race in all phases of its businesses, from product 
design and development to manufacturing and distribution. 
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1.2.2 Reasons that lead to alliances across industries 
Alliances, through which firms share names, products, resources, and 
technology, are used for a variety of reasons: lowering costs, obtaining access 
to or sharing in markets, sharing risks, pre-empting a competitor, constructing 
complementary service networks, hastening product development, improving 
distribution and optimising marketing strategies. One of the increasingly 
important reasons is to help raise the innovative capacity of companies. 
Alliances enable companies to gain access to new knowledge and new 
technologies which can be used to create new products. 
If partnering has become a must, alliances offer the extra advantage of 
flexibility. In a business environment that remains turbulent and highly 
dynamic, strategic manoeuvring is necessary. Alliances enable companies to 
attain certain strategic positions in their industry, without having to commit 
themselves for the very long run, on the contrary they can easily adapt, 
amend or simply abandon contracts. 
Alliances are increasingly shaping the competitive arena as they bring higher 
growth, higher profitability. Global companies with successful alliances got 
more than 20% of their revenues from alliances in 1998 and were expecting 
that percentage to increase to 35% by 2004 (figure 1.2). They also bring 
higher market valuations. Their importance is so widely recognised that any 
alliance announcements cause surges in the stock of both partners. 
Companies already report that, on average, 35% of their stock market value 
depends on alliances (de Man, 2003). 
In many cases, alliances between companies serve more than one strategic 
imperative. In the paragraphs that follow some examples of alliances 
established will be briefly presented in an effort to highlight the reasons 
behind the formation of alliances and indicate their relevance for the air 
transport industry. The list is by no means comprehensive nor thorough, it just 
aims to offer insights into firm conduct and performance always in relation to 
airline alliances. Under each category, an example taken from the air 
transport industry will be presented. 
A. Acquiring a technological competitive advantage 
Convergence of industries and the exponential speed of technological 
development are among the main drivers of alliance activity. As industry 
boundaries have been eroded, a broad diversity of knowledge from different 
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disciplines comes together in modern product production. No company is 
likely to possess all the required knowledge in-house nor can it afford the 
resources, time and effort to develop it all by itself nor is it possible for a single 
company to keep up with all technological developments. Therefore, 
companies through alliances pool and exchange their knowledge. Any new 
and unexpected breakthrough emerging through cross industry collaboration 
has the power to change the rules of competition and thus bring great profit to 
the companies involved. 
The convergence of industry boundaries across computer hardware, software, 
Internet, telecommunications, media and services has been a powerful 
incentive for cross-industry alliances. Multimedia products and services are 
part of our everyday life but their creation was due to the convergence of 
computing, telecommunications, Internet, broadcasting (and other media) 
data, voice and image transmission technologies. Had it not been for the 
collaboration between firms in these different industries their development 
would not have been possible or would have taken much longer to be 
achieved. 
Another example of this technology convergence is the development of the 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). To advance hand-held devices that can be 
used to schedule one's activities, as a calculator, a mobile phone, and a 
wireless Internet Access device, it was necessary to pool the expertise of 
computer hardware and software business groups. Firms that possessed the 
expertise in the different industries aligned not only to make the product but 
also to get it quickly into market. Through this allied effort all firms enjoyed the 
first mover advantage. 
Alliances are critical to create innovative solutions and to make operational 
the solutions in the marketplace with the needed speed. As products become 
increasingly sophisticated, many firms find that it is not practical to develop all 
of the critical technologies in-house. When IBM, for example, realized in the 
early 1980s that Apple's role in the PC market was gaining momentum, it 
decided to enter the PC market. Not having the in-house expertise to quickly 
design a PC operating system nor the technological expertise to develop 
microprocessors for CPUs, IBM chose to form strategic partnerships first with 
Microsoft to design the operating system and second with Intel to develop the 
microprocessor. Without these alliances PC production would have been 
severely delayed. Instead, the partnerships allowed IBM to be the first mover 
in the PC market and set the industry standards over Apple. 
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The telecommunications industry is an excellent example of how technology 
advances have created the need to build or access quickly new capabilities. A 
major telecommunications company, Ericsson exemplifies the effort to acquire 
a technological edge. In November 2000, Ericsson and Canon announced an 
alliance that involves the strategic collaboration to enable the real-time 
sharing of digital images between cameras and mobile devices. It aims at 
transferring images taken on a digital camera to be displayed in the mobile 
phone display sent as a message. In other words, the technology that will 
enable executive directors to have a live videoconferencing through their 
mobile phones wherever they are will be a reality within a few years. In April 
2001, Ericsson Inc. and Sony Corporation announced their intent to form Sony 
Ericsson, an alliance to design, produce, develop and market current and 3G 
mobile communications devices. It will allow Ericsson to maximize leverage of 
its networks division, while leveraging Sony's design and marketing core 
competencies. The alliance will allow Sony to expand its access to the mobile 
communications device market at a time when there is intense competition 
around the development of 3G wireless enabled handheld computers. 
In many turbulent high-tech industries, such as mobile telecommunications, 
large companies are investing in small innovative companies to acquire 
access to promising new technologies. Larger companies partner with smaller 
ones because they are less capable of smoothly responding to rapid 
technological change compared to their smaller counterparts, but are 
constantly pressurized to generate new products in order to sustain their 
competitive advantage. Therefore, they constantly scan their environment 
looking for companies with promising technology to ally with, hoping to find 
the new 'blockbuster' product. This allows them to explore new fields of 
technology without the need of the full investment that would be needed in the 
case of internal development. Smaller companies at the same time are in 
need of large partners to further develop their products and bring them to 
market. 
Another major technology - related reason behind alliances is the need to set 
technology standards that will facilitate compatibility in a globally linked world, 
or in one word, standard isation. The IT-industry for example depends on 
standard isation. The products and technologies from different sectors need to 
communicate and for this they require interfaces to be able to work together. 
Standards are required to realize this but standards can only be set when 
sufficiently large players work together to promote them and this drives multi- 
partner alliances. This stimulates partnering between the leading firms in an 
industry for joint research, joint investments and knowledge exchange. 
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Air transport is an example of an industry where the need for setting common 
standards has been one of the major drivers behind the formation of alliances. 
Special technology requirements and capabilities have led to the development 
of cooperative alliance Computer Reservations Systems (CRS) such as 
Galileo Computer Reservations System, which is operated under the 
guidance of British Airways and several airline partners, and other integrated 
computer systems technologies addressing issues such as reservations, 
check-in, baggage services and flight information and planning computer 
systems. 
B. Acquiring knowledge 
Even in sectors not involved in leading edge technology, alliances are 
concluded to communicate and share skills, competencies and know-how. An 
alliance is one of the fastest and less costly ways of communicating 
knowledge and of translating it globally into new products and services. The 
main aim of such alliances is "synergy", value creation and learning. The allied 
firms unable to, constrained by their resources, by their skills, or by time, 
develop internally the capability offered by the other firm, combine their 
capabilities to yield a total value that is greater than if the capabilities were 
used separately. 
Such an example is the alliance General Motors-Toyota plant at Fremont, 
California established in 1984. The two companies agreed to co-manufacture 
small cars in a former GM plant in California using Toyota's methods and 
rehired laid-off GIVI workers. This gave GIVI managers and technical personnel 
an opportunity to learn lean manufacturing methods from its proven Japanese 
master while testing those same methods on a traditional US workforce. The 
cooperation with US rivals offered the Japanese partner insights into the 
competitive strategies of their partners-competitors, as well as perspective on 
how fast their capabilities were improving. Toyota used its alliance with GM to 
learn to deal with US labour practices. This knowledge proved highly 
beneficial when Toyota opened its own fully owned US manufacturing plant, 
where it had to blend American labour management practices with the 
Japanese production system. The benefits of learning potential outweighed 
the fact that the automobiles produced were to be sold competitively under 
both the GM and Toyota brands (Mockler, 1999). A very interesting aspect of 
this alliance was that the deal was structured to terminate once the learning 
had reached a logical time limit. 
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Alliances aiming at the spread of best practices have found an application in 
the air transport industry, in the "Wings" alliance. The transfer of knowledge 
between KLM and Northwest Airlines has increased KLM's capability in yield 
management, obtaining the best price for each seat sold. Without the alliance, 
KLM would not have obtained this knowledge (CGCP, January 2002). 
C. Sharing Cost 
Another major reason that has encouraged or compelled corporations to enter 
into alliances is the impossibility to undertake the prohibiting costs of the 
development of high risk new products and services; this need to lower cost 
have been heightened by the economic slowdown. 
Cost-economizing agreements are associated with the sharing of fixed costs 
and the control of transaction costs or operating costs of companies, and aim 
at capturing economies of scale. These economies of scale - large size and 
resulting efficiencies - arise from reduced labor costs, fewer offices and fewer 
plants, as well as cost savings in distribution originating from the integrated 
network. At the same time, companies can through alliances achieve 
significant cost savings in research expenditure, as the allies focus on 
particular areas of research with substantial cost saving compared to fully 
fledged in-house research facilities. 
This type of alliance is widely used in capita 1-i ntens ive sectors, such as the 
automobile industry. Automakers have used all kinds of alliances - with 
suppliers, competitors, non-competitors and potential competitors. Economies 
may be achieved in the production chain by having each supplier specialize in 
the making of a few parts or components, thereby allowing the automobile 
manufacturers to focus on the production of key parts such as bodies and 
engines. This method had been adopted by Toyota. This use of strategic 
partners reduces the automobile production cost by allowing suppliers to 
exploit economies of specialization and manufacturers to exploit economies of 
scale. 
The National Semi-Conductors (NSC)-Federal Express (FedEx) alliance is 
another example of a cost reducing agreement which allows NSC to focus on 
the production of its core products, since FedEx manages NSC's logistics and 
distribution. This alliance enables NSC to benefit from economies of 
specialization and FedEx to gain from specialization in logistics and 
distribution. 
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Many hi-technology products are designed and developed in one country yet 
manufactured in another. Such cross-country specialization and division of 
work enable high-tech industries to minimize the unit costs of both production 
and distribution. For example, in the early stages of PC development, the PC 
and its operating system were developed in the United States using 
Singapore-made hard drives and sound cards and Taiwan-made monitors and 
peripheral equipment. These inter-firm arrangements allowed PC 
manufacturers to not only save on unit costs, but to also meet the demands of 
rapidly shorter PC life cycles. 
Alliance formation, even with competitors, helps firms share the risks of large 
scale R&D and/or capital investment projects and lower the exposure to the 
possibility of failure. Six of the world's largest semiconductors manufacturers 
(Intel, NEC, Micron Technology of USA, Samsung Electronics, Hyundai 
Electronics and Siemens) formed an R&D alliance to develop the next 
generation of DRAM chips for PC's. This alliance will aid the players in 
combating the rising prod uct-development costs of the new chip and share the 
risk of developing a product for a market that has not been fully formed. 
In the air transport industry, airlines are involved in very high production costs 
- mixed fleet, separate check-in lounges, on board entertainment, FFP, 
revenue management and brand building. An alliance can share the costs 
among its allied members and thus reduce them. Alliances offer scope for 
cost reduction through joint purchasing - from aircraft to in-flight amenities - 
through lower maintenance costs, ground handling costs. Further cost 
reductions are achieved as the allies undertake all advertising and office 
operations at their base for all the allies which means keeping overall fewer 
offices. 
D. Acquiring market share and critical mass 
Globalisation means that competition widens from national to regional and 
even global arenas. Reaching critical mass is extremely important for effective 
global competition. Globalising firms can through alliances build the critical 
mass needed to stake out and hold market positions. 
The 1997 alliance between France T616com and Deutsche Telekom, two of 
Europe's most traditional national telecommunications service operators, is a 
characteristic example that served the double purpose of cost saving and 
market share increase. France T616com and Deutsche Telekom were faced 
with the prospect of the complete liberalization of telecommunications 
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services. They entered into an alliance designed to merge some specialized 
services and avoid rivalry between themselves. They have created together 
new provisions of services that would have been extremely expensive if each 
partner had undertaken all alone to meet them. It also gave the two firms a 
critical mass in continental Europe that improved both their competitive 
capabilities and their bargaining power in subsequent alliances. Through the 
alliance they also wanted to counter British Telecom. British Telecom was in a 
position to challenge the two companies in their home markets, as it had 
several alliances in other parts of Europe and was teaming up with MCI, a 
major long-distance provider. France T616com and Deutsche Telekom were 
also threatened by AT&T, which was building its own network of alliances with 
national operators in smaller European countries. The alliance secured their 
home bases and gave them global reach. Together they gained a joint 20% 
stake in Sprint (the third largest long-distance service provider in the United 
States) giving them access to North America and to other markets Sprint had 
expanded. In sum they have sought to gain access to new markets through an 
alliance with Sprint while also shoring up their domestic positions (Doz, 1998). 
In 1997, British Petroleum (BP) joined with Mobil Oil in a refining, distribution 
and marketing alliance covering 43 countries in an effort to substantially 
strengthen their position in Europe and in the international oil industry. The 
two companies - which were not in themselves market leaders while their 
major competitors were holding 10% market share each - expected to gain 
scale benefits and scale economies. They managed to establish a strong 
market position in Europe in 2-3 years and to have 12.5% market share in 
Europe. Doing this on their own would have taken them 8 years (Mockler, 
1999). 
Rupert Murdoch, chairman of the Autralian-based News Corporation used 
alliances to achieve his corporation's objective, "own every major form of 
programming - news, sports, films and children's shows - bring them via 
satellite or TV stations to homes in the United States, Europe, Asia and South 
America", he concluded several alliances to achieve this objective. News 
Corporation, for example, which owns two satellite services one in Asia and 
one in the UK, allied with three partners in Latin America to form a direct 
broadcast service. Murdoch entered into several partnerships to transmit 
entertainment, news and sports programming channels to millions of homes 
equipped with satellite dishes and digital receivers in the US, Europe, Latin 
America and Asia. In no instance has his company worked alone. Murdoch's 
worldwide media operation will substantially contribute to the growing 
globalisation trend he is responding to and taking advantage of 
(Mockler, 1999). 
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Alliances make it possible to build the critical mass and global presence the 
race for the world requires. It is one of the reasons that has led to the creation 
of airline alliances. British Airways, as well as other European firms, have 
done this in their effort to break into the larger - and more profitable - US and 
Latin American markets dominated by US airlines. Through its alliance with 
American Airlines, British Airways is hoping to build critical mass in the US 
market. Further, in order to make itself more attractive as a partner in global 
alliances British Airways has co-opted through alliances weaker regional 
airlines in Continental Europe and gained access to additional hubs, such as 
Orly airport in France, which American Airlines uses as well (Doz, 1998). 
E. Geographical access-market segment access 
It's hard to imagine an industry that is still dominated by local competition. 
Globalization means that firms aspire to reach new markets to acquire global 
reach and build global brand names. Alliances can be effective business unit 
enablers to grow, as they contribute in effective organization marketing and 
management in new geographical areas. Each market and country however, 
has its own specific requirements. Quite often firms have significant difficulty 
in penetrating a foreign market where the opportunity is attractive even if they 
have a viable product because they lack basic understanding of customers, 
local culture and applications, and the relationships and infrastructure to 
distribute products to customers of this market. Alliances limit a company's 
exposure to risk when entering a new and unfamiliar market. 
Furthermore, acquisition opportunities may be limited due to size, 
geographical restrictions, regulatory constraints and owner reluctance 
regarding loss of control. In telecommunications for example market access 
by foreign firms is regulated. However, if access to foreign markets is 
regulated, the simplest way of building global awareness is to forge strategic 
alliances with partners in other lands. Even in totally deregulated markets, 
countries may have invisible entry barriers that limit the establishment of 
production plants and/or distribution plants by foreign firms. Alliances are the 
only practical means for non-national firms to provide reasonable service to 
customers in these countries. Thus alliances may secure speed of entry and 
legal compliance. 
Gillette has used alliances to expand rapidly worldwide; alliances have been 
for this company as an effective way to move quickly into different countries in 
an adaptive, flexible way while still retaining global brand identity. Gillette's 
strengths were its leading technology, its superior resources and its worldwide 
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brand leadership. It entered into different kinds of cooperative 
distribution/marketing agreements in many countries to secure marketing and 
mass distribution of its products. Gillette used joint ventures to enter the 
Chinese market. Forming a joint venture was a precondition for any company 
wishing to operate in China, a controlled emerging economy. Such countries 
did not have adequate free market infrastructures for distribution, sales and 
promotion, and a joint venture was the only solution to develop the required 
infrastructures. The agreement included both distribution and joint 
manufacturing locally. While enjoying lower manufacturing costs thanks to 
much lower labour costs, it wanted to protect its proprietary technology; thus 
the Chinese plant produced razors and blades using the prior generation 
technology and imported the more advanced products. 
Access to new markets was one of the fundamental reasons behind the 
formation of airline alliances. Consumers prefer or even demand airlines that 
serve a large number of cities and offer ease of connections. Therefore, to 
attract more passengers in the increasingly competitive airline environment, a 
major airline needs to offer convenient service to virtually every destination in 
the world. Access to foreign markets and the ability to develop efficient service 
networks is constrained, because most countries prohibit foreign airlines from 
providing domestic service and restrict foreign ownership of their airlines. By 
connecting their networks with those of other airlines, partners are able to 
expand their routes beyond their respective territories and provide seamless 
services for their customers. 
1.2.3 Reasons behind Airline Alliances 
The airline business is no different from all other business in that its objective 
is to provide a service at a price that passengers are willing to pay and to 
keep costs below that price so that profit can be made. What is sometimes 
forgotten is that airlines are involved in a service industry. But unlike other 
service industries, it is a capital and labour-intensive business, which is 
dependent on technology and subject to high operating costs, that are mostly 
out of the control of airlines, such as the price of fuel. As in all other 
businesses the aim has been in recent years to meet the challenges of 
globalisation. Globalisation for airlines meant that they needed to offer 
convenient service to virtually every destination in the world. Faced with this 
challenge in combination with the continuous economic stress, whether 
increase of the price of fuel, the Gulf War (1991), the Yugoslavia War (1991), 
airlines began to implement a three-part growth strategy in the 1990s: 
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First, they wanted to dominate as far as possible their own home markets 
through acquisitions, franchising or other commercial agreements, achieve 
critical mass in the domestic market and thus achieve the marketing 
advantages of large size and network scope. At the same time, airlines 
experienced lower yields increasing the pressure for cost-efficiency. 
Second, they tried to establish their presence in markets outside their own 
whether European and US for the European airlines, or in the neighbouring 
American markets and in Europe for the US airlines. 
Third, to develop a global marketing spread through marketing and code 
share agreements or even share purchases in Europe, North America or East 
Asia Pacific region, the three largest markets (Doganis, 1998). 
A survey by the Association for Corporate Growth (2000) indicated that 67% 
of the sampled US and European airlines recorded global reach as a prime 
reason for forming alliances (Alamdari, 2000). Growth in the 1990s meant that 
airlines were expected to access new transatlantic and transpacific markets, 
thus they needed to start building an international route structure. Even mega 
carriers cannot achieve access to all destinations all alone; they need to rely 
on partners to set up efficient global networks. By connecting networks, 
alliance partners are able to expand their routes beyond their respective 
territories and provide seamless services for their customers. International 
marketing agreements seemed like a perfect way to expand their networks. 
Alliances allow airlines to enter markets that would be too expensive, time- 
consuming and risky to serve with their own aircraft, and restricted under 
bilateral aviation agreements with another nation. An airline participating in an 
alliance is going to reach new markets without making new financial 
investment. Therefore, airlines have resorted to alliances to access new 
markets and hence increase traffic volumes and improve service levels 
through the introduction of "seamless" travel initiatives. This has increased 
their revenues and the number of passengers they carry, improved service 
levels through the introduction of "seamless" travel initiatives; and on a 
second level, the allied airlines have improved their efficiency and reduced 
their costs. 
The main driver behind airline alliances has been increased coverage but 
benefits and market power accrue from large networks and geographical 
spread. Thus other reasons that have led airlines to form alliances can be 
summarised as follows: 
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Carrying more passengers fills airplanes, which increases load factor 
and revenues. By successfully linking airline partners' networks, each 
airline is able to feed traffic to the other and thus increase their 
respective load factors. Each partner can offer increased flight 
frequency to its customers without actually increasing its own aircraft 
deployment. Their effect is multiplied in terms of traffic volume and 
market access. The increase in direct city-pair services offered by each 
airline in its own schedule is a decisive factor in improving the 
company's profitability. At the same time, network expansion and 
mutual traffic feed allow partners to achieve higher traffic density, which 
very simply means that by increasing their frequency and using larger 
aircraft on a route, they can reduce unit costs. 
To increase their efficiency by improving their capacity utilization or 
reducing their costs through the consolidation of redundant operations. 
By co-ordinating schedules and aircraft, partners can also reduce their 
fleet requirements. Shared use of airport facilities and ground staff, 
cooperative advertising and promotional campaigns, joint procurement 
of fuel and amenities, combined development of computer systems and 
software, and mutual handling of baggage transfers and passenger 
check-in, are some ways that alliances will result in economies of 
scale. 
To enhance the marketability and quality of their services to 
passengers by offering greater convenience, a larger network and 
greater frequency of flights. An alliance can increase flight frequency, 
offer more convenient flight schedules and increase the number of on- 
line connections. Partners in an alliance coordinate flight schedules to 
minimize waiting time for connecting passengers and ease connections 
by locating arrival and departure gates close to each other. All these 
improve the service quality available to customers and may increase 
customer loyalty. 
To overcome regulatory constraints on the ability of individual airlines 
to participate in foreign markets, such as capacity restrictions in air 
services agreements, restrictions on ownership and equity holding 
across national borders, and restricted access to airport infrastructure. 
it is considered by many analysts as perhaps the most critical factor 
pushing airlines into developing alliance strategies (Doganis 2000). 
To enhance their ability to exercise market power and to reduce the 
level of competition. Airlines previously competing on a route decide to 
cooperate and charge competitive prices and thus acquire enormous 
competitive advantages over their competitors. 
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At the same time the flexible alliance structure of alliances allows each partner 
to monitor its growth within the alliance while retaining the possibility to make 
adjustments in their contributions or the agreement form itself; even to leave 
the alliance - at a certain price - as a result of changes in the economic 
environment. 
Section 1.3 Alliances in the aerospace industry 
The other components of the aerospace industry that need to be considered 
in terms of alliances are airports and manufacturers. Airlines, allied or not, in 
order to offer their services need airplanes to fly, engines to power these 
aircraft and airports to land them. Aircraft manufacturing, engine 
manufacturing and airport services have been experiencing intensive alliance 
activity. 
1.3.1 Aircraft manufacturing 
The aircraft manufacturing area has known several alliances, as well as 
mergers and acquisitions, as corporations seek economies of scale and 
economies of scope. To grasp the extent of the consolidation this sector has 
experienced it should be noted that while in the 1960s and 1970s a lot of 
companies were in the business of designing and building commercial 
airliners - the Caravelle, the Mercure, the BAC One Eleven and the Concorde 
- none was able to broaden its market significantly and challenge the 
American "superpower", Boeing. By 1996 the number of large manufacturers 
of large airliners was down to three: Airbus with 40.2% global share for 
commercial airplane orders, Boeing with 56.4% and McDonnell Douglas with 
only 3.4%. Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas in 1997 reduced the 
number of players in the market of large passenger jets to only two. In 2002, 
Airbus, 33 years after its establishment, has toppled Boeing from the 
dominant position in the ultra-large capacity aircraft. 
It was the deregulation of the air transport industry that triggered the 
movement towards the consolidation of manufacturing. Most aircraft 
manufacturers were and still are at the same time manufacturers of military 
aircraft. As long as manufacturers could count on military spending to balance 
fluctuating airline orders and the airlines could count on the same 
governments to limit competition, the system worked. When deregulation 
began the situation changed. While manufacturers continued to cross- 
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subsidise their commercial business through their defence contracts, airlines 
could not. Airlines started seeking the best deals in the market of aircraft. This 
is the reason airlines supported Airbus's effort because they saw their own 
interests threatened by Boeing's market power. The eventual strength of 
Airbus would make it possible for the airlines to play the two suppliers against 
each other. 
The second factor is the staggering cost of developing new aircraft. As aircraft 
became larger the cost of manufacturing them spiralled. Aircraft 
manufacturing requires enormous investments that must be made for a return 
that will not be realised until many years later. At the same time a company's 
ability to maintain its position as a global aerospace manufacturer depends on 
its capitalising in new market opportunities (Doz, 1998). Thus, collaboration 
agreements and mergers have swept this industry sector. 
The development of Airbus exemplifies how direct competitors, who were 
extremely weak when they were competing independently, become partners 
in an alliance and gradually build a major challenger to the market leader and 
conquer an important market share. Finally, it points out clearly the way 
politics intervene in "sensitive" industry sectors, such as the aerospace 
industry. 
British Aerospace, A6rospatiale and DASA had attempted, separately and 
unsuccessfully, through consolidations, within their home markets, to compete 
against Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed. They aligned their 
strategic market interests to compete as a group against Boeing, since an 
alliance would permit them to maximize partner specialisation and benefit 
from the resulting economies of scale and through this from industry 
competitiveness. 
Airbus Industrie was founded in 1969 by a consortium of the governments of 
the UK, France, Germany and Spain,: AL&rospatiale (France, 37.9%, state- 
owned, manufactured the cockpits and parts of the fuselage and assembled 
finished parts), Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA) (Germany, 37.9%, privately 
owned, manufactured portions of the fuselage and assembled some planes), 
British Aerospace (20% privately-owned, manufactured most of the wings and 
some small fuselage parts) and CASA (Spain, 4.2%, state-owned, 
manufactured horizontal tail stab iI ize rs) (Mockler, 1999). 
It started out as a marketing and research and development consortium of the 
four companies whose percentage of participation was dictated by their 
contribution to the aircraft manufacturing. The capital and specific 
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manufacturing capabilities of the four major companies were required for 
Airbus to perform the research and development needed to design and 
manufacture competitive commercial aircraft. Thus, each firm's resources 
leveraged synergistically so as to maximize each partner's strengths. Each 
group had its responsibilities well defined, with mutually negotiated milestones 
for each team to achieve. 
Airbus's success is mainly due to that fact that it came up "with the right 
product at the right time". At a time when the airline product became less 
differentiated and the airlines competed more and more on the basis of price 
and schedule, and focused on purchasing cost-efficient aircraft, Airbus offered 
airlines a product that answered their needs and which helped it conquer the 
market: its planes were more fuel-efficient and had lower operating costs than 
Boeing's. Another element that made Airbus aircraft hugely popular among 
airlines is the idea of commonality of older models with new ones. This 
commonality in the systems, power plants, equipment and structures of all its 
models allows operators to realize many savings in training costs and in 
spares holdings and investments. 
The following figure presents the historical evolution of Airbus and the deals 
that have helped it become market leader. 
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Boeing in its turn followed a two-way policy to counter growing competition 
from Airbus. First, it introduced new models, cut lead times and pared prices, 
and second it turned to collaborative agreements. In a way it was forced into 
extensive cooperation by the coalition build of its challengers. By building a 
web of relationships Boeing has tried to pre-empt companies that might 
otherwise collaborate with Airbus. Some agreements with these partners 
explicitly forbid taking part in other coalitions, so as to ensure that its partners 
would be part of a coalition around Boeing rather than around Airbus. In the 
1980s it entered into an agreement with the Japanese Aerospace 
Development Corporation (JADC), a consortium of Kawasaki, Mitsubishi, Fuji 
and Nissan. 
Changing industry requirements, the external competitive environment, the 
increasing heavy competitive pressures from Boeing and the economic 
slowdown forced Airbus to revise its alliance structure. Airbus was 
encountering many other problems: huge amounts of money were needed for 
new plane development, high costs resulted in non-competitive pricing and a 
cumbersome corporate structure which led to long product development lead 
times. Production was complicated by the fact that the factories that make 
Airbus aircraft are scattered all over Europe. In addition, being a consortium 
Airbus was unable to raise directly the money needed to develop new models; 
tightening government budgets could no longer subsidize new projects. These 
pressures coupled with the merger of McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, forced 
Airbus to make strategic and structural changes in 1996. 
To carry out strategies that would alleviate the cost, capital and lead time 
problems, Airbus proceeded to an enterprise - wide reorganization to 
centralize control. This arrangement would unify functions like design (then 
done at four locations), eliminate white-collar bureaucracies, such as market 
forecasting, and assign work on a competitive bid, even to the point of using 
lower-cost outside contractors. The decision to move from consortium to 
corporation has led to process integration between the partners. Dramatic 
organization changes at Airbus helped increase Airbus' market penetration to 
more than 50% in 1998. 
A new restructuring took place in 2000. Under this new restructuring, Airbus is 
a stand-alone marketing and sales company, which coordinates 
manufacturing and design and in which the four partners have equity 
participation. Airbus raises its own financing and is responsible for its own 
debts now. 
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The following figure presents the new organisation of Airbus 
Figure 1.6 
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A. Regional aircraft 
Airlines have used for many years regional aircraft - with 20 to 100 seats, 
(smaller and cheaper to operate) - to connect small cities with their big hubs. 
Until ten years ago the regional aircraft market was characterised by a broad 
diversity of turboprop types and several famous players: Bombardier, Cessna, 
Raytheon, Gulfstream and Embraer, BAE's Avro, ATR, Canadair Fokker, 
Saab, Beech. But things changed when, Canadair, a subsidiary by then of 
Bombardier, launched its first model of the regional jet in 1992. Although 
some questioned the concept originally, the Bombardier CRJ program is 
universally recognized now as one of the most successful aircraft programs 
ever and demand for regional jets has boomed. 
The popularity of RJs has made them the fastest-growing segment of 
commercial aviation and has radically changed the international scene for 
regional aircraft. One manufacturer after the other started withdrawing from 
the scene, killed by a variety of factors, such as high costs, an overcrowded 
market, uneconomical products and over-concentration on turboprops. BAE 
Systems, producing the Avro, family of regional aircraft, has closed its regional 
jet programmes. The last player to withdraw from the arena was Fairchild- 
Dornier, German/US-owned company, the world's third largest regional jet 
maker, when it filed for bankruptcy in mid-2002. By 2003, this sector has also 
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become a two-horse race between Canada's Bombardier and Brazil's 
Embraer. There is also a small marginal producer left in the sector, the 
turboprop manufacturer ATIR, which has a wide experience in alliances. 
ATR (Avions de Transport Regional) began as a consortium in 1985 when 
Aerospatiale (now part of EADS) and Aeritalia (now Alenia Aeronautica, 
division of Finmeccanica of Italy) merged their two separate, but similar, 
regional aircraft designs into one single effort. In order to reinforce their 
partnership on the regional turboprop market, ATR's Parent Companies, 
Alenia Aeronautica and EADS, decided to merge their ATR activities into one 
single entity-in which each has a 50% share - designated as ATR "Integrated" 
in 2001. The benefits of the integration results in a decrease of 20% of the 
structural costs of the ATR programme and will allow ATR to increase its 
profitability. 
Since 1986 Canada's Bombardier, the world's biggest producer of railway 
equipment, has embarked upon a series of acquisitions to increase its market 
share: thus it has acquired Canadair, the Ontario-based de Havilland, Learjet 
and has become the world's largest aircraft manufacturer after Boeing and 
Airbus. It discovered a niche market at just the right moment, gambled on the 
potential market for regional jets and starting from scratch in 1992, it has 
managed to perform a major turnaround and become a thriving international 
success. 
Embraer was set up in 1969 as a state industry with a mix of domestic and 
foreign investment and expertise, and was privatised in 1994. A decade ago, 
few would have guessed that Embraer would be Bombardier's main 
competitor in the regional jet business. It has been a strategic partner of 
Airbus parent EADS since 1999, when a consortium of French companies - 
Dassault Aviation, EADS, Snecma, and Thales - took a 20% stake in 
Embraer. Their investment aids the introduction of new technology and 
products while enhancing its prospects in world markets. Embraer has 
managed to become a global economic player by seizing the opportunity to 
exploit the late 1990s' boom in worldwide regional jet travel, it has committed 
itself to lighter, faster, farther-ranging and less expensive jets, which proved 
attractive to airlines even though they aren't considered as technologically 
advanced as Bombardier's. 
The two existing regional jet players face increasingly tough competition from 
above, from both Airbus and Boeing, each of which is pushing new 100 seat 
models. There was much talk about a tie-up between ATR and Embraer, 
which would provide a link with Airbus, and about Boeing buying out Fairchild- 
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Dornier in an effort to return to the regional aircraft market it abandoned in the 
1990s. Nothing has materialised so far, but the prolonged downturn seems to 
be forcing further consolidation. What stands in the way of transatlantic 
alliances are political problems. Although aircraft manufacturers have sought 
to diversify their production and enter into military aircraft to lessen their 
exposure to the unstable civil air transport, at the same time this move 
prevents them from striking any transatlantic deals. Such alliances cannot be 
concluded as governments would stand in the way and would forbid the 
sharing of "national sensitive" technology. 
1.3.2 Engine alliances 
Aircraft need engines to power their flight and commercial jet engine 
manufacturing is another air transport sector that has seen several alliances. 
The very successful alliance of General Electric (GE) and "Soci6tL& National 
d'Etude et de Construction Moteurs d'Aviation" (SNECMA) in the 1970s is an 
example of a partnership in which value was created - and through this 
substantial market presence - through co-specialisation. GE had entered the 
civilian jet engine market in the late 1960s, but with limited success as Pratt & 
Whitney remained the undisputable US leader in civilian aircraft engines and 
the British Rolls Royce was a strong global contender'. 
In its effort to challenge Pratt & Whitney's dominance in North America and to 
prevent the development of a European alliance centred around Rolls-Royce, 
GE established in the 1970s, CFM partnership, a joint venture/co- 
development contract with the French state-owned jet engine maker SNECIVIA 
to fabricate commercial jet engines. GE choose SNECMA to secure its 
entrance to the European market as SNECMA had close links with Airbus. 
SNECIVIA was to "deliver" Airbus, where as GE was to secure access to 
leading US airlines. 
An alliance and not acquisition fitted well with the larger corporate strategies 
of both companies. An acquisition would not be politically feasible. GE as an 
US company could not independently develop the close relationships it 
needed to operate in Europe. Any effort on SNECMA's part to enter civilian 
markets alone and try to earn the credibility GE already enjoyed with Boeing 
and McDonnell Douglas would have been long, difficult, costly and perhaps 
futile. Each company brought specific technical skills to the alliance: GE 
1 The presentation of this alliance is based on Doz and Hamel's presentation in "Alliance 
Advantage". 
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brought SNECMA infrastructure and expertise in selling, supporting and 
servicing civilian engines worldwide, while SNECMA brought to GE both its 
privileged relationship with the French government (and the Airbus 
consortium) and its expertise in military engines which could be applied to 
civilian jet engines. 
Although the two partners began collaborating on a single product, they 
quickly found it necessary to expand collaboration to their entire range of 
civilian engines and by the 1980s their alliance encompassed the entire jet 
engine business of the two companies, both civilian and military. 
When GE-SNECMA became challenger to Pratt & Whitney's supremacy, Pratt 
& Whitney, historically the leader in the US aircraft engine industry, became 
more willing to conclude equal partnerships as it did with MTU, the aircraft 
engine subsidiary of Daimler-Benz. As long as Pratt & Whitney was the 
market leader, it did not look for equal partners as it needed allies only to 
share the costs of new product development. Any co-specialisation agreement 
it concluded was very asymmetrical and in Pratt & Whitney's favour. 
MTU and GE had a relationship that preceded MTU's agreement with Pratt & 
Whitney. But as GE with SNECMA as its lead European partner, leaving little 
room for a second European company, MTU switched its allegiance to Pratt & 
Whitney. 
Today's picture of engine manufacturers is an entangled spider's web with 
every major manufacturer having an alliance and cooperation agreement with 
the other, whether on the military or civil level: SNECMA with Rolls-Royce, 
Pratt& Whitney with GE, GE with Rolls-Royce. On the vertical level Boeing 
has joined forces with Pratt & Whitney. In 1996, long term competitors 
General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce pIc formed a co-development 
partnership alliance to develop a jet engine. All this activity confirms that the 
staregic goals of all of them is as SNECIVIA states on its web site to "Seize 
any external growth opportunity that arises due to the consolidation of the 
aerospace industry". 
1.3.3 Airport alliances 
Globalization, the reduction of regulations on airports and concentration 
through transnational strategic alliances has major implications for airports 
and related services and may soon boost consolidation. 
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A. Airports 
Airports are experiencing considerable upheaval with widespread 
privatisation, deregulation and the break-down of monopoly situations. 
Airports have always depended on airlines and now on airline alliances. The 
long term rise in the number of passengers, coupled with the ever greater 
demands placed on safety and service, present airport operators with major 
logistical and financial challenges, as they have to invest heavily in their 
infrastructure to keep up with the growth. 
As airline alliances look to bring as much alliance activity within their group, 
there will be increasing pressure placed on airports to provide strategic 
alliances with benefits at reduced costs. Airports in the era of the airline 
alliance must be vitally concerned not only with attracting airline alliance 
business, but also about the manner in which they tailor their offerings and 
operations to accommodate alliance demands. Airports must have the 
possibility to accommodate extra traffic and frequencies, to coordinate 
synchronized waves of arrivals and departures, to develop appropriate airport 
infrastructures to streamline rapid connections between flights, to offer joint 
check-in, gate management. 
Each airport needs to consider also its position in both the air industry 
structure and in the airport hierarchy. An airport that by its geographic 
position is near a business centre can develop as an orig i n-desti nation and 
hub airport. These airports however, most of the time, suffer from space 
constraint, thus they put emphasis on developing systems for automating and 
speeding up passenger through traffic and on becoming "small cities" with 
various entertainment possibilities. 
As space is running out and congestion is increasing in many airports, plus 
concern about noise and exhausts, airlines are seeking alternate hubs that 
seem vital for their future success. Airports away from business centers focus 
on their low costs and non-existence of bottlenecks to attract airlines and 
develop convenient intermodal connections to the business centers. Any new 
air service, especially to an overseas destination, vastly improves the 
economy of the airport's home region. It results in significant time-saving 
benefits, especially for business travellers of foreign trade- oriented firms, as 
well as improvements in terms of access to world markets, capital imports and 
the location of new firms - that also means new jobs for the community. There 
are ample opportunities for recapturing traffic which has drifted off to a major 
hub. The high growth rates at smaller airports illustrate that the assumption by 
the large hubs that they would always be the first choice for passengers no 
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longer holds true. This finding is also something that interests airlines too as it 
could indicate an increase in point-to-point traffic. 
Markets have liberalised, so airports have begun to compete with each other 
for business. Privatisation of major airports is rapidly gaining acceptance 
throughout the world and is the first step towards worldwide alliances of 
airports. Federal, regional and local governments are no longer able or willing 
to bear the high costs of airport development and are turning to privatisation. 
Airports are getting ready to face the new situation by forming alliances. There 
have been two cases of airport alliances so far. 
1) Fraport, which owns and manages Frankfurt airport, forged a partnership 
in December 1999 with Schiphol Group, the private operator of Amsterdam's 
Schiphol airport. The Fraport/Schiphol joint venture is known as Pantares and 
marks the beginning of the world's first major cross-border airport alliance. 
Pantares is seeking to privatize and manage airports in all regions of the 
world, forming an alliance of facilities. It is also open to taking on a third and 
perhaps fourth major hub as additional partners in the venture. Pantares' 
largest current project, on which it plans to soon break ground, is building and 
managing the logistics center at Hong Kong's Chep Lap Kok airport. 
The partnership was initiated with the aim of realizing cost synergies from 
optimizing hub operations at Amsterdam and Frankfurt airports and to gain 
market share in the global airport market. Open to other airports in the future, 
"Pantares" parallels the development of alliances in the airline industry and 
expects to build market momentum quickly and to be a leading player in this 
dynamic growth industry. "Even large companies like ours cannot act alone in 
taking advantage of all the business opportunities that will arise in the coming 
years", says Dr. Wilhelm Bender, Chairman of the Executive Board of FAG. 
FAG and Schiphol Group are developing cooperation in six key business 
areas: passengers and retailing, aviation ground handling and cargo, real 
estate development, facility management, information and communications 
technology, and international activities. In the more than 100 privatization 
projects coming up internationally, both CEOs see excellent opportunities for 
mutual success. Both companies are sure to achieve higher market 
acceptance and project success by cooperating in international joint ventures, 
such as in Indonesia and Thailand. 
A large number of airports have been designated for privatisation in the next 
two or three years. Utilizing one another's know-how and combining the 
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financial strength of Schiphol Group and FAG will ideally provide for 
successful participation in a large number of these privatisations. 
2) The other airport alliance is between Hochtief AirPort, Germany and Aer 
Rianta, Ireland which formed the Airport Partners consortium, that holds 
stakes in European airports. Hochtief holds 60% of the consortium and Aer 
Rianta 40%. Hochtief holds equity stakes in Flughafen Dosseldorf (50% via 
the 60% stake of the Airport Partners consortium) in Athens International 
Airport (39.9%) and in Flughafen Hamburg - 28.8% as part of the Airport 
Partners consortium which owns 36%. 
An alliance of airports would have leverage when negotiating with airlines, 
possibly signing a contract with an airline or an airline alliance, allowing the 
airline to use a string of partner hubs for one price. It is quite apparent that an 
airport alliance has a strong position in negotiating with airlines. With airport 
deregulation, airports will charge for slots in a competitive and capitalistic 
manner. Airports key geographical locations will be able to take advantage of 
their central location to achieve better prices for their slots, while airports a 
few miles away will have to offer competitive prices to secure "clients". With 
aiport competition increasing, airports will have to set appropriate landing 
fees, simplify passenger flow, reduce walking distances for both arriving and 
departing passengers, adopt state-of-the-art specifications. The key challenge 
for airports is to maintain connections with the intercontinental hubs of 
alliances other than that of their own national airline. 
B. Ground handling 
Widespread consolidation is set to sweep through the ground handling sector 
over the forthcoming decade as increasingly powerful independent players 
seek the benefits of scale and airline alliances opt for joint contracts. 
According to a KPIVIG report, "The events of 11 September are likely to 
accelerate the outsourcing of ground handling services as airline management 
resources choose to concentrate on core business issues such as attracting 
and satisfying customers, or planning and negotiating fleet renewals in difficult 
market conditions. " (Air Transport Intelligence news, 2002) In Europe, where 
airports processing more than 1,000,000 passengers per year are required to 
disband handling monopolies by the end of this year, it is believed that 
greater competition still will result and lead to further consolidation. 
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"Also, a move towards centralised purchasing by airline alliances - in order to 
deliver the true benefits of such arrangements - is likely to fuel the trend to 
outsourcing as alliances look to global suppliers for their needs". 
The market share of the independents will rise to 45% by 2010. It points out 
that the top nine players worldwide still account for only 15% of the market. 
Although there are literally thousands of ground handlers worldwide, only 24% 
of the market is currently available to the true independents because of the 
overwhelming dominance of self-handling airlines and airport-owned 
suppliers. 
Summary 
Firms in all industries have turned to alliances to respond to the increasing 
demands globalisation and technology advances have put on their resources, 
growth and profitability. Globalisation means that firms have to deal with 
global markets that link formerly disparate products, markets and 
geographical regions, and that they need to be able to respond to the 
constantly changing conditions and opportunities. Alliances seem a natural 
and appropriate way of doing business in a multinational and cross-cultural 
industry and market context. In an alliance two or more entities unite to pursue 
certain important agreed-upon goals while maintaining their autonomy; the 
partners share both the benefits of the alliance and the control over the 
performance of assigned tasks during the life of the alliance. Firms have come 
to realise that no firm is self-sufficient enough in technology, knowledge, 
resources to undertake global growth, nor could they undertake all alone such 
costly risks. Thus, they enter into alliances to achieve multinational growth, to 
add value to enable learning, to protect and enhance core competencies and 
competitive advantages, or simply to secure flexibility to meet changing 
market and industry structure. Companies have opted for alliances because 
strategic alliances help partners to achieve these goals in a more cost- 
effective and safe way than they could if they remained unaligned. Whether 
this alliance remains an alliance of whatever form or move to the next level - 
merger-acquisition - is something that circumstances will determine. The 
formation of the alliance is however, the first step towards the creation of truly 
global companies on a geographical, operational and technological level. 
In the air transport industry, the main driver of alliances has been the need to 
acquire global access and provide customers with the global coverage and 
service the "global village" needs. But this is only one of the reasons that have 
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pushed airlines to jump on the alliance bandwagon; the need for 
standardisation and to create systems that could provide better service, the 
need to share costs and risks, the need to create the critical mass necessary 
to enable them to strike better deals with their suppliers, even the need to 
improve their knowledge, have all come into play. In addition, alliances 
enable airlines, through the development of a joint network, to stimulate new 
traffic and to save costs, to generate strategic advantages and to secure long 
term growth potential, and market oriented and cost efficient operations. 
It is not only airlines that have realized the potential alliances hold but all 
players involved in the air transport industry, aircraft manufacturers, engine 
makers, airports, ground handlers and many others. 
t 
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Chapter 2 
The 
movement 
towards 
iberalisatioi 
In the air transport sector, as in all industries, it is the economic pressures 
towards large size, wider marketing spread and globalisation that have 
pushed airlines in cooperation's across national boundaries. The prime 
objective for any airline wishing to become a global player is to expand the 
geographic scope of its network without undertaking sizeable capital 
investment. At the same time in order to stay profitable in an increasingly 
competitive market an airline needs to streamline its operations and to cut 
costs. In most industries these objectives would normally be realised through 
mergers and acquisitions. But one of the main problems airlines are facing in 
their effort to achieve growth is the international regulatory framework that is 
imposing restrictions on foreign ownership, capacity and access. Transport 
licenses and traffic rights are normally given to airlines majority owned and 
controlled by nationals -a merger means that such rights would be lost or 
would have to be renegotiated. This is why airlines turned to alliances to 
bypass these restrictions and to contest new markets but also to serve so far 
reserved markets. 
The deregulation in many domestic markets - with the United States getting 
the ball rolling - and regional blocs, in combination with the gradual 
liberalisation of the international air transport industry, created a new 
environment that offered new opportunities and challenges. Within this 
framework, in this second chapter the regulatory framework will be presented 
and the way it has evolved under the liberalisation wave. Next, the way 
liberalisation has impacted on airlines leading them to the formation of 
alliances will be discussed and finally some comments on the future 
developments regarding this international regulatory framework and alliances 
will be presented. 
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Section 2.1 Regulatory developments 
2.1.1 Domestic deregulation - United States (1978) 
Deregulation started at a national level within several countries with the United 
States being the first. Domestic deregulation played a catalytic role in the 
international liberalisation movement as well as in the wider air transport 
industry. More particularly, the significance of US domestic deregulation - the 
largest domestic air transport market - lies in the fact that it led to the 
restructuring of the domestic airline business and to the US pursuing open 
skies policy internationally, which was to influence alliance establishment. 
Above all, US domestic deregulation generated pressures for change, which 
inevitably spread to international air transport. 
The Airline Deregulation Act, October 1978, applicable only to domestic air 
transportation, aimed at attaining the objectives of efficiency, innovation, low 
prices and more price/service options while still providing the needed air 
transport system. Deregulation had a dramatic impact on industry structure, 
bringing in a lot of low-cost new entrant airlines and encouraging smaller 
airlines until then confined to intrastate routes to expand outside their own 
state. The number of airlines offering scheduled services on trunk routes rose 
from 36 in 1978 to over 120 by 1985; and by 1985 the top five airlines 
accounted for 57% of the US industry's output, compared with 69% in 1978. 
So industry concentration fell; fares and costs also fell; and profits rose, as 
airlines become more efficient. From 1985 onwards however, concentration in 
the industry began to rise again and the industry entered a period of 
consolidation, mergers and acquisitions, which reached its peak in the 1990s 
coinciding with the Gulf War, high fuel cost and a recessionary economy. 
Hardly any of the original new entrants survived as independent operators and 
some of the established majors such as American Airlines, United Airlines and 
Delta Air Lines proved to be financially strong enough to weather economic 
downturns. Their success was attributed to the marketing advantages of large 
size and network scope. The industry has become more oligopolistic and 
concentrated than it was before deregulation, with the top five airlines 
accounting for 70% of the industry's output. 
Deregulation in the US was followed by a similar movement in Canada and 
Australia. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the United Kingdom governments 
influenced by the tide of liberalisation allowed the emergence of new domestic 
and/or international airlines able to compete directly with their established 
national airlines. 
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Airline deregulation has also resulted in structural changes, mainly in the form 
of the development of hub-and-spoke networks, which were to have 
considerable impact on the air transport industry as they were adopted by 
almost all scheduled airlines. US airlines entered in new markets and dropped 
unprofitable routes, but recognised the importance of providing a national 
service network. As most did not have a presence in the smaller regional 
markets, they realised the value of drawing feeder traffic from these regional 
routes. Thus they developed and strengthened hub-and-spoke networks to 
effectively cover the entire nation. The larger airlines used alliances with 
regional feeder airlines to attract feed traffic to their national networks 
concentrating on major hubs. Through marketing arrangements, operational 
synchronisation and schedule coordination they formalised their links with 
independent feeder airlines. 
From the late 1970s through the 1980s the trend towards increasing 
liberalisation of airline industry spread from the domestic United States 
industry to international markets. Deregulation in the US ended with few 
domestic airlines dominating the domestic market and expanding to the 
international market by ousting the US airlines specialising on international 
flights, with new hubs and the emergence of the hub-and-spoke system and 
with the new US majors following aggressive international expansion. But the 
bilateral system made it difficult for them to operate outside their national 
markets. Thus, US authorities started their effort to liberalise the international 
air transport industry through the conclusion of open skies agreements. 
2.1.2 Bilateral liberalisation 
A. Air Services Agreements (Chicago 1944) 
The Chicago Convention on international air transport, to which almost all 
states are signatories, aimed to encourage development of the international 
air transport industry "in a safe and orderly manner" and to establish 
international air transport service on the basis of equality of opportunity and 
sound economical operation. 
Its Article 1 defines national sovereignty - that is, it grants to each state 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and 
the right to regulate air services to, from and within their countries. 
The Chicago Conference in its effort to facilitate the extension of world air 
routes and to obtain satisfactory operating and traffic rights to be exercised by 
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airlines on their foreign routes led to the international air transport 
agreements, which came to be known as Air Services Agreements (ASAs). 
Under the network of (ASAs) or "bilaterals" individual states negotiate 
bilaterally the provision and exchange of air services/traffic and capacity rights 
between national territories in the form of "Air Freedom Rights" as presented 
in Appendix A. 
Today, most of the routes awarded by a bilateral agreement are the so-called 
third and fourth freedom rights that entail transportation of passengers and 
cargo between a city in one signatory's country and a city in the other 
signatory's country. There are restrictions on the number of airlines from each 
side that may operate the routes. Most ASAs require that the majority of the 
capital and effective control of the airline be in the hands of citizens of the 
designating State. Or, in the Convention phraseology, they should be 
"substantially owned and effectively controlled" by country nationals. This 
nationality clause is further reinforced by the limits set by each country on 
foreign investments in their airlines (e. g. the ceiling is 24.5% in the US and 
49.9% in Europe). 
The Chicago regime led to an almost universal protection of national flag 
airlines. For many years, the bilateral ASAs allowed comfortable duopolies 
between the respective state airlines of contracting states, even allowing for a 
pooling of revenue on shared routes. 
B. Open skies agreements 
Only liberal ASAs providing for full market access without restrictions on 
designation, route rights, capacity, frequencies, code sharing and tariffs 
between the participating countries would enable the new big US players to 
become active on the international scene and to fly to new markets. As a 
result, the US began to renegotiate less restrictive bilateral air services 
agreements, inaugurating the move towards the gradual liberalisation of 
international air transport. 
In 1984 the Netherlands and the UK deregulated air transportation services 
between the two countries with the adoption of an ultra-liberal bilateral, the 
first "open market" bilateral, which was to serve as a template for all 
subsequent open skies agreements. 
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More specifically such an agreement: 
" provides access to all routes with unrestricted designation (known as 
"multiple designation"), which means each country's airlines are 
allowed to fly between any city/point in their home country and any 
city/point in the participating country. 
" removes restrictions on capacity, fares, routings and offers unrestricted 
frequencies on all routes and access to all points in each country. 
" offers a deregulated system for fares, cargo and charter flights. 
" includes articles dealing specifically with inter-airline commercial 
agreements, unconstrained code sharing or other commercial and 
cooperative arrangements among the participating countries' airlines, 
which until then were considered anti-competitive. 
From 1992 onwards, the United States began to sign a series of open skies 
bilateral air services agreements with various European and Asian countries, 
which provide for unrestricted route and operational rights, as well as Third to 
Fifth and Sixth Freedom rights. By June 2002 some 85 open skies 
agreements had been concluded involving approximately 70 countries, both 
developed and developing ones. Two thirds of them involve the US (Table 
2.1). 
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Table 2.1 
US Open Skies 
Year Month Entity Year Month Entlif 
2001 11 Sri Lanka 1997 12 Netherlands Antilles 
2001 10 France 1997 12 Romania 
2001 9 Oman 1997 10 Chile 
2001 5 Poland 1997 7 Aruba 
2000 12 Senegal 1997 6 Malaysia 
2000 11 Benin 1997 5 New Zealand 
2000 10 Malta 1997 5 Nicaragua 
2000 10 Rwanda 1997 4 Costa Rica 
2000 10 Morocco 1997 4 Honduras 
2000 8 Nigeria 1997 4 El Salvador 
2000 5 The Gambia 1997 4 Guatemala 
2000 3 Turkey 1997 3 Panama 
2000 3 Ghana 1997 3 Taiwan 
2000 2 Burkina Faso 1997 2 Brunei 
2000 2 Namibia 1997 1 Singapore 
2000 1 Slovak Republic 1996 11 Jordan 
1999 12 Portugal 1996 2 Germany 
1999 12 Dominican Republic 1995 12 Czech Republic 
1999 11 Tanzania 1995 5 Austria 
1999 10 Qatar 1995 5 Belgium 
1999 8 Argentina 1995 5 Denmark 
1999 5 Bahrain 1995 5 Finland 
1999 4 United Arab Emirates 1995 5 Iceland 
1999 4 Pakistan 1995 5 Luxembourg 
1998 11 Italy 1995 5 Norway 
1998 5 Peru 1995 5 Sweden 
1998 4 Korea 1995 5 Switzerland 
1998 2 Uzbekistan 1992 9 Netherlands 
Source: DOT (International Series) 
The major - from an air transport industry point of view - countries that have 
not signed an open skies agreement with the US are the United Kingdom, 
Japan and Canada. 
The UK has not signed since such an agreement would result in British 
Airways having to give up many slots in London-Heathrow airport. Under the 
current bilateral agreement between the UK and US only two airlines from 
each country - British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, American Airlines and United 
Airlines - are allowed to operate services from London-Heathrow to US. The 
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limiting of the designated airlines has proved most beneficial to the two UK 
nominated airlines, which account for 64% of the overall number of 
passengers travelling from London-Heathrow to the US. Despite the greater 
opportunities enjoyed by airlines based in countries that have established 
open skies deals with the US, the UK continues to account for around 40% of 
the passenger traffic between the two continents. All other US airlines have to 
use London-Gatwick, which lacks the range of connecting flights that makes 
London-Heathrow so attractive to passengers and airlines, which is so vital for 
the profitability of services. Thus, there are not many incentives to radically 
alter the terms of the bilateral from the British Airways perspective, which 
holds the majority of slots in London-Heathrow (and this is exactly what Virgin 
Atlantic and British Midland and its allies are objecting to). With an open skies 
agreement though, British Airways would have to give up slots, US airlines 
would gain access to London-Heathrow but UK airlines would not have 
cabotage 2 rights in the US. 
Canada and the US, which represent the world's largest bilateral passenger 
market, have since 1995 an "open transborder" agreement under which 
Canadian airlines can fly to any city in the US and the US has unrestricted 
access to Canadian cities. The agreement however, does not provide for 
cabotage rights. 
Japan on the other hand, has not proceeded to an open skies agreement 
because of the differing views of the two governments. The US wants more 
slots at the Tokyo-Narita airport while Japan wants US cabotage rights. The 
Japanese fear that unless they receive US cabotage, an open skies 
agreement would mean more rights for US airlines as with more slots they will 
operate more frequencies (Knibb, 2001). 
According to its critics, open skies agreements are simply liberalised Chicago- 
regime bilaterals as they still restrict competition on routes between the 
signatory states to airlines "substantially owned and effectively controlled" by 
nationals of those states and forbid services by foreign airlines within 
domestic markets. 
2 Cabotage or eighth freedom rights: the right granted to a foreign airline to operate in another 
country's domestic route network, that is to carry passengers between two domestic points of 
another country. 
51 
Cran#eld The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic I\)% 
I KS1 II 
C. Regional, plurilateral and multilateral liberalisation 
a. The three Packages in the European Union 
The deregulation proceSS4 in Europe dates back to 1986 when a decision by 
the European Court of Justice opened the way to the establishment of a 
European market in aviation. The entering into force of the Single European 
Act provided the catalyst that led to the first of the three packages in 
December 1987. 
The Commission's goal was to create a Single Aviation Market, a common air 
transport market by a gradual relaxation of existing controls, expecting that 
such liberalisation would result in lower prices, a motivation to growth of the 
industry, lower costs, unobstructed competition on intra-European routes and 
profits for efficient airlines. In the longer term, this would create jobs and 
contribute towards a coherence of the single market that could not be 
achieved by states acting individually. It was at the same time emphasized 
that national social and economic objectives would be safeguarded. 
Deregulation in Europe was accompanied by the privatisation of the almost 
exclusively state-owned European airlines. 
The Table below presents the main points of the three "packages" that 
gradually led to the full liberalisation of the European Union (EU) air transport 
industry. 
3 The distinction between a "multilateral" and a "plurilateral" seems to be that a multilateral 
body consists of a determinate number of members and may thus be exclusive, whereas a 
plurilateral may have a varying number of members and is, by implication, open to new 
members (Staniland, 1999). 
4 The presentation of the deregulation process in Europe is mostly based on Impact on 
Services: Air Transport, The Single Market Review, European Commission, prepared by 
Cranfield University, Kogan Page-Earthscan, London, 1997. 
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Table 2.2 
Summary of intra-EU air transport packages 
I st package 2nd package 3rd package Scope From I January 1988 From 1 November 1990 From I January 1993 International scheduled International scheduled Intra-Communlity air transport passenger transport passenger transport 
Fares Fare type % of Fares Fare type % of Fares 
ref Fare approved ref. Fare approved 
by States by States 
Discount 66-90 Automatically Fully Flexible 106- Unless Free pricing 
Deep discount 45-65 Automatically double However, provisions made States 
All other Dbl. approval disapproval and/or the Commission to intervene 
Normal econ 95-195 Automatically against 
Discount 80-94 Automatically 
-excessive basic fares (in relation to 
Deep discount 30-79 Automatically long term fully allocated costs) 
All other If Dbl. -sustained downward development 
Approval offares, 
Designation Multiple designation by State Multiple designation by a State No longer applicable 
allowed if: allowed if: 
-250,000 pass (I st year after -140,000 pass or 800 rt flight (from 
notification) Jan 91) 
-200,000 pass or 1,200 rt flights -100,000 pass or 600 rt flight (from 
(2nd year) Jan 92) 
-180,000 pass or 1,000 rt flights 
(3rd year) 
Capacity Capacity shares between States Capacity shares of a State of up to Unrestricted 
45/55% (from Jan 88) 60% 
40/60% (from Oct 89) Capacity can be increased by 7.5% 
peryear 
Route access -3rd/4th Freedom region to hub -3rd/4th Freedom between all -Full access to international and 
routes permitted airports domestic routes within the EU 
-5th Freedom traffic allowed up to -5th Freedom traffic allowed up to including routes between states 
30% of capacity 50% of capacity other that the base of the airline 
-Additional 5th Freedom rights for -Public service obligations and Fxemptions for Greek islands and 
Irish and Portuguese certain protection for new regional Azores 
-Combination of points allowed routes -Cabotage is allowed for up to 50% 
-Some exemptions -A 3rd/4th Freedom service can be of capacity if the domestic sector 
matched by an airline from the is combined with a route to the 
other State home country 
-Scope for traffic distribution rules -More developed public service 
and restrictions related to obligations and certain protection 
congestion and environmental for new thin regional routes 
protection -More developed scope for traffic 
distribution rules and restrictions 
related to congestion and 
environmental protection 
Competition Group exemptions regarding: Group exemptions regarding: Group exemptions regarding: 
n rules -Some capacity coordinations -Some capacity coordinations -Some schedule coordinations 
Tariff consultations -Tariff consultations -Tariff consultations 
-Slot allocation at airports -Slot allocations at airports -Slot allocation at airports 
-Ground handling of aircraft, freight, -Common 
CRS -Common CRS 
passengers and inflight catering -Ground handling of aircraft, -Joint operation of new thin routes 
-Some sharing of pool revenues freight, passengers and inflight 
catering 
Licensing of Full freedom to start an airline 
air carriers Uniform conditions across EU 
Not provided for in the 1 st and 2nd packages Concept of Community ownership and control 
Requirements for financial fitness specified 
Small airlines subject to looser regulation requirements 
Air cargo Largely deregulated under February 1991 Regulation; Replaces 1991 Regulation 
free access (except cabotage) and free pricing 
Source: Cranfield University (1997) 
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The first package on European air transport liberalisation, adopted in 
December 1987, governed the areas of market access, capacity, fares and 
competition, and allowed some co-operative activities to continue. The 
number of routes with multiple designations increased from 22 in 1987 to 33 in 
1989, although these were concentrated in only five member countries. The 
capacity shares between bilateral state airlines remained fairly stable over the 
same period. A Commission report in October 1989 reviewed the 
implementation of the package and concluded that, as a result of these 
measures, there had been favourable developments in traffic, productivity and 
efficiency against a background of stable economic growth and little change in 
both fuel prices and financial conditions. The first package allowed a number 
of smaller airlines, whether existing airlines such as British Midland and 
Hamburg Airlines or new entrants such as Air Europe and Ryanair, to enter 
some of the most important intra-Community routes, offering the mix of 
capacity and fares that they wished. 
Further progress towards European liberalisation was made with the adoption 
of the second package in November 1990. The main changes from the first 
package were some reduction in the threshold for multiple designations and a 
further loosening of capacity share restrictions. Route access was also 
significantly improved and a greater range of fares was to be subject to 
automatic approval. 
The third and final package adopted in July 1992 largely deregulated intra- 
European Union air services and covered the following areas: 
the freedom of airlines to set their own fares. 
the freedom of airlines to fly anywhere within the community subject to 
satisfying technical and safety requirements. 
" common airline licensing regulations throughout the community-airlines 
of the member states were granted unlimited traffic routes on routes 
from, to and within any of the other member states. 
" the standing investment criteria were restated in the definition of 
community air carriers within the European Union. 
" It is the only bilateral or multilateral agreement that includes "seventh- 
freedom" passenger and cargo rights and domestic cabotage. 
Thus, Europe is the world's first fully deregulated region, or single market, with 
the 15 Member States, the three States belonging in the European Economic 
Area (EEA)5 and Switzerland and which will expand, in May 2004, to include 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
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the 10 new members of the European Union. It is important though to note 
that the three packages only apply to air transport within the Community and 
the EEA countries. Air transport services between Member States and third 
countries continue to be regulated by traditional air services bilaterals. Outside 
the European Union, only the Australia-New Zealand regime comes as close 
to a similar seamless commercial aviation border. 
European deregulation has brought about many positive results as a 
Commission report "The European Airline Industry: from Single Market to 
World-wide Challenges" published in May 1999 and based on a detailed 
analysis of the market, states and which points to the dynamism and lively 
competition of the sector: 
" The number of scheduled airlines in the European Union has risen from 
132 in 1993 to 164 in 1998. None of the "big" national players in 
existence in 1993 has gone out of business. 
" The number of routes linking Member States has risen by 30% since 
1993. 
" Prices have moved very clearly in consumer's favour. 
" Job numbers in civil aviation have increased from 435,400 in 1988 to 
489,700 in 1996. 
The deregulation process was implemented so as not to seriously hamper the 
competitive advantages of the flag airlines. Despite privatisation, airlines 
remain national and it was unacceptable for any government to let its flag 
airline fail in the Single European Aviation Market. A number of the measures 
favoured flag airlines including restructuring subsidies and recognition of 
grandfather rightS6 . As a result, traditional flag airlines secured or even 
enlarged their presence at their traditional hub airports, which was to prove an 
invaluable asset at the time of the alliance formation. 
Furthermore, the nationality clause has been replaced by "Community 
ownership", that is to be a "Community carrier", an airline must be "owned and 
continue to be owned directly or through a majority ownership by Member 
States and/or nationals of Member States. It shall at all times be effectively 
controlled by such states or such nationals". 
6 Grandfather rights are the convention by which airlines retain the right to use particular take- 
off and landing slot times at an airport because they have done so previously and 
continuously. 
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b. Kona 
In 2001, the United States and four of its aviation partners - Brunei, Chile, 
New Zealand and Singapore - all five members of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation organisation (APEC) reached the first and so far only multilateral 
US open skies agreement, the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalisation of 
International Transportation known as "Kona". This agreement is open for 
adherence by other members of APEC and non-member states. Peru and 
Samoa have since joined. 
This multilateral agreement offers three important benefits: 
" It provides a competition - enhancing model for future agreements. 
" It substantially liberalizes the traditional ownership requirement, thus 
enhancing foreign airlines' access to outside investment. 
" It provides a single, streamlined mechanism for broader exchanges of 
aviation opportunities. 
Critics have argued that this deal is not genuine deregulation as it does 
nothing more that bring together existing open skies bilaterals, - without 
touching the tricky issues of nationality and ownership rules - creating a club 
which others might join if they first sign up to US open skies. It is more 
symbolic than practical since most of the signatories have already bilateral 
open skies agreements with a number of other signatories and some with all 
of them. The signatories hope that its open skies approach will become the 
international standard. US authorities believe that Kona will provide the 
nucleus for an open skies area so as to build a broader consensus, but TCAA 
is a far more ambitious project (Airline Business, 2001). 
c. Plurilateral Liberalisation in Other Regions 
As in Europe, most agreements seeking to liberalise air transport services by 
providing greater market access and improving services among the Member- 
states have been concluded on a regional or sub-regional basis. Small groups 
of States of comparable size and development would find it easier to agree on 
market access than larger, diverse groups of States and at the same time 
such small groups provide a more manageable environment to test liberalised 
air transport policies (ICAO, Worldwide Air Transport Conference, 2003, WIP 
5). 
56 
These area-specific arrangements are: 
" The Andean Pact founded in 1991 by five South American States- 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela to establish an open 
skies area in which the five freedoms of the air are granted without 
restriction to airlines of member states. This agreement entered in the 
framework of the Free Trade Area established within this sub region. 
" The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Air Service Agreement 
amongst 14 States in the Carribean in 1996. 
" In South America again, the six States that are parties to the Fortaleza 
Agreement agreed to liberalise air services in 1997. 
" The CLMV Agreement by Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar and Vietnam in 
1997. 
" The Banjul Accord among six States in Western Africa in 1997. 
" In the Middle East, the Arab Civil Aviation Commission (ACAC) decided 
in 1998 a phased Liberalisation of the Exchange of Traffic Rights 
ultimately leading to the full liberalisation of traffic rights among the 16 
Member States in the Middle East and North Africa. 
" In Africa, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa and 
the Economic Community of West African States agreed in 1999 to 
move forward with the liberalisation of air transport in the two regions. 
" The 1999 Yamoussoukro 11 Ministerial decision among 52 African 
States. 
" The Agreement amongst the six states of the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) in 1999. 
" In 2002 Australia and New Zealand concluded an open skies 
agreement that created a "Single Aviation Market" between the two 
countries. 
" The 1999 agreement in the IMT-Growth Triangle region by Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand. 
" The agreement concluded within the BIMP-East ASEAN Growth Area 
region by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in 1999. 
D. Future developments 
TCAA 
The Association of European Airlines (AEA) released its policy statement in 
September 1999 on its vision of a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area 
(TCAA). The group that represents the biggest European airlines suggested 
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the creation of a new modern regulatory framework for international air 
transport that would begin as an agreement between the European Union and 
the US and would eventually cover all of the global airline industry. The AEA 
supports the establishment of a Single Air Traffic Control system for European 
skies, which involves the replacement of national airspace by a single, unified 
European airspace; but there is no national air space anymore but a single, 
unified airspace that covers the whole of Europe. And as a unified market with 
a unified airspace has been established, it is the European Union Authorities 
that should proceed to negotiate TCAA with the US. TCAA will allow the 
freedom to provide air services in every market within TCAA including 
cabotage, will remove all restrictions on capacity and the number of airlines 
serving particular routes, and provide for minimal control of fares. It will also 
lift all restrictions on foreign purchase of airline equity in both the European 
Union and the US and it will allow extensive code share and block space 
agreements, subject to rules ensuring fair competition and full information for 
consumers. This agreement will finally cover the right of establishment, a 
common competition policy and joint regulations for aircraft leasing. 
Their initiative has been adopted by the European Commission, which 
considers it as a free trade aviation initiative between Europe and USA. The 
Commission believes that if an air transport dialogue between the world's 
most developed aviation powers is not established so as to come up with a 
common basis, insular interests will prevail over the interests of the industry in 
general. If the two biggest aviation markets of the world become integrated, 
they will bring the others with them. The European Union Transport 
Commissioner, Loyola de Palacio, has argued that the TCAA combines the 
concept of the US open skies and the European concept of the open internal 
market in a framework of harmonization and convergence. The Commission 
envisions that such an agreement will cover CIRS, code share, slot- 
management, state aid, bankruptcy protection, leasing and settlement of 
disputes, bilateral barriers, changing ownership rules, will harmonize technical 
standards and will secure liberalised conditions. 
The United States however, seems so far reluctant to lift its foreign ownership 
restrictions on US airlines and to provide cabotage rights, and is approaching 
the concept cautiously. US officials argued that a nucleus of strong open skies 
agreements is needed before the world's most important aviation markets 
could be made into one. 
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Section 2.2 The Impact of liberalisation on alliances 
2.2.1 Alliance development under the liberalisation wave 
International aviation policies and corporate strategies are acting upon each 
other in ways that have serious implications for the structures of international 
aviation, which becomes even more evident by the fact that liberalisation has 
moved hand-in-hand with airline alliances. A distinct feature of the current 
mega alliances is that a US airline and a European airline form the core 
partnership in each. This pairing is not at all a chance event but answers to 
the specific needs of airlines and their corporate strategies. In 2002, 
passengers carried on transatlantic flights represented 3.6% of all passengers 
carried by air worldwide, partly because transatlantic flights connect the 
world's two largest domestic air transport markets - the European and the US 
markets with 21.8% and 31.6% respectively of the world's air traffic. It is 
therefore understandable that the authorities and the airlines from these areas 
have led and shaped international liberalisation. 
2.2.2 European and US airlines following deregulation 
In order to better understand the origin and background of European Union 
and US airline strategies that resulted in alliance formation it is important to 
remember the peculiarities of the two markets. 
European airlines have always put an emphasis first on intercontinental 
business and then on their domestic industry. The US industry on the other 
hand, first grew as a domestic industry with a separate and specialised 
international sector. This can be explained by an accident of geography: the 
US longer distances have favoured development of a strong domestic airline 
industry while in many European countries there is little market for domestic 
aviation because the mostly short route distances put airlines at a 
disadvantage. Many European airlines always had and still have a larger 
stake in international and long distance markets than US airlines. For the 
major European flag airlines, access to large foreign markets has always been 
crucial because historically they have depended substantially on long haul 
rather than domestic traffic for their revenue, with some European airlines 
deriving more than 30% of their profits from transatlantic services (Egan, 
2001). 
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Before 1978 the share of transatlantic traffic carried was dominated by the two 
US international airlines, Pan Am and TWA, although they did not have large 
domestic feeder networks. These two airlines had concentrated too much on 
international aviation and when the European airlines, revived after the war, 
began to concentrate on transatlantic routes to compensate for the routes lost 
with decolonisation they saw their transatlantic market share shrink. 
The industry reconcentration that followed deregulation left the US air 
transport industry with six major airlines, with three of them - American 
Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines - controlling 58% of domestic 
traffic. These airlines depended for their profitability on the creation of highly 
concentrated traffic hubs, through which by 1993 some 70% of domestic 
passengers passed. Such hubs were often built away from traditional ports of 
entry for international traffic - New York, Boston, Chicago - in smaller cities 
such as Charlotte, Cincinnati and Pittsburgh. These hubs having substantial 
traffic feed from their huge domestic networks concentrated enough traffic to 
sustain international services. International flights were attractive because 
they were more profitable than domestic flights. With the lower cost structure 
the US airlines had achieved during deregulation, they could offer lower fares 
and thus take away traffic from established European airlines. 
The main obstacle was regulatory. The new comers had to obtain authority 
under the existing ASAs to operate international routes. The US airlines, 
which had been previously inactive on international routes, took over from the 
bankrupt TWA and the dissolved Pan Am the routes from US cities to other 
European cities. 
By 1992, seven US airlines were operating scheduled services on North 
Atlantic routes compared with two in 1988. While in 1962 Pan Am and TWA 
carried 32% of all passengers on air services between North America and 
Europe, by 1993, the situation had reversed and although the number of 
European passengers flying across the Atlantic was rising steeply, the 
European airlines' share had shrunk from 68% to 48%. Their impact on 
particular markets was substantial, with the market share of US airlines on 
routes between the US and Germany up from 54.2% in 1989 to 61% in 1993 
and that on routes between the US and France up from 64.5% to 72% 
(Staniland, 1999). 
At the European level, while liberalization as part of the European Union 
single market program has resulted in cabotage restrictions being removed 
and increased competition in the regional airline market, there was uncertainty 
about the external consequences of liberalization and what effect that 
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deregulation would have on the international stakes of European Union 
airlines. After US airlines began their aggressive international expansion, 
European airlines resisted bilaterals that allowed unrestricted capacity 
increases and route expansion. European airlines, and particularly Air France 
and Lufthansa, wanted to resist pressures for liberalization until they had 
undergone massive restructuring in preparation for privatisation and the 
pressures created for service liberalization in the Single Aviation market. 
As in the US, with privatisation and deregulation came consolidation in the 
domestic markets. Domestic mergers - Air France, UTA and Air inter in 
France, British Airways and British Caledonian in UK - strengthened airlines 
and helped them play a stronger role on the European and international 
scene. The existence of the common market in Europe meant that there were 
no restrictions on complete takeover or mergers between airlines operating 
within the territory of the European Union. But a takeover of an airline with 
routes outside the European Union would be unproductive, as it would 
"denationalize" an airline that would probably find its bilateral agreements 
renounced. This has resulted in intra-European alliances that created a 
regional system that is structurally different from the North American 
counterpart: A multi-tiered set of alliances between major and minor airlines 
with smaller airlines acting as clients for larger hubs rather than mega- 
consolidation into four or five "mega-carriers" such as emerged in the US. This 
makes it easier to exclude rival alliances and start-ups, such as easyJet and 
Virgin Express, from competing on certain regional routes and to exclude rival 
alliances from central hubs by preventing them from obtaining feeder traffic for 
their international services. 
By 1992, major European Union and major US airlines faced essentially the 
same dilemma: both had very large stakes in North Atlantic routes, both had 
been hit by the slump in traffic caused by the Gulf War and both were anxious 
to draw more directly on traffic within the other's home markets. 
Europeans saw an US market, which in terms of traffic, was larger even than 
that created through the emerging European single market. This US market 
was becoming increasingly rationalized into hub-and-spoke systems, with the 
hubs often located well away from the traditional east and west coast points of 
entry for international traffic. The dilemma of European Union airlines was that 
even if they could obtain international authority to fly to the hubs concerned, 
they could not under US law organize their own hub-and-spoke systems 
within the US. 
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Although US airlines could expand their shares of international traffic with the 
consent of liberal foreign governments and thus draw traffic from other 
European hubs, cabotage rules prevented them from setting up their feeder 
networks within Europe nor could they buy into national airlines, given the 
restricted foreign ownership rules - although even if allowed it would be 
prohibitively expensive. What they needed was to control feed from European 
markets on to their transatlantic flights at levels and through hubs comparable 
to those available from their US networks. 
The Single European Aviation Market put another obstacle to the creation by 
US airlines of hub-and-spoke systems within Europe. With its establishment 
the US airlines have lost some fifth freedom rights. For example, a US airline 
cannot fly anymore from Rome to Paris as the European Aviation Market is 
considered to be unified and such a flight would constitute cabotage rights. 
Thus, US airlines were forced to enter into alliances with European airlines 
operating in these areas to preserve these flights through code share. Before 
the market was set up, various foreign airlines, including several US airlines, 
obtained fifth freedom rights to carry traffic between national capitals as 
extensions of transatlantic services. In the logic of the single market, such 
services ceased to be "international" flights and became "domestic" flights, 
and were thus prohibited cabotage services. 
The best solution for both US and European airlines was to establish alliances 
because it was the mechanism that provided indirect access to restricted 
markets. It was the US official policy that contributed significantly to the 
success of the corporate strategy of the first airlines that concluded alliances. 
2.2.3 US authorities' tactical pursuit of open skies 
As mentioned above, since 1978 the US authorities have actively applied 
diplomatic pressure to increase US airlines' access to international markets. 
The tactic US authorities used was to lure individual states with the bait of 
access to its domestic market (Staniland, 1998). They encouraged countries 
to sign open skies agreements and their flag airlines to accept commercial 
arrangements that increased the traffic flow available to US airlines. Alliances 
could provide such a flow, the size of which might be much greater than the 
traffic that the relevant local city could generate. In fact, open skies 
agreements were frequently accompanied by the conclusion of alliances 
between the Member State flag airline concerned and a US airline. 
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US authorities found allies in the medium sized airlines from smaller countries, 
such as Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand 
and New Zealand. It was the asymmetry of markets between the US and 
these smaller countries as much as regulatory restrictions on access to them 
that created complementarity and thus a basis for open skies agreements and 
airline alliances. 
Airlines in smaller countries cannot depend on their limited domestic traffic; 
they must compete aggressively in international markets and maintain a 
significant presence on international and particularly long distance routes to 
succeed. A small airline may sustain transatlantic services by gathering traffic 
from surrounding countries or by penetrating foreign domestic markets that 
offer large concentrations of passengers with a propensity for foreign travel, 
such as the US market. Therefore, they were willing to make liberal 
concessions to the US in the way of multiple airlines' rights to all their major 
airports, plus unlimited fifth freedom beyond rights. In return, they would have 
the benefits of the lucrative fifth freedom traffic going to and from more US 
cities. 
Another reason why smaller states took the lead in negotiating open skies 
agreements was because they offered them the prospect of by-passing the 
"balance-of-benefits" principle and obtaining far greater access to the US 
market without any great risk of having US mega-carriers entering their much 
too small home markets. 
The example of the Netherlands and KLM will illustrate this interplay. KLM had 
always committed itself to be an "intercontinental" rather than a "European" 
airline. Its main long-standing objective was to obtain greater access to the 
US market, which was essential for its overall strategy and finances. Such 
access had been difficult to achieve because of the small size of the Dutch 
market and the "balance-of-benefits" principle included in the conventional 
ASAs. Through open skies, KLM saw the opportunity of establishing its hub, 
Amsterdam, as Europe's gateway to North America at the expense of its 
neighbours. With open skies and an immunized alliance with a US airline, it 
could offer greater capacity, more frequency and lower fares on North Atlantic 
services and thus draw passengers from neighbouring countries to 
Amsterdam. Passengers throughout Europe - London, Paris and Frankfurt - 
might decide - given the short surface and connecting air journeys within the 
European Union and the intense competition between the larger European 
airports - they could save money on long distance services by starting their 
long haul journeys from Amsterdam airport. 
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KLM was helped in its effort to build networks to draw traffic from 
neighbouring countries by the European Union liberalisation. As the single 
market abolished ASAs and the associated trading of rights within the 
European Union, it allowed European Union airlines to go deep into the 
domestic markets of other airlines to add traffic to their networks and transit 
hubs without fear of regulatory retaliation by other European states. 
US airlines on their side, having secured open skies could, by allying 
themselves with a European airline, tap into the extensive European feeder 
LI network" and offer "direct" service between smaller cities on their own 
domestic system and European cities through the European airlines' hub. 
Even though it was US authorities that had pursued these open skies 
agreements, the open skies approach provoked criticism on the US side. 
There were many who argued these airlines receive unfair advantage to open 
up their domestic markets to foreign competitors and give them a 
disproportionate share of passengers, when the foreign markets concerned 
offered limited traffic in return. The airlines however, of the smaller countries 
do not usually have the resources and domestic demand to be able to offer 
services to multiple US cities. 
The ulterior motive of the US giving such access to small airlines was to put 
pressure on larger, neighbouring countries to relax protection of their markets. 
In Europe, for example, by concluding liberal agreements with neighbouring 
Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Belgium, the US 
Authorities were hoping to place pressure on the other larger European 
countries - with much larger domestic markets - to give in to US demands for 
open skies agreements. Liberal agreements would serve to divert Italian, 
French, German or British-bound traffic to other European hubs served by 
cheaper scheduled services. 
This policy, in association with a policy of encouraging alliances between US 
and European airlines, was highly successful in diverting trade toward more 
cooperative countries such as the Netherlands. The Netherlands-US open 
skies agreement, for example, led to a substantial increase in North Atlantic 
traffic through Amsterdam, with a large proportion of the increase being traffic 
drawn from airports in neighbouring countries that were still under restrictive 
bilaterals. By 1995, Schiphol airport in Amsterdam had overtaken Charles de 
Gaulle airport in Paris as the fourth largest European hub, the number of 
transatlantic passengers flying through Amsterdam having grown by 74% 
between 1984 and 1994 (Staniland, 1999). This "Encirclement Strategy" 
worked as Germany, fearing that KLM might make inroads into its US- 
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Germany traffic, was induced to sign a more liberal bilateral and the UK 
renegotiated Bermuda 11 accepting more liberalised terms (Toh, 1998). 
The same "Encirclement Strategy" was used against Japan, using the liberal 
bilateral agreements concluded with South Korea, Singapore and Thailand as 
leverage. Japan eventually had to accept US demands for multiple airline 
designations joh, 1998). 
However, when larger countries concluded open skies agreements with the 
US and major European airlines entered into alliances with US airlines, 
smaller airlines lost the competitive edge they had over the larger European 
airlines. KLM, for example, could no more take advantage of the central 
location of its hub to obtain access to the densely populated central European 
market and create hub-and-spoke systems for collecting and redistributing 
traffic. It was then that it decided to negotiate the possibility of merger first with 
British Airways and then with Air France. 
2.2.4 European Commission's reaction 
The US campaign for open skies has provoked a counter campaign by the 
European Commission, whose aim was to frustrate the "divide and rule" 
strategy of Washington in response to the US campaign to liberalise 
transatlantic aviation through bilateral open skies agreements with individual 
Member-States (Staniland, 1999). The European Union was afraid that open 
skies would mean globalisation under US hegemony and that national airlines 
would be overwhelmed by the larger US airlines. There were many in Europe 
who claimed that even if many of the smaller States do not offer sufficient 
traffic to attract great expansion by US airlines, the domestic flag airlines 
might experience a relative decline in market share on routes that are crucial 
to them for earning revenue. 
The European Union's campaign has moved along legal and tactical grounds. 
On a legal level, the European Commission has throughout the 1990s 
asserted that it should take over the role of negotiator of traffic rights with third 
countries on behalf of the Member-States. The European Commission has 
argued that its authority and its jurisdiction over external trade agreements, 
sanctioned by Article 113 (now Article 133), should be maintained also in 
matters of aviation. It has claimed that whenever the European Community 
adopts common rules in a given sphere, the Member-States lose the power to 
contract with non-member countries obligations that affect those rules. Thus, 
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the Member-States are not entitled to undertake international obligations in 
such matters. 
The second legal argument put forth by the European Commission is that 
bilateral agreements between Member-States and "third countries" pose a 
threat to the coherence of the European Union market since they give airlines 
whose governments have signed such agreements a competitive edge over 
the rest. Their exclusive nationality clauses prevent the airlines of all Member- 
States from operating at will between airports in the European Union and 
airports in third countries. The Single Market means that all European Union 
airlines can operate long distance flights from points in Member-States other 
than their own while ASAs give exclusive privileges to one Member-State and 
its airlines rather than to all European Union airlines. 
Based on these arguments the European Commission challenged the legality 
of the open skies agreements signed by many member states with the US in 
the European Court of Justice. In November 2002, the European Court of 
Justice supported the European Commission by ruling that such agreements 
were incompatible with European Union legislation because of their exclusion 
of airlines from Member-States other than those that are signatories to the 
agreements. 
This ruling has resulted in the European Commission being given in June 
2003 the mandate it had been asking to commence negotiations on behalf of 
all member states with third non-member countries, and especially with the 
US. The European Commission has advocated an aviation free trade zone - 
that is the possibility of a single open transatlantic aviation area, the idea of a 
Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA). The prospect of the abolition of 
nationality and cabotage restrictions is aimed at increasing the attractiveness 
of a single transatlantic aviation zone for European industry. Compared to the 
open skies formula, the notion of a common aviation area offers significant 
"value added" as it would make it possible to complete the single aviation 
market within the European Union by permitting European airlines to fly from 
any European city to any city in the US, thus transcending the limits imposed 
by nationality requirements in open skies and other bilaterals. 
Tactically - and probably more persuasively for airlines - the European 
Commission argued that a better deal for Europe could be obtained by an 
authority and a regional bloc representing 374 million people than by fifteen or 
more independent authorities. A regional bloc has the critical mass to achieve 
a parity of markets and thus obtain a better "balance of benefits". 
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Section 2.3 Alliances and competitive concerns 
The level of cooperation between airlines within each global strategic alliance 
has raised increasing regulatory concern in terms of potential adverse impact 
on competition and consumers. What competitive authorities fear is that the 
cooperation of the former competitors creates strong giants that control almost 
the totality of the market share, making it very difficult if not impossible for the 
entry of new airlines in the market the alliance is dominating. Proposed global 
strategic alliances receive close examination by relevant national and regional 
regulatory bodies and, in some cases, certain regulatory measures have been 
introduced to ameliorate the potential anti-competitive aspects of the 
arrangements. 
Antitrust immunity and European Union exemption are crucial to the success 
of an international alliance because it allows the airlines to coordinate their 
schedules and fares, combine operations, pool revenues and offer volume 
discounts to cooperations. 
2.3.1 Antitrust immunity 
The US government is given by law the authority to grant immunity from US 
antitrust laws to agreements in foreign air transportation if these agreements 
are in the public interest and are necessary to permit implementation of an 
approved cooperative agreement. Antitrust immunity provides airlines with 
considerable freedom to jointly plan their code shares, schedules and pricing 
policy. The US government was prepared to grant antitrust immunity and 
access to more US gateway points to alliance partners in exchange for 
agreements with foreign countries agreeing to liberal open skies - and the 
associated issues of market access, frequencies and pricing freedom. The 
approval of the application of Northwest Airlines and KLM, in November 1992, 
is an action closely linked to the September 1992 bilateral open skies 
agreement between the US and the Netherlands. By contrast, in the British 
Airways-American Airlines's application for antitrust immunity the US 
authorities, considering that there is no open skies between the United 
Kingdom and United States, have imposed conditions - the divestiture of a 
significant number of weekly slots at London-Heathrow - which were certain 
to be rejected by the airlines. As this precondition would give US and 
European competitor airlines access to the slot-congested airport, thus 
depriving British Airways and American Airlines of their key competitive 
advantage, dominance over the transatlantic market, these two airlines 
dropped their plans for an immunised alliance. 
67 
Cranýeld The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic 
The US position to global strategic alliances has generally been positive 
believing that they play a key role in the evolving international aviation 
economic and competitive environment as they provide improved, more 
competitive services in thousands of markets. It is also supported the view 
that antitrust immunity increases the quality and competitiveness of air 
services. 
More specifically, the US DOT recognises that global strategic alliances are a 
response to aviation liberalisation and the evolving competitive environment, 
and are a practical way to provide better services to thousands of passengers 
in long distance, low-density international markets (Soames, 2000). It further 
argues that alliances have fuelled enormous increases in connecting traffic 
both in markets that have historically suffered from poor quality interline 
service and virtually no competitive benefits and in markets that already have 
the benefit of seamless service by other individual airlines by providing 
services alternatives. Alliances, according to the US DOT, are stimulating 
demand, lead to pro-competitive changes in industry structure and provide 
customers the benefits of substantially lower prices or according to a US DOT 
study "a Ilia nce-based networks are the principal driving force behind 
transatlantic price reductions and traffic gains" (Aviation Strategy, September 
2001). 
2.3.2 European Union Exemption 
In Europe both national and European Union authorities are competent to rule 
on agreements affecting competition on air services. European Commission 
authorities only cover air transport between European Union airports and do 
not have investigation and enforcement powers as regards air transport 
between European Union and "third countries", as these authorities are 
shared with the national governments. The European Commission examines 
the specific terms of the alliance-forming agreements but it also looks at the 
alliance itself as a contractual whole with respect to its potential impact on 
competition. 
With regard to alliances between European Union airlines the European 
Commission has argued on several cases that "airline alliances play an 
important role in this consolidation process. They can produce benefits by 
extending networks and improving efficiency. However, they can also restrict 
competition on certain markets, in particular on routes between hubs of the 
alliance partners. When assessing such alliances under its competition rules, 
the Commission therefore has to weigh the benefits in terms of network 
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synergies against the potential losses arising from the reduction in 
competition. In order to minimise the latter, often remedies are imposed on the 
alliance partners" (European Commission, Competition in Aviation Policy, 
CPN3-D2). 
When examining an alliance, the European Commission requires that the 
merger of the complementary networks of the allies results in technical and 
economic progress, given the improvements in connectivity and the cost 
savings and synergies achieved through a wider choice of air transport 
services to more destinations, better connections and convenient scheduling, 
and seamless travel. It further examines whether the co-ordination and 
extension of the Parties' scheduled networks creates a more efficient network 
and whether it improves connections, whether the alliance will lead to 
improvements in service quality that will be attractive to consumers and 
whether there will be benefits from reductions in fares. When it concludes that 
there will be significant loss of competition resulting from the alliance, it 
imposes a number of remedies on the parties, including: divestiture of slots in 
order to enable competitors to mount connecting services on certain specific 
routes on which the conclusion of the alliance led to the elimination of 
potential competition between alliance members, price reduction mechanism, 
the obligation to enter into Special Prorate Agreements and inter-modal 
agreements, reduction of frequencies on the hub-hub routes on which the 
services between the airline alliance members overlap, precluding members 
from pooling their FFPs or requiring them to allow competitors without 
comparable FFPs to participate in the joint alliance FFP. 
The European Commission's position is in contrast to that of US DOT since it 
has on several occasions expressed reservations towards alliances. The 
European Commission has always disputed the advantages of hub 
competition over point-to-point service. It has expressed the opinion that the 
agreements between airlines could lead to "fortress hubs, '7 creating barriers to 
new entrants and thus stifling liberalization. 
it is argued that the European Commission uses the alliance investigation in 
order to extend the scope to the existing open skies agreements concluded 
between the relevant European Union member states and the US. This 
attitude is similar to the US DOT policy of consistently granting antitrust 
immunity to transatlantic alliances subject to the conclusion of open skies 
agreements between the US and the governments of the national European 
Union airlines involved. 
7 "Fortress hubs": where one airline controls more than 60% percent of the traffic and 
where in the absence of competition the major airlines are able to charge excessive fares. 
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Summary 
Regulatory provisions have played a paradoxical role in the air transport 
industry development. Nationality provisions and the relevant traffic rights 
have acted as a disincentive to the physical absorption, mergers, acquisitions 
of airlines by other airlines. At the same time, both nationality provisions and 
cabotage have provoked airlines to create global alliances as a second-best 
way of integrating markets when regulation prevents taking over a foreign 
airline and prohibits operating domestic services in a foreign market. 
The airlines in their effort to extend their network to meet the needs of the 
it global village" have had to interact with regulatory authorities whether in 
teamwork or in conflict. Unsurprisingly, it was the European and US airlines 
that led and set the pace of the movement since they were those that had 
most to gain from liberalisation and most to lose for restrictions. It is difficult to 
say whether the authorities gave in to the lobbying of the airlines or whether 
airlines' strategy was a reaction to regulatory developments. As always, the 
truth is somewhere in the middle. 
By whatever route, the air transport industry moves toward greater 
liberalization, the impact of such liberalization will depend as it did in the past 
on the continuous interaction between airlines - and their strategies - and the 
public bodies and the regulatory framework they impose. The scale and 
dynamics of the industry will probably lead in the near or medium future to the 
abandonment of the Chicago regime. 
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Chapter 3 
Airline 
Alliances 
The main driver between alliance formation has been the need for increased 
network coverage, which could secure increased traffic. The main obstacle 
was the regulatory framework (presented in the previous chapter), which 
forced them to exploit the size they could acquire through the formation of 
alliances. A corollary result of this restriction was that it allowed airlines to 
seek their aims easier, cheaper, with lesser risks and more chances of 
success. The first section of this chapter will start with the definition of airline 
alliances and will focus on the different forms of cooperation alliances adopt. 
Some of the forms of cooperation have been abandoned and these will be 
presented briefly; those forms of cooperation that have been and still are the 
core of airline alliances will be presented more extensively and will be 
accompanied by comments on the way they contribute to the more effective 
operation of the allied partners. 
Since alliances' impact on traffic constitutes the main focus of the second part 
of the thesis, the second section will begin by discussing the way alliances 
structure traffic flows to meet the strategic goals of traffic feed, network 
coverage and new market access. Special attention will be paid to the 
economies of scale, scope and traffic density that result from alliances and the 
important role of hub control. 
The benefits and problems airlines alliances have experienced on different 
levels and operations will be the theme of the third section. A more recent 
parameter of airline cooperation has been the effort to achieve cost reduction, 
and therefore it will be presented more extensively. 
The chapter will finish by referring to the external, horizontal and vertical 
alliances airlines have concluded and to the possibility of alliances moving to 
mergers (fourth section). 
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Section 3.1 Airline Alliance definition 
IATA in the Glossary of 'most commonly used air passenger terms", included 
in its "Recommended practice 1008", provides the following definition for an 
it airline alliance": three or more airlines participating in commercial relationship 
or joint venture, where (i) a joint and commonly identifiable product is 
marketed under a single commercial name or brand; and (ii) this commercial 
name or brand is promoted to the public through the airlines participating in 
the alliance and its agents; and (iii) the commercial name or brand is used to 
identify the alliance services at airports and other service delivery points in 
situations where bilateral agreements exist, e. g. code share agreements. 
The first point that should be made in relation to the above definition is the 
recognition by IATA that an airline alliance is by definition a multilateral 
alliance, which is not what happens in the other industry sectors where 
bilateral agreements qualify as alliances. This seems quite plausible given 
that many partners are needed to achieve global coverage. 
Interestingly enough, ICAO does not have any formal definition of alliances 
because, as its Air Transport Director put it, "the nature and scope of alliances 
vary so widely". 
The literature on airlines alliances provides various definitions. According to a 
one of them "A strategic airline alliance is a long term partnership of two or 
more firms who attempt to enhance advantages collectively vis-A-vis their 
competitors by sharing scarce resources including brand assets and market 
access capability, enhancing service quality, and thereby improving 
profitability ... a strategic alliance 
is one involving strategic commitment by top 
management to link up a substantial part of their respective route networks as 
well as collaborating on some key areas of airline business" (Oum, 2000). 
According to another definition, that focuses mainly on the commercial and 
operational cooperation, an airline alliance is formed when two or more 
airlines agree to cooperate in a number of fields such as scheduling, 
marketing, purchasing, administration, maintenance and frequent flyer 
programmes. The member alliances are likely to have generally 
complementary services without much overlap (Mason, 2002). This definition 
is accepted by prestigious audit organizations such as Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, which carried out a report (1998) on Airline Alliances for the 
Association of European Airlines. 
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The definition provided in the research carried out under the auspices of the 
Institute of Air Transport focuses mainly on the global character of the 
alliances. This definition states that the essential characteristics of an alliance 
are their global ambitions - that is their aim to grow in the world market, their 
multinational character and the linking of intercontinental routes. In many 
cases alliances evolved around already existing cooperating airline pairs as in 
the case of the Star Alliance, which unites Lufthansa/United Airlines and 
Lufthansa/SAS (Naveau, 2001). 
Section 3.2 Types of Airline Alliances 
Airlines cooperate in different areas and at different degrees in the effort to 
enhance their profitability. These areas are usually the following (Oum, 2000): 
Code share/Joint operations 
FFP cooperation 
Joint use ground facilities 
Flight schedule coordination 
Joint advertising and marketing 
Ground handling coordination 
CRS/lT sharing and development 
Joint purchase of fuel etc 
Joint maintenance 
Block space agreements 
Exchange of cabin crew 
Alliance activities such as coordination of ground handling, joint use of ground 
facilities, joint development of systems, joint maintenance etc are designed to 
improve primarily productivity and costs. Other alliance activities such as code 
share, block seat sales, coordination of flight schedules, joint advertising and 
promotion etc. are designed to improve sales and revenue opportunities. All 
cooperative fields though are likely to have direct impacts on hub domination, 
market power and cost savings and may ultimately increase market share. 
Some areas of joint and coordinated activities - such as joint development of 
IT systems, joint advertising, joint maintenance and joint purchase of fuel and 
supplies - require an increased degree of commitment between alliance 
partners; commitment measured in terms of coordination, shared strategy and 
operation. In general, as the areas of coordination are extended to higher 
levels of joint activities, relationship between alliance partners gets stronger 
and elevates to a higher or more integrated level of cooperation, from tactical 
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to strategic. Strategic alliances do involve commitment and integration greater 
than that required by tactical alliances. 
Tactical alliances are very narrow in scope and cooperation is usually 
restricted to coordination of activities on a few routes without combining 
networks. They often take the form of two airlines cross-selling each other's 
capacity on selected routes, or one airline marketing its code on another's 
flights. They involve code share, blocked space and FFP links and to a lesser 
extent joint use of airport facilities such as gates and lounges, and 
coordination of ground handling. It is the simplest form of alliance, involving a 
lower level of commitment and designed to reap benefits in the short term. 
Their most useful functions are to restrict competition on a route, or to take 
feed traffic away from others. They have been very popular because of the 
rapid payoffs they offer and the relative ease with which they can be 
managed. They can act though as stepping-stones to wider-ranging alliances. 
While in 1996, according to a survey conducted by the "Airline Business" 
magazine, the number of tactical alliances outweighed that of strategic ones; 
today it is the exact opposite. One could say that tactical alliances coincided 
with the "trial phase" of airline alliances, when airlines were testing the 
partners fit and the alliance strategy benefits. Now that the situation seems to 
have become more stable, alliances are moving into deeper cooperation, to 
strategic alliances. Still, there are major international alliances that rely on 
tactical relationships to ensure global coverage. 
Apart from the global strategic alliances, which are the focus of the present 
thesis, there are regional alliances which are formed by airlines operating in a 
specific geographical region, such as the one formed by six Chinese local 
airlines to befter compete in an increasingly fierce market, or the one formed 
among regional airlines in the Caribbean. 
The figure below presents the evolution of airline alliances, both in a historical 
perspective and on a cooperation level. Airlines first started to tentatively 
cooperate on a marketing level through interline agreement, moved to code 
share and as they secured antitrust immunity from competent national 
authorities - which was essential for their efficient operation as Chapter 2 has 
indicated - they proceeded to form truly global strategic alliances, that is to 
jointly coordinate flight schedules and set fares. 
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Figure 3.1 
Development of partnerships 
Global families 
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Code share 
Interline 
No 
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Source: Lobbenberg (2002) 
The two categories of global alliances that will be examined within the 
framework of this thesis are: 
marketing alliances 
strategic alliances 
Apart from the different purposes they serve as will be shown below the most 
distinctive differences are first that marketing alliances are most definitely not 
exclusive and second that airlines involved in them are still marketed as 
independent entities. 
3.2.1 Marketing alliances 
These are market-oriented alliances focusing mainly on improving the product 
being offered to consumers in order to increase traffic flows, load factor and 
market share. In marketing alliances the partners continue to operate and use 
their assets independently, each pursuing its own objectives. 
Marketing alliances can involve the following areas and forms of cooperation: 
0 Interline/pro-rate agreements 
Lounge access/Mutual ground handling 
Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFP) 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) 
Joint engineering/maintenance 
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" Code share agreements 
" Pooling agreements 
A. Interline/pro-rate agreements 
Interline agreements are agreements as to the sale, endorsement and 
acceptance of tickets between airlines so that passengers and cargo can 
transfer from one airline to the other on the way to the final destination and 
involve the coordination of, for example, baggage checks, carriage or air 
cargo. Under interline agreements, the airlines maintain their own identity. 
An interline passenger travelling with a single ticket on two or more sectors 
uses a through fare for a journey involving two or more separate airlines and 
is charged the end-to-end fare, not the sum of the separate fares on each 
sector. The method used to share the revenue earned between the different 
sectors flown is pro-rating, defined in IATA's "Glossary of Commonly Used Air 
Passenger Terms" as the division of a joint fare, rate or charge between the 
airlines concerned on an agreed basis. 
The interline system used to be a very important constituent of international 
air transport as it represented as a much as a third of an airline's total traffic 
and was particularly prevalent on routes serving geographical hub airports 
such as London-Heathrow, New York, Amsterdam or Singapore which were 
major interline centres. With the development of airline alliances the interline 
system is gradually disappearing as allied partners interline preferentially with 
each other via code share. Besides, with the development of effective hub- 
and-spokes systems, airlines focus on transferring passengers to their own 
flights or to those of their allies at their hubs. 
According to the US DOT, there are important differences between code 
share and interline agreements and more specifically, interline agreements do 
not include reciprocal frequent flyer and airport lounge rights and airlines will 
generally not hold outgoing connecting flights to wait for delayed incoming 
flights. Most importantly however, fares for code shared flights are generally 
much cheaper than for interline flights (GAO/RCED-99-37). 
B. Lounge access/Mutual ground handling 
Within this cooperation framework, most allied partners operate reciprocal 
and/or mutual ground handling, share facilities and passenger handling - 
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passenger lounges and terminal facilities - in jointly served cities, allowing 
their customers to have access to the other partner's business lounges. The 
one partner handles the ground handling service in its home market and 
provides check-in service to all connections for all its partners. Its aim is to 
coordinate, streamline and enhance passenger service, such as baggage 
handling, check-in and ticketing, by providing for example one stop check-in 
between any two partners connection, where boarding passes and seat 
allocation are given for all legs of the trip at the first check-in point. 
Star Alliance, for example, has identified 27 key hubs worldwide to start the 
integration process of sharing and developing common airport facilities and 
ground services. At each station one airline was appointed "landlord" and 
given the responsibility for airport service like check-in and ticketing for all the 
other alliance members. Since the other airlines do not retain any activity in 
these hubs, the program implied a take over of the entire staff of all the other 
partner airlines by the "landlord" airline. The next step will probably be for the 
development of entire terminals dedicated for the alliances: Star Alliance for 
example, will take Terminal 4 at Heathrow when Terminal 5 will be built. 
This form of cooperation serves a double purpose, passenger satisfaction and 
cost savings. 
Common check-in lessens time, increases speed of service to the customer. 
The use of the same terminal for the coordination of schedules and flights 
reduces the inconvenience, and waste of time of passengers, thereby 
increasing their satisfaction and attracting more passengers. Passengers 
travelling on British Airways do not have to change terminal to board Qantas, 
while passengers flying on an airline not a member of the alliance have to 
move from Terminal 2 or 3 to Terminal 4 in London-Heathrow Airport. 
Passengers get the feeling, even when flying on another airline, a member of 
the alliance that they are flying on the airlines they usually fly on as they enjoy 
the same benefits and privileges. And satisfied customers are loyal 
customers. 
On a cost level, airlines can reduce their costs by avoiding duplication of 
operations. An airline instead of creating lounges, maintenance and ground 
handling facilities at each airport and having personnel stationed at other 
countries' airports, uses those of the other airlines, members of the alliance, 
or they create them jointly, thereby reducing costs. 
Furthermore, as the outsourcing of ground handling services becomes a 
certainty, as was presented in Chapter 1, allied partners enjoy greater 
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negotiating power and can secure better facilities and charges with 
independent ground handlers through joint contracts. 
This form of cooperation has been extended to include common sales offices. 
Airlines represent in their respective home markets the other members of the 
alliances and for that reason an airline does not need any more to maintain 
offices in other countries since it is the flag airline that assumes these duties 
in his home market. Star Alliance for example maintains Star Alliance city 
offices in London and Paris, thus the partners do not have to maintain 
independent sales offices. And this certainly contributes to the creation of the 
brand image of the alliance. 
C. Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFP) 
A FFP is a purchase incentive plan that rewards passengers for repeat 
patronage of the services of a particular airline or alliance. Under such 
schemes, passengers, "frequent flyers", accrue points for each flight on a 
particular airline or alliance. As their points build up they are entitled to 
attractive free flights or other travel benefits. The first FFP was launched by 
American Airlines in 1981 and this was so successful that other US airlines 
and European airlines introduced similar schemes. 
The major aim behind the establishment of such programmes is simply to sell 
more seats; this is achieved by ensuring the loyalty of passengers, by 
encouraging them to use on-line connections with the same airline rather than 
interlining on to a different airline and to choose the same airline for their 
future flights. In the marketing of FFPs airlines target business class full-fare 
passengers. Although these passengers typically represent only around 20% 
of total traffic, their contribution to total revenue is much higher, about 50%. 
Hence, if the FFP succeeds in securing the loyalty of high yield passengers, 
the potential gains from FFPs can be large, especially, as this lock-in effect 
means that they become even less cross-price elastic than they were before. 
Evidently airlines with more extensive networks have much more attractive 
FFPs because they offer many more opportunities both to earn mileage points 
and to spend them. This marketing benefit arises primarily from larger scope, 
that is geographical spread, rather than size, and it is exactly what an airline 
alliance can offer. According to the Chairman of Lufthansa, member of Star 
Alliance, the combined FFPs" is the glue to hold the alliance together" (JUrgen 
Weber, quoted in Airline Business, August 1997). As most alliances include 
fully reciprocal, worldwide FFPs, passengers can accrue benefits on a wider 
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range of flights and transfer bonuses in the different FFPs of the allied 
partners. 
By extending reciprocal FFP memberships to each other's passengers 
alliance members promote loyalty schemes to the alliance as a whole. These 
programmes, combined with integrated customer services and more seamless 
travel, can increase passenger numbers significantly. Alliances have 
structured their FFPs in a way that they do not only offer a wider network but 
also related products (hotels, car rental programs) at much more competitive 
packages, which contributes even more in the retention of passengers. The 
critical mass of alliances enables them to conclude agreements at competitive 
prices with rent-car companies, hotels, credit card institutions, namely to offer 
their customers a more global service. 
FFPs increase market share, create strategic advantage and reduce the 
potential for competition in two ways, on a route level and on the hub level 
and thus they can be a significant barrier to entry. Therefore, FFPs seem to 
be a significant barrier to entry since airlines can utilise their FFPs in a 
predatory or anticompetitive manner by adjusting the rewards so that mileage 
and other bonuses are temporarily increased on routes on which they face 
competition. 
Firstly, the more extensive the network to which the FFP applies, the greater 
the advantage the members of a global alliance will have over smaller non- 
alliance airlines in competition for high yield business travellers. These 
passengers are given through coordinated FFPs a rewards incentive to 
concentrate their flying on airlines within a particular alliance and the more 
global the networks of the alliances become, the less need there will be for 
passengers to use non-alliance airlines. 
Secondly, an airline that actually dominates a particular hub - and thus routes 
from and to the hubs - gains more important customer loyalty advantages 
from FFPs. Frequent flyers in the hub city could become "captive" to the hub 
airline. 
In these two ways FFPs increase market power by increasing the costs of 
switching from an airline to another, lowering cross-elasticities of demand and 
reducing incentives for competitive price-cutting. 
It is believed however, that the power of FFPs to ensure passenger loyalty 
has been slowly eroded as frequent flyers have each become members of 
different schemes or as airline alliances allow such passengers to earn 
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transferable points when flying with an airline to whose scheme they do not 
belong (Doganis, 2002). And this is reflected in the results of a relevant 1999 
survey in which membership to an FFP programme has been recorded among 
business travellers only as the third most important factor that influences the 
decision as to which airline to fly, with convenient scheduling and reputation 
for safety ranked first and second respectively (Doganis, 2002). 
D. Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) 
One of the first areas where airline cooperation appeared was in financing the 
enormous cost of the major CRSs and their associated communications 
networks developed in the 1980s. CRSs were developed in order to automate 
and facilitate reservations and ticketing both by the airlines themselves and 
travel agents. As CRSs required huge investments of billions of dollars in 
hardware, software and technological expertise, which could not be financed 
by individual airlines, airlines grouped together in consortia to share high 
developments costs as well as their existing sales outlets. 
US airlines pioneered the development and effective exploitation of CRSs with 
United's "Apollo" and American Airlines "Sabre" systems being the first to be 
developed. Because of fears that CIRS markets would be dominated by the 
two largest systems in the United States conferring on the two "host" airlines 
enormous market power, airlines in other regions of the world grouped 
together to establish their own large systems, such as Galileo and Amadeus 
in Europe and Axess and Abacus in the Far East. The Five "super" regional 
GDSs (Global Distribution Systems - as CRS are now called) that emerged - 
Sabre, Worldspan (in the United States), Amadeus, Galileo (in Europe) and 
Abacus (in the Far East) account for 80% of CRS locations and 85% of CIRS 
terminals. In the United States, the largest market share is taken by Sabre, in 
Europe Amadeus has approximately half the market. 
Alliance partners reap substantial gains from advantages associated with 
CRS display, and the following explains why. A code shared non-stop flight is 
listed twice in the CIRS screen because both partners list the same flight, with 
different designator codes and flight numbers, as their own. CIRS screens list 
code shared connecting flights ahead of interline flights. Furthermore, a code 
shared flight with one connection gets listed three times in the screen. Which 
means that these multiple listings of the same flight push down the screen or 
on to the next screen the non-aligned airline flights. 
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Because of fears that the dominance of CRS in particular countries or markets 
could give considerable market power to code shared allies, the European 
Commission and US Authorities forbid display bias and require charges to be 
reasonable and non discriminatory. But many of the original regulatory 
concerns with CRSs have diminished in recent years as CRSs are becoming 
increasingly independent of their airline owners, operating more and more as 
businesses in their own right and give no preferential treatment to any 
particular one of the owners. 
Air transport industry developments have however significantly altered CRSs' 
role. While CRSs were developed on a regional basis, alliances formed for the 
purpose of traffic feed tend to be between airlines based in different regions. 
So in the 1990s many airlines that were partners in the same CRS found 
themselves in competing global alliances. 
The increasing use of the Internet for reservations and the rapid development 
of e-commerce, which permit both travel agencies and airlines to bypass 
CRSs, are eroding the importance of CRSs as provider of airline reservations. 
British Airways and KLM, for example, realising that participation in a CIRS is 
no longer a core-activity and no longer provides them with a competitive edge, 
have sold their shares in Galileo. 
The following table presents how a Star Alliance flight is displayed on the 
different CIRS systems. This table confirms that the flight is shown as effected 
by the alliance (the indicator A) and not by the individual allied airlines. 
Table 3.1 
Star Alliance CRS system 
A common Star Alliance availability display containing only Star Alliance airlines' 
flights is available in Amadeus, Galileo, Inflni, Apollo, Sabre, Abacus and Worldspan 
Example for flights from London-Heathrow to Bangkok: 
- System Entry 
APOLLO A DDMMM LHRBKK +rA (please enter: "end Rem" instead of +) 
ABACUS 1 DDMMM LHRBKK / rA (please enter: "cross of lorraine" instead of +) 
GALILEO A DDMMM LHRBKK +rA 
(please enter: "Yen mark" instead of +) 
SABRE I DDMMM LHRBKK +rA (please enter: "cross of lorraine' instead of +) 
WORLDSPAN A DDMMM LHRBKK -1*A 
*A: Indicator to obtain Star Alliance availability 
Reciprocal access to Passenger Name Records (PNRs), covering display and update capability, is under 
development 
Source: StarAlliance (June 2001) 
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E. Joint engineering/maintenance 
Maintenance consortia were purely cost-motivated agreements: to share the 
maintenance and overhaul of the fleets of the constituent airlines in order to 
keep down the costs of the infrastructure and equipment needed to run a 
heavy maintenance programme. The airlines realised that a fleet size of at 
least 20 aircraft was needed by each airline to justify the necessary 
investments in hangars, equipment and simulators (Learmount, 1989). The 
creation of a consortium would allow the airlines to spread the cost of the 
capital outlay by allowing individual members to specialise and would further 
reduce cost by eliminating duplication of equipment, training and spare 
inventories. Each airline would specialise in certain aspects of maintenance, 
whether airframes, engines, avionics or landing gear or to concentrate on 
particular aircraft types. Economies of scale would be reaped as buildings, 
facilities and labour were utilised optimally, and investment costs for spare 
would be reduced. In this way savings in aircraft maintenance of the order of 
some 10 to 20% could be achieved (Learmount, 1989). Another reason apart 
from maintenance cost saving was to increase safety and guarantee quality 
as lack of quality meant costly time on the ground. 
At the same time these consortia presented some disadvantages such as the 
increasingly complex decision-making processes and the increasing and time- 
consuming transportation and communication costs, as well as the very long 
term commitment. While a certain amount of flexibility was lost because there 
are four airlines, for example, instead of one, it is more than compensated for 
by the financial benefits and improvement in efficiency. 
Two consortia were established in the 1960s among European airlines to 
share and coordinate expensive manufacturing facilities. 
KSSU, an acronymic name after the founding partners, was founded in 1970 
by KLM, SAS, Swissair and UTA. But its origins go back to 1968 when SAS 
and Swissair decided to cooperate on the maintenance of DC-8s, Caravelles 
and Coronados. The KSSU was a simple arrangement under which heavy 
maintenance responsibility for the aircraft types, their engines and major 
components was split among the partner airlines. KLM was for example 
responsible for almost all KSSUs Boeing 747s. There was no duplication of 
buildings or heavy maintenance equipment and substantial savings were 
made from buying spares jointly and improving overseas supply logistics. 
Atlas was founded in 1968 by Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa and Sabena, with 
Iberia joining in 1972. Originally, a complex model of work-sharing was 
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developed to ensure an equitable spread among the partners. Air France for 
example specialised on Boeing 747 airframes and landing gear with Lufthansa 
on Airbus A300 airframes and landing gear plus JT91D engines. In 1989 three 
of the Atlas members - Lufthansa, Air France and Iberia - went even further 
and signed a more comprehensive agreement covering harmonisation of 
aircraft purchasing policies, establishing a joint catering company, joint 
training of pilots and increased collaboration of computer reservation systems. 
The Atlas consortium is now formally disbanded, but some cooperation 
continues on a bilateral subcontracting basis. 
In both consortia while the group members collaborated deeply on 
maintenance, they remained independent, preserved the separate identity and 
remained highly competitive in commercial matters. 
Air transport industry developments, especially the emergence of airline 
alliances, have outgrown the economic significance of these consortia. Major 
airlines have acquired by now fleets of substantial size and the necessary 
level of expertise to justify investing in and setting up their own maintenance 
facilities. Furthermore, membership of the maintenance consortia does not 
correspond to membership of the global alliances; for example, the three 
members of Atlas belong to three separate global alliances. Future 
cooperation on maintenance is going to be more with partners in the same 
global alliance than in traditional maintenance consortia. 
F. Code share agreements 
According to ICAO (Circular 296-AT/1 10,1997) code share is the practice 
whereby one airline permits a second airline to use its airline designator code 
on a flight, or where two airlines share the same airline designator code on a 
flight. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines it as "a marketing 
arrangement that permits [ ... ]a carrier to sell service under its name and 
airline designator code when the service is provided in whole or part by 
another air carrier". Consequently, the use of code share permits the offer and 
sale of transportation services involving more than one airline (which would 
normally be considered as "interline") as if they were transportation services 
on one airline (which would be normally be characteristic of "on-line"). In its 
application, each airline sells seats on the other airline's flights under its own 
flight numbers that is as it were its own and passengers actually fly on an 
airline other than the one identified on the ticket. 
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The figure below depicts the way code share is performed: airlines code share 
on the hub-hub route with one of each or both airlines performing the flight 
using the designated code; once arriving at hub B passengers continue their 
trip to behind points with the remaining passengers of the airline that started 
the flight at hub A even if it is performed by the other airline. 
Figure 3.2 
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Code share has been the most prevalent element in multinational airline 
alliance arrangements. In the simplest case, an international code share 
alliance links the route network of one airline with the route network of 
another, forming an end-to-end alliance with little overlap. It was motivated by 
the need to satisfy passengers that prefer to remain online whenever possible. 
Furthermore, the increased non-stop flights between Southeast Asia and 
Europe, between Southeast Asia and the West Coast of the United States 
pushed airlines to conclude code share agreements because stops would put 
airlines in severe competitive disadvantages. 
Besides the competitive advantage code shared flights secure through the 
better display position in CRS, other motives that led to the conclusion of code 
share agreements are related to where airlines' desire to maintain, protect and 
improve their positions in the market. Code share is an inexpensive marketing 
tool that helps airlines: 
To achieve better presence on routes they do not fly. 
To enable joint operations airlines to operate a viable service where 
traffic volumes do not justify individual operations by two airlines: for 
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example Delta Air Lines and Sabena code shared on a Delta Air Lines 
- operated flight between Brussels and Atlanta. 
To remain competitive or, in some cases, to enhance competitive 
position by obtaining feeder traffic: for example bmi British Midland 
feeding United's transatlantic operations out of London-Heathrow. 
To obtain increased market access to points hitherto restricted by 
capacity provisions in ASAs. 
Code share may involve a major airline sharing its code with a smaller feeder 
airline, usually a regional/commuter airline, which may or may not be owned 
by the major airline, to enhance consumer recognition and create the illusion 
of "seamless service". It can also be an arrangement between two or, in some 
instances, three or more airlines based in different countries for a flight 
operated cooperatively, such as a joint venture flight, or for a connecting 
service which uses the same code. In international markets the practice 
generally involves use of both parties' designator codes on a route operated 
by just one of the airlines concerned. 
The most common forms of code share are: 
a. Block space 
Block space occurs when a number of passenger seats and/or specified 
space are purchased by an airline for the carriage of its traffic on an aircraft of 
a second airline. Block space predated code share as a practice and was 
used to optimise available capacity, but it evolved into code share 
arrangements. 
Figure 3.3 
Block space 
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b. Free-flow 
In a free-flow (or dynamic inventory) agreement, aircraft capacity is not initially 
shared out. The operating airline manages all the available seats in its own 
inventory. The marketing company or companies sell a notional flight - that is 
a flight that exists in commercial terms - through their CRS, with their own 
reservation classes, which will "dip" into the inventory of the operating airline 
using an equivalence table. This actually means that the flight is shared by 
two or more airlines. 
Figure 3.4 
Free-flow 
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The theoretical benefits of code share include traffic synergy, the resulting 
revenue and cost savings from joint services and economies of scale. It has 
been calculated that a percentage point increase of the transatlantic 
passenger load factor could provide an extra 24 million US$ for a major airline 
(ICAO Circular 269,1997). 
The example of the KLM/Northwest Airline alliance will illustrate better the 
benefits arising from code sharing and how KLM managed to be a major 
international airline without having a large domestic "origin and destination" 
market. The partners have claimed for the 1994 financial year that revenues 
had been boosted by 100 million US$ for the European airline, and by 150 
million US$ for the US airline. These gains do not come only from the routes 
covered by the code share agreement but also from an increase in interline 
traffic between two partners. KLM's load factor on US routes has been 
boosted by 5% since 1993. Traffic between the Netherlands and US grew by 
a 13.6% yearly average between 1990 and 1995, while the whole Europe/US 
traffic was only progressing by 3.5% per year. Amsterdam hub has been 
being used to channel flights to and from beyond destinations at the expense 
of other European hubs. 
Depending on market circumstances, code share can be either pro- or anti- 
competitive in its implications. It can be pro-competitive if it allows two airlines 
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to link in order to compete more effectively against another airline with a larger 
network or better geographical coverage in certain market areas. For 
example, United Airlines and bmi British Midland can together compete 
against British Airways's more combined North Atlantic, UK domestic and 
short haul European network than each one would be able to in isolation. 
Also, Virgin Atlantic and Malaysian Airlines can together compete against 
British Airways and Qantas in the UK-Australia market. 
On the other hand, where it is used simply to reduce the number of operators 
on a route - as Delta Air Lines does in thin North Atlantic markets - the 
outcome can be anti-competitive, although in this case it might possible to 
argue that without code share, on some routes non-stop service would be lost. 
G. Pooling agreements 
Pooling is a traditional form of inter-airline cooperation, often sanctioned or 
even required by bilateral agreements and usually motivated by capacity 
considerations. The pooling agreements involve flights identified by the 
designator codes of two airlines that typically have agreed to share revenues 
and/or costs. Two airlines cooperate on all aspects of the flight splitting costs 
and sharing profits. Both airlines charge identical fares and there is no 
competition between the "partners" for traffic. 
Under pooling agreements the revenue earned by different airlines operating 
a particular route is shared between them in accordance with a particular 
formula. In some cases revenues were divided up in proportion to the capacity 
offered by each airline. In others, airlines pooled revenues only up to a certain 
percentage of seats sold, or by some other more complex revenue allocation 
scheme. Pooling agreements also often provided for cooperative scheduling 
and joint marketing, two things that are important aspects of the alliances 
airlines are currently entering into. Most pooling agreements were between 
airlines operating the same route whereas the current alliances are mostly 
between airlines operating different routes. 
Pooling agreements are the first stage towards the formation of alliances but 
they have been replaced - with the help of liberalisation - by code share, 
block space or other interline agreements, whose prime objective is the same, 
namely to coordinate schedules, avoid capacity or frequency competition and 
thereby push up load factors. Today pooling agreements can be found only 
among some Asian, Middle East and African airlines (Doganis, 2002). 
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3.2.2 Strategic alliances 
A strategic alliance is one where the partners mingle their assets in order to 
pursue a single or joint set of business objectives. Co-mingled assets may be 
terminal facilities, maintenance bases, aircraft, staff, traffic rights or capital 
resources. If two or more airlines offer a common brand and a uniform service 
standard then that means they are co-mingling their assets and have moved 
into a strategic alliance (Doganis, 2001). Strategic alliances are so named 
because cooperation exists in a wide rage of activities ranging from sales and 
marketing to purchasing and maintenance and takes a long term view and 
because involvement is at all levels in the company, from chief executive to 
baggage handler. 
When we have a strategic alliance, the partners cooperate in almost all areas 
of joint activities presented under marketing alliances, including such areas as 
exchange of flight crews (Delta Air Lines and Swissair used that form of 
cooperation), joint advertising and promotion, and joint purchase of fuel, other 
supplies and possibly aircraft. Reciprocal FFP recognition, coordinated 
schedules and some fare planning - provided they get regulatory approval - 
are characteristics of strategic airline alliances with the ultimate goal of 
delivering "seamless" travel experience to the entire alliance network. Some 
partners, such as the British Airways-Qantas alliance, further integrate their 
operations in maintenance, purchasing and inventory management. But none 
of these characteristics alone nor all of them together are sufficient to elevate 
the level of cooperation to a strategic one. It is the higher level of commitment 
and the higher degree of coordination that makes an alliance truly strategic. 
The degree of integration must be made stronger by joint development of 
operations planning systems, pricing and yield management systems and joint 
development of information technology systems. As the scope of collaboration 
and the areas of joint activities between alliance partners widen and deepen, 
the partners enjoy increased profitability (and thus larger cost savings). 
Benefits are greater for strategic alliances with deeper scope of collaboration 
than for simple alliances with a limited scope of collaboration. 
There are however two definite characteristics of strategic alliances: exclusive 
membership and a joint marketing entity. 
Exclusive membership means that a formal member of one strategic alliance 
cannot simultaneously be a formal member of another strategic alliance, while 
all airlines can at any time engage in tactical cooperative strategic agreements 
with multiple airlines in the same or different alliance. 
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A strategic alliance must also be branded as a dedicated marketing entity. 
Strategic alliances are joint, dedicated marketing entities for network-wide 
cooperation. Sometimes partners jointly promote and advertise. For example, 
KLM and Northwest Airlines, although they have not given to their alliance an 
official name as the other airlines have done, they do share a "Worldwide 
Reliability" logo on the fuselage of their planes, tickets, advertising materials 
and in-flight service amenities. 
Strategic alliances apart from the activities presented under marketing 
alliances may also include the following areas of collaboration: 
Coordination of networks/schedules. 
Equity involvement. 
Joint Venture flights. 
Franchising. 
IT sharing and development. 
A. Coordination of networks/schedules 
Allied partners can, apart from the wider network it offers to the passengers, 
organise together their combined network so as to provide passengers with a 
greater number of connections and reduced connection times and introduce 
new services increasing the variety of both direct and indirect services to 
passengers. 
By coordinating the scheduling of aircraft arrival and departure at mutually 
convenient times, the location of arrival and departure gates to minimise 
connection time in an effort to avoid long stays at the hub, allied partners offer 
passengers the "seamless" experience, or the illusion of on-line, point-to-point 
flight thereby securing customer loyalty. In addition, improved connection 
times achieved through schedule coordination shorten the elapsed time, a 
major element in the ranking of flights on CIRS displays. 
Consumers benefit a lot from the combined alliance hub-and-spoke systems 
as they can fly to more destinations with higher frequencies and with shorter 
connecting times than what was the case before the development of hubbing. 
Alliances offer a varied schedule of departures and arrivals and also more 
frequencies, for example after the establishment of SkyTeam alliance the 
flights from Paris to New York-JFK increased from 3 to 5 per daily, and their 
structure is more rationally organised and there are more available seats 
satisfying all customers needs. 
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Airlines need to be able to coordinate their schedules and have antitrust 
immunity and exemption, which would also allow them to jointly set fares and 
thus reduce the price of the ticket for the passenger. Furthermore, given an 
open skies regime, those airlines wishing to operate transatlantic services will 
be able to do so through re-allocating partners' slots. Northwest Airlines could 
gain access to London-Heathrow slots through its partner KLM and Delta Air 
Lines through the pooled slot resources of Air France and Alitalia. 
B. Equity involvement 
Equity involvement refers to a firm taking an equity position in its partner -a 
unidirectional investment - or to the exchange of equity shares between the 
partners -a bi-directional investment. The opportunity to take an equity stake 
in foreign airlines has increased as many states relaxed the rules on foreign 
investment and control conditions in national airlines in the bilateral air 
services agreements. 
There is also a kind of passive equity involvement. British Airways and Air 
France have a number of such alliances with a number of African airlines. The 
reasons for these alliances are mainly political in nature and originate from the 
colonial times when the UK and France had ties with those African countries. 
An equity stake can be a high-risk investment or a source of tension among 
the partners. If the partner gets into financial difficulties, this will obviously 
reduce the market value of the stake and in the extreme circumstances of the 
partner entering bankruptcy and ceasing operations, the investment may have 
to be written off all together. This is what happened to SAS when Continental 
Airlines entered into bankruptcy and SAS had to forget a 100 million US$. 
Some times unidirectional investment may be perceived as an attempt by the 
investor to exercise control over the airline it has invested in. When the 
financial condition of the partner who receives investment improves, there is a 
good chance that the interests of the two partners may collide. Thus, either 
the relationship gets balanced or the alliance could end. This happened in the 
KLM/Northwest Airlines alliance: KLM invested in Northwest Airlines when the 
latter had financial difficulties. The two partners worked very well for a while. 
Conflicts started to surface as Northwest Airlines became profitable and did 
not need any more KLM's financial support. 
Other times though taking an equity stake can confer a competitive advantage 
and give the investing airline "first mover" advantages over other airlines 
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stakes at a later date. The investment of SAS in bmi British Midland prevented 
any other airline from striking any marketing and ownership deals with bmi 
British Midland. bmi British Midland was a much sought after airline as an 
alliance partner as it had managed to build up a substantial holding in take-off 
and landing slots at London-Heathrow where slots are in scarce supply. 
Supporters of equity stakes - especially of bi-directional ones in which neither 
partner attempts to control the other - argue that such financial transactions 
are essential to cement the relationship between the allies. Equity investment 
in foreign airlines is often made as part of a strategy to forge or strengthen 
and expand market access. Holding shares in another airline demonstrates 
commitment in the alliance and this assures the other airline that there is 
serious interest in a long term collaboration. Despite the subsequent discords, 
commitment to the partner survival is exemplified in the KLM-Northwest 
Airlines alliance, when a KLM official stated ".... if we did not have the equity, 
we would let Northwest Airlines go into bankruptcy". 
Opponents to the involvement of equity purchases maintain that it is a sign of 
unhealthy agreements and a symptom of airlines in distress. The very equity 
stake which held the KLM-Northwest Airlines alliance and the control it 
granted to KLM was responsible for their clashes in 1995-1998 as stated 
above. Their view was supported by the fact that the Delta Air Lines-Swissair- 
Singapore Airlines alliance, which, despite the exchange of equity shares, 
broke down as Singapore Airlines joined the Star Alliance and Delta Air Lines 
joined up forces with Air France. A minority equity position was not enough to 
inhibit defection by some airlines. When investment levels are small, such as 
the case of Delta Air Lines, Swissair and Singapore Airlines, the commitments 
to alliances tend to be weak. 
Experience has shown that equity ownership is neither a prerequisite for 
strategic alliances nor a necessary indication of any form of cooperation. It 
should be noted that most alliances struck recently among airlines involve no 
investments in equity at all. Despite the frenzied increase in the number of 
alliances, the number of alliances entailing equity stakes has remained more 
or less constant. At the end of 2001, over 60 airlines had shareholdings in 
foreign airlines while about 200 airlines had equity owned by foreign investors 
(ICAO, 2002). 
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C. Joint Venture flights 
Under a commercial joint venture cooperation code shared airlines share or 
pool the revenues and costs of such sales in some agreed way. Such 
agreements are in essence an extension of the concept of revenue pooling. 
Revenue pooling has been introduced as a solution to the problem of routes 
on which traffic is thin. Under joint venture flights the initial concept is 
extended into agreements covering routes that cannot support two airlines. In 
such wider cost-sharing pools, both airlines operate on one or more routes 
between their countries and all their costs and revenues are shared on the 
basis of an agreed formula. The flight numbers often carry the code of both 
airlines. 
D. Franchising 
Franchising is the practice of one airline - the franchisor - granting the right to 
another - the franchisee - to use various elements of its corporate identity 
such as its name, aircraft livery, flight designator code, uniforms and brand 
image generally. In marketing and delivering its air service product, the 
franchisee is subject to standards and controls intended to maintain the 
quality desired by the franchiser. Usually, when one airline sells these 
privileges to another, often as part of an overall package, the franchisor 
undertakes the franchisee's marketing and sales management. In return, the 
franchisee pays royalty fees and adopts the service standards of the 
franchisor and carries the franchisor's flight code. 
This practice started out from the effort of large airlines to reduce labour costs, 
the franchisee smaller airlines, with lower operating costs and lower unit wage 
costs and with local expertise, operating on their behalf on thinner and short 
haul routes, which usually require smaller aircraft, and acting as a feeder 
airline to the franchisor's main network. Another reason behind franchising 
agreements was the desire of the major airlines to dominate as far as possible 
their own home markets as "Franchising allows major airlines to spread their 
brand name and generate revenues on thin routes without a commitment of 
major capital investments" (Button et al., 1998). 
Franchise is a kind of regional alliance between a larger airline and a regional 
or feeder operator, in which the franchise partners pursue a joint objective, 
which is to profit from the common passenger traffic generated as a result of 
the franchise. Thus, despite the fact that one partner may be much smaller 
92 
than the other, many franchise agreements are truly a strategic cooperation, 
since two airlines co-mingle their assets and do not use them independently. 
British Airways' network of franchisees demonstrates the strategic purpose of 
franchising. In 1999 British Airways had nine franchisee partners, which 
added seventy-four destinations to the British Airways network. Seven of them 
were UK airlines operating both domestic and international services; one was 
a Danish airline and one a South African domestic operator. One of the 
franchisees, City Flyer Express, was an airline with a relatively extensive 
network of domestic and some short haul international services radiating from 
Gatwick airport. These flights provided excellent domestic feed to British 
Airways' own international services from Gatwick. In 1999 British Airways 
bought this airline to safeguard these routes and its numerous slots at 
Gatwick. 
It is quite probable that in the future many smaller regional, domestic or 
international, airlines will decide to become franchisees of larger airlines 
operating part or all of their services in the colour and livery of the franchisor. 
E. Information Technology (IT) sharing and development 
Alliance customer information management is a strategic and perhaps even a 
differentiating factor in the market and IT will enable alliances to carry out their 
promises to their customers. Hence, for alliances to fulfil their promise of the 
"seamless" journey experience, it is essential that they have more flexible 
access to real-time data and even more crucially, communication between the 
different CRSs used by the alliance partners. In Star Alliance, for example, 
half of the members use Amadeus and some of them Apollo, in oneworld 
most members use Amadeus while American Airlines is tied to Sabre. This 
can be achieved only through common information management. 
Thus, alliances have forged alliance-wide Internet-based communications 
networks which link the participating airlines at least as far as operations, 
reservations and direct interaction with customers is concerned. In most 
cases, these networks consist of protocol-based standalone platforms, which 
protect the legacy systems of the individual airlines but reduce the number of 
interfaces between the various airlines in the alliance, ensuring that 
information appears in the host's computer language and which are flexible 
enough to incorporate new members into the technology platform. 
Within the common IT platforms two applications have been developed: the 
first is flight forecast query response which allows front-line desks of member 
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alliances to obtain speedily online, real time flight information (such as 
connections, cancelled flight notification, flight-status) for all alliance airlines. 
The second application is redemption availability for frequent flyers. Partners 
may view redemption inventory on other member's flights, which allows 
passengers to automatically accrue miles on any participating FFP regardless 
of which airline operates the flight. The next application to be developed is 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) servicing which will enable members to 
access, update or change any ticket from a member airline on-line. 
Star Alliance was the first to launch IT links between its members, by 
establishing StarNet, a central hub that translates messages between airlines 
into a format that is understood by the host systems of each, followed by 
SkyTeam with SkyTeamNet, a middle-ware system that translates messages 
between member airlines and views other PNR from other airlines e-ticket 
interlining. For oneworld, on the other hand, lack of antitrust immunity is a 
barrier to the development of such a central platform and thus the partners 
use bilateral communications carried on the existing network infrastructure. 
Not only the marketing edge to be gained from providing alliance customers 
with seamless travel, but also the potential to save costs from joint purchasing 
to shared check-ins and sales offices rests heavily on IT and the ability of 
systems of talking to each other. It was estimated by Star Alliance that the 
cutting from nine applications to two reduce the development costs by 50% 
(Airlines International, 2000). The multiple functions that a common IT can 
serve range from strategic planning to operations and back-office applications 
for marketing and sales. If allied partners proceed to joint corporate contracts 
with suppliers they will need common sales support systems to handle these 
contracts. In the area of strategic planning, allied partners need common 
decision support tools on which to base their network optimisation. The 
biggest benefit of reduced number of systems is lower development costs, 
higher purchasing power and the opportunity of standardising business 
processes, with the ultimate goal of easier integration between the partners. 
A common middleware is a quick way to link partners without forcing the pace. 
The next step will be alliance IT commonality but such a plan requires time 
and considerable programming effort. It is clear that certain areas of individual 
airline development will be replaced by alliance development so as to reap 
economies of scale within an alliance. A dedicated unified alliance IT 
organisation needs substantial up-front investment but once achieved, it will 
drive the whole cost level down. Under the current financial crunch, airlines 
are unwilling to commit to the huge expenditure involved in replacing old 
legacy mainframes. In addition, it would be a huge commitment as it entails a 
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long term strategic tie up with the other partners. Such consolidation would 
mean that individual IT departments would lose some control but in exchange 
they would get a certain influence in the whole alliance organisation. 
There will certainly be a strong interaction between alliance development in 
the air transport industry and the consolidation in the IT providers industry. If 
alliances are a way of consolidating the airline industry, IT will have to 
consolidate to act as a provider for these alliances. Maybe, the final step will 
be to have separate dedicated suppliers for each alliance (Airlines 
International, 2000). 
Section 3.3 Benefits and disadvantages of Airline Alliances 
Airlines form alliances because they expect that financial benefits will flow 
from such participation. These benefits will appear in the form of increased 
revenue and cost reductions. The mere size of the allied airlines will bring 
about economies of scale. Size in combination with the spread of the 
combined network will bring about economies of scope. Economies of scale 
and scope along with the way the respective networks will be combined to 
increase traffic and facilitate connections will result in economies of traffic 
density. Clearly, it is arbitrary to examine these parameters in isolation since 
they are closely interrelated with each other, but it will be done for the sake of 
clarity. Any increase in any and all of the above mentioned parameters will 
lead to an increase in revenue and profit. Revenue enhancement and profit 
maximisation are after all, the ultimate goals of airlines as of all firms. 
Lufthansa for example, benefited 250-270 million DM in 1997, thanks to its 
alliance with United Airlines, SAS, Thai Airways, Air Canada, Varig (Doganis, 
2001). For British Airways, its alliance with USAir generated 68,000 extra 
passengers and 100 million US$ in additional revenue (Doganis, 2001). 
Finally, the SkyTearn executives also project that the alliance's trans-Atlantic 
enhanced commercial cooperation will generate approximately 100 million 
US$ each year in additional revenue for its US and European members over 
the next three years. 
3.3.1 The benefits of size 
Economies of scale are achieved as a function of size and result in an airline's 
long term average costs as the size of its operations increase. Economies of 
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scale result if a partner can serve the same amount of traffic at a lower cost. 
Airlines are involved in very high production costs - due to mixed fleet, 
different needs of their customers, separate check-in lounges, on board 
entertainment, FFP, revenue management and brand building. An alliance 
can share the costs among its allied members by eliminating duplication of 
operations and thus reducing overall cost for all partners. Shared use of 
airport facilities and ground staff and mutual handling of baggage transfers 
and passenger check-in, cooperative advertising and promotional campaigns, 
common sales offices are some of the ways airlines can achieve considerable 
cost savings increasing the economies of scale on the marketing side. 
Cost reduction and cost efficiency opportunities result also from the ability of 
partners to take advantage of the increased volume and negotiating power in 
the purchase of resources. The power and the mere size of an alliance 
enables it to negotiate from a position of force and to strike better deals and 
better prices with the suppliers from aircraft manufacturers to in-flight 
amenities. A characteristic example of such a supplier-airline contract is the 
agreement between SkyTeam and Coca Cola (2002) by which the two 
companies agreed to an eight year strategic marketing and beverage 
agreement. Common fuel and oil purchasing, joint procurement of in-flight 
amenities, common negotiation of airport charges, joint cabin crew training are 
other examples of the potential cost reduction sources. The Star Alliance 
members purchase about 15 billion US$ of goods and services each year. By 
buying in bulk they achieved a better price per aircraft than if each had 
ordered separately as they had previously (Doganis, 2001). 
Even where joint purchasing has occurred, there has been a tendency to 
collaborate on the smaller and less controversial items, such as office 
stationery, headsets etc, but alliances have avoided items that touch too 
closely on product differentiation. Core areas however, that can contribute 
significantly in cost reductions are more difficult to achieve, such as aircraft 
purchasing, central support systems, combined development of computer 
systems and software. 
Also, it must be borne in mind that cost reduction needs more time to be 
achieved compared to revenue increase that appears immediately through the 
creation of economies of scope and of traffic density, and require deeper 
commitment and cooperation. The deeper the level of cooperation and 
integration, the greater the potential cost benefits increase as the depth of 
integration increases. Another point that needs to be stressed is that "cost 
savings rather than revenue gains have emerged as the priority for global 
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alliances as they come to terms with economic crisis and an uncertain future" 
(Airline Business, January 2003). 
There are two areas of cost reduction that merit special attention, fleet and 
labour, as the first will signify the move towards a strategic commitment from 
the part of allies, and the second constitutes the biggest operating cost of 
airlines. 
A. Fleet commona ity 
Airline alliances can significantly reduce airlines costs in terms of purchasing 
costs, maintenance costs and training costs, if they decide to use the same 
aircraft type. Such a commitment exceeds the boundaries of marketing 
cooperation and moves alliance cooperation to a truly strategic level. 
Prerequisites for a successful campaign include a joint specification of the 
aircraft, a joint performance evaluation, joint cash operating cost analysis, and 
a joint support and quality requirement. Partners need to agree on issues 
ranging from galley layout, number of toilets, and lighting panels that will have 
to be common across all partners' aircraft, to the inclusion or not of equipment 
to facilitate operation in fog conditions. In addition, in the case of fleet 
commonality, the purchase of spare parts or replacement parts is made with 
more profitable terms and better prices for an alliance than for an individual 
airline, as greater quantities are bought if all members of the alliance use the 
same type of aircraft. 
There have not been many efforts in this direction since such decisions 
require lengthy negotiations and mutual concessions to agree on the aircraft 
specifications. Qualiflyer Alliance made in the past such a move - when 
Swissair, Sabena and Austrian Airlines all bought Airbus (A320 family) and at 
present Star Alliance is attempting this too. 
Four Star Alliance airlines, Air Canada, Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa and SAS 
are joining forces to place a common aircraft order with one manufacturer that 
will be built to a common specification. Each of the airlines has given in on 
some requirements and thus the majority of hurdles to a common specification 
aircraft are being overcome. As a Star Alliance officer put it "You can live with 
non-specification items if there are cost advantages". Such bulk aircraft orders 
benefits both manufacturers and airlines. Benefits for the manufacturers 
include economies of scale due to the larger order volume and a standardized 
specification allowing cost-efficient production. Such commonality would mean 
that there might be flexibility in the delivery dates for the airlines. The airlines, 
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meanwhile, expect to see cost savings through operation, maintenance and 
training opportunities, and the ability to dry-lease their common-specified 
aircraft between Star Alliance partners. 
When there is fleet commonality across the alliance, an airline can buy the 
idle aircraft of the partners. Qantas, for example, took the aircraft (Boeing 737- 
800) American Airlines had commissioned but was unable to use since it was 
cutting down its fleet after the 1 1th September events. Such a deal benefits 
both partners since the one does not need to resort to outside suppliers and 
the other does not have to incur the costs of maintaining idle aircraft on the 
ground. 
Fleet commonality sounds promising in theory but in practice things are quite 
different since politics play a major role in fleet decisions, as there are now 
only two major aircraft manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing, the former 
European, the latter US. Delta Air Lines for example has an almost exclusive 
contract with Boeing, while American Airlines has a 20-year exclusive deal 
with Boeing which runs through to 2017. 
As many airlines are still state-owned and not subject to normal business 
rules, politics plays a part. Thus, an airline making a specific order may 
receive political compensation for its preference. For instance, no sooner had 
Air Mauritius bought Airbus A340s in 1994 than it obtained an upgrade from 
Paris Orly to Charles de Gaulle airport, which is Air France's main base with 
better onward connections (The Economist, 12 th June 2003). 
B. Labour cost reduction 
Labour cost represents one of the bigger costs for an airline. Among major 
North American airlines labour costs including social charges generally 
account for 30-40% of total operating costs. Among European airlines the 
figure is somewhat lower at 25-35% (Doganis, 2002). It is the labour cost that 
constitutes a major cost differentiator between airlines competing in the same 
markets, since other input costs (fuel, landing fees, aircraft purchase, ground 
handling) will be broadly similar (Doganis, 2001). The alliance gives the 
opportunity to the participating airlines to reduce their labour costs in two 
ways: first by enabling them to reduce the number of sales and ground 
personnel, as, instead of maintaining separate offices in many parts of the 
world, they use or share the offices and the bases of its allies. Second, 
alliances enable airlines to resort to the low wage structure of its allies to staff 
its operations. 
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Wide international differences in salaries and wages are possible because of 
restrictions on the employment of non-nationals. The increasing globalisation 
of airlines, whether through mergers or through alliances, may well lead to 
some easing of these restrictions and to a certain levelling out of salaries 
across airlines. Airlines based in high-wage hard-currency countries have 
begun to move some of their activities to countries where labour costs are 
much lower, Lufthansa for example has transferred part of its aircraft overhaul 
requirements to Shannon Aerospace in Ireland (Hanlon, 2000). It is quite 
possible that many more airlines will subcontract work to partners based in 
low-wage economies -a process known as "outsourcing" - and that more 
airline jobs will be exported out of high-wage economies in the future. Virgin 
Express for example, which is based in Brussels, in 1998 warned that it might 
move to the UK or Ireland in order to reduce social taxes on employment. 
Within an alliance, an airline can use the cheaper labour force (flight 
attendants, pilots) of the other alliance partners based in another country. 
Thus, airlines can save expenses without reducing the quality of services. 
Alliances can also resort to outsourcing to reduce labour costs. Having 
achieved the critical mass necessary they can outsource a particular activity 
to a third supplier without having to maintain staff to assume such activities. "A 
further factor affecting labour productivity is the degree of outsourcing which 
an airline undertakes. If labour-intensive activities such as flight kitchens, 
heavy maintenance, aircraft cleaning or Information Technology support are 
outsourced then an alliance's own staff numbers are invariably reduced and 
output per employee is enhanced (Doganis, 2001). 
3.3.2 Benefits of network size 
In the air transport industry, economies of scope are achieved as a function of 
the number of points served by an airline. They are generated as a result of 
traveller demand for service in more than one city-pair. Thus, airlines are 
seeking to reap economies of scope by extending their marketable network. 
This expansion can be achieved by the various forms of alliance cooperation, 
franchising, code share with airlines operating complementary networks in 
other parts of the world. By creating larger networks, increased concentration 
can result in greater market power on certain routes. 
99 
Cra nI eld The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic 
A. Marketing advantages 
The scope economies large airlines reap lie mainly on the marketing side, 
most of them related to network size. This is why the marketing cooperation 
agreements that were presented in section 3.1 of this chapter were the first to 
be developed. Size and scope come into play in alliance marketing. As it is 
easily understood, an alliance thanks to its size and geographical spread can 
conclude better agreements with advertising companies and can reduce their 
advertising costs through joint advertising programmes. But most importantly, 
as alliances serve large and widespread networks, they can more easily afford 
large-scale marketing campaigns which are much more efficient than 
promotions of individual routes. It is easier for an alliance than for a stand- 
alone airline to adopt an aggressive large scale advertising campaign all over 
the world since the participating airlines will cover all the geographical areas 
and it will be feasible to have a global approach while respecting at the same 
time the particularities of each specific area, culture customs etc. In addition, 
advertising on an entire network gives large airlines a strong sense of identity 
in the public mind. 
The airline is guaranteed a global advertising campaign and promotion as it is 
given the opportunity to advertise itself with the alliance to which it is member 
and its name appears under that of the alliance even to countries and areas to 
which the airline does not operate flights. For example, the brand names and 
images of American Airlines and Aer Lingus are promoted in Greece, although 
these airlines do not operate flights to or from Greece, through their 
participation in the oneworld. So in a way they obtain free advertising or the 
maximum possible promotion with the lowest cost and in contrast more 
revenue. 
Economies of scope confer competitive advantages to the partners. Through 
economies of scope, commission overrides can strengthen the competitive 
position of alliances with travel agents. An alliance serving the largest network 
from the agent's home city provides the agent with the most opportunities to 
sell tickets thereby reinforcing the advantages of size and scope. 
B. Branding 
Airlines tend to wage competition in the non-price arena, using advertising 
and increased customer services as the major weapons. Once travellers 
obtain information about service, quality, cost and convenience in one city- 
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pair, they form an impression about that airline's service in other markets. But 
this method can be only partially successful, since so many service elements, 
such as the quality of in-flight catering or of ground handling, are subjective. 
This is where the concept of branding comes in. Through product and service 
improvements, combined with targeted promotions, an alliance can change 
from being a common commodity to being a "brand". 
Network span and schedule convenience are an integral part of the alliance 
brand. As a unique brand, Photo 3.1 
it becomes more attractive and Star Alliance aircraft 
on certain routes, it may even 
attract a higher fare than that 
prevailing in the market. A brand 
is exemplified not only by service 100ým ri 
and product standards but also 
by designs and colours used in 
the aircraft interior and exterior 
and on the ground, as well as in 
won" 
more mundane aspects such as 
crockery, cutlery, ticket covers, and so on. 
At the same time, the ever-growing global alliances have a flipside posing a 
particular branding and image problem. That is, how to try and create an 
Photo 3.2 alliance 
brand, which can be an 
SkyTeam Logo effective marketing tool, while not 
I ý" 
lb&\ diluting the strength of any existing 
airline brands. The problem becomes 
especially acute when there are many 
airlines within an alliance, since they SAM are then less likely all to have the 
same high service standards and an 340 
'4 
AIQ PJMAPW-- equally good image. The Star Alliance 
faced exactly this problem in 2001 
because it had thirteen or so members with differing service quality. 
The photos above show the way the image of the alliance is promoted through 
the aircraft themselves. The photo 3.1 shows the way the fuselage is used to 
promote the alliance, while photo 3.2 is the standard way used to show that a 
particular airline belongs to a specific alliance. 
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C. Reduced cost to enter new markets 
The topic of the economies of scope that alliances enjoy arises again as such 
economies occur when it is less expensive to increase service on the existing 
network than it would be for other airlines to initiate new service on the same 
routes. Alliances can, instead of investing huge amounts of money in order to 
enter new markets, sign on the alliance airline that dominates a specific local 
market and hub and incorporate it to its network and thus provide efficient 
connecting service to new orig in-desti nation markets without having to incur 
capital investment, landing fees, advertising, price war (for example the 
dominant position of Olympic Airways in the domestic Greek market). An 
alliance can also strengthen the presence of an airline in an airport-hub as 
was done in the case of bmi British Midland at London-Heathrow Airport. 
3.3.3 Benefits of network configuration 
Directly related to economies of scope and revenue enhancement are 
economies of traffic density which airlines reap by configuring their networks 
as hub-and-spoke networks. Economies of traffic density arise when by 
combining passengers and groups of passengers an airline can carry the total 
more cheaply than if it carried them separately. There is a direct and 
interdependent relation between traffic and revenue since any increase in the 
former results in a more or less equivalent increase in the latter, in most cases 
at least. The section that follows will present how the allied partners organise 
their combined networks so as to achieve the maximum benefits in terms of 
traffic, load factor, geographic spread and market share. This issue is directly 
related with airport slot constraints, fleet rationalisation and may eventually 
create high barriers to entry. 
Alliances enable each airline to extend its marketable network to cities served 
by its partners. This results in each member of the alliance being able to 
attract more traffic without increasing the number of routes operated, and thus 
each member's marginal cost may fall through economies of traffic density. 
With economies of traffic density, provision of airline services on a route 
exhibits increasing returns of scale, so that cost per passenger falls with traffic 
density. 
Network expansion involves extra cost - more aircraft, more staff and more 
support services. The growth that is induced by network expansion has a 
parallel with that stimulated through a decline in yields. Economies of traffic 
density arise because greater density enables the airline to use larger, more 
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efficient aircraft with lower costs per seat-kilometre and/or to operate at higher 
service frequencies and consequently at higher load factor, which lead to 
lower costs per passenger-kilometre. For all these reasons unit cost falls as 
traffic density in the airline's network rises, and hubbing has a major effect in 
increasing density. Hubbing increases density by enabling the airline to 
consolidate traffic from many different origin-destination markets onto a much 
smaller number of links in the network. 
A. Network rationalisation and optimisation 
For economies of traffic density to flow, partners need to rationalise and 
optimise their network so as to reap the benefits of increased traffic. Network 
coordination provides an efficient and cost effective traffic system meeting the 
requirements of the local traffic as well as providing good transfer possibilities 
for connecting traffic. 
In a simplified description the alliance network works as following: each airline 
collects traffic from its network or from a variety of dispersed "thin" markets 
served by itself or its partners on the same continent - the so-called "spokes" 
routes it through central hubs and disseminates it through "pipeline' routes 
to other hubs (from which it is dispersed into "thin" markets at the destination 
end) (Aviation Strategy, March 1999). For example, the individual markets 
may be insignificant. The number of passengers who wish to travel from Lyon 
to Boston may be insignificant but when combined with those that want to 
travel to Chicago, Los Angeles and Toronto, they reach significant levels. The 
aircraft flying transatlantic to Boston will be carrying passengers who began 
their journeys in Bologna, Bremen and Birmingham. The more spokes there 
are, the more origin and destination (O&D) markets are served, and the 
greatest the number of the potential passengers whose travel needs, from the 
beginning of their journey to their ultimate destinations, can be served by a 
single alliance. 
It follows that for this system to be exploited to the full, there are two essential 
elements: the ability to expand service to and collect traffic from the widest 
possible range of local markers and to have a hub capable of serving 
efficiently a large number of passengers, which means slot availability and 
expansion opportunities. 
The following example illustrates the benefits of schedule coordination 
achieved by the alliances. At the time of Sabena and Delta's alliance, the hub- 
hub connection between Brussels and Cincinnati, Delta's second hub, there 
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were 50 connections available in Brussels and 64 connections in Cincinnati 
within one and a half hours of their arrival time. 
The simple formation of an alliance does not add value to the participating 
airlines. The value being extracted is dependent on the way alliance 
partnerships are structured and on the partners that participate. Airlines 
choose their partners to achieve three different objectives: major airlines 
operating trunk routes seek alliances with small regional airlines flying short 
haul routes; international airlines with no cabotage rights seek to be 
associated with airlines serving large domestic networks in foreign countries: 
and airlines with a large presence in one part of the world often wish to team 
up with others in areas where they are not at all that well represented. 
To illustrate the way partners are chosen to achieve "complementary fit" the 
example of United Airlines should be mentioned. As United Airlines had 
acquired in the early 1990s Pan Am's Latin American routes and London 
routes with Heathrow slots, it never considered British Airways as a possible 
partner. 
More importantly, by coordinating schedules and aircraft airlines can reduce 
their fleet requirements. An alliance offers more flights without having to resort 
to the utilisation of new aircraft since the schedules are shared and divided 
among the participating airlines. An increase in density permits more intensive 
utilisation of aircraft and crews, operating more flight hours per day. 
An alliance can also reduce overcapacity and increase load factor since the 
former competitors cooperate on routes and are trying to push down average 
yields and at the same time increase the average yield of certain routes that 
enjoy high demand, and prevent the entrance in the market of new 
competitors. 
Allied airlines can, in periods of economic depression -just as during the Iraq 
war, and the SARS threat, jointly adjust their schedules to maintain all 
destinations while reducing capacity. 
B. Barriers to entry 
The air transport industry has certain peculiarities that make the entrance of 
new competitors easy and difficult at the same time. On the one hand, barriers 
to entry take the form of substantial capital requirements and the need for the 
technical and technological know-how. In addition, the major incumbent 
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airlines have an inherent competitive edge over their competitors in terms of 
branding, frequency and network - which are further strengthened by the 
formation of alliances. The established airlines can utilize the latest 
technology available and offer enhanced service at a lower cost due to 
economies of scale. On the other hand, the homogeneous nature of the airline 
product makes the emergence of entirely new airlines or the incursion of new 
airlines on existing routes relatively easy. It is very difficult to find qualitative 
differences especially on the shorter haul flights between new entrants and 
long-established airlines. From the passenger's viewpoint there is little 
difference between one aircraft and another; this pushes airlines into making 
costly efforts to try to differentiate their services, by spending more on in-flight 
catering or on ground services and by advertising. 
Alliances and economies of traffic density are a way for established airlines to 
increase market share and to strengthen the partners' foothold on a particular 
market, and pre-empt competition by improved scheduling, increasing control 
over hubs and locking in customer loyalty. 
a. Scheduling 
Schedules and frequencies are the primary products of an airline and the 
leading factor in a passenger's choice of a particular airline. Since scheduling 
convenience is the most important differentiating characteristic of the airline 
product, all airlines strive for higher scheduled frequency on every important 
route. Alliances are the very means by which to achieve this increased 
frequency. Frequent service on a particular route contributes to improving the 
image of the airline in the eyes of passengers. Thus, large incumbent airlines 
also enjoy the competitive advantage of schedule frequency. By having an 
extensive network through the alliance, the established airline is more likely to 
attract passengers. The larger networks of the major airlines allows them to 
increase service at a lower additional cost. 
b. Control of hubs 
Airlines and airports are directly interrelated. Airlines' hubs are located in 
airports, it is there that airlines set up their bases and headquarters. Traffic is 
increased and interconnected through hubs where passengers are fed to 
other hubs of the other alliances or at the spokes, and the whole system 
means more destinations and more flights. Hubs and the network they support 
may become strategic resources which, if worked efficiently, can be turned 
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into sources of sustainable competitive advantage (Holloway, 1998). The 
shortage of running slots in increasingly congested airports will enforce the 
competitive strength of airline alliances (Doganis, 2001). Hub airlines are 
often dominant in their hub cities partly because airport capacity constraints 
seriously inhibit competition from new entrants. There are hardly any new 
slots available at congested airports and incumbent airlines are willing to go to 
any lengths to keep the slots they already have under the system of 
It grandfather rights". 
Schedule rationalisation means that alliances reduce the flights performed at 
the same time period and allocate the schedule of flights in a more rational 
way so as to minimise congestion at the hubs. The formerly competing airlines 
that were operating flights to the same destination at the same time in their 
effort to compete with each other now as members of the same alliance 
operate only one flight to this destination at a particular time and move the 
other flight sooner or later on in the day so as to relieve airport congestion. 
At the same time, "the creation of alliances has significantly increased the 
base airline's domination of slots" (Doganis, 2001). The slots are directly 
related to the value of an airline, so they can secure and strengthen their 
position in the market by concluding code share agreements with other 
airlines. The scheduling of spaced up hub-hub flights and multiple connections 
increases the possibility of the allies controlling a specific hub and thereby 
push out of this hub its competitors and deter new competitors from entering 
and competing on the thicker and more lucrative routes from the hub. At major 
hub airports, the base airline together with the alliance partners and 
franchisees may effectively control 60-70% of the total availability of slots. For 
instance at Amsterdam-Schiphol, KLM and its partners have over 70% of the 
scheduled slots (Doganis, 2001). Also, if an alliance controls a hub it becomes 
more difficult for another airline and/or alliance to enter to it (Doganis, 2001). 
The alliance itself is based essentially on the existence of a global network 
achieved through the existence of multiple hubs. Control of as many hubs as 
possible constitutes a competitive advantage for the participating airlines and 
for the alliance, resulting in increased revenue. 
c. Customer loyalty 
A larger presence in a given city and a wider alliance network enhances 
customer loyalty through FFP strategy. FFPs in combination with frequencies, 
connections and scheduling - that is the very competitive advantages of 
alliances - increase market share, create strategic advantage and reduce the 
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potential for competition. The more extensive the network to which the FFP 
applies, the greater the advantage large airlines which are members of a 
global alliance will have over smaller non-alliance airlines in competition for 
high yield business travellers. Through coordinated FFPs these passengers 
are given a rewards incentive to concentrate their flying on airlines within a 
particular alliance and the more global the networks of the alliances become, 
the less need there will be for passengers to use non-alliance airlines. Hence, 
cross-elasticities of demand for services of one alliance relative to the 
services of non-alliance airlines could fall quite sharply. 
FFPs thus put up entry barriers on the demand side of the market by creating 
artificial linkages between different services - frequency, coverage -, so that 
they deter entry by creating a need for airlines to establish from the outset a 
network of a certain size. The only real way of offsetting the disadvantage of a 
small network is for the airline to link its FFP with those of another airline. This 
is what many airlines with limited networks have done. bmi British Midland, for 
example, has entered into reciprocal FFP arrangements with Air Canada, SAS 
and United Airlines, while Austrian Airlines had similar pacts with Delta Air 
Lines and Swissair. 
Another element of global alliances, code share agreements, can create 
significant barriers to entry because of the particular dynamics of hub-and- 
spoke networks. 
3.3.4 Learning 
Apart from the tangible benefits of revenue enhancement and cost reduction, 
alliances bring about benefits equally important but less quantifiable in the 
form of learning and specialisation. Alliances promote learning on two levels: 
learning of technical and operational skills and best practices, and the learning 
of how to manage the alliance, for example the build-up of an "alliance- 
capability" (Kleymann, Seristo, 2001). 
Alliances can take advantage of the expertise of each airline in their 
respective market so as to meet the customer requirements in terms of 
schedule, comfort and service. Each partner's expertise helps the alliance to 
make the best choices and the best predictions about the future. Thus both 
the alliance and the partners can meet customer needs in different markets. 
Within an alliance, each airline should focus only on the segment whether 
technical or operational, in which it has a competitive advantage so as to 
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achieve better organisation and to avoid the creation of confusing multi- 
product management tasks since the needs and demands for business and 
leisure travel are not the same. Within the framework of such expertise and 
specialisation, each airline can carry out the maintenance of its aircraft at its 
hub or at the hub of its allies if the other airline has better expertise in an 
particular type of aircraft, while the former airline will specialise in other types 
of aircraft used by all the members of the alliance. 
Through alliances airlines can create huge databases through which they can 
learn and share knowledge about different subjects such as IT, technology, 
organisation, activity information, demographic information, that will help them 
draw more substantiated conclusions and gain knowledge without a 
supplementary cost for the airline. With the larger amount of information "an 
alliance has the possibility to determine more accurately the competitive 
environment, the quantity, quality and price of the air transport product 
produced and the price that meets the current demands of the passengers, 
benchmarking against partners, reducing market uncertainty" (Doz, 1998) and 
If pushing" the airlines to improve themselves. So marketing becomes more 
effective, takes more correct decisions and attracts more customers while 
minimising the possibility of errors since the sample on which the gathering of 
information is based is so large. 
On the level of alliancing capability, the alliance gives the possibility to create 
bridges between the airlines on different levels: on the operational level where 
the detailed knowledge of the alliance tasks resides and where specialists can 
communicate with specialists; on the strategic level, that helps executives to 
understand and share the value creation logic of the alliance, to put valuation 
conflicts and operational problems into a broader strategic context, and to set 
a tone of cooperation at the lower levels; and on the middle-manager level to 
bring operating personnel together on operational and strategic issues (Doz, 
1998). 
Common training and unobstructed communication can support inter- 
organisational learning of partner companies, increase mutual understanding 
thereby enlarging feeling of trust and may even lead to innovation that will 
make the difference between successful alliances. Such communication and 
trust can help alliances create global mindset and networking capabilities 
across borders, raising value by building intellectual capital that is difficult to 
imitate by others. It is the basis on which the fusion of the partners' different 
corporate cultures will take place. It is this that makes up the glue that keeps 
the alliance together and may help it to move ahead towards deeper 
integration. 
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A closer relationship can contribute to a lowering of transactional costs 
through less problematic cooperation in areas such as sales, the development 
of an IT infrastructure, or the adaptation of service schemes. The experience 
of having built up relational capital (Kleymann, Seristo, 2001) is a type of 
knowledge that can be used in other, future relationships and is an important 
ingredient of alliancing capability. 
3.3.5 Negative effects 
Experience so far has shown that cooperation between competing airlines is 
more difficult than envisioned. Alliances are partnerships difficult to cement 
and to implement and they come at a cost that may be proven too high to pay. 
Alliances are promoted as "mutually beneficial cooperations", but these 
benefits are at best limited and most of the times far from tangible and 
measurable. Airlines take a cautious stance towards alliances because they 
fear the full implication of joining a global alliance. They fear that an alliance is 
not always a "win-win" situation. 
This difficulty is due to the inherent nature of alliances: They are complex, 
heterachical and dynamic networks (Vaara et al., 2001); they are highly 
asymmetric - that is they consist of airlines of different sizes and market 
power - and consist of multilateral links of different strengths between 
autonomous partners. Interdependent needs bring partners together but 
power imbalances keep them apart. Minimisation of these power and 
knowledge imbalances is not always easy to achieve. As the development of 
a truly international network requires a big number of allied partners, 
asymmetry becomes inevitable. 
Another element that may lead an alliance to negative outcomes is the 
instability within and outside the alliance. The within alliance environment has 
been proven to be highly volatile. Although portraying long term cooperation 
and developing networks, alliances are easily broken, new ones are formed 
very frequently and airlines leave one alliance group to join another. This 
turbulence seems to have brought a measure of cautiousness by airlines. As 
far as the outside wider environment is concerned, this remains highly 
dynamic The exogenous variables include the industry regulation, economic 
cycles, prices for fuel and aircraft, the emergence of new economic 
opportunities and the competition from low-cost carriers. 
This asymmetry and instability bring about negative effects both financial - 
increased cost - and non-financial and non-tangible costs - loss of control, 
109 
Cranfield The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic 
giving conflicting priorities as will be shown in more detail below. They affect 
mostly the medium and small-sized airlines, but there are some - brand 
dilution, increased cost, conflicting aspirations- that may hit hard larger airlines 
too. 
A. Loss of independence and identity 
Participating in an alliance means that an airline has to adapt to new 
conditions created, it has to integrate its management system, its functioning 
and its IT to participate in the alliance. The organisation of the individual 
airline needs to be adjusted to that of the alliance, just as each country of the 
European Union has been harmonised with the others so as to enter the Euro 
zone. Organisational differences to which all partners will have to adhere to 
range from simple "innocent" issues such as dress-code, presentation 
formats, office layouts, meeting times, to more sensitive issues such as 
software, chain of command, hierarchy structure, seniority and to data and 
analyses on which decisions are made. The alliance may thus lead to the loss 
of the independence of an airline because the participating airlines must make 
compromises, harmonise their procedures, and proceed to changes inside the 
alliance, which sometimes are contrary to the strategy they were following as 
independent entities. Barriers to such implementation of common standards 
include each alliance member's instinctive protection of its core products and 
value proposition (reliability, punctuality, safety, customer service). The fear of 
being swallowed up by the mega-carriers keeps smaller airlines from 
proceeding to deeper integration. 
There are many that attribute this fear to "outdated" political and emotional 
attachments related to the idea of the "national flag" carrier. They further 
maintain that airlines resist integration because it is the national symbol 
whose independence appears threatened. It is certainly true that It is often 
politically unacceptable to relinquish the control of the national airline to 
another one. As mentioned in the introduction, most airlines have been 
strongly associated with the natural heritage of the country, serve as "national 
flag carriers" and are thought to offer a "public service". 
But these experts are only partly true. This fear of the small and medium-sized 
airlines is due to the desire to retain their stand-alone capability in case the 
alliance fails, loosens or changes shape. Alliance membership could reduce 
smaller airlines to feeder status and gradually jeopardize their standalone 
capability. 
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The very idea of "network optimisation" that has been put forth as one of the 
benefits of alliances involves serious risks for the allies as benefits to the 
alliance as a whole may not be to the benefit of each member. The members 
of an alliance core carve up markets between themselves, which means that a 
firm might have to cease being directly present in one market for the sake of a 
partner. Second tier carriers may be particularly vulnerable, for example, if 
network optimization concentrates activity into the dominant hubs and reduces 
other partners to more of a feed role. The overall alliance might gain 
advantage if a member airline operating an intra-regional minor market 
sacrificed some higher yielding, point-to-point traffic in favour of lower yielding 
feed traffic for long haul services. But this may interpreted by the smaller 
partners as a power shift towards the larger partner and could over time 
undermine the alliance's stability. 
In the same way, if a medium-size airline that operates both inter-regional and 
intra-regional services teams up with another airline in the same region with a 
substantially larger operation from a dominant mainland hub and gateway. 
Competition and business logic puts pressure on the medium-size airline to 
feed the long haul services from the main hub to achieve higher load factors 
for the alliance as a whole. As a result the long-haul services of the medium- 
size airline might fall below critical mass and the power shift towards the major 
partner (Gemini, 2000). If the alliance weakens or dissolves, the airline would 
need to incur the costs and efforts to re-establish itself in that market. 
On the other hand, if an alliance does not proceed to such an optimisation, 
there will be significant overlap in the partners' networks and the more the 
partners, the greater the overlap. Such duplication is bound to lead sooner or 
later to internal conflicts. 
An issue closely associated with the loss of independence is that of brand 
dilution. Brand dilution applies both to larger and small airlines. Airlines risk 
being as strong as the weakest member of the alliance and a customer's poor 
experience, in terms of service or safety - with one alliance member will affect 
the brand reputation of the others (Aviation Strategy, 1999). 
At the same time, the most tangible benefit to alliance membership, the power 
of cross-marketing, can also be the one that will lead to the loss of brand, or to 
the distinctive personalities of the airlines involved. Airlines typically possess 
strong cultures and identities. Most airlines still invest in the airline brand more 
than in the alliance brand and fear that homogenization will weaken their 
brands. The airlines will loose their identities and the recognition by the 
passengers since it is the alliance that is mainly promoted. Within the alliance 
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framework, the alliance super-brand is being promoted at the expense of the 
national brands/identities. This could start with marketing pushing the super- 
brand with member airlines listed underneath with large letters initially but 
over time the letters become gradually smaller, until just the super-brand is 
promoted with no mention of the individual airlines. In case of alliance 
dissolution, they will find themselves "crippled" (Vaara et al, 2001) with the 
need to rebuild their brand. Airlines are very protective of their brand because 
they know well that once an airline identity goes, it will be very difficult to get it 
back. 
For high quality service providers (for example, Virgin Atlantic) integrating too 
tightly into an alliance with the corresponding requirement for 'seamlessness' 
poses relatively more problems: the high-quality service providers might find 
themselves in a position where they would have to reduce the very source of 
their differentiation. It appears that airlines which occupy a functional niche, 
whether geographic or service-related, are those which are most likely to lose 
or seriously compromise their competitive advantage when entering into an 
alliance at high integration levels. 
To better understand why airlines resist deeper integration the following 
should be mentioned. Each airline brings to the alliance its resources; route- 
system related resources e. g. traffic rights, airport slots and hub location; 
technical resources incorporating the airline's operating infrastructure and 
including its fleet, IT systems and know-how, and installations at hubs and 
outstations and non-tangible resources including the customer basis (e. g FFP 
top tier members corporate accounts) the airline's overall reputation and its 
brand. (Kleymann, 2003) It is these resources that make an airline an entity 
that help it function and that make it an attractive partner. But even within an 
alliance an airline wants to remain an attractive partner that might be sought 
for association with others. Given the volatility and insecurity described above, 
it becomes clear why airlines challenge any idea of integration. They opt for 
looser coupling which permits an airline to remain independent enough to be 
able to seek a more optimal arrangement and when the opportunity arises to 
switch partners. 
The airlines want to maintain their adaptability to change, their freedom to 
respond as markets evolve, as conditions change. Participation in one alliance 
may be profitable under the current market conditions and regulatory 
circumstances but may not be under different circumstances. Should 
conditions change pressures to restructure or dissolve alliance partnerships 
can emerge. Even if mergers and consolidations become inevitable, these 
might take place outside and not inside the existing alliance groupings. 
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An issue that should be stressed in relation to independence and control is 
that of exclusivity. Although it has not been fully implemented except perhaps 
at Star Alliance, if it does get implemented it will have serious effects on the 
manoeuvring latitude the partners have. In tightly integrated alliances, 
members will not be free to design their own alliancing strategy outside the 
alliance group even if such a cooperation might serve the interests of these 
particular airlines. Instead, alliance partners will be bound to cooperate 
"exclusively" with partners from their own airline alliance group with very strict 
limits on the nature and extent of cooperation with outside airlines (Kleymann, 
2003). But if this alliance for any reason dissolves, it will be very difficult for 
the partners to establish anew a whole range of bilateral agreements as they 
will be viewed as "alliance members' only and not as autonomous or semi- 
autonomous operators. 
Thus, medium and smaller-sized airlines, even though they realize the need to 
join an alliance as a precondition for their survival, try to strike the right trade- 
off between autonomy and survival. Even though airlines in their effort to 
justify their choice of a particular alliance present these alliances as market 
driven that benefit the airline in terms of enlarged network and cost savings 
and offer the advantage of being linked up to a prestigious firm, in reality 
airlines may choose a particular alliance to resist the dominance of larger 
alliance partners. Because what may seem an "excellent" partner to team up 
with because of its prestige, financial status etc, may also be an 
"overwhelming" partner which acts as a centre of gravity to which airlines may 
become absorbed. There are instances of airlines that have opted for one 
alliance over another exactly because they wanted to be in alliance where 
dissent and non-conformity - or relatively autonomous decision-making was 
allowed for even small partners. So they have opted for an alliance group that 
is less tightly integrated. Others choose a specific alliance because in this 
alliance the potential two leaders can often be at odds and this allows the 
smaller airlines to be more influential. Even this may be seen as a weakness 
from the point of view of the alliance but it is an advantage from the small 
airline's point of view (Vaara et al, 2001). 
The first airline to realise the danger of the "gravity pull" of the larger airlines 
was Swissair. Swissair was unwilling to play second fiddle in a cooperation 
with giants, which would transform Zurich from a major hub in its own right 
into an airport feeding Frankfurt and/or London. It believed that it could only 
survive and flourish in association with "peers", that is of other like-minded 
and similarly positioned airlines. It strived to lead an alliance linking small and 
medium-sized airlines so as to enable them to survive in the increasing 
competition with giants from substantially larger markets. It had hoped that it 
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would lead an alliance that would become big enough to hold up against the 
really big boys (Swissair's Annual Report 2000). But as it was presented 
above, no matter how commendable in theory its plan was, the way it pursued 
it led to its demise. One of the major reasons that led to the collapse of the 
alliance led by Swissair was exactly what has been described above, 
overpowering pressure it put on its allies to do things as it alone saw best. 
According to some airline experts, companies who obstinately uphold their 
independence allow this to stand in the way of essential restructuring. Most 
flag airlines have the choice either to stay independent as niche players or 
give in to gravity and be absorbed. They argue that by refusing tighter 
integration they are simply deferring the inevitable, that is of becoming 
absorbed, resulting in these being ancillary, second tier or niche airlines, in 
effect regional air transport operators which feed traffic to one of the industry's 
giants. They might be right. But airlines need to be assured of the extent and 
sustainability of cost synergies before accepting to sacrifice their 
independence. Should, however, their profits continue to fall, and they face 
economic crisis, their attitude will certainly change. 
B. Conflicting agreements 
The cost benefits that may arise for the partners from exercising their 
combined bargaining purchasing power with key suppliers have been 
presented in the previous paragraphs. The desired integration would require 
the establishment of one supplier for all the alliance members. But each 
partner has already its own supplier and thus allied partners may find 
themselves within an alliance where each partner has a different supplier, 
which may adversely affect any attempt for a close cooperation among the 
allies. Many airlines have long-standing agreements with their own suppliers 
which they are not willing to give up not only because of monetary 
considerations - penalty clauses for the rescission of the contract and such a 
move would be an extra financial strain on the airline which will not be easily 
offset and amortised by the reduction in the cost the new supplier will offer - 
but also because they will have to adapt to a new supplier, which demands 
money, time, building up of new relations, familiarization with different 
systems and magnitudes. Once ties with a particular supplier are severed, it 
will be very difficult to re-establish them and certainly not at the favourable 
terms the long relationship with the supplier had created. 
It would be, for example, very difficult to convince American Airlines to give up 
Sabre CIRS. Even though Sabre became a separate identity from American in 
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1996, it is still a unit of AMR, American's parent company, and it has a 10- 
year outsourcing contract with American Airlines. 
Furthermore, the choice of a supplier will probably be decided by the larger, 
and by definition most influential, airline, and so impose this upon the other 
partners, with all the problems this may entail. Thus, the reluctance to change 
suppliers may be an expression of the desire of each airline to remain 
independent, not to be fully committed to the exclusive bonds of one particular 
alliance, and to preserve their latitudes for manoeuvring. 
C. Increased cost 
Alliance participation comes at a financial cost, which is not at all negligible. 
The cost reduction benefits the alliance promises can be offset in the early 
years by project costs. Apart from the alliance subscription fee that an airline 
pays to join the alliance, there are some one-off and short term operational 
costs and alliance-specific investments ranging from harmonisation of 
baggage-hand ling standards, moving airport facilities, creation of CRS 
linkages, fuselage repainting, severance packages to marketing a joint brand, 
establishing joint station operations and joint FFPs. In addition, the formation 
of an alliance will require substantial investment and numerous amendments 
in the interior of the airplanes to satisfy the alliance obligations. These sunk 
costs are concrete expenses that may be difficult to bear especially for hard- 
up airlines. 
These sunk costs serve a double purpose: they constitute alliance-specific 
investments without which efficient alliance operations would not be possible 
and at the same time they serve as a commitment in the relationship deterring 
partners from opportunistic behaviour or defection. They act as a greater 
incentive to cooperate and will bring greater stability to the cooperation. 
Once a partner incurs the sunk costs associated with the structural changes a 
firm makes to accommodate cooperation with a partner, the firm will seek to 
"amortise" this investment and thus will be heavily dependent on the alliance. 
This dependence increases the difficulty in reversing out of an alliance But 
many airlines doubt the effectiveness of purpose of such expenses in the 
knowledge that many alliance ventures fail or outlive their initial purpose. 
Alliance membership means also increased management overheads that 
place extra demands on the resources of the member carriers, which hits the 
smaller airlines hard as they try to ensure that they have representatives on 
the numerous alliance committees. Medium and small-sized airlines do not 
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like the idea of several regular meetings since they do not have enough 
personnel to send to attend them. If they do not send though, they fear that 
their voice will not be heard and that decisions will be reached without them. 
But when they do attend they get frustrated by the fact that no decision is 
taken at these meetings. Thus, many times alliance-level coordination 
mechanisms and meetings are perceived as tedious and inefficient, which 
contributes even more to the creation of internal conflicts. 
Harmonisation costs and analysis of airline cost structures are further 
complicated by the fact that "most airlines produce several types of output 
which might include numerous scheduled passenger products, cargo 
products, tour and charter products, and possibly also support services in 
engineering and maintenance, ground handling, catering or consultancy" 
(Holloway, 1998). Within the alliance framework, all the airlines need to 
harmonize their different outputs so as to offer a homogeneous product, which 
involves extra costs as well as difficulties as the airlines come from different 
regions of the world where working conditions, cultures, expectations, 
measurement systems and logistics systems differ greatly. 
Alliances can also bring about labour cost increases. Alliances bring together 
airlines with different levels of wages and varying work practices which may 
eventually lead to an increase in costs (Doganis, 2002). A common labour 
force and consequently uniform salaries can actually increase costs for 
airlines since the salaries paid to the employees of one airline may be lower 
than those of the other alliance partners. Employees within alliance partner 
airlines and their unions will seek to ensure that the wages paid within all 
alliance partners match those paid by the airline with the highest wages and 
the least onerous work practises are also adopted. Lufthansa's pilots, for 
example, were seeking parity with their colleagues in the German airline's US 
alliance partners (The Economist, 7th July 2001). Cross border trade union 
activity and solidarity will intensify and the unions' goal will be to conduct 
alliance-based labour negotiations, to harmonise wages and compensations 
across global alliances. There are, for example, Star Alliance Pilot Groups and 
Star Alliance Cabin Crews. Such labour unions may use the alliance platform 
to seek the "highest common denominator" in wages and working conditions. 
Alliance-wide labour action could bring an entire global network to a halt 
(Airline Business, August 2001). Their role is strengthened against the airlines 
and they gain stronger negotiating power that can help them conclude better 
agreements, which means increase of costs and decrease of profits for the 
alliance as whole. And that certainly means that costs will soar producing the 
exact opposite effect of the desired one. 
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Alliances may, according to certain writers, self-defeat one of the very reasons 
for which they have been formed, that is economies of scope. "The 
reorientation of traffic flows around a network caused by hubbing can also 
have a negative impact on unit costs, counterbalancing the benefits sought 
from economies of scope" (Holloway, 1998). The yields of an alliance present 
in general decreasing tendencies since with the existence of hubs and once 
non-stop flight is now effected through the hubs thus generating more RPK to 
perform the same journey. 
D. Conflicting expectations and coordination problems 
An inherent feature of alliances is the strong partner heterogeneity: there are 
significant power asymmetries and a large diversity as to resources and policy 
goals. It is not a common purpose that brings these allies together but their 
interdependent needs (Kleymann, 2003). They join alliances for different 
reasons. Some want to find suitable partners to expand their networks, others 
seek membership as a shelter to avoid open competition. Others join an 
alliance in the hope of achieving an instant boost in revenues rather than deal 
with the fundamental problems of their own airline, which could be high costs. 
This may expose the partners to the problems of other alliance members, 
from union unrest to safety concerns and to financial crises. And as much as 
stockholders admiration is conferred to an airline for being associated with a 
prestigious financially healthy airline, stock prices go down when an ally runs 
into trouble. 
Airlines participating in alliances for different reasons may view their 
participation from a different point of view. For some airlines, the alliance may 
be the main focus of their strategy since the alliance can constitute the way to 
achieve some of their aims (more passengers, reduction of competition, its 
establishment in a market, etc. ) but for others it is simply a necessary evil 
which will help it not to lose market share, and for others simply a minor part 
of their strategy (for example: to be applied only on certain routes). In other 
words, some airlines may view them as a simple marketing tool while other 
partners may aspire to a true strategic long-term cooperation. There are other 
airlines that aim at obtaining part or the entire share of the other airlines 
participating in the alliance, which means that they seek their own benefit to 
the detriment of the overall general benefit of the alliance. 
From this incongruity of expectations and aspirations arises another thorny 
aspect of alliances, the difficulty of coordinating methods and activities. It 
comes from the differences in corporate cultures at the airlines, which retain 
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their personalities within the alliance, with the conflicting priorities, the culture 
clashes and the vaguely stated alliance objectives. The bottom line is though 
that each airline continues to work toward its own sales target. Problems and 
potential conflicts arise for alliances from the effort to coordinate and integrate 
the different operations. Alliances have to tread a fine line through a maze of 
competing interests. Too much integration risks internal power struggles and 
divorce, too little produces no synergy. It is a fine line between what is in the 
best interests of the company and the broader benefits to the alliance. With 
thousands of employees, layers of managements, competing agendas and 
different cultures and time zones, consensus building is often not only 
demanding but also time-consuming. 
An alliance can become so large that it is difficult to make decisions quickly 
and effectively and it is even more difficult to achieve consensus (because of 
size, distances etc). Within a single alliance, "a multiplicity of partners, each 
with its own stakes, constraints and ambitions can create problems" (Doz, 
1998). Airline alliances are not a homogeneous whole because in them 
participate different airlines in terms of their size and also airlines coming from 
all the world with different expectations, different cultures, different languages, 
and time zones. Different market segments have their own expectations with 
regard to each of these and, to the extent that expectations must be met, the 
costs involved in serving them will differ (Holloway, 1998). 
The example of FFPs coordination gives a good example of a source of 
conflict. The individual airline programs are often intrinsically different. Airlines 
hold differing views on FFPs, often cost and competition oriented. FFPs tend 
to be more generous in North America than in Europe and even less so in 
Asia. It will be difficult to come up with a single model. 
Major airlines might get frustrated at the "disproportionate amount of voice" 
the small airlines get (Airline Business, August 2001). Bringing disparate 
groups with differing, sometimes competing, goals is a delicate situation, 
particularly when you are working with alliances involving one or two "anchor" 
airlines (Oum, 2000) - such as United Airlines, Lufthansa, American Airlines - 
and many smaller airlines that fill in the strategic geographies around the 
globe. The rivalry between the airlines of the alliance can prove fatal for the 
very existence of the alliance. It is very probable that the alliance members 
will disagree on choices that might distress the individual interests of each 
airline. 
It seems that although joining an alliance is a must, aligning operations with 
other partners is expensive. Small and medium airlines have accepted this, 
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whether reluctantly or not, as a natural development. Although they recognize 
their interdependency they seek to preserve their standalone capability, 
exploiting their own niches as much as possible. 
Section 3.4 Recent and future developments 
3.4.1 Horizontal, vertical and external alliances 
Airlines in their effort to increase their performance and yield have resorted to, 
apart from horizontal alliances, vertical and external alliances. Horizontal 
alliances are widely defined as alliances between firms selling in the same 
product or service market. As airlines tend to ally themselves with partners - 
against which they were in head-to-head competition - that have 
complementary networks, to achieve traffic feed and access to new markets, 
intra-airline alliances are indeed a true example of horizontal alliances. 
The air transport industry sector has experienced its share of cooperation 
efforts on the vertical axis - with suppliers, distributors or buyers - as well as 
of external alliances drawn up with the producers of substitutes or 
complements in other industries. 
Before presenting some of these airlines, it should be mentioned that a major 
aspect of airline passenger services is that the demand for these services is a 
derived demand, which means that it is dependent on the demand for 
business trips, holiday travelling, weekend excursions or even sports or 
cultural events. This means that to forecast the demand for air services one 
must forecast the demand for all these other types of expenditure. Airlines 
have been under pressure to expand vertically into other areas of the travel 
industry, such as hotels, travel agencies, car hire or tour organisers in order to 
gain greater control over the total travel product. 
The clearest example of vertical alliances in the air transport industry are the 
collaborative arrangements that exist between airlines and hotels, car hire 
firms, travel agents and other companies involved in travel and tourism, and 
this in effort to provide "total travel products" and secure for themselves 
greater proportions of the consumers' total expenditure on travel. British 
Airways for example, is in partnership with a number of hotel chains such as 
Marriott, Hilton, the Ritz-Carlton Group, the Savoy Group among many others, 
with Hertz for car hire and with Diners Club for charge cards. 
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Few airlines have been able to integrate vertically with airport authorities, 
usually because airports are most of the times in public ownership and 
because governments usually prohibit airlines from taking equity stakes in 
them as well as in air traffic control facilities, if these are transferred to the 
private sector. 
External alliances, or as they are sometimes referred to "diversification" 
alliances, are rather infrequent. In the air transport industry, they traditionally 
have been limited largely to joint ventures in marketing promotions, for 
example special offers on fares, frequent flyer bonuses, package holidays, 
insurance etc. There are also certain cases of airlines transferring other 
specialised activities to external alliances. The 50/50 joint venture between 
Delta Air Lines and AT&T, under which AT&T handles much of Delta's internal 
computing requirements is such a case. 
As special case of alliances that merit special mention is the alliances 
concluded between airlines and railways. Although in theory they should be 
defined as external alliances as they are alliances between two industries 
offering substitute services, in effect they have important vertical elements as 
the one industry feeds traffic to the other. Intermodal alliances with railways 
have grown both in Europe and in North America. Air and rail industries have 
traditionally increasingly been cooperating to provide quick access between 
airports and city centres. Access to airport through dedicated metro or train 
lines reduces the problems associated with local road traffic and consequently 
the deterioration of air quality around airports. It also provides communities 
living near airports with better access to city centers. But alliances with high- 
speed trains is a novel feature. 
Although initially, airlines considered the train system, primarily high speed 
train, as a competitor as it threatened to substitute and control short haul 
distances since the door-to-door time on a train journey is equal, if not shorter, 
more convenient, smooth and less stressful than that on a plane. But in time, 
airlines have come to see trains as a support and supplement to air traffic 
since it enabled them to discontinue some ultra-short and expensive flights 
and to free the slots for more valuable destinations. When airlines realized 
that the solution to moving passengers quickly between major hubs and 
smaller industrial centers is rail, many airlines did not hesitate to pull out of 
routes that had become unprofitable and to enter into code share agreements 
with high-speed trains. 
The catalyst for the conclusion of these intermodal alliances has been the 
limits of airport capacity, but other contributing factors include the crowded 
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skies and continuing traffic delays, environmental concerns, the smooth flow 
of passengers, the finite opportunities for airport infrastructure construction, 
and the cost-ineffectiveness of short haul routes because of fuel, delays and 
landing fees. 
With rail taking over shorter feeder haul services, capacity for more medium 
and long haul flights at the congested hubs is being freed up. It is estimated 
for example that extending short haul routes to rail could free up to 5% of 
Frankfurt Airport's 460,000 annual flight movements-equivalent to a year of 
growth (Airline Business, 2001). In Europe, where high-speed train 
connections are actively being developed, it has been estimated that 10 to 
15% of air traffic could be absorbed by this mode of transport. It could 
complement or substitute air travel particularly between major centers. 
Thus, Air France has discontinued the Paris/Roissy-Brussels flights in favour 
of concluding a code share with the TGV; Lufthansa has considerably reduced 
its operations between Frankfurt airport and Stuttgart as it relies on the high- 
speed Deutsche Bahn for serving some of the Frankfurt-Stuttgart traffic and is 
considering of extending the idea to include Cologne and Dusseldorf; traffic 
between Ottawa and Montreal in Canada for travellers arriving to Montreal on 
British Airways flights is operated by a connecting bus service with a British 
Airways code. The same with travellers flying to Montreal on KLM flights. 
As access to major airports becomes an ever-scarcer commodity, it is 
conceivable that airlines, provided with the right infrastructure, may be 
increasingly receptive in contracting out extremely short haul services to 
surface transport. Many airlines use railways for feeder traffic as rail-airlines 
offer substantial benefits for airlines: intercity and high-speed trains have the 
potential to complement air transport and absorb part of the growth in 
demand, thereby increasing airport capacity. Under these agreements, railway 
stations act as check-in agents, thus passengers can hand luggage, which will 
be automatically transferred automatically to the aircraft - and pick up 
boarding passes at the train stations ticket counters and at the airports they 
can proceed directly to departure gates without any queuing or waiting. Airline 
tickets are valid for rail travel on these routes. 
The main obstacle to intermodality is lack of interconnectivity, that is the two 
industries have totally different infrastructures, lack common rules and 
facilities and have so far operated independently, therefore they are unable to 
provide passengers with "seamless" service. The incompatibilities that need to 
be overcome include: train and aircraft schedule/frequency coordination-this 
would make airline tickets valid for train riding, would render both passenger 
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and baggage check-in and baggage claim and custom services available at 
the point of origin and at the final destination respectively, whether it is train 
station or airport- IT integration of different systems and the ability to book 
train tickets through CRSs; coordination of airline and train FFIP offers (SNCF, 
for example, operates a system called "Grand Voyageur"), the need for trains 
to invest in baggage containers and transport vehicles to transfer baggage to 
the airport. Another problem is that high-speed rails links to airports are not 
profitable in the short term. The capacity of trains - at least 500 seats which 
exceeds by far that of aircraft - does not easily fit in with air passenger 
demand for frequent connections. 
3.4.2 Virtual merger 
Although there have been no instances of cross-border full mergers in the air 
transport industry - at least not yet -, there have some instance of multi- 
country airlines. National governments from neighbouring countries have 
agreed to pool their resources, form consortia on regional bases and establish 
airlines from scratch: SAS in Scandinavia, Gulf Air in the Middle East, Air 
Afrique 8 in francophone West Africa and LIAT in the West Indies. 
There have been some efforts for transnational consolidation, such as SAir 
Group's acquisition of 85% of Sabena - which ended in bankruptcy for both 
with one year difference - the aborted KLM-Alitalia joint venture, Air New 
Zealand's 100% acquisition of Ansett Australia. Under these joint ventures, 
two or more parent companies establish a new legal entity to manage the joint 
venture firm. The most recent cross-border consolidation is the recently 
announced Air France-KLM merger in which the airlines maintain their 
separate identity in order to maintain their traffic rights under bilateral 
agreements. 
This particular feature indicates clearly that cross-border mergers are 
stumbling upon the bilateral agreements, which link airline's nationality clause 
with traffic rights. Therefore, joint ventures with their unique management 
being controlled by the citizens of two or more countries are not allowed under 
the existing bilateral regulatory system. Any cross-border merger means that 
the merged company acquires the nationality of one of the previously 
independent airlines. This may result in the traffic rights granted under the 
bilateral agreement made separately with the governments of the previously 
independent carriers being lost. The example of the merger talks between 
This airline is no longer in existence 
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British Airways and KLM in 2000 illustrates this restriction. This plan, which 
would give rise to the biggest airline in the world in terms of revenue, broke 
down when the US proclaimed that the open skies agreement it had with the 
Netherlands would not extend to the new company, which simply meant the 
Dutch traffic rights and licences in US would be revoked. 
As things stand, legal, political and institutional constraints on mergers and 
institutional constraints between airlines of different nations will continue to 
exist. Many countries are proud of having an independent "national flag" 
airline. Mergers or acquisitions of such airlines by foreign airlines would be 
politically unacceptable to many governments and electorates, in the 
foreseeable future at least. 
3.4.3 Is the industry moving towards consolidation? 
Now that the focus of airline alliances has moved from network reach to cost 
savings, airline managements are wondering whether alliances are the right 
medium to deliver on costs. Revenue has been cited as the main alliance 
benefit, coming mainly through the channels of code share and loyalty 
schemes, closely followed by feeder opportunities and joint sales in third 
markets. Alliances were created because they "allowed airlines to achieve 
global network coverage without capital investment". But now the focus has 
shifted towards to cost synergies. 
The purpose of most mergers is to gain a substantial increase in market 
share, greater economies of scale, more buying power in the purchase of 
resources and various other advantages that smaller firms and alliances do 
not posses]s to the same extent. On the other hand, mergers are irreversible 
and give rise to a good many difficulties. Therefore, airlines have opted so far 
to ally rather than merge, to seek a partner who can help cover routes, trim 
costs and even take on costly booking needs. With an alliance, it is possible to 
envisage broad coverage of a market without making permanent 
commitments, without raising production costs and without any of the parties 
having to give up its identity. Also, alliances provoke little reaction from labour 
and in principle they pass the hurdle of competition laws more easily. 
Alliances can thus be seen as a transition phase of consolidation, but a phase 
that may turn out to be very long. 
While in global strategic alliances the drive for stand-alone airlines has been 
access to destinations that would be unreachable otherwise, in mergers the 
driver is network synergies, cost savings in double digits across all their 
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business and economies of scale. Looser cooperation among independent 
alliance partners would be lucky to achieve half of that result. It is widely 
argued that alliances are rarely capable of delivering the sort of cost-savings 
offered by a full-blown merger. 
But airlines are now reassessing their priorities. For many airline officials and 
aviation analysts, unless the industry restructures and airlines work to cut 
costs, there might be a whole industry collapse. Mergers and consolidations is 
the only way to secure a sustainable future for the airlines and a viable and 
competitive airline system. By their unwillingness to allow cross-border 
mergers, the competition authorities seem to completely ignore the ongoing 
crisis and the turbulent financial environment in the global aviation industry. 
According to an airline CEO this refusal by competition authorities highlights 
"the growing gulf between the commercial realities and long term restructuring 
challenges facing the aviation industry and the pursuit, by competition 
regulators, of ideals and market outcomes that the industry simply will not be 
able to deliver on a sustainable basis". Only full mergers will allow airlines to 
extract genuine economies of scale and substantial cost-savings. Another 
advantage of a single merged organisation is that unified ownership and 
control helps promote common objectives, strategy and structure. 
The United States is under pressure to open its skies to all European Union 
airlines, and this regardless of where in Europe they fly from and regardless of 
whether the governments of these airlines have signed an open skies 
agreement with the United States. This will encourage mergers and 
acquisitions, by reducing the threat to European Union member airlines of 
losing key traffic rights through such restructuring. "This will enable the 
international aviation system to continue without the threat of breakdown, " 
notes a European Union official. Until recently national flag airlines were 
untouchable national assets, but now the European Commission thinks that 
consolidation among its majors may be inevitable and even desirable if they 
are to retain a leading role on the world stage. KLM has always supported that 
"only true mergers can yield success .... any alliance that falls short of that is 
not our objective" (Aviation Strategy, June 2000). Even IATA believes that 
consolidation/mergers are vital to cope with forecast annual growth in 
international air traffic of nearly 5.6% a year. An IATA spokesman supports 
there were too many airlines in Europe for the amount of passengers, noting 
that there are 15 large competing airlines in Europe: "The airline industry is 
the only industry in the world that has not undergone a wave of mergers and it 
needs to go through that process, a process in which a lot of national 
companies will lose their independence, " he said. There are contradicting 
views over the feasibility of airline mergers: some claim that alliances are an 
124 
artificial response to an artificial problem and they "will not be here in 10-15 
years" (a British Airways officer); others support that there will be 
consolidations but only among smaller and weaker airlines and that alliances 
will retain their importance. 
Most analysts expect that the consolidation will continue with only a handful of 
major airlines. These airlines will be supplemented by numerous smaller 
airlines providing regional/commuter service. 
Even though there may not be mergers in names or brands, and this only to 
satisfy the conceits of national politics, this nonetheless, does not mean that 
there will not be real control shifts; such control shifts will create quasi joint 
ventures and consolidation. Furthermore, the lesson from other industries 
shows that once a few deals are in place, momentum can build surprisingly 
fast. As soon as one deal is in place then it becomes a vehicle which has to 
be utilised by others. 
Inter-continental relationships will probably retain their current status. But 
within deregulated markets and regional blocs such as EU and NAFTA, the 
real benefits could indeed come from crunching together national airlines to 
help dominate markets and strengthen economies of scale. Major airlines, the 
powerhouses of alliances, will use the global groupings with transatlantic 
partners for revenue enhancement, but will resort to regional or bilateral 
relationships for cost reductions, Majors are acting as centres of gravity within 
the regions, taking the lead on developing shared service with local partners. 
If mergers do occur in Europe resulting in the creation of new European 
giants, US authorities will certainly review their perspective on US 
consolidation. 
The figure below presents the way airline cooperation has evolved and will 
probably evolve in the future. It started out as simple code sharing 
agreements involving low level of cooperation and commitment. Although it 
produced limited benefits, at the same time it secured ease of exit. The liberal 
changes in regulation have permitted airline cooperation to proceed to higher 
levels of cooperation. With complete deregulation and abolition of bilateral 
agreements, airline cooperation will reach the full merger stage that will 
enable it to reap the highest synergy benefits. This however, entails high 
degree of commitment since once an airline makes the decision to merge it is 
very difficult to undo. 
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Figure 3.5 
Summary 
The different forms of cooperation alliances adopted so far have been 
presented from the airlines' perspective and not from the customers' 
perspective. It should be stressed briefly that customers do perceive benefit 
from using the alliance services. These benefits may arise from higher 
frequency, improved transfer times, the availability of more destinations the 
alliance can offer them to a much larger extent than an individual airline, 
improved ground and in-flight service levels, and more attractive loyalty 
schemes. Alliances may however, result in the creation of monopolistic 
conditions, and disappearance of competition. Fares may increase instead of 
decreasing especially on hub-hub routes where there is little or no, in certain 
cases, competition. There is always the danger that with the "gigantism" of 
alliances service will be become homogenised, uniform, standardised and 
impersonal. When flying with an alliance, passengers do not know which 
airline they are going to fly with to their destination, be forced to make many 
stops until they reach their final destination on routes they could fly non-stop 
before the establishment of the alliance. They will have to put up with 
increased fares as well as longer journeys. 
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Source: Eggleton - British Airways (1999) 
Alliances have by definition a multilateral and multinational character. The 
core driver behind the formation of alliance groupings was the shape and size 
of their combined route network. Alliances started tentatively as airlines 
attempted to reap the revenue enhancements marketing alliances - with code 
share and FFPs being the core of all agreements - could bring about within 
less than two years of their establishment. They proceeded to more strategic 
partnerships as they realised the benefits they could reap in terms of cost 
synergies. Code share and alliances have become strategic options. They 
enable alliance partners to increase their traffic without or with little cost and to 
reap some limited cost reduction benefits. 
The deeper the integration, the more the benefits but few alliance partners 
have the ambition to go as far as the unified model requires. The flipside of 
the integrated unified model is that it makes it more difficult to reverse the 
integration and almost impossible for an airline to leave the alliance. If an 
airline is more or less absorbed in the alliance, it looses its identity and it is 
very difficult to regain it and it looses its ability to take advantage of future 
developments that might arise. Alliance partners value independence over 
the potential benefits deeper integration may bring at least as long as they can 
afford to. 
There is much talk about whether alliances will proceed to mergers and 
consolidations but whether there will be such developments or not, alliances 
will continue to play an important role in air transport industry for years to 
come. 
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Chapter 4 
Past 
and Present 
Airline 
Alliances 
The past experience of airline alliances, as it will be shown in the first section 
of this chapter, has clearly been one of great instability. Many alliances have 
been abandoned because of management difficulties and/or divergence of 
airlines' needs, interests and tactics. Airlines, especially the privatised 
previously state-owned airlines in Europe, loosing government protection and 
having to deal with the Single Aviation Market in Europe, experimented with 
different partners. Smaller partners formed alliances with other small airlines 
to become big enough to match the majors. Others gave priority to long haul 
routes and turned to US partners. Before 1995 the success rate of alliances 
was just below a three-year period. 
After the late 1990s it seems that the global alliance picture begins to stabilise 
around the major alliance groupings, having as core members a major 
European and a major US airline. Changes are certainly taking place but the 
global groupings remain stable. Their background, the forms of cooperation 
they include, their major strengths and weaknesses will be presented in the 
second section. Finally some major unaligned airlines and the reasons of their 
choices will be discussed in the third section. 
Section 4.1 Past Airline Alliances 
The first international alliance, in recent times, was formed in 1986 between 
Air Florida and British Island, with Air Florida feeding US originating traffic to 
code shared British Island's flights on the London-Amsterdam route. It is 
interesting to note that this first ever alliance was concluded on transatlantic 
routes, the area that was to lead the liberalisation effort. 
Figure 4.1 presents a historical evolution of airline alliances with the red lines 
indicating the past airline alliances that have been disbanded while the lower 
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part of the figure shows with the blue lines the inception of the existing airline 
alliances. 
Figure 4.1 
Airline alliance historic development 
Atlantic Excellence 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 03 
4.1.1 European Quality Alliance (EQA) 
In October 1989, Swissair and Scandinavian Airlines Systems (SAS) - 
already partners in purchasing and maintenance ventures since 1958 - 
signed a cooperation agreement, which led to the formation of the European 
Quality Alliance together with Austrian Airlines, in which Swissair had a 10% 
shareholding, and Finnair, to cooperate in operational and marketing areas. 
Swissair and SAS had a 7.5% cross shareholding in each other's stock. The 
alliance had joint operations at around 30 airports. 
Swissair was one of the first airlines to seek close ties with other airlines in an 
effort to diversify risk, secure long term profitability and build critical mass. 
With Switzerland being outside the European Union, having a home market of 
limited potential and high labour costs, Swissair realised that it needed to pull 
its partnerships into a grand global alliance. Swissair's first move was to take 
a controlling stake in the Belgian flag airline, Sabena, to take a foothold in the 
European Union. But this move displeased SAS, which had always remained 
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distant barring the feeding of some traffic from its Scandinavian hubs into 
Zurich and Vienna. 
The group was composed of two larger and two smaller airlines, whose 
contributions largely complimented each other. There was always however, 
the danger of potential conflict because of network overlap. Furthermore, It 
was a regional alliance lacking the network extent an intercontinental alliance 
could offer. Swissair was the most influential member as it was the most 
significant airline and appeared to be the driving force in the alliance and was 
pushing for greater integration, a goal not all of its partners shared or even 
feared. Compared to other airlines Swissair did not have the network an ally 
seeking global coverage would prefer. Finnair and SAS exited because they 
were not closely tied to European Quality Alliance but also because they had 
a strong substitute in a relationship with Lufthansa, which was potentially 
offering greater benefits and greater value (Suen, 2002). 
The agreement between Lufthansa and SAS - which did not involve any 
equity - in 1995 to link their traffic systems and combine route networks put 
an end to SAS's role in the EQA. As a result, Swissair and Austrian Airlines 
intensified their relationship and Sabena joined the Swissair camp. 
The table below presents the cooperation between the EQA members in 
1996. 
Table 4.1 
Collaboration details of EQA members 
Partner airlines Cooperation details 
Swissair Austrian Airlines Code share from Vienna to Zurich and Geneva, and 
from Zurich to Linz, Salzburg, Graz, Klagenfurt and 
Innsbruck. Shuttle services on Zurich-Vienna. 
Catering, handling and maintenance joint ventures. 
FFP co-ordination 
Swissair Sabena Code share on Brussels-Geneva and Brussels- 
Zurich. Cooperation on sales and reservations, 
ground services, information systems, freight and 
FFPs 
Austrian Airlines Sabena Block-space agreement and code share on Vienna- 
Brussels. FFP cooperation 
Source: Airline Business (June 1996) 
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4.1.2 Global Excellence 
The first truly global alliance was the one among Delta Air Lines, Swissair, 
Singapore Airlines, which launched in 1989 and involved an equity swapping 
of up to 5% of shares between each of the partners. Despite the cross- 
holdings, whose aim was to bind the airlines together, the partners did not 
start code sharing until April 1995. The alliance was joined in 1995 by Austrian 
Airlines, Swissair's partner in EQA, possibly as part of an effort to integrate 
EQA and Global Excellence, an Intercontinental and a European alliance. By 
combining the route networks of the EQA and Global Excellence (Figure 4.2), 
the constituent airlines were able through a hub-and-spoke pattern in the 
intercontinental arena to develop a strong presence in three important 
regions, namely Europe, the US and Asia/Pacific. 
Figure 4.2 
EQA and Global Excellence world-wide coverage 
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Source: Bissessur (1996) 
The beginnings seemed very promising, as the relationships between the 
three had started as separate ventures. They were all quality-driven, enjoying 
reputation for premium quality and dedication to customer service. 
Furthermore, Delta Air Lines and Swissair had similar fleet types made by 
McDonnell Douglas and that is why they were considering the interchange of 
flight deck crews. The partners had code share and block space agreements, 
shared terminal facilities, had FFP cooperation, schedule coordination to allow 
connecting flights to operate effectively and joint handling. They focused 
primarily on joint marketing: joint frequent flyer schemes, shared ticket offices, 
round-the-world fares, through check-in, joint airport handling. The alliance 
also aimed at achieving alignment of reservation systems and common ticket 
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offices. They were considering a series of joint marketing projects including 
package tours, a global small parcel delivery service, passenger and cargo 
handling, joint use of ancillary services and marketing cooperation. 
There were also discussions and teaming agreements on a bilateral basis 
such as crew exchange scheme between Swissair and Delta Air Lines. The 
alliance managed to receive antitrust immunity from the US DOT, effective for 
five years, which granted them greater freedom in their collaboration. 
A very interesting aspect of this alliance was the fact that its three mainstays - 
Delta Air Lines, Singapore Airlines, Swissair - had established a joint venture 
of in-flight material purchasing, the Zurich - based DSS World Sourcing. This 
venture combined the purchasing power of the three big airlines to get lower 
prices on everything from in-flight amenities to computers and office and 
equipment, crew uniforms and fuel. This remained in place even after the 
cooperative alliance in code share was terminated. 
In 1997 the alliance suddenly collapsed when Singapore Airlines in November 
1997 signed a commercial agreement with Lufthansa, which included code 
share and joint marketing. Singapore Airlines defected because the alliance 
was "unproductive" and Lufthansa could offer greater benefits by making 
Singapore its primary hub in Asia (Suen, 2002). 
The partners of this alliance had joined up for different reasons and pursued 
differing objectives. As a result it was not a truly strategic alliance pursuing 
common objectives (Doganis, 2001) but purely a commercial agreement 
concerned with FFP, joint ground handling, prorate revenue agreement and 
interlining. Despite the 8-year relationship, the airlines neither became 
operationally integrated enough to benefit from synergies nor interdependent 
enough to form natural exit barriers (Suen, 2002). Singapore Airlines withdrew 
precisely because it was not a strategic alliance and joined Star Alliance, 
which seemed to be more compatible to its individual services and structures. 
Delta Air Lines for example was unwilling to move quickly, too cautious to give 
complete access to their database and to spend to invest in the rationalisation 
of fixed assets, such as terminals and frequent flyer lounges and to develop 
CRSs. Similarly, Swissair and Singapore Airlines never code shared and even 
directly competed on trunk routes such as Zurich-Singapore. 
Despite its break-up after eight years, this was the forerunner of other global 
alliances. 
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The table below presents some details in relation to the collaboration existing 
among the Global Excellence and EQA members. 
Table 4.2 
Collaboration details of Global Excellence and EQA members 
Partner airlines Cooperation details 
Swissair Delta Air Lines Code share from Zurich to New York JFK, Atlanta and 
Cincinnati, on Geneva-New York JFK and on intra- 
European routes to Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Munich via 
Zurich. Schedule co-ordination, FFP cooperation and 
joint handling. Trilateral code share agreement with 
Austrian Airlines on Vienna-Geneva-Washington. Joint 
purchasing with Singapore Airlines 
Swissair Singapore Co-ordination of schedules, code share, joint handling 
Airlines and FFP link 
Delta Air Lines Singapore Code share and block space on Singapore Airlines 
Airlines Singapore-New York JFK service via Europe. Joint 
purchasing with Swissair 
Delta Air Lines Austrian Code share on Vienna-New York. Vienna-Atlanta and 
Airlines on intra-European flights from Vienna to Hamburg, Kiev 
and Odessa. Trilateral code share agreement with 
Swissair on Vienna-Geneva-Washington 
Delta Air Lines Sabena Block space and code share from Brussels to Atlanta, 
New York, Chicago and Boston, and on flights to 
Germany via Brussels 
Source: Airline Business (June 1996) 
4.1.3 Alcazar Project 
SAir Group, Swissair's parent company, believing that there was "no future for 
the smaller players in Europe" that were not fully integrated into a strong 
alliance, led in 1993 an effort to merge four European airlines in order to 
centre on gaining critical mass within a liberalised European market built 
around several hubs in Europe. All the operators were of comparable size, 
three of the negotiators, SAS, Swissair and Austrian Airlines were already 
linked partially on marketing through the European Quality Alliance, and the 
fourth was KLM. The four airlines would fuse together into a single, jointly 
managed and owned airline. 
It was difficult however, to harmonize a full global alliance with existing and 
potentially conflicting partnerships held by the four airlines. Swissair had 
stakes in several European airlines such as TAP Air Portugal, had a three- 
way equity swap with Delta Air Lines and Singapore Airlines, while KLM was 
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integrating US services with Northwest Airlines. If the Alcazar - an acronym 
for "Alone carriers zigzag at random" (Knorr, 2003) or according to others 
named after the four-sided Moorish fortress in Spain (Staniland, 2003) - 
alliance had gone ahead, it would have solved the problems of scale that were 
worrying Europe's smaller national airlines. The four airline groups would have 
sales higher than even those of the US groups, ranking well within the world 
top ten airlines for scheduled-passenger numbers and traffic. It would have 
formed Europe's second largest airline immediately after British Airways with 
a traffic system based on a multi-hub network around Amsterdam, 
Copenhagen, Geneva, Oslo, Stockholm, Vienna and Zurich, hence enabling it 
to offer customers services to over 200 online destinations. 
It was mainly political concerns about the future of the national airlines that put 
an end to the project. The smaller partner, Austrian Airlines, was going to hold 
only a 10% stake in the venture - with the other partners taking 30% each - 
raising fears that the Austrian national interests would be overwhelmed and 
that a full-blown merger and the subsequent rationalisation would result in the 
loss of jobs and the possible closure of Vienna as a hub. Thus, Austrian 
Airlines opted for which Lufthansa was offering a cooperative agreement, 
covering scheduling and some technical and operational areas but stopping 
short of an equity stake. 
The deeper problem was a tension between, on the one hand, the wish of 
small-country airlines to defend their domestic markets against their larger 
competitors and, on the other, the equally insistent imperative of getting 
access to large markets outside the European Union. KLMs' focus was 
primarily on the intercontinental market and its international partnership, while 
the other three were interested in building a strong home market together first, 
as a prelude to an increased market presence" (Staniland, 2003). After 1993, 
all four parties to the Alcazar Project adopted strategies that involved a 
relationship with an US airline, sometimes in partnership with a large 
European airline. 
Another factor that contributed to the collapse of the project was divergence 
on the choice of US partner. KLM stood by Northwest Airlines since their 
alliance was advantaged by antitrust immunity. Swissair, on the other hand, 
was unwilling to give up Delta Air Lines for it was in better financial shape than 
Northwest Airlines and because it had a much more extensive network into 
Europe. 
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4.1.4 Atlantic Excellence 
Swissair, Sabena, Austrian Airlines and Delta Air Lines launched their alliance 
arrangement in the North Atlantic market in 1998. Delta's four-way Atlantic 
Excellence had won US antitrust immunity and was considered at the time to 
be one of the most successful alliances in the world. The three European 
airlines of this alliance initiative were also allies in the Qualiflyer Alliance, the 
other two allies TAP Air Portugal and THY Turkish Airlines were not invited to 
participate in the Atlantic Excellence alliance because neither Portugal nor 
Turkey had open skies agreements with the United States. The major benefit 
of this alliance was the US antitrust immunity and open skies agreements 
between the United States and the three European nations. The four partners 
established a revenue pool on the north Atlantic, under which the revenue 
from routes from United States to Zurich, Brussels and Vienna were divided 
up according to a pre-agreed formula. They abandoned fixed quotas of seats 
on their flights; each had access to all available seats. The partners were 
offering identical fares and used the same booking fares and categories 
across the Atlantic. It was claimed that traffic and bookings increased after the 
partnership started. The allies also established a common yield management 
operation in Atlanta. In their effort to enhance their integration they had even 
begun placing joint orders for aircraft within the framework of fleet 
harmonisation. 
While the alliance was looking for partners to expand, in June 1999 Delta Air 
Lines abandoned its partner Swissair and the alliance itself and a few months 
later Austrian Airlines deserted the same alliance and announced its 
adherence to Star Alliance. Delta Air Lines formed an exclusive long term 
strategic agreement with Air France, which was regarded by Swissair as its 
major competitor and could not accept the new arrangement. However, it was 
the defection of Austrian Airlines from the SAir Group (probably tired of 
waiting for Swissair to decide on a new strategy and finding a better deal 
elsewhere) followed almost immediately by the departure of Delta Air Lines, 
which had revised its European strategy, that struck the fatal blow to the 
Atlantic Excellence alliance. The Alliance was scaled back to the European 
dimensions of SAir Group and to the Qualiflyer alliance, though Swissair and 
Sabena did provide for one essential need of the alliance by concluding a 
code share agreement with American Airlines, which was given antitrust 
exemption. 
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4.1.5 Qualiflyer 
The founders of the Atlantic Excellence alliance negotiated a series of service 
and frequent flyer agreements with other European airlines, including Crossair 
(subsidiary of Swissair), Air Europe, Air Littoral and others in another alliance 
called Qualiflyer. Qualiflyer was built in 1998 around the SAir Group, 
Swissair's parent company, with the other members being Sabena, Austrian 
Airlines, TAP Air Portugal, THY Turkish Airlines and AOM/Air Liberte. These 
were later joined by the Italian Volare Group, the number two operator in Italy, 
Portugalia Airlines and LOT Polish Airlines. 
The Qualiflyer alliance agreement provided for joint purchasing programmes, 
including fleet, fuel and on-board consurnables, cooperative and joint- 
handling, joint computing projects, cargo handling and marketing, aircraft 
maintenance and overhaul, passenger handling and duty free sales, frequent 
flyer programme benefits and joint lounge facilities and improved transfers at 
the alliances' multiple hubs. It should be noted that Swissair and Sabena took 
a step towards complete integration in July 1999 with the launch of a single 
airline management group to run their flying operations. Other members of the 
Qualiflyer group would be able to put their own services under this company 
name. It seemed at the time that the partners were getting ready to further 
cement their alliance as they were on the brink of combining their assets and 
using them jointly. Swissair had insisted on building this alliance through 
purchasing more substantial shareholdings in a number of airlines that it was 
hoping to secure as allies. It was proven that cross-shareholdings were not 
sufficient to cement these alliances. A major problem of this alliance was the 
lack of a transatlantic link since Swissair's tie-up with Delta Air Lines was 
broken up. Although this alliance was much smaller than around the same 
time emerging global alliances led by British Airways, KLM and Lufthansa, 
each of the partners had a strong grip on its own home market. On the other 
hand, even though some of its members had sizeable international route 
networks, Qualiflyer was actually only a regional alliance as all of its members 
were based in Europe. This grouping drew most of its membership from small 
to medium-sized Europe based airlines and as a consequence its share of the 
vital and profitable intercontinental markets was very small, 4% of the world's 
scheduled passenger traffic (Airline Business, September 2001) and thus the 
demise of the alliance had an almost negligible impact on the international 
airline industry. 
What distinguished Qualiflyer from all other alliances is that it had established 
a multi-hub system all around Europe, which consisted of a series of several 
small hubs (Figure 4.3). This system was supposed to advantage customers 
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by minimising waiting time and by offering a wide range of destinations and 
frequencies. Qualiflyer was not organised as a web of bilateral arrangements 
amongst members on top of some common mutual commitment which is 
typical of all other alliances. By contrast, Qualiflyer was organised as a hub- 
and-spoke system. 
Figure 4.3 
Qualiflyer hub system 
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With Swissair bankrupt in October 2001 and Sabena in November 2001, that 
is with the core members of the alliance grounded the alliance ceased to exist. 
The members announced officially the discontinuance of their alliance in 
February 2002. This disbandment signalled the end of one of the most 
interdependent alliance groups. Swissair had acted as the nucleus of the 
alliance owning an equity stake in most of its partners. It had also attempted 
to coordinate fleet plans with many Qualiflyer partners who were customers of 
Swissair's leasing subsidiary, Flightlease. Swissair's aggressive policy of 
acquisitions played a catalytic role in its failed alliance record. 
By insisting on acquiring stakes in small and financially unstable, it exposed 
itself as it was asked to support and to a large extent sustain these airlines. 
And when the crisis after September 11,2001 hit all airlines, Swissair was 
unable to muster the resources necessary to support itself. 
It was also the first multi-airline alliance to go beyond joint FFP and code 
share and to establish a joint subsidiary, owned in equal proportions by all 
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members, to define, buy, oversee the ground handling of their flights at 
several airports in Europe. 
The table below presents the members of Qualiflyer alliance and the market 
share they had conquered in September 2001. By studying closely the figures, 
it becomes evident that Swissair and Sabena were the dominant allies as they 
held 40% of the total market share of the alliance. Once Swissair and Sabena 
faced financial problems, the alliance was doomed to fail. 
Table 4.3 
Qualiflyer 
Core Members 
Date 
joined 
Passenger traffic & shares 2000 
Traffic (RPK) Passengers 
Billion Share Million share 
Group 
sales 
$ bn 
Swissair Mar-98 35.9 1.2% 15.1 0.9% 9.6 
Sabena Mar-98 19.7 0.7% 10.9 0.7% 2.2 
Turkish Airlines Mar-98 17.4 0.6% 12.0 0.7% 1.5 
AOM/Air Liberte Mar-98 15.6 0.5% 7.3 0.4% 1.2 
TAP Air Portugal Mar-98 10.4 0.3% 5.3 0.3% 1.0 
Volare Group Mar-99 7.7 0.3% 1.9 0.1% 0.3 
LOT Polish Jan-00 5.7 0.2% 2.8 0.2% 0.7 
Crossair Mar-98 3.5 0.1% 6.3 0.4% 0.8 
Air Littoral May-00 0.8 0.0% 1.5 0.1% 0.2 
Portugalia Jan-00 0.8 0.0% 1.0 0.1% 0.1 
Total 117.5 3.9% 64.1 3.9% 17.7 
Note: Traffic is for parent operation not group 
Source: Airline Business (September 2001) 
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4.1.6 KLM-Alitalia 
The KLM-Alitalia alliance launched at the end of 1998 aimed at creating two 
joint ventures companies, one for passenger services and a separate one for 
cargo operations. The plan was signed shortly after the opening of the Italian 
airline's new Milan hub at Malpensa Airport, which KLM wanted to be its 
second hub in Europe. 
KLM lacked critical mass within Europe but had transatlantic links with 
Northwest Airlines. This last was unique in that it benefited from US antitrust 
immunity and started much earlier than the other alliances to go further in 
boosting the number of joint services and code share points, co-ordinating 
schedules and pricing and marketing a joint business class product. 
The KLM-Alitalia agreement went further than any other global alliance in 
integrating the two companies' operations without being a full merger. The two 
airlines were operating common/joint check-in desks, sales offices and 
lounges. A jointly appointed "Network Organiser" would provide a unified 
management structure for the two joint operating ventures which it would offer 
to existing fleet and staff and those of its close subsidiaries as service 
providers. In the first year, each airline would be able to keep 450 million E of 
earnings. But revenues above that level would be shared on a 50: 50 basis. 
The two airlines intended to completely integrate management, share profits 
and make joint fleet and investment decisions. This agreement, if 
materialised, would be the closest ever two European airlines have come to a 
"virtual merger" together with the Swissair/Sabena "virtual merger". 
KLM decided in April 2000 to terminate the alliance and the former partners 
began a legal battle claiming millions of euros in damages. The Dutch 
arbitration tribunal deciding the legal dispute between KLM and Alitalia over 
the termination of their alliance agreements concluded in 2002 that KLM's 
termination of the agreement with Alitalia was not valid and granted Alitalia's 
claim for damages of 250 million E plus interest. 
The continuing uncertainty about Malpensa's future growth and the Italian 
non-fulfilment of the condition for the Italian airline's privatisation prompted 
KLM's decision to pull out of the alliance. KLM had also been complaining the 
airport had been plagued with problems, including a poor on-time record and 
long waits for baggage. According to some other analysts (Agusdinata, De 
Klein, 2002) it was not so much the problems of the Milan airports as the fact 
that Malpensa was supposed to be one of the alliance's hubs and therefore 
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crucial to the alliance but whether the Malpensa hub could be developed in 
the future remained uncertain because of environmental regulations. 
Section 4.2 The Airline Alliances today 
Having learned from experience, many airlines started looking for deeper, 
more meaningful and mutually beneficial relationships, for real economic and 
financial paybacks and often finding them in numerous small agreements 
rather than in the grand strategic marketing alliance. Airlines are by now 
pursuing concrete results. 
Before proceeding to present current airline alliances, it should be mentioned 
that the airline industry is a highly fragmented industry. On a company level 
the six largest companies account for 30% of the market revenue, compared 
with 79% in the petroleum industry and 62% in the automobile industry (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 1998). But if examined on an alliance level, it is 
observed that the four alliances groupings control 56% of world RPK (Table 
4.4). These data indicate that alliances, even if we cannot talk about 
"companies" yet, have reversed this fragmentation and the air transport 
industry is moving towards some form of consolidation. 
Table 4.4 
The global alliance groupings - traffic/revenue totals and world market share 
(2002) 
Passenger traffic (RPK) 
billion Share 
Passenger numbers 
million share 
Group revenues 
$ billion share 
"Wings" 175 6.0% 65 4.0% 15 4.5% 
Star Alliance 624 21.2% 301 18.6% 70 21.1% 
oneworld 493 16.8% 214 13.3% 47 14.1% 
SkyTearn 351 11.9% 202 12.5% 38 11.4% 
Total Alliances 1643 55.9% 782 48.4% 170 51.1% 
Source: Airline Business (July 2003) 
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Figure 4.5 
Alliance world passenger share 
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All current airline alliances are centred around at least one European and one 
North American member since the intra-North American traffic, the intra- 
European traffic and the North America-Europe traffic together account for 
57% of world traffic flow (Figure 4.6). 
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4.2.1 General 
Since 1986 many airlines have formed a large number of alliances, many 
have dissolved over time others have formed as airlines experiment with new 
partners. It seems, however that at present the air transport industry has 
stabilised itself around the formations presented below. In the period between 
1995 and 1998 there has been a remarkable increase in the survival rate of 
alliances, the overall rate improved from 38% in the 1992-95 period, 
compared to 68% between 1995 and 1998. 
The table and figure below summarise the agreements currently in force 
among 163 passenger airlines. They show clearly that the number of 
cooperation agreements among airlines constantly increases and the most 
popular form of agreement is code share, the most strategic of all. 
Table 4.5 
Alliance survey 2003 - current agreements by type and start date 
Start date Block space Code share Marketing Other Total 
pre-1970 1 1 
1970s 3 5 2 10 
1980s 2 10 6 18 
1990 5 1 1 7 
1991 5 2 7 
1992 1 5 2 8 
1993 2 8 2 12 
1994 9 2 11 
1995 1 20 6 27 
1996 1 14 4 19 
1997 1 41 1 43 
1998 1 49 7 57 
1999 2 48 2 52 
2000 4 55 19 78 
2001 2 65 3 70 
2002 58 1 59 
2003/pending 37 12 49 
Date not given 27 12 2 41 
GRAND TOTAL 17 459 86 7 569 
Source: Airline Business (September 2003) 
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Figure 4.7 
Alliance survey 2003 - summary by type and start date 
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A 1999 survey conducted by Boston Consulting Group revealed that about 
70% of alliances include a code share agreement and almost 50% a linked 
FFP. Only 15% have joint ground facilities, shared catering, training or 
maintenance and even fewer involve joint marketing, scheduling, combined 
sales forces or purchasing of common spec aircraft. There is also a definite 
decline trend in the percentage of equity alliances, more specifically from 21 % 
in 1994 to 10% in 1999. Fewer equity alliances are now formed but they have 
a higher survival rate than non-equity alliances. Equity investments seem to 
be common among regional - that is within the same continent - alliances, 
probably in an effort to secure the stability of a feeder airline's network. But 
even the survival rate of non-equity alliances has improved from 26% in the 
1992-95 period to 62% in the 1995-98 period. 
it seems that major strategic alliances will become more stable as each 
partner will be motivated to remain with one major strategic alliance group. In 
the earlier stage of the alliance frenzy, many airlines participated in the race 
simply because they feared being left behind. Others formed multiple alliances 
with different airlines without a master plan. The cost of leaving a major 
alliance is likely to become prohibitive since the possibility of joining an 
equally attractive alliance diminishes over time. These reasons indicate that 
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global alliances will increasingly become more stable and durable. 
Furthermore, alliances, having filled the gaps in their global coverage, are 
going now through a stabilising phase which aims at increasing the level of 
commitment amongst partners so as to obtain all the potential benefits 
alliances can offer; or in other words to move from marketing alliances to true 
strategic partnerships. 
At the same time it should be noted that the situation is still evolving since as 
the figure below shows that the airlines even if they belong to a certain 
alliance, they still value their independence and they maintain relationships 
and agreements with airlines from other alliances in an effort to remain flexible 
and adaptable in a highly volatile industry. 
Figure 4.8 
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4.2.2 "Wings" 
6 
"Wings" is the tentative name (not officially sanctioned) for the alliance of 
KLM, Northwest Airlines, with Continental Airlines being an affiliated partner. 
KLM, having a small domestic market was forced both to restructure and to 
look for powerful European and North American partners to achieve global 
reach and secure access to the stream of transatlantic traffic, which 
represents 35% of world traffic. Thanks to its investment in Northwest Airlines 
KLM had 25% of Northwest's voting shares and 49% of its equity - KLM was 
able to launch a solid alliance over the Atlantic in 1989. Thanks to the antitrust 
immunity granted by the US DOT in November 1993 the two airlines were 
able to make joint decisions on capacity, scheduling and pricing. KLM and 
Northwest Airlines have had a far reaching alliance agreement with common 
branding, purchasing, management, marketing and FFP, although the equity 
stake that KLM had in Northwest Airlines was sold after disagreement of 
control of Northwest Airlines. The two airlines cooperate closely on 
transatlantic flights (for example: coordinated schedule planning) and on 
beyond-hub code shares. In 1999 Northwest Airlines bought a stake in 
Continental Airlines, and announced far-reaching cooperation, including code 
share and frequent flyer participation. Also in 1998, KLM and Alitalia 
concluded an alliance agreement, setting up passenger and cargo joint 
ventures to manage the airlines operations and marketing which shared costs 
and revenues. Alitalia is also a longstanding code share partner of Continental 
Airlines. The number of passengers transported would rise to 130.9 millions. 
However, the KLM and Alitalia partnership was dismantled by August 2000. 
As a result the tripartite code share between KLM, Alitalia and Northwest 
Airlines has been abandoned. Ever since the KLM-Alitalia joint venture broke 
down, the future of "Wings" has been put into question despite Northwest 
Airlines and KLM's insistence that they wanted to continue. 
Despite being the first strategic partnership to be established, the alliance has 
not developed much beyond between KLM and Northwest Airlines despite 
several efforts to bring along several airlines (such as KLM UK, Braathens, 
Eurowings, Air Europa, Kenya Airways and Malaysia Airlines). For the time 
being, the alliance survives in the reduced form of a basic partnership 
between KLM and Northwest Airlines, with Continental Airlines remaining an 
important partner for both allies. At the same time there is a trilateral alliance 
among Northwest Airlines, Continental Airlines and Delta Air Lines. There is 
much speculation that KLM and Northwest Airlines will join SkyTeam. 
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KLM and Northwest Airlines share a "Worldwide Reliability" logo on the 
fuselages of their planes, tickets, timetables, advertising materials and in-flight 
service amenities. From 1993 all KLM flights on North Atlantic routes 
connecting to and from the US have been operated as a joint venture with 
Northwest Airlines. They operate joint round-trip flights from Amsterdam to 
Minneapolis/St Paul, Detroit and Boston, KLM operated the route between 
Amsterdam and Detroit, while Northwest Airlines operated routes between 
Amsterdam and Minneapolis/St Paul, Detroit and Boston. By doing so, they 
linked Northwest's domestic service from 88 interior US cities to 30 cities in 
Europe and the Middle East. They overall operate a route network connecting 
about 360 cities in 78 countries on 6 continents. 
Netherlands and US have recorded the largest percentage growth in direct 
traffic (Williams, 2002), on the numbers of passengers travelling between 
Amsterdam and US cities. The partnership grew the once sleepy Amsterdam- 
Detroit route by over 50%, with most passengers headed for smaller final 
destinations. 41 out of the 64 weekly flights in 1988 were operated to Chicago, 
New York and Los Angeles, whilst by 1998 49 were operated of the 107 
weekly services to Atlanta, Detroit and Minneapolis. Prior to the open skies 
agreement, there were no direct flights from Amsterdam to either Detroit or 
Minneapolis. Aside from the doubling of frequency between 1998 and 2001, a 
considerable rerouting of traffic via the hubs of Northwest Airlines has 
occurred. The routing of substantial amounts of traffic through Northwest's 
hub at Detroit is clearly apparent from the five daily services operated to there 
from Amsterdam in summer 2001. 
There are researchers who believe that because "Wings" does not have 
members from each region of the world, it cannot be regarded as a truly 
global strategic alliance. This alliance grouping lacks partners in Asia and 
South America. Although the relation between the partners seems to be 
stable, unless the alliance collects partners, it is likely end up joining up with 
one of the other alliances as many rumours; support. 
The Dutch airline has officially abandoned its ambitions to form a global 
grouping with its partner Northwest Airlines and is considering entering 
SkyTeam after the creation with Air France of Europe's leading airline group. 
The table below presents the members of "Wings" with data concerning the 
date they joined the alliance, the revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), the 
passengers they flew and their revenue. 
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Table 4.6 
"Wings" 
"Wings" 
Date 
joined 
Pax traffic 
RPK million 
Passengers Revenue 
million $ million 
KLM 
Northwest Airlines 
Jun-89 
Jun-89 
57,845 
117,733 
16 6,015 
54.1 9,905 
Total 175,578 70.1 15,920 
World share 6.0% 4.0% 4.5% 
Source: Airline Business (July 2003) 
The figure below presents the participation of "Wings" allies in the alliance in 
terms of passenger traffic. 
Figure 4.9 
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4.2.3 Star Alliance 
In 1996, Lufthansa formed an alliance with United Airlines. The Star Alliance 
was launched in May 1997, by Air Canada, Lufthansa, SAS, Thai Airways and 
United Airlines to create a global airline network. Through this alliance, 
Lufthansa aspired "to achieve the building-up of its geographical poles and to 
structure its strategy against its large competitors" (Bouayard, 1996). Varig, 
the sixth member, joined the alliance in October 1997, followed by Ansett 
Australia and Air New Zealand in March 1999. Ansett subsequently left as it 
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ceased operations in March 2002, disadvantaging the alliance in a region, 
Australasia, which was previously considered a point of strength (Airline 
Business, July 2002). All Nippon Airways - an until that time mostly domestic 
airline -joined the Star Alliance on 31 st October 1999, Austrian Airlines Group 
including Lauda Air and Tyrolean Airways joined in March 2000 and 
Singapore Airlines on 7 th April 2000. bmi British Midland and Mexicana joined 
on Vt July 2000. Thus, Star Alliance boasts to be the world's largest airline 
grouping with sixteen members, with Asiana Airlines and Spanair being the 
last ones to join the alliance in 2003. LOT Polish Airlines will become a 
member in October 2003. 
Star Alliance is already an established and apparently coherent alliance 
possessing a total of almost 2,000 aircraft, serving around 673 destinations in 
more than 130 countries worldwide and transporting more than a quarter of a 
billion passengers annually, through extensive code share agreements, with 
"round the world" fares for global travelers. The alliance allows access to over 
500 Star Alliance lounges around the world, reciprocal FFPs, through check- 
in, streamlined airport operations, cargo cooperation, joint purchasing, 
advertising and promotions. By having a strong geographical foundation and 
hubs in Frankfurt, London, Singapore and Bangkok as well as in the most 
powerful US airline system, Star Alliance multiplied its chances of being 
operational on a global scale. 
To increase cohesion and separate the supervisory and management 
functions, the alliance set up a management team composed of high-level 
executives from United Airlines and Lufthansa in June 2000. 
Within the alliance framework, there is an even closer cooperation between 
Lufthansa and SAS, which stipulates that the two partners put in common 
their prod ucts/services, their registration and cargo/freight system. The 
partners aim at making Frankfurt (Lufthansa hub) the turning point of the 
international flights of the two airlines and Copenhagen the hub for the flights 
to China and Japan, since Asia was the weak structural point of SAS. They 
have also agreed to harmonise their FFPs aiming at integrating them in the 
future. This close cooperation may be the precursor of a future merger. 
Lufthansa/United Airlines alliance received originally antitrust immunity from 
the US DOT in 1996 and this was renewed in 2001, but unlike the 
KLM/Northwest's immunity, under this immunity certain routes between the 
partner hubs were still subject to antitrust laws. There was to be no 
coordination of pricing, inventory or yield management coordination, or 
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pooling of revenues on the Chicago-Frankfurt route and the Washington- 
Frankfurt route. 
The lack of equity commitment may in fact help foster a sense of democracy 
among member airlines in the alliance, an attribute highly favoured by 
increasing pride in regional identities. 
Four Star Alliance airlines, Air Canada, Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa, SAS, 
have recently announced that they are joining forces to place an order for a 
common specification aircraft in the 70-120 seat size. The benefits of such a 
move include cost savings through operation, maintenance and training 
opportunities, the ability to dry-lease their common-specified aircraft between 
Star Alliance partners, and increased residual values for such aircraft and the 
opportunity to swap delivery slots. 
United Airlines has been facing serious financial problems recently and has 
sought protection under Chapter 11; this development may seriously 
jeopardise Lufthansa's access to the North Atlantic. However, US Airways, the 
US airline that emerged from bankruptcy protection (April 2003), is to become 
the eighteenth member of the Star Alliance. Being the USA's seventh largest 
airline, with an extensive network on the US east coast and a strong presence 
in the business hubs of the eastern United States/Florida and the Caribbean, 
US Airways will significantly expand the alliance's network. Given that 60- 
70% of US air traffic originates from the eastern seaboard, US Airways was a 
wonderful strategic fit for the Star Alliance: "The addition of US Airways will 
increase the number of airports served by the Star Alliance network from 673 
to 771, while the number of countries served will grow to 133 from 130". 
Star Alliance is the largest airline alliance and according to its officials: "the 
alliance will never be completed. We are dynamic and have to respond to 
customer needs". China will probably be the next priority area in seeking new 
partners with Air China being a probable candidate. 
Star Alliance wins the network contest occupying the top rank in terms of raw 
frequencies, system capacity and destinations served. It also leads on the 
number of destinations covered by more than one partner, a potentially 
important factor when it comes to forging connections and in creating critical 
mass at hubs where the individual partners alone have little presence (Airline 
Business, July 2002). 
The sheer size of Star Alliance may however act as a deterrent for airlines 
wising to enter an alliance. When Cathay Pacific was being courted by the 
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leading two alliances in the late 1990s, put off by the size of Star Alliance and 
the potential complexity of a mass of bilateral agreements, it chose oneworld 
with its more straightforward links to British Airways and Qantas (Airline 
Business, July 2002). 
The table below presents the members of Star Alliance with data concerning 
the date they joined the alliance, the revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), the 
passengers they flew and their revenue. 
Table 4.7 
Star Alliance 
Star Alliance 
Date Pax traffic Passengers Revenue 
joined RPK million million $ million 
Air Canada May-97 69,447 16.9 6,269 
Air New Zealand Mar-99 21,484 19.6 2,389 
All Nippon Airways Oct-99 36,565 41.0 7,575 
Asiana May-03 15,945 11.9 1,724 
Austrian Airlines Group Mar-00 17,979 8.8 2,278 
bmi British Midland Jul-00 5,303 7.5 1,092 
Lufthansa May-97 88,570 43.9 16,123 
Mexicanag Jul-99 13,000 8.5 1,400 
SAS May-97 23,212 21.9 3,865 
Singapore Airlines Apr-00 74,183 15.3 5,897 
Spanair Jun-03 4,329 5.2 764 
Thai Airways May-97 46,571 18.3 3,005 
United Airlines May-97 176,121 68.5 14,286 
Varig Oct-97 26,115 9.7 2,500 
Total 624,653 301 69,589 
World share 21.2% 18.6% 21.1% 
Source: Airline Business (July 2003) 
The figure below presents the participation of Star Alliance allies in the 
alliance in terms of passenger traffic. 
9 Mexicana has announced that as March 2004 it will begin cooperation with American 
Airlines, thuse severing its relationship with Star Alliance. The reasons behind this decision is 
the airline's desire to maintain its "freedom to look at other options" in light of "evolving 
business trends". 
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Figure 4.10 
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This global marketing alliance was announced in September 1998 and 
officially launched in February 1999. It was centred on British Airways and 
American Airlines as core members joined by Iberia, Finnair, Canadian 
Airlines, Cathay Pacific and Qantas, on 1st June 2000, Lan Chile and Aer 
Lingus became members. After being taken over by Air Canada, Canadian 
Airlines left oneworld on 1't June 2000. Swiss Air Lines became the ninth 
member in September 2003. 
The partners offer closer linking of FFPs, reciprocal access to airport lounges, 
smoother transfers between airlines and a range of global products including 
"oneworld Explorer" fares. This alliance serves some 561 destinations in 135 
countries and offers its customers 380 lounges. It has favourable positions at 
major airports, notably London and the major US hubs. There is no cargo 
alliance. There was no exchange of equity or any other form of cross-share 
holding. It will not be able to operate with full efficiency, however, until the 
cooperation and code share agreements between the two 'pillars" are 
immunised by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and enter into 
effect. This is however, quite improbable given that there is no open skies 
pact between the United Kingdom and the United States, a necessary 
precondition for any airlines aiming at receiving anti-trust immunity. It is for 
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this reason that until recently the cooperation between the members focused 
mostly on marketing agreements and only this year have the partners begun 
to deepen the level of cooperation between them. The alliance has been 
working to strengthen bilateral ties between members. 
This nine-member alliance serves more countries than any global airline 
alliance. The major asset of this alliance is the particularly complimentary fit of 
the networks of two poles of the alliance, British Airways and American 
Airlines, the one complementing the weaknesses of the other: British Airways 
is strong in Europe and in the Middle East, American Airlines is strong in the 
US and in Latin/South America. In order to implement the alliance fully, British 
Airways and American Airlines needed regulatory approval from three 
separate regulatory bodies: the UK Office of Fair Trading, the European 
Commission and the US DOT. The two companies have applied twice to 
receive immunity and exemption, one in 1997 and in 2002. But the prospect of 
an immunised alliance between British Airways and American Airlines has 
troubled competition authorities. The UK-US market with more than 12.5 
million passengers a year is twice as big as the next largest North Atlantic 
market, that between Germany and the US. The combination of British 
Airways and American Airlines would give the alliance a high market share, 
60% of UK-US scheduled passenger traffic and this together with the 
importance of London-Heathrow as a hub airport has been sufficient for the 
authorities to regard the British Airways/American Airlines alliance as 
especially challenging to competition. When the airlines applied for the second 
time, the UK Office of Fair Trading announced that it would grant its approval 
if the alliance were to surrender 168 weekly slots in London-Heathrow, while 
the European Commission's requirement was for the surrender of 267 weekly 
slots and US DOT's for 224 slots. Although it was a great improvements from 
the first application when the European Commision's requirements were for 
350 slots and the US DOT insisted on the conclusion of an open skies 
between the two countries. The surrender would permit other airlines (Delta 
Air Lines, bmi British Midland, Virgin Atlantic, Continental Airlines or US 
Airways) to operate an additional 19 flights a day (ATI, 25 th January 2002). 
US DOT also requires greater access to slots at London-Heathrow as a 
condition for approving the alliance, but in addition it wanted the UK 
government to agree an open skies air service agreement with the US as a 
kind of "quid pro quo" for granting antitrust immunity, which the British 
Government was unwilling to conclude. British Airways and American Airlines 
thought that this was too great a sacrifice and have decided to continue 
without antitrust immunity. 
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In the absence of an immunised alliance between British Airways and 
American Airlines, traffic continues to be concentrated on routes to the major 
centres of population, that is Boston, Los Angeles, New York and San 
Francisco rather than to the major hubs of the US airline - that is Chicago, 
Dallas and Miami. On the contrary, in the "Wings" alliance, which enjoys 
antitrust immunity, substantial amounts of traffic are routed through 
Northwest's hub at Detroit, five daily services operated to there from 
Amsterdam in summer 2001 while point-to point traffic between the two 
cities would probably be sufficient for one flight per week. 
The absence of antitrust immunity has affected the evolution of oneworld and 
prevented it from proceeding in deeper cooperation and puts this alliance in 
disadvantage in comparison with the other three strategic alliances - 
Lufthansa/United Airlines, Northwest Airlines/KLM and Delta Air Lines/Air 
France - which have been granted antitrust immunity and are operating and 
offering network benefits that the British Airways/American Airlines alliance is 
prevented from offering. 
Failing to get antitrust immunity, British Airways and American Airlines moved 
to secure regulatory approval in September 2003 on beyond UK hubs and US 
beyond hubs but still no code share on non-stop services between US hubs 
and London-Heathrow is allowed. By now, code share is now in place 
between 20 of the potential 28 pairings of oneworld's partners. 
oneworld is also developing common engineering specifications to cut 
maintenance costs through bulk buying and sharing spare parts, to leverage 
the cost-cuffing potential of alliances. The alliance says that its partners have 
saved around US$ 300 million through joint purchasing over the first three 
years since its inception in 2000 (Airline Business, July 2003). The partners 
are aligning their "policies and processes" so that they can cooperate more 
closely and share best practice. 
oneworld set up a centralised management team shortly after the alliance's 
launch in early 2000. 
The table below presents the members of oneworld with data concerning the 
date they joined the alliance, the revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), the 
passengers they flew and their revenue. 
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Table 4.8 
oneworld 
Oneworld 
Date 
joined 
Pax traffic 
RPK million 
Passengers 
million 
Revenue 
$ million 
Aer Lingus Jun-00 8,810 6.3 910 
American Airlines Sep-98 195,897 94.1 15,967 
British Airways Sep-98 100,112 38 11,940 
Cathay Pacific Sep-98 49,041 12.3 4,245 
Finnair Sep-99 12,793 7.0 1,616 
Iberia Sep-99 40,470 23.9 4,245 
LanChile Jun-00 11,138 5.3 1,452 
Qantas Airways Sep-98 75,134 27.1 5,946 
Total 493,395 214 46,541 
World share 16.8% 13.3% 14.1% 
Source: Airline Business (July 2003) 
The figure below presents the participation of oneworld alliance in terms of 
passenger traffic. 
Figure 4.11 
oneworld passenger traffic 
6% 3% 11% 2% 
18% 13% 
3% 
44% 
MAer Lingus 
OArnerican Airlines 
E British Airways 
0 Cathay Pacific 
EFinnair 
Oberia 
11 LanChile 
N Qantas Airways 
154 
4.2.5 SkyTeam 
It is the most recent global alliance. Air France and Delta Air Lines started 
cooperating in 1999 and they formed an alliance in 2000 while extending the 
alliance's reach with Aeromexico, and Korean Air. CSA - Czech Airlines and 
Alitalia joined the alliance in 2001. With a marketing focus on passenger 
service, this alliance's strategy is based on market synergies and the growth 
potential of Paris-CDG as a connection platform. SkyTearn currently offers 
nearly 7,100 flights to more than 496 destinations in 117 countries. It also has 
289 reception lounges. The alliance cooperation offers code share, joint 
marketing and reciprocal FFP. In September 2000 the SkyTearn global 
alliance announced the creation of a cargo alliance focusing on joint selling of 
their cargo services in the United States and eventually of harmonised 
products. 
Air France had refrained until then from entering in any alliance - and it was 
the only major that had not been a member of any grouping - because of the 
need to maintain a protective Franco-US bilateral while it was being 
restructured in preparation for privatisation. 
The fact that this alliance controls Europe's largest domestic market is one of 
its major strengths. Another one is related to the fact that Air France's hub and 
Korean Air's new hub, Seoul's Incheon Airport, are among the very few major 
hub airports with room to expand, that is the possibility of adding runways and 
gates and therefore flights. Another major asset is the antitrust immunity 
granted to the quarter-partite alliance among Air France, Delta Air Lines, 
Alitalia and CSA - Czech Airlines, thus making it the only alliance with 
antitrust immunity tying up all its members. Furthermore, the alliance between 
Delta Air Lines and Korean Air has been granted antitrust immunity, which is 
the first over the Pacific, between an US and Asian airline, making SkyTeam 
the only alliance with both trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific antitrust immunity. 
The recent approval of the tripartite US code share between Delta Air Lines- 
Northwest Airlines-Continental Airlines followed by the announcement that Air 
France and KLM formed a new airline group which will lead to KLM joining 
SkyTeam has given the alliance new impetus. It is expected that KLM as well 
as Northwest Airlines and Continental Airlines, will join SkyTeam on 1st May 
2004. The decision also means that KLM will be aligned again with Alitalia, its 
former partner. With the new additions, SkyTeam will be on ar ith Star 
Alliance in terms of size and antitrust immunity, at least over the til C. 
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Asia remains a weak point for SkyTeam since it has no home base further 
south than Seoul. 
Table 4.9 
SkyTeam 
SkyTeam 
Date Pax traffic Passengers Revenue 
joined RPK million Million $ million 
Aeromexico Sep-99 13,500 9.2 1,500 
Air France Sep-99 97,151 38.6 12,697 
Alitalia Jul-01 30,025 22.2 4,598 
CSA-Czech Airlines Mar-01 4,181 3.1 402 
Delta Air Lines Sep-99 164,267 107 13,305 
Korean Air Jul-00 41,801 22.2 5,047 
Total 350,925 202 37,550 
World share 11.9% 12.5% 11.4% 
Source: Airline Business (July 2003) 
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On 30th September 2003 Air France and KLM announced their decision to 
create a new group, a joint holding company, called Air France-KLM which will 
capitalize on two brands, strong hubs and complementary networks. Under 
this agreement KLM shareholders would own 19% of the new group, the 
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shareholding of the French State would be 44% and the other Air France 
shareholders would own 37%. 
The new group, whose final transaction agreement was signed on 16 th 
October 2003, will retain the two operating companies, Air France and KLM, 
and traffic rights agreed in the various bilateral agreements by the respective 
governments. It will focus on three core businesses: Passengers, Cargo and 
Maintenance and more precisely, they "will full code share, harmonizing the 
flight schedules and optimizing common management revenue policy" (Air 
France-KLM, 2003). 
Air France-KLM anticipate "annual synergy savings in the region of 220-260 
million E by the third year of cooperation. They hope this will rise to between 
385-495 million E by the fifth year (ATI, 30/9/2003). 
According to the timetable, the new group for an approval petition will file with 
US DOJ and European Commission, an approval petition in December 2003. 
The European Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti said that the 
European Union had no bias against the merger between Air France and 
KLM. In March 2004 the exchange offer will be launched and finally in April 
2004 the proposed exchange offer will close. 
KLM will join SkyTeam, which will further strengthen the alliance, making it the 
second largest alliance. The comment made by the President of Northwest 
Airlines (partner of KLM at "Wings" alliance) that the "Northwest/KLM joint 
venture will operate on a business as usual basis and will continue to 
compete, as it does now, against the Air France/Delta Air Lines alliance" 
(Northwest Airlines, 2003) presents some interest since it is difficult to 
understand how they will be able to cooperate with half the company and 
compete with the other half. 
Finally, there are also plans for the integration of Alitalia into the combined 
airline grouping. 
Section 4.3 Major Unaligned Airlines 
There are some major airlines that remain outside the four alliances 
mentioned above. These airlines enter in two categories: a) those that have 
not decided which alliance fits best their interests b) those that want to remain 
independent. 
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In the first category enter airlines such as Continental Airlines, Malaysia 
Airlines, Aeroflot, South African Airways and many airlines coming from China 
(Air China, China Southern and China Eastern). They want to enter an 
alliance but they have not decided which alliance to enter. Many of them have 
already established some form of cooperation with airlines that are already 
core members of one of the four strategic alliances. Continental Airlines, for 
instance, has a trilateral alliance with Delta Air Lines (core member of 
SkyTeam) and Northwest Airlines (partner in the two airline alliance of "Wings" 
which will most probably be disbanded before the end of 2004) and will most 
probably join SkyTeam. Malaysia Airlines has a close cooperation with KLM 
and Aeroflot with Air France while South African Airways has one with 
Lufthansa. All Chinese airlines are the major attraction for all alliances given 
the huge Chinese market and the growth potential of the Chinese economy. 
Thus, Star Alliance has approached Air China and United Airlines and Delta 
Air Lines have approached China Southern. United Airlines for example has 
entered in August 2003 a marketing alliance with Air China, which includes 
code share, reciprocal FFP mileage accrual and lounge access. 
Some of the above airlines remain unaligned because they participated in the 
past in an alliance - for example Continental Airlines and Malaysia Airlines 
joined for some time the "Wings" alliance - but since this participation has not 
been fulfilled, they have found themselves outside of alliances and are now 
looking for an alliance to join. Malaysia Airlines for example has stated that it 
is looking for the partners and the alliance that fits best their needs. Finally, 
the airlines coming from extensive markets and emerging economies such as 
China, South Africa, India and Russia are much sought after by all alliances. 
In this particular category, a special case should be mentioned, that of TAP 
Air Portugal. TAP had been a founding member of the Qualiflyer Alliance led 
by Swissair. After the collapse of this alliance, the Portuguese flag carrier has 
decided to remain unaligned even when its former Qualiflyer allies rushed to 
join new groupings. It is the only western financially sound European airline 
that remains non-aligned. TAP's unwillingness to join an alliance is based on 
its fear of becoming "a minor feeder into a large airline's hub" (Air Transport 
Intelligence News, February 2002). It prefers to remain independent with a 
number of bilateral alliances on particular routes according to what best fit its 
needs in every market it serves. Two reasons can explain this decision. First, 
TAP is one of the few medium airlines that have managed to improve its 
results dramatically despite the setbacks of the post 1 1th September 2001 
downturn. Second, TAP has had negative experiences from Qualiflyer, 
including the high cost of changing reservation systems and the denial by 
Swissair to "effectively rationalize the combined networks' among the allies; 
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thus Swissair insisted to serve virtually every market, even in Brazil, where 
TAP had geographic and cultural advantages. 
Japan Air Lines (JAL), Emirates and Virgin Atlantic on the other hand, are 
among the airlines that have chosen to remain unaligned and do not intend to 
join any of the alliances, in the near future at least, because such a move 
does not fit in with their business plan. They have been able to grow profitably 
without joining an alliance grouping. Or, in the words of Emirates: " You have 
to have specific revenue motivations for joining a grouping, and thus far we 
cannot identify one", (Airline Business, July 2003). For these airlines 
preserving their independence means maintaining their flexibility to choose its 
partners and adapting promptly to the changing. 
JAL, for example, has a strong international network and an extensive 
network of partnerships with a variety of airlines in all alliance groupings. If it 
enters in a strategic alliance, it will loose its identity and it "will be at the risk of 
losing valued partnerships with airlines in other alliance groups. One alliance 
grouping will not be sufficient to satisfy the evolving needs of our customers in 
terms of networks" as the Vice President, Corporate Management of JAL 
stated. It is for these reasons that JAL prefers to continue to have alliances on 
a bilateral level and to choose code share partners on a case-by-case basis: 
"With agreements with Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam carriers, we 
have in effect set up our own alliance, one that give us the freedom and the 
flexibility to do what is best for us and our passengers" (Airline Business, July 
2003). 
JAL's Vice President has stressed the flexibility non-alignment offers by 
stating that "JAL would like to work with airlines that have network and 
products which will complement our network and products, irrespective of the 
alliance groupings. Some of the smaller airlines may need closer affiliation to 
larger airlines, hoping to obtain feed from larger airlines, but we believe the 
need for joining alliances vary from an airline to airline. The benefit of not to 
join an alliance, for us, is the flexibility to choose its partner airline and a best 
mix of marketing variables. A leisure market, for example, requires very 
different marketing variables from what is required in business-oriented 
market. Our objective is to provide the best marketing opportunities with a 
best mix of marketing tools to our sales force". 
Emirates and Virgin Atlantic prefer to remain unaligned because they have a 
high quality level of service, which is their distinguishing feature, and they 
prefer to proceed selectively to partnerships rather than finding themselves 
"locked" in an alliance with specific partners. These airlines feel that the 
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incremental benefits of global alliance membership do not justify the costs 
involved in joining. When the Director of External Affairs and Route Planning 
of Virgin Atlantic was asked about the possibility of his company entering an 
alliance, he answered that they have not needed to join any alliance so far. 
They value their freedom to select code share partners for particular routes. 
The Commercial Planning and Strategy Director of Virgin explained why 
alliance participation does not fit their business plan: "Virgin Atlantic is a 
unique company, has a unique brand and a unique product and we are being 
conscious of our individuality, which makes it difficult to join an alliance. Virgin 
also is a point-to-point carrier (less than 10% is online or offline connecting 
traffic) and Virgin is not dependent on a network in the same way as the other 
airlines members of the alliances. For these reasons it is not necessarily to 
join an alliance, Virgin will not bring a lot to an alliance and an alliance will not 
bring a lot to Virgin". When asked what the negative aspects of alliances are 
he answered that "the cost of joining, because of the IT integration and so on, 
is quite expensive, but it is also that the charges of the management of 
participation in the alliance are quite significant. Virgin will join an alliance 
where bureaucracy is as little as possible and the cost of joining not too high". 
Finally, he added that the benefit arising from the decision not joining an 
alliance is the retaining of the flexibility. So they will be able to better negotiate 
with alliances when they decide to join one. He added that although "he 
cannot point to any particular hard benefit in cash terms from not joining an 
alliance" he believes that Virgin has lower costs by not having to pay the 
alliance subscription fees and by not having to dedicate management time on 
alliance meetings. 
Emirates has been able to remain outside alliances because its key 
geographic position has let it strike multiple code share deals with several 
international airlines without needing to ally with any particular group. "The 
benefits of joining are outweighed by staying independent. We don't have to 
consult anyone regarding our timetable or our fleet" (Airline Business, July 
2003). This alliance has also opted for bilateral inter-carrier route-specific co- 
operation. Emirates say that the most negative aspects of alliances is the 
slow decision and the compromise members in an alliance are required to 
make so as to settle for the lowest denominator. For them this is not a very 
healthy situation for forward looking and progressive carriers as alliances 
become bureaucratic heavy and take their members'eyes off their core 
business proper. However, the growing strength of airlines such as Qatar 
Airways and Oman Airways, geographic competitors of Emirates, and the 
imminent entrance of Gulf Air to Star Alliance may influence its future 
decisions. 
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Even though JAL, Virgin Atlantic and Emirates want to remain unaligned, all of 
them mentioned that the option to join an alliance is still open. When they 
realize that they are unable to remain profitable without joining, or start "not 
feeling safe outside the alliances by losing "corporate selling" to an alliance or 
when the alliances will establish common FFPs (SkyTeam FFP instead of six 
different FFPs)" as the Commercial Planning and Strategy Director of Virgin 
added, they will reconsider their position. 
To sum up it can be said that what these unaligned airlines resent in alliances 
is their exclusive character, the bureaucratic load and the multi-lateral 
membership that distracts an airline. Non-alignment means independent 
decisions that are taken quicker, adaptation to changing needs and undivided 
focus on the core business of the airline. 
These airlines have been helped in their decision not to join an alliance by the 
fact that the bulk of inter-carrier agreements continue to be on the basis of 
bilateral deals and that alliance groupings are not really exclusive. Alliance 
carriers retain a host of bilaterals with non-members and there are several 
instances of code sharing between members of rival global alliances. Once 
the shape of global alliances becomes much clearer and more stable and 
alliances become more and more exclusive in nature, it will become very 
difficult for unaligned airlines to cooperate with airlines in alliance groupings. 
Furthermore, if existing alliances proceed to deeper integration and achieve 
ultimate cost reduction, this will tip the scale in favour of alliances, as it will 
increase their profitability and competitive advantage. Such developments will 
put extra pressure on the unaligned airlines to re-evaluate their approach 
towards alliances. 
Summary 
The international airline business has ever since the 1980s been a mixture of 
competition and cooperation, with virtually every major international airline 
regularly entering cooperative agreements with other airlines to expand route 
networks, to circumvent political and capital obstacles to growth and to gain 
operating synergies. The core driver behind alliances is however, the size and 
shape of their combined route network. The winner is the alliance that can get 
its passengers to the most destinations in the most ways (Airline Business, 
July 2002). 
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Alliances have been a vehicle for market share gain and for bypassing 
regulatory constraints in an inherently volatile industry, exposed to macro- 
economic and political effects. 
Airlines have acquired significant experience in alliances and have by now 
opted for reciprocal commitments amongst all the airlines which are 
strengthened at the bilateral level. 
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The second part focuses exclusively on the empirical analysis of the impact of 
airline alliances on passenger traffic. Its aim is the study of the correlation 
between alliances and passenger traffic in order to find out if there are any 
positive effects on passenger traffic arising from airline alliances. It is 
composed by a survey and an econometric analysis. The first one is based on 
the opinion and the belief of the airlines themselves who have been not only 
interviewed but also asked to respond to a specific questionnaire. The latter 
covers besides traffic several other major fields. In order to assess correctly 
the potential effect of airline alliances, the survey has been extended to airline 
industry expert other than those working for airlines. The econometric study 
on the contrary is a pure statistical analysis based on time series data and 
more particularly on the estimation of a regression traffic model for 124 routes. 
Complementary to the survey, its goal is to check the robustness of the 
quantitative and qualitative conclusions drawn by survey. In others words, it 
tries to confirm statistically the survey results. 
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Chapter 5 
Survey 
The survey constitutes the first step of the empirical analysis. It is based on 
the opinions of the key players, i. e. people working for airlines currently 
participating in global strategic alliances or the airline industry. Therefore, this 
chapter constitutes a pragmatic approach to the issue of alliance' impact on 
passenger traffic since it focuses on its practical, operational aspects, as it 
puts emphasis on the assessment of the alliance impact by the interested 
parties themselves, whose opinions and beliefs are of particular importance 
given the experience accumulated through their participation in alliances. 
The survey consists of two sections: the first one comprises the interviews 
with the executives of every airline member of global strategic alliances, while 
the second one presents the results of a brief questionnaire forwarded to the 
heads of alliance departments of all allied airlines. Contrary to the interviews 
that were conducted with heads of alliance and networks departments, the 
questionnaire was conveyed only to the executive heads of alliance 
departments. The interviews include general interest questions covering a 
wide range of alliance-related issues, while the questionnaire, which comes as 
a supplement to the interviews, focuses mainly on the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of alliances, as these are perceived by the very 
protagonists involved, and more particularly on traffic effects. 
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Section 5.1 Interviews 
5.1.1 Interviews with airlines and alliances 
This section presents the interviews with the airlines and alliances executives 
and forms the main body of the qualitative analysis. 
A. General 
The interviews concentrate mostly on the perception of alliances by the 
participating airlines and include questions of a more general nature 
concerning airline alliances: their performance and efficiency, possible 
problems and dysfunctions, success factors, benefits, future evolution, etc. 
The structure of the interviews is not characterised by a standard set of 
questions focusing on the same subjects of discussions but by a number of 
different categories of questions, whose content was modified and adapted 
during the course of the different interviews. 
It should be noted that the interviews and the respondents' input have 
contributed significantly in the preparation and drawing up of the 
questionnaire, which makes up the second section of the survey. 
The interviews took place in the period from November 2001 to February 
2003. Face-to-face meetings were conducted, whether at airlines' 
headquarters or at the "Routes 2002" conference. In a few cases, the 
interviews had to be done over the phone. The personal contacts were 17 
while the telephone conversations amounted to 11.10 face-to-face contacts 
took place at airlines' offices. The whole procedure was welcomed by all 
airlines of the four global strategic alliances, and thus the number of the 
airlines that have participated to the interview process amounts to 28, the total 
number of airlines participating in airline alliances at the time of conducting of 
this survey. Thus, all airlines have the opportunity to express their opinions 
and none was excluded, which is unusual for similar undertakings. 
The interview process was divided into different stages with the majority of 
them taking place during the last two months of 2002. From the very 
beginning, the whole process had a highly dynamic nature. This dynamic 
character was prompted not only by the effort to gather the greatest possible 
experience, comments and opinions from the executives interviewed but also 
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by the need to use interview findings to proceed to the gradual clarification of 
the object of the study, which focuses on alliance impact on traffic. With the 
elapse of time, the initial more general questions were replaced by more 
specific ones concentrating on the issue of the impact of alliances on 
passenger traffic. This does not however, mean that the first interviews do not 
present interest, quite the contrary, since they gave insight to a necessarily 
wider range of subjects, which are not covered, or are not covered as 
extensively in the ensuing interviews. 
As stressed above, the interviewees are executives of either the network or 
the alliance departments. 36 executive officers from 28 airlines have been 
interviewed, among whom 4 Vice-Presidents, 13 Directors, 15 Managers and 
4 Executive-Specialists. Executives from different departments were 
interviewed in an effort to formulate a more complete picture and to confirm 
whether the various airline departments share the same perspective on 
alliances. 
The interviews serve a double purpose: on the one hand, they supply 
information about the beliefs and the opinions of airlines regarding alliances 
and, on the other hand, they constitute the basis upon which a concise and 
specialised questionnaire, primarily focusing on the impact of alliances on 
passenger traffic, was built. Without a doubt, the interviews play a catalytic 
role in the formation of the questionnaire and in selection of the questions that 
were included. 
Table 5.1 presents the details of the airline executives interviewed and the 
date of the personal or telephone interview. 
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Table 5.1 
Airline interviews 
Person 
Position 
Airline Alliance Place* 
H. de Graauw Director Alliances KLM 'Wings" AO 
E. Stokhuyzen Director Alliances AO 
E. Wong Alliance Development - Manager AO 
h&6. - .............. I ....... .......................... ...... I ............ II........ . ........... I ........ . ..... 11 11................................................... enior Manager Alliances ......................... ............. Northwest Airlines 'Wings" TC 
M. Eggleton Alliance Strategy Manager British Airways oneworld AO 
M. Bradley Alliance Strategy Manager AO 
I ......... ... ......... onso ................. . .......... - ............................. I ..................... . ........ ............................... Head of Int Med Haul Routes Mngt ............ ............ Iberia oneworld RC 
Network Development 
. .......................... .. I.......... . ...... 
. 
Nokkala ..................... ............. . .................. ............................ . ................................... .......... .. Director Network Planning ............... .... .... ...... - .... ... ..... . ........ ........ .......... ..... Finnair .................. oneworld RC 
15-1- ....................... ................. 
. 
O'Neill ...... . ......................................... I ........ . ........... II......................... ........... . ......... .... ........... ... .... . .......... Manager- Business Planning & .... I .......... II..... . ...... ................ ..... Aer Lingus ......... oneworld RC 
Alliances 
. ............. ........................................ ... ................ - ...... . ................. . ........ .............. . ..... ................ . .................... . ............... - ............ 
. 
Blodget-Stephan Oneworld Project Director ......................................... ........... American Airlines oneworld AO 
G. Bachani Manager International Planning 
Sc V-0- y...... -- .. ..... ...... ... - Onieworl d ect D irect or-' . ..... .. Clintas oneworld TC 
. ... . .............. I-- ............... - ....... 
. 
Prus ........... I ................. - .......................... ......................... - .......... . .... . ............ . ......... Oneworld Project Director .......... I --- --I........... ........... . ..... Lan Chile ... oneworld TC 
. ............ ........................... 
. 
Lau ..................................... ...................... --- ............... I ......... . ... - ........................ . ... . .... ......... ..... Oneworld Project Director ......... ............... -11 1-.............. . ...... . .......... . ... Cathay Pacific ................... oneworld TC 
............................... . ... 
. 
Bianquis ........................... . ............................................... ............... .... . ............. . ... . ........... VP Alliances ........ .............................. - ..... . ......... ....... Air France 
. 
.... .......... I- SkyTeam I1 11 11 11 - AO 
V. 
. 
&4 1 '' - ............... :................. . .................... ................... - ...................... ........... ............ . ........... i5irector Alliance Development ........ ..... ...................... ............ .......... ..... Alitalia .......... - .......... .......... SkyTearn AO 
G. Callegari Director Alliances and International 
Relations 
.......................... I a .......... ................ tý ..... . ....... I ............... .................. ....................... - ......... puty General Manager Alliance & ............................... -. 1 ................ . .. -........... Korean Air SkyTeam RC 
Network 
. ......... ............ ......... . zua ........... .................... . ........................ I .......... ............... -- .......... ............................ . Director Network Planning .......... . .................. ............. I ............ ...... CSA - Czech Airlines 
.... - SkyTeann RC 
.......... . ...... 1 11 ............ .... ...... I .. E. Moore ..... ... ..... ....... ...... .... .... .... ....... . ........ .................... ...... .... . ..... ..... Acting Director Commercial Alliances .... . ......... .... ................................. .............. Aeromexico ....... ý -- ý-...... . ...... SkyTeam ............ .............. RC 
............ - ............ Woodin . ........... ............ .............. - ........... ............. - Specialist Alliances - ....................... -_. - ................... - Delta Air Lines .......... .......... ........................... . .... . SkyTeam .... .... . ........ - AO 
G. Guertin Manager, Alliances-The Americas 
. -S-b .... . ................... . ............. 
. eyohoff 
................................ I-................................ ............. -_ ........................ ---- II........ Manager Market Development ...... ............ . ....... -....... Lufthansa ............... Star Alliance AO 
C. Spohr VP Alliances 
........... ..... . ........ ........................... - ...... . ........ .. ....... ...... .... ... .... .......... ............ 
. 
Jansen ..................................... .-.... . . . .. - Manager Alliance Strategy .......... bmi British Midland ............... - .............. Star Alliance AO 
.... . ......... . ................. 
. 
Seow ................................... - ............. . ..... . .......... . .... - ...... . ... Manager Alliance .............. - -- .................... . ... ........ . Singapore Airlines ......... ...... ....... - Star Alliance AO 
-k . .......... - ....... . .............. - .... 
. 
Maluangnon ....... ............. ................. - ........... ........... ........... ....... . .. - Manager Traffic Planning 
...... . ........................ . ...................................... . .. . . ........... ........... . 
-- ........... -- __, ........... .......... -- ................. Thai Airways 
.......... .. ... 
- 11 - .............. Star Alliance RC 
i. Sch'off ....... .. . . ... .. . .. Pioje ct Manager Star Allianc . .................. .......... United Airlines ..... . ..... .... ............... ........... Star Alliance -.................... AO 
C. Trofta Staff Rep. Industry Marketing & 
Alliances 
..................... . .... . ... 
. 
Zaarour .......................... ............. 1 11 - ............. . ......... ................... . ... .......... Director, Alliance Development ............ - .......... ...... . .......... Air Canada Star Alliance ..... ................ - TC 
Jiiflik"-- .......... _ --, --' "'Aliain6e Mi-niager '- - Au'st'din Ai*rli'nes-*- Sta_r_AIIianc'e-* -- TC 
........... . ..... . ......... . ....... . .......... 
. 
Whittaker --..... ............. ... - ..... ...... --............... .............. . .... . ........ .. Manager Alliances .......... ...... Air New Zealand .... - ............ Star Alliance ....... -----__ ......... .. TC 
...... ............. I .................. . ..... 
. 
Humer . ......... I........................ II........... - ......... ................ . ...... .............. . ... ............. I .......... Director, Alliances and Sales & . ... ........ I -- ............. .......... ..... .... . Mexicana ........... I -- I Star Alliance ............. I-- TC 
Marketing Overseas 
.. . .... . ..................... . ............ 
. 
Moller .. ........................... .......................................... . ......... I-................ - ............ ......................... VP Alliances and Partnerships ... ...... - ... ....... - ... . ........ . ... .... .... SAS .......... Star Alliance ......... . .... TC 
kiki . .... ..... .. -- ----- V P" *A- IJ i a' 6c e-s- &-lin't, e, 'r, n- ati on, a I-A If -a" i r*s AIIN, i pp" ,6n 'A ii w -a- y 's'- -S t "a- rAIIi ince TC*-- 
ir'ard'i_-__'_ *'Members" hip i-iiii"on'-, S tir'Allia"n6e Vairig Ai'lian'o- e-- 
AO: Airline Office 
RC: Routes 2002 Conference (Athens) 
TC: Telephone Conference 
B. Analysis of the interviews with the airlines 
The method followed for the analysis of the data arising from the interviews 
(see Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire used) was a rather simple 
one: in a first stage the questions and answers were divided into three wider 
groups - entitled general, performance of the alliance and future evolution- 
167 
Cranfeld The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic IN 
mergers - to facilitate their processing and presentation and in a second 
stage the answers were collected, studied, compared, paralleled and 
commented upon. 
a. General 
All interviewees agree that the aim of alliances is the creation of a global 
network that serves many destinations without the airlines incurring extra cost. 
In this way, passenger traffic increase was observed in combination with the 
creation of a global FFIP. This results in a rise of revenues and a 
corresponding reduction in operating cost. Even if this cost reduction has not 
been achieved yet, or achieved at the desirable degree, it is certainly one of 
the major future goals of alliances. In essence, the airlines can through 
alliances, as they state, "satisfy customer demand with more global products" 
and achieve "global presence without global cost structure". In parallel, 
alliances permit airlines to increase their competitiveness and gain market 
share. 
As for as smaller airlines are concerned, some claim that alliances help them 
to deal better with their major competitors in the wider area of their business 
activity, while others declare that the cooperation with industry' major players 
and brand names results in the costless expansion of their network. Some go 
as far as saying that alliances are the key to their survival. Quite interestingly, 
these airlines coincide to a large extent with those that believe that an alliance 
is an intermediate step to a greater degree of consolidation. By contrast, 
major airlines state that through alliances they aim at securing their longevity 
and remaining among the major players. At any rate, all airlines strive to 
increase the loyalty of their customers through the enhancement of the 
services offered (global network, better scheduling and increased flight 
frequencies, which are after all the major competitive attributes at least from 
the consumer perspective) and the integration of FFPs. 
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Figure 5.1 
Alliances' objectives 
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The duration of alliances is designed to be a long one although each one has 
chosen a different agreement arrangement. In the case of Star Alliance, the 
alliance agreement is unlimited in time, while the airlines participating in 
oneworld alliance have not concluded any agreement in relation to duration. 
"Wings" and SkyTearn have opted for a ten-year duration, automatically 
renewable. At this point it should be stressed that although airlines claim that 
they form alliances that are intended to last, the previous history tends to 
reveal the opposite. 
What motivates the choice of one airline over another, as a partner, is first of 
all, the existence of network synergy and common interests in certain 
geographical areas. Most aviation experts point out that at the present stage 
airlines focus on the potential benefits they could gain from network 
complementarity since no or very few airlines are in a position to reap the 
potential and existing synergetic gains. Second in rank comes the existence of 
previous cooperation agreements with the allies whether simple code share 
agreements or long term agreements. In third place they state that they avoid 
coexisting within an alliance with an airline they had frictions in the past or 
with one considered as a major competitor. If "Wings" does indeed disband 
and the partners join SkyTeam, it will be interested to see how the relations 
between Alitalia and KLM will evolve given their previous conflict. Some other 
airlines justify their choice of allies by simply stating that this was the best one, 
or simply one which could potentially bring the best benefits without 
expanding further. Finally, one airline mentions the level of the quality of 
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service and another one the working culture. Both of these airlines are small 
ones. 
Without exception all airlines consider that their choice of allies was the best 
and most appropriate one. In their majority, they mention that they highly 
value their independence and that they remain independent as far as their 
management is concerned. However, some declare that they do take into 
consideration the alliance opinion in their decision-making process. The only 
obvious restriction has to do with the possibility of concluding agreements with 
third parties that is airlines outside the alliance. Such agreements are explicitly 
prohibited in the case of Star Alliance and "Wings" or need to have the 
consent of the other alliance partners in the case of remaining alliances. A 
major European airline affirmed that it remains independent but that it does 
respect its promises and commitments to its partners. When the partners have 
the benefit of antitrust immunity, any decisions concerning fares, scheduling 
and planning are taken jointly. 
The decision-making process on the alliance level pertaining to issues relative 
to the alliance operation tends to differ from alliance to alliance. In Star 
Alliance, the one airline-one vote principle is applied, whereas in the case of 
oneworld the consensus principle prevails although in practice it is the major 
airlines, American Airlines and British Airways, which assume the leading role 
over the rest of the members. In the case of SkyTeam, the consensus 
principle is applied, but in case of voting, the voting power of each member is 
proportionate to its size within the alliance. Finally, "Wings", given that it is 
composed of only two airlines that have established a joint venture, any 
decision is a joint one. 
As for disadvantages, the interviewees mention the slow decision-making 
process, which is due to the fact that decisions have to be taken jointly. 
Therefore, the whole process is hindered and delayed by the diversity of 
opinions, the differences in culture, the geographic distances and time 
differences (which affect mainly the Asian airlines). Initial cost incurred for the 
harmonisation of the IT systems and marketing constitute another major 
negative point, since it puts a strain, on a short term basis, on profitability. 
Without doubt, the immediate appearance, that is within the first year of the 
alliance formation, of benefits sets off any disadvantages. The exclusive 
character of alliances, that is the impossibility of concluding agreements with 
third airlines, does constitute a problem for certain airlines, even if the number 
of the airlines that state this is rather limited. Some secondary problems 
indicated include pricing, the non-existence of commitment, the possibility of 
ceding flights in a closed and highly controlled market, the lack of antitrust 
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immunity and finally the fact that in many cases the allies remain competitors, 
especially in those markets where one of the partners holds a large market 
power. 
On the whole however, the majority of airlines state that they have not come 
up with serious and insurmountable problems, and that alliances, apart from 
their efficient and profitable functioning, produce indeed the expected benefits. 
These benefits have resulted from code share and bilateral agreements. What 
should be stressed though is that the interviewed airlines, without stating it 
clearly and on the record, refer indirectly to the existence of some serious 
problems that obstruct the proper functioning of the alliances. A European 
airline revealed that it would have preferred a more dynamic US partner but 
because of its close cooperation with a US airline within the alliance 
framework it cannot proceed to such an alliance. A North American airline 
alluded to its desire to acquire antitrust immunity, which seems impossible 
given the unwillingness of its European partner to do the necessary 
concessions. 
All the above issues were mentioned by at least two of the respondents. 
There are however some interesting points, which were raised by individual 
respondents and are worth mentioning, since these comments shed a 
different light on the "rosy" image about alliances. A lot of comments have 
focused on the difficulty of managing an alliance and indicate that the 
organizational problems might be more serious than the airlines are willing to 
admit. One respondent has stated that the difficulty of agreeing common 
ground may result in serious operating problems since each participating 
airline has its own views and is unwilling to compromise. Another respondent 
implied that airlines' having different philosophies and different corporate 
cultures has proven to be an almost insurmountable problem. Another 
respondent has stated that sharing decisions with the other parties may be too 
great a concession to make. Another one has even implied the compromise 
that an airline has to make in relation to some company policies and 
procedures is not desirable and even contrary to the interests of the airline. 
Another series of negative comments focus on the problem of standardization, 
which is a major aspect of the integration process. According to one 
respondent, the standardization sought after by the alliance is not always easy 
to achieve and for some it may even be an unwelcome development. First of 
all, it is difficult to arrive at such standardization as each airline is interested in 
keeping their existing systems. The technical problems, such as the different 
IT and CIRS, increase significantly the cost of harmonization. This requires an 
investment firms may not always be willing to make, even more so as they are 
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uncertain of the outcome and the stability of their relationship. Another 
respondent took an anti-integ ration stance because such a development 
makes any prospects of exit from the alliance difficult and costly. This creates 
tense situations during negotiations, which may have negative repercussions 
on the whole operations of the alliances. According to another respondent 
such standardisation in procedures is undesirable because it limits the 
individual airline's ability and flexibility to respond to situations and to come up 
with solutions. In a dynamic, turbulent and uncertain market, it is difficult for 
airlines to accept a dependency status and give up their beloved 
independence that gives much more manoeuvring margin. 
Another problem with allying relates to the inability of the alliance to project a 
clear and homogeneous image to the passengers as the allies may have 
different performance standards, for example some allies may have a poor 
level of safety. There are many who resent the fact that they are dependent 
on the performance of others. Airlines with high quality images by cooperating 
with lower quality airlines leave the passenger uncertain about the service 
level he or she can expect when buying a ticket. 
One of the respondents has stressed different organisational problems from 
those mentioned above and which were usually related to bureaucracy and 
rigidity issues. He has stated that it is difficult to make the staff understand the 
idea and value of the alliance and to convince them that they must serve the 
passengers of the allied airlines as if they were their own. A respondent from 
a large airline dislikes the fact that the alliance mechanism forces them to give 
home market advantage to the other members of the alliance, usually small 
airlines. 
Another comment from a small airline has centred on the pressure small 
airlines feel from the alliance. Another one, from a small airline too, stresses 
that small airlines feel overwhelmed by the large airlines' eagerness to give 
them more than they actually need or can deal with. Another respondent has 
complained that giving up something or adapting to a certain procedure or 
policy for the benefit of the alliance means that certain projects need to be 
redesigned and refocused. 
A small number of responses on the negative aspects point to alliances 
delivering results lower than those initially expected. One respondent has 
mentioned unsatisfactory efficiency and another one has stated that growth 
has not been as much as expected. A third one has maintained that the 
alliance's inability to produce joint capabilities is the most serious 
disadvantage. 
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Finally, the respondents whose airlines belong to the oneworld alliance have 
mentioned that the alliance has not delivered what it had promised due to lack 
of antitrust immunity and that they find it difficult to develop the alliance. 
It is clear from the above that the major problems result from the different 
corporate cultures and the unwillingness of the allies to proceed to the 
concessions that are necessary for the integration of the alliance. This 
unwillingness is related to the inability of airlines to deal with lack of control 
and uncertainty about the evolution of the alliance and exact nature of the 
profits to be gained. These two elements lead to low trust and commitment 
and are the major source of operational problems. 
Figure 5.2 
Proportion of airlines that faced problems 
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b. Performance of the alliance 
The overwhelming majority of the allied airlines examine more than one factor 
to determine and assess the alliance' performance. Among those most 
commonly used and considered as most important, one can find revenues (18 
airlines out of the 28) in combination with passenger traffic (14 airlines). On a 
second level, many tend to use cost savings and network performance, but 
also "what they sell to the other members of the alliance and what they get 
from them" (two European airlines), "simulating to find out how much would be 
the frequency if they didn't have the alliance" and marketing presence. 
All airlines agree that the benefits are long term ones since they will be 
observed for a long time. Contrary to revenues, that seem to show signs of 
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improvement almost immediately, the cost reduction is a prolonged and time- 
consuming procedure; there are certain airlines that do not pay particular 
attention to cost as a parameter of alliance performance, at least in the short 
term. This trend seems logical since airlines sustain, despite revenue rise, 
cost directly related to their participation in alliance, expenditures that require 
some time to be redeemed and to start yielding. Besides, considerable time is 
also required to achieve economies of scale. The reduction in cost remains 
however a goal in itself but a long term one, even if revenue continues to 
increase or alternatively reaches a plateau. Although no one knows for sure 
when and at what point this ceiling to the revenue gain will be reached, the 
need to reduce cost is imperative given the continuous blows - terrorist 
attacks, recession, Iraq war, SARS threat - the air transport industry is 
undergoing since 11 th September 2001. 
The overwhelming majority consider that the so-called financial benefits 
originate from two sources, that of marketing (26 out of the 28 airlines) and 
that of expenditures squeezing and saving (21 out of the 28 airlines). Fewer 
believe in the benefits stemming from the productivity improvement (13 out of 
the 28 interviewees) and even fewer those resulting from labour cost cutting 
(9 out of the 28 interviewees). 
The fact that marketing benefits occupy the top ranking is quite expected 
since these are the very first benefits an alliance produces, even with the 
printing of the logo on stationery and brochures. All other sectors need deeper 
cooperation, if not integration, to produce advantages for allies. For example, 
the reduction of labour costs is difficult to achieve given the existence of 
different labour unions governed by distinct regulation rules. 
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Figure 5.3 
Fields in which financial benefits have arisen from the participation in airline 
alliances 
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As is expected, benefits are not equally allocated among the members of any 
alliance. Alliances help major airlines to strengthen their positions. On the 
contrary, they tend to constitute a matter of survival for the smaller ones, 
which are most of the times characterised by weak financial robustness, 
limited network, fleet and international presence, and finally by a comparative 
advantage only in their local markets. In most cases, the benefits arising for 
revenues and passenger traffic levels are the result of the negotiating power 
and of the spread of the network served by each airline. In exceptional cases, 
such as the two airlines of "Wings" alliance benefits are equally allocated. 
The factors that play a key role for the success of an alliance vary. Those that 
appear to occupy the top ranks - and must be necessary conditions - are 1) 
the commitment towards a common goal, 2) the mutual trust and cooperation, 
3) the existence of common ideas, strategies and interests, 4) the 
complementarity of networks and the compatibility of IT systems. Commitment 
is not simply a catchword; it is a key factor since commitment entails share of 
information, harmonisation of systems, etc. and potentially the risk of losing or 
transfer of know-how. 
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Figure 5.4 
Most important factors explaining alliance' success 
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All alliances have established a minimum standard of service (seat pitch, 
lounge, meals, in-flight entertainment, etc. ) so as to ensure product 
conformity, which, according to airlines, impacts positively on passenger 
traffic. Beyond that minimum standard, the airlines have the possibility to 
differentiate and to improve even more the service already provided based on 
the culture and policy of each airline. If, for example, on a given flight, the 
minimum standard is to provide passengers with a meal, it is in the 
discretionary power of each airline to determine the menu so as to give 
passengers a taste of traditional cuisine. A parallel development however, 
shows that service standards tend to downgrade on short haul routes and to 
upgrade on long haul flights. It is also observed that the level of service differs 
from one geographical region to another. US airlines, for example, tend in 
general to provide on domestic flights poor quality service for cost reasons, 
while, on international flights and especially on transcontinental flights, 
competition forces them to upgrade significantly the level of the services 
provided. Thus, many alliances for example, offer beds instead of seats to first 
class passengers. Finally, many airlines tend to put an emphasis on the way 
services are provided so as to obtain a comparative advantage (for example, 
the way the meal is served). Consequently, the way of execution as well as 
the level of expectation on the part of passengers differs from region to region. 
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Figure 5.5 
Barriers the airlines have come up with so far 
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Among the greatest barriers of alliance efficient operation and success, the 
respondents state: 1) conflicting network strategies, 2) the existence of 
different suppliers, ground handling operators, aircraft maintenance, 3) the 
differences in corporate cultures and 4) IT systems incompatibility. 61% of 
airlines have stated that the first two barriers have been overcome but the 
other two still present problems as half of the airlines have stated. Cultural 
differences is a constant problem for all alliances because of differences 
covering a wide range of subjects such as working habits, mentality, etc. IT is 
probably the most difficult barrier to overcome since it requires significant 
financial resources, strategic long term commitment and time. 
The factors that determine the success of the contribution of an airline within 
any given alliance is its existing network (cited by 19 airlines), and more 
specifically its extent, spread and degree of complementarity in relation to 
those of its partners. Some airlines point out that their contribution is closely 
associated with the quality, style and culture of the service they offer (cited by 
three airlines, two Asian and a North American), the attributes of their 
passengers lists (cited by two airlines) and their brand name (cited by two 
North American airlines). 
The initial expectations airlines have from alliances have been fulfilled to a 
large extent. In case of non-fulfillment, this is most commonly related to the 
regulatory issues such as lack of antitrust immunity, which does not permit 
allied airlines to cooperate on pricing, scheduling and capacity. That is why 
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most airlines seek to secure antitrust immunity in order to intensify and 
integrate their cooperation in order to maximize their respective benefits. 
Regulatory issues tend also to influence the decision concerning the choice of 
routes that are code shared. Other criteria influencing that decision include: 
routes with high demand/traffic flows, connectivity with other flights, 
frequencies and departure/arrival times, possibility of opening up new 
destinations and questions regarding to what extent the existing network 
satisfies demand, whether a certain route is beneficial for both partners, etc. 
The answers given to the question seeking the reasons that determine the 
decision over which routes are to be code shared - these answers are 
graphically represented at the following figure - are in accoredance with the 
answers given in relation to the question relative to the airline objectives 
(Figure 5.1). The findings of these two answers confirm that the major drive 
behingd the formation of alliances is to increase traffic flows. 
Figure 5.6 
Reasons for which routes are code shared 
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The participation in a global strategic alliance enables airlines to provide 
passengers-customers with a global product, which is brought into existence 
from the creation of global networks, global FFPs and lounge access. 
Among the positive impacts, the airlines put a premium on revenues and 
passenger traffic increase. In relation to the latter, 76% of the interviewees 
cite a rise exclusively in the traffic of high yield customers, while only 24% 
mention an increase in both high yield and low yield passengers (Figure 5.7). 
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Similarly, no airline mentions a decrease in traffic of any category of 
passengers. This is an absolutely reasonable result since one of the very 
reasons for alliances is the creation of the right incentives in order to attract 
high yield passengers, given that global network and global FFPs respond to 
the needs of this particular class of passengers. At this point it should be 
stressed that network, FFPs, and lounge access do not always coincide with 
the enhancement of the services provided and to what the business travelers 
are seeking. Business travelers also value highly reliable departure timing, 
minimal unproductive waiting time. Also, there has been no decrease in the 
traffic of any kind of passengers as the creation of a global product benefits 
low yield passengers as well even if at non significant rates. This sounds quite 
logical since what allied airlines are seeking, besides raising load factor and 
traffic, is also higher revenues per seat. 
Figure 5.7 
Airline alliance impact on the type of traffic 
Both 
9AO/ý 
Low yield 
0% 
High yield 
76% 
-j 
Positive results whether these concern passenger traffic or other parameters 
appear to have been achieved in a short space of time. 81% of the airlines 
interviewed state that they experienced positive results within the first twelve 
months after establish ing/join i ng a strategic alliance (Figure 5.8). Results from 
the alliance are immediate given that from the very moment a common code 
appears, the passenger and the revenue this passenger represents benefit 
both allies. The same holds true for the marketing benefits whether these 
arise from the advertising brochures or the CRS presence. 
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Figure 5.8 
Time bracket for the appearance of positive effects from the alliance 
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Consequently, airlines are convinced that passenger traffic constitutes an 
extremely important parameter for the measuring of alliance impact. Even 
more important, at least for one of the airlines interviewed, is the correct 
mixture and the quality of passengers. In other words, what counts is not 
simply the volume, but the "valuable volume", i. e. that which maximizes 
revenues per seat kilometer. 
c. Evolution-Mergers 
Whatever are the reasons that have led to their formation, alliances tend to 
have a long term character. This does not however mean that they will 
eventually move in the future towards consolidations and mergers since only 
one third of the airlines interviewed declare that such an evolution is indeed 
their ultimate goal. It is quite interesting to note that airlines, which mention 
that alliances are only a transitional phase leading to mergers, are European 
ones. At this stage, a distinction should be made between domestic and 
cross-border mergers, or as far the European Union is concerned, between 
intra-European Union mergers and outside-European Union ones. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that the regulatory framework - through the creation of 
a single European aviation market and the abolition of nationality ownership 
conditions - within which European airlines operate permits, at least 
theoretically, such moves, being much more flexible and adaptable, especially 
if compared with the much more stringent North American and Asian 
regulatory framework. Certainly, even if it is possible to foresee intra- 
European mergers, it still very difficult to talk about international ones. Among 
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the airlines that take a negative stance regarding mergers there are many 
Asian and US airlines. More specifically, they state that they prefer alliances 
because such groupings allow them to maintain their independence while at 
the same time they facilitate the transfer of know-how and constitute the 
fastest and cheapest way to create a wider network. This stance reflects both 
the maturity of the industry and the corporate focus, as the US airlines want to 
gain greater market access. At the same time, the Asian airlines want to play 
a role in the alliance game but don't really need to become too integrated. 
Figure 5.9 
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The following figure is a graphic representation of the answers given by the 
interviewees to the question what are the different stages of alliance' 
evolution. 
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Figure 5.10 
The different phases of the evolution of an alliance 
Despite the common belief that airlines would have merged if regulatory 
authority had allowed, two thirds of respondents - North and South American 
airlines, Asian and Oceanian airlines - see alliances as their ultimate aim. 
Besides the regulatory framework, the public ownership of many airlines can 
act as a barrier towards mergers given the public utility character many 
airlines have. If mergers are indeed concluded, a huge problem arises in 
relation to open skies agreements: a bought out airline stops being a national 
flag airline making any open skies agreement invalid since such an agreement 
links two countries. For example, if British Airways were to buy or merge with 
KLM, then KLM would no longer be a Dutch airline and the agreement the 
Netherlands has signed with the United States would not apply to KLM 
anymore. KLM would lose its traffic rights to fly to US and cannot bring to the 
new merged company. Traffic rights are determined between governments 
and concern airlines that have the nationality of two countries involved. 
Moreover, mergers can cause many problems relative to labor issues 
especially as far as crew personnel are concerned. Another aspect that 
should be stressed is that passengers tend to favor national flag airlines, a 
fact that renders airlines reluctant to lose their "national airline" identity in 
order to avoid the risk of losing part of their domestic clientele. Other airlines 
fear that mergers might drive away their loyal passengers. A major obstacle is 
182 
also the differences in culture as the abortive merger between KLM and 
Alitalia has eloquently illustrated. 
As things stand at present, there are very few chances for the creation of a 
unified airline that will bear the name of the alliance. What seems on the other 
hand quite possible, is to have cross-border mergers inside Europe (Air 
France-KLM) provided of course that the regulatory framework changes. As 
for the time horizon of such a development is concerned, it is believed that 
regulatory changes will be a response to a mature industry and consolidation 
evolution and to the industry problems as well. 
The difference between an alliance and a merger lies in the fact that the 
former does not constitute a financial entity, that is a legal entity able to 
present a consolidated balance sheet, nor have a single decision maker and a 
common ownership structure. Mergers could bring about greater reductions in 
costs and improved profitability because it would be possible to proceed to 
labour cost reduction and more efficient management. 
C. Analysis of the interviews with the central management of the 
alliances 
This section analyses the interviews made with the central management of 
alliances that have such a kind of management (oneworld and Star Alliance). 
Table 5.2 
Alliance interviews 
Alliance Person Position 
oneworld M. Blunt VP PR 
........ ..... -...... ......... . ....... - .................... ....... . ......... - ........ . ........ -. - ........... ... ....... ................... . ............... ..... . ..... . ............ --.... ... ... ........... ........ Star Alliance J. Albrecht CEO and President 
H. Findeisen VP Commercial 
M. Puffer Business Project Manager 
According to the central management, alliances aim at the establishment of 
mutually profitable cooperation, which can offer to all the members/allies 
satisfactory benefits. It benefits also: 1) the customers/passengers through the 
supply of a better product and higher service standards, 2) the shareholders 
through safeguarding better returns on capital invested and higher dividend 
yields and 3) the employees through the provision of increased safety and 
better career and salary prospects. However, they omit to mention that not 
everybody is always satisfied: for example, SAS is not satisfied with the traffic 
flow out of Germany. 
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As for the airlines themselves, they have every reason to want to enter or to 
form an alliance so as to secure additional traffic and extra revenue. This is 
achieved through the establishment of a global network, code sharing, etc. 
and a corresponding reduction of cost through joint common purchasing and 
sharing facilities/offices. As a result, the member airlines are in a position not 
only to attract and secure the loyalty of their customers by achieving better 
service for their customer base but also to improve their competitiveness, 
which they would not be in a position to do if they remained stand alone 
companies as such an effort would be both extremely time-consuming and its 
cost would be prohibitive. One cannot but wonder whether there is evidence 
to prove that the better service provided to a customer is indeed provided by 
the alliance or whether such enhanced service is provided only by the 
individual airline. 
Several points need to be raised at this point since evidence indicates that 
benefits from joint common purchasing to date have been negligible. 
The benefits however, seem to be allocated proportionately to their respective 
contribution with the larger airlines securing the larger benefits. The success 
of any alliance is certainly inexorably related to the degree of mutual trust and 
cooperation shown by the members, and by their willingness to integrate and 
move forward. 
The central management does not intervene in the administration and 
management of the individual member airlines but focuses exclusively on the 
management of the alliance. Its competencies include the resolution of any 
problems arising from the operation and management of the alliance, the role 
of the intermediary, and the implementation of various alliance-related 
projects, etc. It is not in any case a decision maker. Independence is 
important for the member airlines but their activities within the framework of 
the global alliance is subject to certain limitations - such as the fact that no 
airline can decide independently of the others - which in many cases causes 
annoyance. 
It has been stressed however, that Star Alliance and oneworld, although they 
possess central alliance management, they have at present no intention of 
proceeding to a merger/consolidation. For oneworld, the first priority is the 
deepening of the relations among its members so as to enable them to 
achieve and reap the awaited increased benefits from alliance participation. 
New members have to be high quality and value-added ones. Furthermore, 
each member pays a contribution based on their size (ASK) and a percentage 
of the costs of the alliance activity. Star Alliance on its part puts a premium on 
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attracting new members. Any further expansion of the alliance depends on 
customer needs for network coverage and the new focus will be a geographic 
one towards India, Africa, China and Russia. 
When asked whether the size of the alliance has created overlapping routes, 
the CEO of Star Alliance answered that there is some overlapping, which can 
be a problem but can also turn into a positive thing. The benefits of the 
complementation are more than enough to offset the potential overlapping 
and lead to market share gain. Regarding the problem that might arise from 
the financial problems some allied partners enter into, and how this might 
affect the alliance overall, the answer is that it is not a problem but an 
opportunity for the alliance. United Airlines is expected to come out of Chapter 
11 "a much better company, a much more profitable company, a sound 
company with a much better cost structure and it will be the example to follow 
for the other airlines". 
The measure they use to assess the impact and performance of alliances is 
RPK. They believe that there are financial benefits arising in the particular 
fields of marketing and cost savings. Star Alliance has achieved so far 
revenue gains and an increase in traffic, amounting up to 10%, and these 
gains result from the creation of a wide network thanks to the great number of 
participating airlines. This alliance pays a special attention to transfer traffic. 
They expect that cost savings will appear later on since on a short term basis 
alliances bring about additional costs, due to marketing alliance related 
expenses and IT coordination. At any rate, both revenue gains and cost 
savings remain very important issues. They do not consider the numerous 
partners as a disadvantage, even if it renders more complex management and 
implementation of projects. The central management play a significant role in 
the smooth and efficient functioning of alliances as the CEO of Star Alliance 
put it: "brings together the efforts, implements the projects, harmonises 
schedules, thinking and supports from all the airlines". 
D. Conclusion 
The evaluation of the interviews points to the fact that airlines believe that 
alliances enable them to create a global network, which itself and on its own 
entails significant benefits. Apart from the increase in passenger traffic and in 
revenue, the greatest benefits are observed in the area of marketing, while 
there have been no, or very few benefits registered in the areas of productivity 
and cost reduction. Cost reduction seems to be a long term objective, since a 
short term increase in costs is often observed while the possibilities of 
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achieving economies of scale remain rather doubtful. As a matter of fact, 
economies of scale cannot be achieved immediately since there is no 
common policy and strategy on important issues such as ground handling for 
example; only a common policy can permit cost savings and its lack 
constitutes a barrier to the achievement of an optimum cooperation. Among 
the numerous advantages of alliances, airlines state the possibility to attract 
more high yield passengers, that is those that permit the increase of revenue 
per seat kilometre within the framework of the effort to maximise valuable 
volume. Passenger traffic together with revenue variables constitute the basic 
gauges for the impact of alliances while at the same time they constitute the 
most common criteria of alliance success evaluation. Any possible positive 
impact arising from alliances, including passenger traffic, tend to appear very 
soon. On the whole, airlines do not reap any negative effects from their 
alliance participation apart from the curtailing of their independence and more 
specifically from the impossibility to cooperate with third, non-allied, airlines. It 
results that airlines, despite their operating in an alliance environment, do 
maintain their operative and strategic independence to a large extent and 
most of them seem not to have come up with any serious problems because 
of this participation. The issue of independence is not as simple as the 
interviews suggest. Airlines know - and experience from other industries 
confirms it - that unless they get the necessary integration, they will not even 
be sub-optimising. What concerns them however is the longevity of alliances 
and the history of airline alliances so far is indeed a source of concern. The 
consequent resistance to become integrated means that airlines retain their 
independence because they want to maintain their options open. 
Airlines consider that airline alliances are a permanent phenomenon, 
("alliances are here to stay") but few state that their ultimate goal is merger or 
consolidation, and the creation of a unique company with all the benefits such 
a change would bring about. European airlines though do believe that 
alliances are a transitional stage that will lead to mergers some time in the 
future. Although not all airlines, especially Asian and US ones, concur with 
this perception, all airlines agree that the current regulatory framework acts 
prohibitively to such an evolution. 
Finally, the key factors for the successful course and performance of an 
alliance are, according to the airlines themselves: commitment, 
communication, complementary network, good cooperation, common 
strategy, vision/goals and above all trust. 
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5.1.2 Interviews with aviation organisations, regulatory bodies and 
aviation experts 
Apart from the interviews with the airlines themselves, equally important for 
the enrichment of the present study and the formulation of a more well- 
documented and complete perception on the airline alliances were the 
interviews conducted with "outside" and specialised officials. "Outside" 
aviation experts are those that are not employed by airlines but are working 
for international aviation organisations, regulatory bodies or other aviation 
experts. Their selection was based on the fact that, because of the nature of 
their work, these people are directly or indirectly involved with alliances or 
know the subject exceptionally well. Furthermore, their views offers the 
possibility of approaching the subject from a different angle from that 
expressed by those directly involved. 
A. General - Questionnaire 
The interviews with "non-airline" aviation experts act in a supplementary and 
complementary way, and have as the ultimate goal to enrich the survey by 
presenting the way the aviation organisations and bodies as well as the wider 
air transport industry community perceive the alliance performance, role and 
prospects, and whether this differs from that of the directly interested parties 
and if it does, on what issues and to what extent. 
More specifically, three different categories of specialised experts were 
approached. Their opinions have a special weight for anyone wishing to 
thoroughly comprehend the airline alliances phenomenon in all its aspects, 
their overall performance and development, their potential benefits or any 
side effects. 
1) International aviation organisations such as International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) and International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
2) Supervisory bodies such as the antitrust immunity heads of the US 
Department of Transport (DOT) and the competition commission 
members of the European Commission 
3) Finally, experts from "Airline Business" Magazine, which regularly 
undertakes various surveys concerning airline alliances and "CTAIRA" 
in its capacity as stock market analyst and consultant for the air 
industry sector. 
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The table below presents the interviewed executive officials, their title and the 
organisation they are working for. 
Table 5.3 
Aviation organisations, regulatory bodies and aviation experts' interviews 
Type Organisation Person Position 
Aviation organisations ICAO C. Lyle Air Transport Bureau 
IATA R. Smithies; Director, Policy Analysis 
Government & Industry Affairs 
..... ........ I ................................ ...................... gulatory bodies .......................... .................................... US DOT .... T. Homan ...... .. -............. -. 1 ....................... -. 1 ............ - ... . ............. . .. Chief, Competition and Policy 
European Commission Dr M. Gremminger Analysis Division 
DG Competition - Transport Unit 
(Air Transport group) 
Aviation ex *p*e' rt *s Airline Bu si ne ss K. O'Toole ' Editor 
CTAIRA C. Tarry Transport Analyst 
The questionnaire used was made up of two groups of questions: there were 
some common questions with the questionnaire used with the airline 
executives so as to enable comparison; there were also, as it was natural, 
some different, depending on the capacity of the interviewees and of the 
organisation they work for, so as to formulate a clear picture about how the 
alliance issue is perceived. In any case the number of questions was smaller. 
B. Analysis of the responses 
The usual role held by the regulatory and supervision bodies is to ensure that 
the airline market functions properly through the encouragement of 
competition. Thus, the main aim is to avoid the creation of monopolistic 
situations, which would be harmful for the consumers' welfare. Their opinions 
are of increased importance, given their extensive market knowledge. 
According to the US DOT and the European Commission, the basic aim of the 
airlines participating in alliances is the better network coverage which enables 
them to offer to their customers a more integrated and global network, but 
also the acquisition of a comparative advantage against their competitors 
especially the non-allied ones. Allied airlines can also access to new 
destinations at no cost. When Aeromexico for example joined SkyTeam, it 
forced Mexicana to adhere to Star Alliance. The same happened when 
Korean Air entered SkyTeam, Asiana was forced to join Star Alliance. Besides 
the benefits related to the reduction of costs, the companies obtain, through 
their alliance participation, a more international and global character, 
according to Mr. 0' Toole of Airline Business. In addition, alliances tend to 
offer a secured place for the smaller airlines, especially the European ones, 
as it can guarantee their survival preventing them from mergers and 
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consolidations, which at any rate remain difficult given the current regulatory 
framework. 
Neither IATA nor the European Commission and ICAO possess data 
concerning the alliance impact on passenger traffic and, as a result, they are 
not in a position to express any opinion on this issue. The extreme and radical 
position adopted by IATA is worth mentioning as it supports that alliances 
have not managed to generate the expected results since they are time- 
consuming and not fast moving, and they have not changed the aviation world 
as expected. US DOT takes the exactly opposite position and states that the 
researches carried out by the organization itself, or on its behalf, indicate that 
there has been an increase in traffic, and this is especially true when there is 
no overlapping of routes. Anyway, all the respondents agree that some 
alliances perform better than other, depending for example on the level of 
cooperation they have achieved. Antitrust immunity, for example, allows a 
greater stimulation of traffic and network. The key to the success is the 
creation of a particularly wide and global network, which could allow them to 
sustain competition. 
As far as competition is concerned, it seems that there have not been any 
particular negative consequences. According to the European Commission, 
alliances have improved the level of competition on many routes while at the 
same time they have multiplied the available choices for the customers- 
passengers. 
Among the negative characteristics, one can find the curtailing of allied 
airlines independence and their desire to see the shareholders receiving a 
large part of created benefits. 
The strategic direction and corporate vision of alliances depends mostly on to 
what extent their respective faiths are linked and to what extent they are 
willing to work in that direction. Equally important is the governance structure, 
how effectively the alliance is able to leverage some of the synergies. As far 
as the future of alliances is concerned, the proposal for TCAA brought by the 
European Commission is expected to strengthen the alliances since it will 
permit the closer cooperation and will increase competition. TCAA will 
certainly benefit more the European airlines as they usually possess only one 
hub contrary to the North American ones that may possess up to four and 
already cover a large number of European destinations. At the same time the 
playing field is very unbalanced at the present time as the US government 
moves to financially support 1/3 of the industry players. 
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Section 5.2 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is a logical continuation of the interviews, as it constitutes a 
more explicit way of approaching the issue, focusing exclusively on the 
analysis of alliance impact. It combines both quantitative and qualitative 
elements since the respondents have been asked not only to express their 
opinions on issues closely related to the alliance, but also to evaluate alliance 
impact based on their own experience. It represents one of the first efforts - 
and one of the few since 11th September 2001 - to measure the effects of 
alliances, which is based on the very beliefs and opinions of the interested 
parties themselves. This is exactly what attributes to the present research 
increased significance. Contrary to the interviews, the questionnaire was 
forwarded solely to the executives of airlines, members of global strategic 
alliances and more specifically to the heads of the alliance departments. 
5.2.1 General - Questionnaire 
The questionnaire aims at examining and assessing the position and stance 
of airlines, current members of airline alliances, putting primarily special 
emphasis on the impact of alliances on passenger traffic and secondarily on 
several other parameters. 
The questionnaire, whose formation and compilation was strongly influenced 
and assisted by the interview process, received its final form and was 
forwarded to the selected executives at the beginning of November 2002, and 
the whole procedure was completed by February 2003. 
The questionnaire focuses mostly on the study of alliance passenger traffic 
impact and therefore makes it possible to assess the degree of any impact 
experienced by each of the four global alliances groupings. It is the purpose of 
this questionnaire to gather the opinion of airlines, belonging to the current 
major global alliances, regarding the effect alliances have had on their 
performance. But given the chance to collect inside information, the questions 
were not limited to passenger traffic per se and their scope was extended to 
other parameters with equal importance such as fares, cost, revenue, etc. 
The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to all the airlines-members of the four 
global strategic alliances and more specifically to the executives of the 
alliance departments so as to achieve a homogeneous sample. It has had a 
100% response rate since all - the total number of airlines participating in 
airline alliances at the time of conducting this survey - the 28 airlines 
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considered has responded. However, only 79% of them filled in all the 
questions. The parts that were not filled were the ones that were asking a 
quantitative evaluation of alliance performance, and this was done probably 
for confidentiality reasons. 
In its first draft, the questionnaire contained some 30 questions. There after, 
the number was significantly reduced in an effort to come up with a more 
attractive and comprehensible version, and above all, in an effort to secure 
the highest possible response rate. This reduction in the number of questions 
was further facilitated by the fact that the questions of more general interest 
were posed and answered during the interviews. 
In its final version the questionnaire (Appendix B) includes 10 questions and 
focuses on the possible alliances impact, and more specifically, on the way 
those are perceived by the interested airlines themselves. Special emphasis 
was given to passenger traffic, which after all constitutes the main topic of this 
thesis, without however ignoring other important issues. As this questionnaire 
presented the unique opportunity to obtain the airlines views, especially since 
11 th September 2001, it seemed necessary to include a set of questions, 
which could cover the wider theme of alliances impacts and go beyond the 
simple traffic impacts. Therefore, questions analysing the effects on fares, 
cost, load factors and revenue were added. Besides, some additional ones 
has been included in order to examine whether there have been satisfaction 
from the alliance participation, the degree of satisfaction arising from this 
participation, how fast the results appeared, etc. 
The assessment of the impact on passenger traffic was done in a way so as 
to examine to what degree the existence and the scope of such effects 
depends on the degree of cooperation developed among the airlines 
themselves (FFP, code share, strategic alliance without or with antitrust 
immunity), on the route distance (short or long haul) and on their type of route 
(hub-hub, hub-non hub, non hub-non hub). This comprehensive analysis was 
considered necessary, as it would provide a complete image and a better 
understanding of the consequences of the alliances on passenger traffic. 
Great assistance to the whole process of compiling the questionnaire was 
offered by the comments, judgments and inputs of experts directly or indirectly 
involved in the air transport industry and of academicians. More particularly, 
the opinions of Michael Blunt, VP PR (oneworld) and Marcus Puffer, Business 
Project Manager (Star Alliance) were taken into consideration, whose 
experience in the field is granted since they belong to two of the alliances 
under examination; of Kevin O'Toole, editor of the "Airline Business" 
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magazine, which magazine has undertaken in the past similar researches; of 
Chris Tarry, a Transport Analyst (CTAIRA), a specialised stock exchange 
analyst of the airlines sector; and of Dr Nicolas Skourias, an economist 
specialising in quantitative and qualitative analysis. Their invaluable opinions 
were very helpful and were taken into consideration to achieve the greatest 
possible rate of acceptability among the respondent executives. 
The table 5.4 presents the name of the persons who filled in the 
questionnaire, their position, the airline they work for and the alliance to which 
their airline belongs. 
Table 5.4 
Airline resoonses 
Person Position Airline Alliance 
H. de Graauw Director Alliances KLM "Wings" 
- .................... ................. M. Chock ............................... ........................ ............................ ...................................... - Senior Manager Alliances -11--l- ý. I-- ...... ...... ......................................... Northwest Airlines ......... ........... - .............. . .. "Wings" 
--11-1.11- ................... - 11 .......... P. O'Neill ......................... .............. ..... . ................ Manager- Business Planning & ... Aerl-ingus ....... - ...................... ....... ... oneworld 
Alliances 
........... ................. .-.......... 11 .................. ............. . .......... B. Blodget-Stephan .. I................... -- ............ ................... ..... ................. Oneworld Project Directon American Airlines .................................... . ... ....... - oneworld 
................... ..................... - ................... ................... L. Lau I ............ I ............... ............... .............. ............... . ... . ........ ............... Oneworld Project Director ..... Cathay Pacific 
11 ................ I ................. 
oneworld 
........ ................... ............................. - ........... M. Sucksdorff ............. .............. . ............... . ....... Oneworld Project Director I'll. 11 ý Finnair 
... - -- --............... . ...................... . 
oneworld 
......... .. - .................. .......... . ... ................... ............................. ..... . M. Clavero Pineda ..... ............... .................... ... ... - ...... ................ ................ ............. ...... . ........ Onoworld Project Director Iberia oneworld 
I ............ - ................... - .................. .............. A. Prus ......... ............................. I ..................................... ............ ........... - .............. . ... ................... ... Oneworld Project Director ............. 11 -I- --- ..................... Lan Chile .......... . oneworld 
M. Eggleton ............... I-- .............. .............. .... ........... -- -1-1- 1-.. ....... . ................. Alliance Strategy Manager ..... - 11 - -. 1 .... ............ British Airways oneworld 
............ ... ... 1-11 .......... ....... I--........................... ................. J. McEvoy ... ................. .......... .... ......... -- ........... - ............ .... .... .. Oneworld Project Director Qantas 
........ 
oneworld 
........ ..... ......................... . ........ ........... -, --- ............. I ..... . .... E. Moore ............ - ............. -- .............. --I -- - ............ I1 11 --............ Acting Director Commercial Alliances Aeromexico SkyTeam 
.......... 11 .................... . .... ............... . ........ P. Bianquis ...... ............. .. VP Alliances 
.... . 
.... ...... 1 11.1 - 111 ý--..................... ........ 1-1 Air France 
. .......... -- -- I-......................................... 
- .......... --.............. . .... SkyTeam 
............................................ .. --- .... ... ........ .... . .. M. Oretti ....... - .................. - ............................ .............. ............... ...... I ............ Director Alliance Development Alitalia SkyTeam 
..... ........... --- ............ ..... . ......... . ............... . ...... . ... J. Toth ............... - ............... - ..... ..... 11 - -. 1 1 ............ Director Alliances and International CSA - Czech 
........... - -. 1--l-. 1 . ................. SkyTeam 
Orientation Airlines 
........... ......................... . .... . .. - J. Woodin --- ................ Specialist Alliances ..... .... . Delta Air Lines .......... SkyTeam 
............ - .... ............ 11 ................ - ................ - ............ Y. Park ................. ..... - ................. ................ - ............... . ............ ........................................... .......................... Deputy General Manager Alliance & ............................................. Korean Air ......... ......... - ....... . .... . SkyTeam 
Network 
............ -. 1 ........... ........... ......... R. Zaarour ..... -, .......... ... ......................... -- ...................... - .................. - .......... Director, Alliance Development .......... Air Canada Star Alliance 
. - 1-1.1 -ý-ý1 1-1 ................ ........ . .... J. Whiftaker .I........ ..... .. I. -I -I............. 1- ............. .................... . Manager Alliances -1- 111.11 1-.......... - ..... ..... ............. Air New Zealand I .... ..... I- - Star Alliance 
............. ..... ................... . ...... .. K. Iki ....... -1-1 ............. ................... --............... ........... ............ ............ - VP Alliances & International Affairs - ................... - .................. .1 All Nippon Airways 1111 ........................ -- ..... . ... . .... . Star Alliance 
............ - .......... -- ...... .... . ....... P. Paflik ............................ -- -. 1 ............. - ......................... . ........... . .... ...... ............. ..... Alliance Manager ................ ....... 1 -11 ... - 1.1-1.1- - .......... Austrian Airlines ýI--................ I Star Alliance 
--. 1 - 11-1. ............. ................ . .... A. Jansen ............ ............ ... -- - ........... -I- 11.1 .II.. ......... Manager Alliance Strategy bmi British Midland ............... Star Alliance 
............ - .......................................... ..... . ..... S. Beyohoff 
......... 
- ...................... - ........... I-- ........................ ............... .......... I ...... Manager Market Development 
... ............. - ......... . 1111 .......... - ........... 
..... Lufthansa 
............ 
...................... Star Alliance 
I ........... -1 1-- ............. ......... ....... T. Humer Director, Alliances and Sales & Mexicana Star Alliance 
Marketing Overseas 
........... -..... K. Moller .............. - -- ........... ............ VP Alliances and Partnerships SAS ........... - Star Alliance 
.......... - 11 ................ - .................... .................. ............... J. Seow .... . ........ 111 - 1- ........................ - ........... Manager Alliance .... ................. - Singapore Airlines Star Alliance 
... ............ ---- .......... ............... ............ . ... D. Smuthkochon 
1-...................... . ......... 
...... ............ -, 11 ---.............................. ........... I-- ............. Director Special Projects & Alliance 
..... ............. - ............. - .......... - ............... . ............. I . 
........... I .............. II1 11.1 -. 1- ......... ......... . Thai Airways ............. ........ - .............................. Star Alliance 
............ ---l-. 1- C. Trofta - ...... ..... - .................... - ................ ..... Staff Rep. Industry Marketing & ................... . ............... 11 -. 1 . ..... - .......... United Airlines ......... ..... .. Star Alliance 
Alliances 
........... - .................... ... .... ........ F. Girardi ................. -1.1.1 ....... . .......... ............ .............. . Membership Liaison - Star Alliance ..................... ........................ Varig ........... ............ Star Alliance 
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5.2.2 Analysis of the responses 
The processing and analysis of the questions is conducted both on an overall 
level as well as on the level of passenger traffic so as to formulate the best 
possible picture. The analysis will begin by stating the general conclusion 
arising from the processing of the total sum of the responses before 
proceeding to a more extensive study of the impact on passenger traffic, 
which after all constitutes the main focus of this study. Whenever considered 
constructive, the analysis is accompanied by comments by alliance grouping, 
airline size and continent. 
A. Alliance performance assessment questions 
The collection and analysis on an aggregate level of the responses confirms 
the literature review, that is, the positive impact airline alliances have. 
Based on the respondents' opinions, the following overall percentages can be 
drawn: 96% of them state that the accession and participation in the alliances 
is considered as very successful. More specifically, 64% believes that the 
course and operation of the alliances has been so far "good", while 32% rates 
them as "excellent". There were no negative comments since only a small, 
mostly regional, European airline expressed some reservations and preferred 
to adopt a neutral stance. 
Figure 5.11 
Opinion about alliance cooperation so far 
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The positive opinion of the interested parties results from the impact of airline 
alliances on passenger traffic, cost, revenue, load factor and fares, 
parameters which, as it is generally accepted, constitute the commonly used 
evaluation measures of alliances performance. 
It becomes evident that, and to this concur the vast majority of the executives, 
alliances bring about an increase in passenger traffic with a parallel increase 
in load factor and some reduction in cost. Thus, a clear improvement of 
revenues is observed, a fact resulting from the combination of increasing 
traffic and decreasing cost. On the contrary, the results regarding fares are 
quite mixed showing sometimes an increase and some others a decrease. 
Such increases and decreases may be directly related to the quality and 
quantity of flights offered. On the one hand, one could expect fares to rise on 
average on routes such as those linking Europe and Australia, since British 
Airways and Qantas have cut capacity. On the other hand, one could expect 
on routes where travellers have a wider choice among different airlines of 
distinct and alliances, fares to decrease. 
More specifically, the airlines executives declare at a rate of 93% that 
alliances have impacted positively passenger traffic, while they state at a rate 
of 100% that revenue have been positively influenced. In addition, 89% 
declares that load factor have increased, whereas 81% affirms that cost have 
registered some reduction. Answers relative to the impact of alliances on fares 
can be characterized as ambiguous since 68% indicates that fares have not 
been influenced, while 32% declared the opposite. 
Given that the totality of the airlines rank as the highest goal of alliances the 
creation of a global network - that is the creation of a more extensive 
destination network combined with better scheduling, which aim at attracting 
more passengers and increasing revenues - it is reasonable that the double 
trend of increase in passenger traffic and revenue registers high ranking. The 
common and widely spread practice of creating global FFP among the allied 
partners has also contributed significantly to this trend. 
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Figure 5.12 
Impact of alliances on several parameters 
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In an effort to further investigate the impact on the above parameters, the 
airline representatives were asked first to locate the area in which the greatest 
changes have been observed and second to proceed to a quantitative 
evaluation of this impact. 
The results demonstrate that the most pronounced effects have been located 
in the area of passenger traffic. Next in ranking are: revenue and load factor. 
The least pronounced impacts have been observed in the areas of cost and 
fares. 
Figure 5.13 
Alliance impact on different aspects on a 1-5 scale 
Fares 
Cost 
Revenue 3.26 
I 
Load Factor F- 3.24 
Traffic 3.62 
012345 
Scale of I to 5,1 = no impact and 5=significant impact 
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As far as cost is concerned, this finding seems absolutely reasonable given 
that their improvement represents a long term objective for airlines as a 
whole. At the same time, one should not disregard that the participation in an 
alliance does entail certain substantial initial expenses such as, for example, 
IT system harmonization, marketing expenses (i. e. a unified ticket issuing 
system, printing the alliance logo on stationery, on brochures and on the 
aircraft fuselage) and advertising expenses, which put a serious strain on 
costs at least on a short term basis. If one takes into consideration the fact 
that the majority of alliances have been formed recently (Star Alliance in 1997, 
oneworld in 1999 and SkyTeam in 2000), most airlines are still going through 
the phase of the amortisation of the costs incurred. 
Regarding fares, the trend surfacing so far is that of diversity since their 
course is a function of a variety of factors, such as the kind of cooperation and 
the kind of routes involved. In the case of hub-hub routes for example, 
Brueckner (2001) stated that in the cases that "alliance partners often provide 
overlapping service, and in this situation, cooperation may result in collusion 
behaviour, which leads to higher than lower fares. This outcome contrasts 
with the interline trips case, where the pursuit of higher profit, leads fares 
cooperating airlines to reduce fares". 
Figure 5.14 
Airline alliance impact on fares regarding the different types of routes 
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As illustrated by Figure 5.14, variations in fares have been observed in hub- 
hub routes, much more often in comparison to other routes. As a matter of 
fact, fare rises have been observed mostly on hub-hub routes (33%) whereas 
they constitute the exception on the others routes (<10%). On the whole, one 
can conclude that alliances have not lead to a rise in fares, except in certain 
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cases. On the contrary, they have led to a stabilisation and even to a 
reduction of fares. This confirms what Brueckner (2001) has obtained even if 
his study has concluded to a substantial decrease in fares (between 17 and 
30%), much greater than the one recognised by the airlines themselves, 
which on average reach 10%. However his study is based only on Star 
Alliance airlines. 
Table 5.5 
Estimation of the impact of the alliance 
Traffic Less than 5% 6/15% Above 16% 
Load Factor Less than 5% 6/15% Above 16% 
Cost Above 0% -1/-10% More than -11 % F-4%-] 
Revenue Less than 5% 6/15% Above 16% F 2-2 0/-(o- I 
Fare More than -11% -10/0% F376ý6-] Above 1% F3-2-0/-co)-l 
Through the perusal of table 5.5, one can derive numerous and important 
findings given that they make it possible to examine not only the way each of 
the considered performance criteria has changed but also the degree to which 
they have been impacted. Before commenting on them, it should be noted 
that some airlines have not responded to whole questions. More particularly, 
only 78.6% of the interviewees replied. This can be attributed either to a 
possible ignorance since in certain cases it is difficult to measure or too soon 
to observe the alliance results, or most probably, to their reluctance to take a 
position due to confidentiality reasons. One airline states that the only factor it 
measures is revenue. 
First of all, the results confirm the positive impact of alliances on passenger 
traffic and load factor, which register an increase exceeding 6% of the cases 
in 64% and 45% respectively of the airlines. In tandem with the increased 
passenger traffic, there has been an improvement of revenues as all the 
participating airlines state between 6 and 15% in 35% of the cases and 
exceeding 16% in 22% of the cases. The reduction of cost ranges between 1 
and 10% in 82% of the cases - with the exception of a small European airline 
which mentions an increase in cost, the same that has expressed reservations 
regarding the effectiveness of alliances. It should be mentioned that although 
the respondents state that there has been reduction in cost, in fact most 
aviation experts believe that in reality this reduction in cost is very much on 
the low side. The real issue is whether the cost and revenue gains have had a 
significant impact on profitability. As far as fares are concerned now, the 
above-mentioned ambiguity remains, since the eight airlines that have 
previously responded that there has been no fares reduction, state now the 
opposite indicating a rise up to 20%. Nevertheless, 2/3 of the respondent 
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airlines continue to mention a decrease in fares. Therefore, the expected 
reduction in competition has not led to acute monopolistic situations - surely 
regulators would act to prevent such a development - and part of the 
observed reduction in cost has passed to prices enabling airlines to offer 
lower fares. But what remains rather alarming is that airlines that take the 
contrary opinion and claim that there has been an increase in fares up to 10% 
are among the biggest in the industry and major players in the existing 
alliances on both sides of the Atlantic. Such fare increases may be due to 
airlines wanting to deal with decreasing profitability rather than to a 
monopolistic situation. Each airline however, follows the policy that it sees fit 
even if it contradicts the policy followed by its partners. For example, 
Lufthansa's strategy after 11 th September 2001 was to cut capacity and 
maintain fare discipline whereas United Airline's strategy was to cut fares. The 
dispute between the partners ended up with the German government 
complaining to the US government. United's choice of policy proved to be 
rather questionable given that they filed for bankruptcy protection under 
Chapter 11. 
As it results, alliances, apart from some minor exceptions, produce the 
expected that is an increase in passenger traffic and revenues. The only 
question remaining concerns fares and the way they will evolve in the future. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that long haul flights, intercontinental flights 
mostly, tend to produce much better results than short haul ones. These 
findings cause no surprise since many airlines, which can be characterised as 
new alliance members, have quickly proceeded to organise a code sharing 
network for their long haul flights especially on their hub-hub routes. In 
addition, short haul routes are usually subject to more intense competition 
since it is easier for a start-up airline to undertake short haul flights. 
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Figure 5.15 
The impact on route type measured by length of haul'o 
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B. Impact on passenger traffic 
As has been mentioned above, passenger traffic is among the basic factors 
that are positively influenced by the participation in an alliance given that on 
the one hand, the majority of respondents stated that there has been an 
upward trend directly resulting from alliances, and on the other, of the five 
parameters under examination, it is passenger traffic that has experienced the 
greatest impact. 
Based on the answers given to the questions concerning passenger traffic 
specifically, one can say that the first benefits appear almost immediately. As 
a matter of fact, 89.3% express the opinion that a passenger traffic rise was 
evident within the first two years, while half of them (46.4%) state that this 
positive impact was observed during the first twelve months. 
lcý Neutral: equally impacted 
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Figure 5.16 
Time needed to observe the impact of alliance membership on airline traffic 
10.7% 
46.4% 
As expected, the greatest increase in passenger traffic is observed primarily 
on hub-hub routes, and secondarily on hub-non-hub routes (Figure 5.17). 
Figure 5.17 
Alliance impact on the traffic of each type of international route 
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More specifically, the increase in passenger traffic on the hub-hub routes is 
assessed as "significant", with 45% stating an increase of more than 16%, 
while the corresponding percentage increase for hub-non hub routes ranges 
from 6 to 15% for 55% of the respondents. As far non hub-non hub routes are 
concerned, all respondents indicate a moderate rise ranging between 0 and 
15%. These results seem absolutely reasonable considering that all global 
airlines, especially the major ones, operate on the hub-and-spoke system, and 
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that the whole alliance organisation aims at increasing the hub-hub traffic, 
especially the high yielding and efficient transatlantic routes. 
Table 5.6 
Quantitative estimation of the magnitude of the allian, 
traffic by route type 
Less than 5% 6/15% 
Hub-Hub 25%ýýý 30% 
Hub-Non Hub 30% 55% 
Non Hub-Non Hub 50% 
ce impact on passenger 
Above 16% 
45% 
20% 
0% 
Among the airlines that state significant impact on their hub-hub routes are all 
the US and many of the European ones, since they have firstly implemented 
the hub-and-spoke system and because these hubs operate more efficiently, 
given the existence also of antitrust immunity in most cases. Asian airlines are 
not included in the airlines stating such an increase, since they were not able 
to take advantage of their hubs as a major tool of their transport model. This is 
certainly the direct result of the different structure of air transport organisation 
in this region. Finally, Central and South American airlines state a significant 
increase on hub-hub routes since they mostly operate flights towards allied 
hubs. 
Figure 5.18 
Quantitative estimation of the magnitude of the alliance impact on passenger 
traffic by route type 
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Quite characteristic and revealing is the fact that among the chosen types of 
cooperation, that is FFP, code share, strategic alliance without antitrust 
immunity and strategic alliance with antitrust immunity, the first three seem to 
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be regarded as the most efficient by airlines without certainly disregarding the 
significance and contribution of the other one. 
Figure 5.19 
The most productive type of cooperation regarding traffic increase 
Strategic alliance with 
antitrust immunity 
7 3.46 
Strategic alliance without 2.72 
antitrust immunity 
Code share 
FFP 
3.84 
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012345 
Scale of I to 5,1 = no impact and 5=significant impact 
The coordination of the different Frequent Flyer Programmes towards an 
unified one contributes appreciably to the increase of passengers by 
promoting loyalty among passengers and giving passengers greater 
opportunities to "earn and burn" miles. The role of antitrust immunity in the 
creation of code sharing should be stressed as it ensures for the passengers 
of the allied airlines a wider range of destinations at competitive prices 
through the issue of one ticket only. Many times airlines may take additional 
steps to foster seamless travel. Most of the times though these two types of 
cooperation - FFP and code share - co-exist. 
A strategic alliance with antitrust immunity ranks third among the types of 
cooperation that impact passenger traffic more positively since it allows 
partners to proceed to a common network, common scheduling and common 
pricing policy. In other words, it constitutes the type of arrangement that brings 
the largest benefits given that the scope for action of the partners is the 
greatest. The reasons that could explain this ranking are first, the limited 
number of strategic alliances enjoying antitrust immunity among the sample 
studied, more specifically 4 out of the 10 in total, and secondly, the fact that in 
two cases antitrust immunity has been granted recently. Thus, many airlines 
were asked to evaluate such cooperation without having themselves 
experience of such cooperation. North American and European airlines, such 
as the members of "Wings" (Northwest Airlines and KLM), constitute an 
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exception to this general trend, since they have been cooperating within this 
framework for many years. 
The figure below presents in more detail the degree of impact on traffic the 
different type of cooperation has had. It points that code share constitutes the 
major contributor to the traffic increase while the other kinds of cooperation 
affect also revenue and cost. It should be stressed that four respondents have 
mentioned that they have experienced negative impact from "strategic alliance 
without antitrust immunity", with three referring to some negative impact and 
one significant negative impact. For convenience reasons, all replies 
mentioning negative impact have been included in the relevant "some impact" 
or "significant impact" category without specifying that it is a positive or 
negative impact. This can be attributed to the fact that such strategic alliances 
evolve in a risky and uncertain environment in which airlines are demanded to 
make a commitment without being certain of the future evolution of the 
alliance. 
Figure 5.20 
Degree of impact on traffic according to type of cooperation 
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Among the factors that tend to cause an increase in passenger traffic, one can 
distinguish the offer of a more global network that covers a larger number of 
destinations with better scheduling and which enables passengers to enjoy 
shorter connections and "seamless" travel (Figure 5.21). A secondary but 
equally important role is played by global FFPs that provide passengers with 
opportunity to accrue miles, and thus gain tickets; this is the factor that 
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contributes the most to customers' loyalty. An alliance brings about an 
increase in the number of flights, which proliferates for any passenger their 
choice as far as the times of departure are concerned. 
Figure 5.21 
Reasons behind any positive impact on passenger traffic 
Better scheduling 13.56 
Better global 4.08 
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C. Additional comments in relation to the impact of the airline 
cooperation on traffic 
The respondents were asked at the end of the questionnaire to add "any 
additional comments concerning the impact of your airline cooperation on the 
level of traffic on your route network". Their answers were quite interesting 
and revealing. 
A very interesting comment is related to the reliability of traffic increase 
evidence they have filled in the previous questions of the questionnaire. 
Almost all respondents mention that it is difficult to actually measure results 
and determine which ones are due to the alliance itself. They also indicate 
that they do not know whether the traffic increase experienced is indeed due 
to alliances since it is very difficult to isolate the alliance impact. There are 
many other market factors influencing the route results as economic growth, 
price policy and so on. As a result, it is very difficult to quantify the traffic 
increase alliances have brought, and the evaluations given are mostly "guess 
estimates". 
204 
0123 
As far as their participation in an alliance is concerned, they state that their 
decision was partly a defensive move. By participating in an alliance, any 
given unaligned airline can partly face increasing competition arising from 
other airlines or existing alliance groups, and expect to gain market share and 
traffic. Alliances obviously do not represent the absolute solution in any 
competition problem. Further, participation in any given alliance does not 
remove the dangers, since competition from other existing groupings remain. 
They also say that the alliance relationship is still complex and still developing. 
The impact of antitrust immunity is just beginning to unfold but they consider it 
as a very important element as it provides airlines with more ability and 
flexibility, while it offer the possibility of further integration. 
More particularly, in relation to alliance impact on traffic they point out 
however that the post 2000 period was characterized by a decrease due 
essentially to the 1 1th September 2001 terrorist strike but also to the 2001 
economic downturn. Many of the respondents mention that the traffic increase 
was more significant during the first years of alliance inception or alliance 
participation, and then started to stabilize. The traffic impact has been quite 
immediate (within the first year) due to global FFPs and greater opportunity to 
earn/spend miles. The impact has grown further in size in the following years. 
Regarding cost, part of the respondents mention that there were some 
important initial cost reductions mostly through "easy hits", such as common 
in-flight provisions. But these savings have been quite modest at least for the 
time being. The significant long term cost reductions require necessarily the 
alignment of some product specifications, common approach and fleet 
planning, but also a high degree of integration. 
As far as fares are concerned, a Star Alliance member declared that is not 
clearly a plus-minus impact as it is not as much coming from fare 
increases/decreases but rather from the added customer benefits due to the 
introduction of new fare types (round-the-world fares, various Alliances, Air 
Passes, etc. ) and to the increased combinability of various fare types among 
the given Alliance members. 
In connection to yields, airlines state that the rise observed was due to traffic 
increase, but also to a better business mix between economy and business 
travellers especially on long haul routes. 
But the most interesting comments relate to the different aspects of traffic. A 
Star Alliance member indicated that only a certain share of their traffic is 
relevant for/or part of their overall business. 10-20% of the Star Alliance 
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members' traffic is related to Star Alliance's Mission and Vision while the 
remaining relates to the domestic and more regional traffic, which are not 
really the key target for Star Alliance. Many Star Alliance members' domestic 
business is not part of the Star Alliance network and services. Though Star 
Alliance could get many cities without actually flying to them, the US partner 
puts emphasis on the main European partners without having to fly to lower 
density cities. 
Some respondents state also that small airlines, except for those of the 
Northern Atlantic region, have observed the most positive impact, since they 
operate mostly long haul flights and since this type of route generates the 
major traffic and the better yields. Although the questionnaire was filled by the 
participants well after the 1 1th September 2001 events, these comments are 
probably true for the period before this attack as most of these airlines 
experienced serious problems and were forced to cut capacity. 
As for the different kinds of routes, some of the respondents declare that in 
relative terms the impact on non-hub traffic is probably higher than for hub 
traffic as the partners in most cases already has/have a strong position in the 
hub-hub markets given their non-stop/direct services. 
D. Comparative overview of the questionnaire results 
a. By alliance 
i. "Wings" 
The participation of only two airlines in conjunction with the existence of a joint 
venture explains why these airlines indicate the alliance has had significant 
impact on FFP and code share. On the contrary, what strikes most is that 
despite the joint venture, revenues have increased at a different rate for each 
partner. Further, the two airlines declare that there has been some reduction 
in cost ranging up to 10%, with each partner giving again different rates. Even 
if the disagreement is disregarded, such reduction is rather at the low end. 
Opposite answers have been also given regarding fares. While in one 
question related to fares, all partners indicate that there has been an increase, 
in another one related again to fares, the first one stated that it had 
experienced some fare increase on hub-hub routes while the other one a fare 
decrease for the same route. The possibility of the two allies having different 
fare levels before the alliance could explain this contradiction. One ally had 
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indeed higher fares and the other lower, thus one had to decrease them and 
the other to increase them. As far as the other categories of route are 
concerned, the respondents remain divided with one declaring that fares have 
decreased and the other that they have remained steady. This is in fact a 
significant conclusion, since partners clearly have opposing views of the 
alliance benefits in this particular issue. 
Stating a traffic increase of above 16% for hub-hub and hub-non hub routes, 
and a rise of 6-15% for non hub-non hub routes, it follows that the partners 
seem to have benefited extensively from the establishment of the joint 
venture. It results also that antitrust immunity has had a significant effect on 
the alliance. Further, the existence of a bilateral agreement makes easier the 
alliance performance assessment. 
ii. Star Alliance 
The positive alliance impact on traffic is immediately perceivable. Code share 
agreements and FFP have had the most significant impact on traffic. Traffic 
and load factor have recorded an increase of 6-15% and 0-5% respectively. 
Traffic impact is mainly observed on hub-hub routes. In comparison, cost has 
registered a smaller decrease ranging from 1% to 10%. 
Fares have presented a small decrease, with the majority of respondents 
claiming decrease of around 10%. However, when examining the responses 
given on the alliance impact on the different kinds of routes, a contradiction 
arises since, on the whole, respondents replied that fares have remained 
constant. The contradiction resides in the following: When respondents are 
asked to quantify the alliance impact on fares they state a decrease of up to 
10% but when they are asked whether there has been any impact on fares, 
they state to the contrary that there has been no change of fares. 
Finally, respondents state that alliance results have been equally good for 
long haul and short haul routes. 
iii. oneworld 
Contrary to the previous alliances, no allied airline has assessed the alliance 
effects as "excellent". This point of view can be attributed to the lack of 
antitrust immunity between the core partners and therefore in the absence of 
deeper cooperation. This "failure" seems to have affected negatively the 
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whole alliance. Even if within the alliance considered there is a widespread set 
of bilateral agreements between all the partner pairs, some of which have 
antitrust immunity, such as British Airways with Qantas and American Airlines 
with Finnair. This also explains why the alliance impact on the alliance 
members has become evident within 1-2 years and not immediately as the 
other alliances stated. Furthermore, this lack of integration may explain the 
smaller increase (up to 5%) of load factor, traffic and revenues in comparison 
to the other three alliances. Finally, they may also account for the limited 
impact, only 5% at best, on the different kinds of routes. 
In addition, fares remain in general stable recording no decrease or increase, 
a result that is easily understandable since the lack of antitrust immunity 
prevents the partners from proceeding to price coordination and forces them 
to remain to a large extent "competitors". 
iv. SkyTeam 
All the participant airlines declare that there has been some increase in their 
traffic, load factor and revenue while there has been no increase in fares (67% 
of the respondents). As a matter of fact, half of the respondents - non- 
European airlines only - reply that fares have decreased by more than 11 % 
on hub-hub routes, while 100% state that they have remained stable on both 
the hub-non hub routes and the non hub-non hub routes. However as in the 
case of Star Alliance, when they have been asked to assess the impact on 
fares for the different types of routes, all respondents indicate that here has 
been no decrease in any category, a fact that certainly contradicts with the 
result previously pointed out. They further declare that lower fares have not 
significantly influenced traffic (giving fares a grade of 2.2 on a1 to 5 scale). 
According to 66% of SkyTeam airlines, there has been a slight decrease in 
cost (up to 10%) while one airline replies that they have actually increased. 
The latter may be explained by the fact that the particular airline could have 
been led to upgrade its service standards in order to harmonize them with 
those of its partners. As far the moderate effect mentioned by the majority is 
concerned, it can be explained by the fact that SkyTeam is the most recently 
formed alliance, established only in 2000. Therefore, the initial cost occurred 
and investments realized, within the scope of alliance participation, have not 
been amortized yet. Further, there has been no harmonization since there are 
still contracts with suppliers, etc. that have not been terminated yet. 
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The most important factor, which is taken into account when considering the 
alliance performance, is traffic and revenue. 
The impact on traffic has been quite immediate as 67% of the airlines declare. 
Additionally, the greater one has been derived from the code share 
agreements among the participant airlines, and the antitrust immunity, which 
was granted in 2002 between most of the participant airlines. 
Traffic has presented an increase ranging between 6 and 15% (as 50% of the 
respondents state), while load factor and revenue have registered a rise up to 
15% (100% of the respondents) and up to 5% (50% of the respondents) 
respectively. All airlines declare that there has been a significant impact on 
traffic of hub-hub routes, amounting in some cases to even more than 20%, 
with no participant stating an increase less than 6%. Concerning hub-non hub 
and non hub-non hub routes, 67% of the respondents mention an impact in 
the range of 6-15%. 
Most benefits on traffic have been observed for long haul flights, whereas 
short haul flights have registered the highest increase in yield. 
v. General conclusion on the impact by alliance comparison 
it is "Wings" alliance, which possesses antitrust immunity and is the only one 
that has established a joint venture that has experienced the most positive 
benefits. Given though that this alliance is made up of only two airlines, it 
cannot and should not be compared with the other alliances whose 
membership ranges from 6 to 17 airlines. Star Alliance seems to have 
experienced the most positive impact on traffic and revenue; the increase in 
revenue may be attributed to the deeper cooperation existing among its 
partners. SkyTeam is the alliance that states the greatest positive impact on 
cost, a result that can by explained by the joint purchasing/procurement 
projects adopted by the allies. This alliance also indicates the greatest 
decrease of fares, a fact that can be attributed to the efficiency of the hubs- 
and-spokes of the partners. Star Alliance seems to have reaped the largest 
benefits from the cooperation it has adopted. It shows that antitrust immunity 
is a major parameter for the success of an alliance as far as traffic is 
concerned. 
The figure below presents the way the members of the major alliances rate 
their experience so far. SkyTeam members seem to be the most satisfied 
from alliance performance followed by the Star Alliance members. No member 
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of oneworld alliance rates his alliance cooperation as "excellent" and it 
constitutes the only airline grouping that has taken a neutral attitude towards 
alliances. This is probably due to the lack of deeper cooperation among the 
members. 
Figure 5.22 
Assessment of the alliance performance by alliance grouping 
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Figure 5.23 shows the impact of alliances on traffic of different kind of routes 
as stated by alliances. This figure concentrates only on significant impact. 
oneworld seems to have performed less efficiently in comparison to all other 
alliances. As a matter of fact, just half of the allied airlines state a "significant 
impact", and that, only for hub-hub routes. All members of SkyTeam and 
"Wings" indicate a significant increase on their hub-hub routes. "Wings" has 
experienced the highest increase on its hub-non hub routes, while SkyTeam 
seems to have experienced significant increase on all its routes. Star Alliance 
finally seems to have registered a major rise in passenger flow in all its routes. 
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Figure 5.23 
Significant alliance impact on traffic of different kinds of routes by alliance 
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b. By size 
i. Major airlines 
Although the major airlines have led the movement towards the formation of 
alliances, their assessment regarding alliances performances is just "good", 
while that of medium and small airlines is "excellent". 40% of them respond 
that fares have increased as a result of alliances, which may be explained by 
the fact that virtual monopolies have been created on at least some of the 
routes they serve. They also declare that the alliance effect on their traffic has 
been immediate. They indicate further that the most significant impact on 
traffic has stemmed from antitrust immunity, which is absolutely reasonable 
given that five out of the seven airlines entering in this category do possess 
antitrust immunity. Similarly, on a scale 1 to 5, they assess the alliance impact 
on fares with 2.3, which means that the alliance has not had a major impact. 
As far as the rates of traffic and load factor are concerned, their assessment is 
rather low. This can be probably explained by the fact that alliances have 
been operated for several years and the initial boom of traffic increase has 
been absorbed and stabilized. Revenue increase ranges in the area of 0-15%. 
They affirm that traffic on hub-hub routes has recorded an increase of more 
than 16%, a quite plausible figure given that they usually possess a well- 
functioning hub-and-spoke system. This also explains fares increased on hub- 
hub routes, but also stability on the other ones. 
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Finally, they state that traffic and yields have recorded better results on long 
haul routes. This is due to the fact that most of their agreements concern long 
haul flights, but also to the fact that long haul, especially intercontinental 
flights, experience less direct price pressure and offer the best opportunity of 
miles accruing to frequent flyers. 
ii. Medium airlines 
Medium airlines state that alliances have had the greater impact on traffic and 
become evident within 1-2 years. Considering that this particular category of 
airlines includes a large number of Asian and Oceania airlines, this relative 
delay can be ascribed to regulatory issues, which tend to restrict cooperation 
to simple code share. They declare further at a rate of 67% that FFP 
constitutes the major parameter explaining the traffic benefits, a fact that can 
be again explained by their geographical position since the long haul flights 
they operate permit their frequent flyers to accrue miles. No airline has 
mentioned an increase in cost. In their majority they state that alliance impact 
on traffic for all kinds of routes amounted to between 6-15%. Finally, they 
assert that short haul and long haul flights have been influenced in the same 
way. 
iii. Small airlines 
In their majority (91%), small airlines state that alliances have resulted in a 
significant decrease in cost and that alliance impact on traffic has been 
immediate and relatively more significant for FFPs and code share. The same 
percentage indicates also a decrease of fares. One can conclude that 
economies of scale have led to cost cutting, which has passed to fares. 
Obviously, one can argue that fares decrease can also be due to market 
conditions in which different airlines operate. It is very interesting to note that 
the same percentage that indicates increase of cost point out as well an 
increase in fares. 
Moreover, 55% declare that there has been some impact on their non hub- 
non hub routes, while 18% indicate a significant impact and with the rest 
declaring that there has been some impact on this kind of route. There are two 
facts that can explain this situation. First, small airlines usually operate non 
hub-non hub routes on behalf of major airlines. Secondly, one can find in the 
category of small airlines, airlines from different geographical areas, which 
has been affected differently as far as the traffic is concerned. In Europe, for 
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example, the network of non hub-non hub routes have been strengthened 
thanks to the extensive code share agreements while in other regions, such 
as South and Central America, non hub-non hub routes have remained steady 
and some routes have even been abolished. 
Finally, small airlines state at a rate of 11% that alliances have had a 
significant positive impact on short haul routes. 
iv. General conclusion on the by size comparison 
40% of medium size airlines assess their alliance experience as "excellent" 
and they constitute those airlines that have been most positively impacted as 
far as traffic, load factor and cost are concerned. Since major airlines have 
registered the most pronounced traffic impact, regardless of the type of 
routes, it becomes evident they have absorbed most the traffic increase 
alliances have brought about. Major airlines have after all led the movement 
towards alliances and determined to a large extent the rules of the game. 
Figure 5.24 illustrates the responses given by airlines according to their size 
to the question which type of alliance cooperation has influenced more 
positively traffic. Interestingly enough, the scores awarded to the different 
kinds of cooperation are proportionate to the size, with the major airlines 
giving the highest scores and the smallest the lowest scores. 
Major airlines accord the highest score to all kinds of cooperation except 
FFPs. This can be certainly related to their pioneer role regarding the alliance 
creation process, which has permitted them to distinguish the most efficient 
type of cooperation and to adopt them. The regulatory framework within which 
they act constitutes an additional reason, since it authorizes deeper type 
cooperation. On the contrary, the small and medium size airlines give the 
lowest scores to the most advanced cooperation type, as they didn't have the 
opportunity to adopt them for regulatory reasons. Besides, they were on 
average more or less forced to join only quite recently an alliance in order to 
face the increasing competition and volatile market. 
Another revealing element is that both medium and small airlines rate FFP 
cooperation as the most effective tool available as far as passenger flow is 
concerned. This figure reveals that the major airlines have benefited the most 
from alliances. 
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Figure 5.24 
The impact of the different alliance cooperation types on traffic according to 
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c. By geographical region/continent 
i. Europe 
75% of European airlines view alliances as "good", while 17% characterize 
them as "excellent", since alliances effects have been moderate so far. This is 
mainly due to the high competition, not only between the established airlines 
but also from the low-cost airlines, which restricts the possibilities of great 
traffic improvement, but also to the short alliance participation period (6 out of 
the 11 European airlines have recently entered alliances), which reduces the 
probability of observing any significant changes. 
As a matter of fact, revenue and cost have not significantly been influenced, 
while the observed rise in traffic and load factor has been relatively small not 
exceeding 5%. Moreover, 70% mention that there has been a reduction in 
fares. 
Regarding traffic, 30% indicate that alliances have had no impact on non hub- 
non hub routes, a result quite reasonable if one takes into account the 
intensive competition from low cost airlines characterising these routes and 
their extended geographical coverage. Competition has led also to a limited 
impact non hub-non hub routes traffic. But when referring to hub-hub routes, 
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40% of the respondents, particularly core alliance members, indicate an 
increase of over 16%. 
Additionally, code share is the type of cooperation for which the most 
significant impact on traffic was observed. This finding seems quite 
reasonable since code share constitutes one of the main types of cooperation 
and since airlines did not have enough time to adopt more deeper forms of 
cooperation. Second in ranking comes strategic alliance with antitrust 
immunity, which has been cited by 3 core members. 
Contrary to the other geographical regions, a more significant impact on short 
haul routes has been observed. This can be explained both by the 
significance of the network and the existence of several "small airlines" in 
Europe. 
ii. Asia-Oceania 
Traffic and the load factor have not recorded much increase in comparison to 
the other geographical regions. 86% of airlines assert that there has been 
some increase in traffic and 71% mention an improvement of load factor. On 
the other hand, 100% of airlines affirm that there has been significant 
decrease in cost up to 10%. In addition, revenue has been the most significant 
parameter. This result comes in opposition with what other geographical 
regions airlines state, according to which traffic has been the most influenced 
parameter. Alliance effects are not immediately apparent, since the 71% 
declare that it took them more than a year to observe the first benefits. This 
can be attributed to the peculiarities of this geographical region, the strict 
regulation framework and the 1997 economic crisis. 
Alliance impact on fares has been limited (1.8 on a1 to 5 scale), that can be 
ascribed to the lack of competition and the absence of low-cost airlines in the 
region. The same is true as far as revenue and load factor are concerned, 
since their increase have been quite moderate, i. e. up to 5%. 
The fact that the respondents indicate that "strategic alliance with antitrust 
immunity" has had no impact on traffic causes no surprise given the highly 
regulated character of this particular area and the fact that up to now only one 
airline of this area has such an agreement. On the contrary they consider FFP 
as the most important factor given that their code share agreements and 
strategic alliances are much more difficult to operate because of regulatory 
restrictions and do not permit any other and deeper cooperation. Furthermore 
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this may be to the fact that the distances these airlines have to cover make 
the accruement of miles much easier. 
The alliance impact on hub-hub routes has been smaller in comparison to the 
other regions, probably because the hub-hub system has not found much 
application in this area. 
Finally, yields of long haul routes, according to 67% of the respondents, have 
performed better because of the high distances separating the area from 
major world markets. 
iii. North America 
Just 20% of North American airlines considered (1 out of 5) state that fares 
have increased. At the same time, 60% indicate that costs have decreased, 
but this cost cuffing does not seem to have been a major one since it has 
been assigned a score of 1.9 on a1 to 5 scale. 5 airlines out of 7, which have 
answered this question, affirm that alliances impact were immediate. This is 
quite reasonable taking into consideration that those airlines constitute 
founding members of the alliances. 
Even though North American airlines mention that lower fares have had a 
positive impact on traffic (3.8 on a1 to 5 scale), at the same time they declare 
that there has been an increase in fares on hub-hub routes (50% of the 
respondents), on hub-non hub routes (25% of the respondents) and on non 
hub-non hub routes (25% of the respondents). 
As expected, 80% give a high score, 4.4 on a1 to 5 scale, to strategic 
alliances with antitrust immunity, since 4 out of the 5 airlines enjoy the benefits 
of antitrust immunity. As they have such agreements with almost all the other 
alliances members, one third of them (2 out of 6) affirm that this kind of 
cooperation has led to a significant increase of their traffic. 
The North American airlines are the first that applied the hub-and-spoke 
system and therefore it is natural that the hub-hub routes have been 
significantly influenced with a corresponding increase in traffic. At the same 
time nevertheless, 4 out of 6 of the respondents (67%) report a significant rise 
also on their hub-non hub routes passenger flows. 
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iv. Central and South America 
50% of the local airlines state that fares have increased assigning them a 
score of 3.5 on a1 to 5 scale. More specifically, 50% indicate an increase in 
fares for hub-hub routes and 25% for hub-non hub routes, whereas no airline 
mentions any fare decrease on any type of route. This can be explained by 
the fact that there is no competition on the routes served by these airlines, 
which are actually monopolies. The same airlines affirm that alliances have 
led to the reduction of cost, since 75% of the respondents observe a cost 
reduction up to 10%. At the same, 75% and 50% declare that traffic and 
revenues have increased by over 16%, while only 25% state the same for 
load factor. This cost cutting can be ascribed to acquisition of technology and 
economies of scale, but also to routes abolishment and personnel reduction. 
The increase in traffic can in its turn be ascribed to the cooperation with major 
European airlines and to the fact that most Central and South American 
airlines entered into alliances in 2000 and are enjoying the initial booming 
results of alliance participation. It should be noted also that according to IATA, 
the South America market is the strongest and fastest growing one. 
All Central and South American airlines mention that code share agreement 
has impacted significantly on traffic (4.5 on a1 to 5 scale). They state in 
addition that alliances have significant impact on hub-hub routes with 75% of 
the respondents reporting an increase of over 16%. While there are few non 
hub-non hub routes in the area, 50% of the respondents indicate an increase 
of 5% at best. 
v. General conclusion on the by geographical region comparison 
The analysis of the responses indicates that Central and South America have 
experienced the greatest increases in traffic, load factor and revenue as a 
result of alliances. It should be noted though that three out of the four airlines 
of this area considered entered alliances recently, from 2000 and onwards, 
and may be experiencing the initial positive alliance boom, which no one can 
confirm will continue in the coming years. This is the reason also why half of 
the airlines from this region - the highest percentage among all regions - 
characterize alliances as "excellent". The greatest increase in fares has been 
registered in Asia. As far as costs are concerned, the European ones report 
the most significant decrease, since local airlines are among those that feel 
more pressingly the need of cost cutting. As it was expected, the North 
American airlines followed by the European ones have experienced the most 
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important positive impact from antitrust immunity, since it is them that have 
the majority of these exemptions. 
Figure 5.25 illustrates the scores given by the airlines of the different 
geographical regions to the question which type of alliance cooperation has 
had the most positive impact on traffic. European airlines award the lowest 
scores to all kinds of cooperation, except strategic alliance with antitrust 
immunity, which can be easily explained if one considers that this 
geographical area includes firstly the largest number of airlines (11), and 
secondly airlines of all sizes many of which have a very limited network. North 
America on the other hand consists mostly of major airlines, which are 
alliances founding members. As a result, they tend to be enthusiastic 
supporters of all kinds of strategic cooperation as the high scores awarded 
demonstrate. Airlines from Asia, Oceania and Latin America value highly 
FFPs, since the latter remain their strongest competitive measure due to the 
absence of any most advanced cooperation such as antitrust immunity. 
Figure 5.25 
Assessment of the impact the different types of alliance cooperation have had 
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Figure 5.26 depicts how the airlines of the different geographical regions 
estimate the impact of the alliances they participate to on their traffic. It is the 
Central and South American airlines that seem to have experienced the 
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greatest increase in traffic, since no airlines have recorded an increase lower 
than 6%. This can be explained both by the fact that it is the area that is 
undergoing the greatest increase in traffic, and by the fact, that these airlines 
had a rather limited network before the establishment of the alliances. Asia 
and Oceania is the region that has stated the second greatest increase in 
traffic, with the majority of airlines indicating an increase in traffic ranging from 
6 to 15%. This geographic region includes many developing countries and has 
organised the last years many important athletic events. European airlines 
have declared the lowest increase since the local airlines had before the 
formation of alliances an extensive network and numerous connections with 
all the other geographical regions of the world. 
Figure 5.26 
Alliance impact on traffic according to geographical region 
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Conclusion 
Useful and enlightening conclusions have been derived from the processing of 
the questionnaire filled in by the allied airlines in relation to the impact of 
airline alliances, on passenger traffic and other factors as well. The overall 
substantial conclusion is that alliances, despite the form of cooperation 
chosen and established among the partners, entail numerous benefits for the 
airlines and certainly do come up to the initial expectations. 
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The questionnaire analysis indicates that both passenger traffic and load 
factor have showed a clear increase within the first two years from alliance 
participation. This in turn has impacted positively on revenue, while the effect 
on cost, even though positive, has remained comparatively limited at least on 
a short term basis. The impact on passenger traffic has been substantial and 
immediate from a time perspective. It is mainly due to the creation of a global 
network, which constitutes obviously the very first aim of any alliance. 
Regarding the influence on fares, the situation remains rather hazy, since the 
majority of airlines have produced ambiguous answers. It should be noted of 
course that such increases or decreases might be route-specific, and it would 
be hazardous to assess or quantify alliance global impact on fares. 
The greatest benefits from alliances have resulted from the more advanced 
and integrated forms of cooperation, just as the one that links the airlines of 
the "Wings" alliance, which is characterised by the existence of antitrust 
immunity and a joint venture. Most alliances however, remain "strategic" only 
in name, at least at their present stage, basing their cooperation on code 
share and FFP coordination, as they did not proceed yet to deeper integration. 
Airlines have not proceeded to deeper integration because there are serious 
negative aspects to alliances. Despite the fact that airlines desire to work 
together they strongly resent the idea that they might have to cede control to 
some central joint steering committee. They do not seem convinced that the 
rational benefits arising from the integration are as beneficial as they are 
presented. 
The airlines that remain unaligned avoid alliance membership which they 
consider as time and resource consuming and opt for a portfolio of bilateral 
agreements with various carriers from all alliances instead. 
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Chapter 6 
Econometric 
Analysis 
The sixth chapter focuses exclusively on the quantitative analysis of the 
impact of alliances on passenger traffic. Its purpose is not only to determine 
whether there is indeed any impact on traffic due to alliances but also to 
quantify it. In this sense, the present chapter seeks to confirm the results of 
the previous empirical survey, interviews and questionnaire, whose findings 
indicate that alliances do lead to a significant increase of passenger traffic. 
Consequently, the econometric analysis acts as a complement to the 
empirical survey and aims at further enriching the empirical analysis and 
corroborating the robustness of any results the latter has arrived at. The 
proposed econometric study is one of the very few ever conducted; all 
previous such studies show that alliances do result in an increase in 
passenger traffic (Park, 1997, Ourn et al, 2000, Bissessur, 1996, etc). 
The approach used in the present study is a two-step one. At a first stage, a 
specific methodology of determining and measuring the impact of alliances is 
developed, which is mainly inspired by that used by Bissessur (1996). The 
latter is based on a passenger traffic model which relates passenger traffic to 
a limited set of exogenous variables: on the one hand, the per capita GDP 
expressed in real terms as an index of income/economic activity and on the 
other hand, a capacity index (flight frequency or available seats) and fares. 
The second stage consists in the econometric estimation of the above 
regression model using time series data, followed by the isolation of the 
alliance impact by separating alliance from non-alliance effects. A 
classification approach will be proposed then in order to determine which type 
of airline routes and bilateral agreements produce the greatest positive impact 
and which not. Before, a special survey of the previous empirical studies is 
presented, as is the usual practice, in order to enable comparisons. 
The present study contains many innovative elements not only in relation to 
the time period examined but also regarding the sample of routes-airlines 
studied. Apart from the fact that the evaluation study extends to the 1990s 
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covering the period 1982-2001, thereby including even the most recent years, 
it also covers routes served by airlines which are members of the four global 
strategic alliances actually in force ("Wings", Star Alliance, oneworld and 
SkyTeam). Furthermore, the present study does not concentrate exclusively 
on North Atlantic flights, neither on hub-hub routes nor on major airlines, as 
other studies on traffic have done. At the same time, a more innovative and 
functional definition of alliance date formation is proposed in order to correctly 
assess the impact on passenger traffic. 
The analysis that follows supposes that the success of an alliance is indeed 
assessed in relation to its potential beneficial impact on traffic volume. 
Passenger traffic however, constitutes only one of the several performance 
criteria used to evaluate alliance success, together with passenger load factor, 
cost, revenues, productivity, profitability, etc. But it is undeniable that all these 
parameters are partly related to passenger traffic, since any increase in 
passenger traffic may, all others things being equal, lead to higher load factor, 
lower cost, improving revenues and profitability. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that the aim of the econometric analysis is 
exclusively and solely to determine and measure any possible impact of 
alliances on passenger traffic. This study does not intend to identify the major 
and most important factors affecting the alliances' success measured in terms 
of partners' traffic changes. 
Section 6.1 Previous empirical studies on traffic volume 
The available econometric studies that have attempted to identify and 
evaluate the potential impact of alliances on traffic volume (and load factor) 
are quite limited and recent. An overview of previous empirical works is given 
in Table 6.1. These econometric analyses are actually only six in number and 
the one by Ourn et al. (2000) seems to be the more thorough one. Greater 
emphasis is given to the quantitative results and conclusions they have 
arrived at in an effort to present the most complete picture possible of the 
previously conducted econometric studies. 
Improvement in connecting services and flight frequencies are among the 
major benefits airline alliances can bring to the passengers as Youssef and 
Hansen (1994) found in the particular case of flights in Swissair/SAS hubs". 
" Youssef and Hansen also looked at the effect of an alliance on competition. They found 
that it enhanced the market power of both Swissair and SAS. Competition in the hub-hub 
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schedule delay of three Trans-Atlantic alliances (KLM/Northwest Airlines, 
Lufthansa/United Airlines and Delta Air Lines/Swissair/Sabena), Ourn et al. 
(2000) suggest that complementary alliances (where partners have non- 
overlapping routes) enable partners to offer higher flight frequency to those 
who fly beyond non-stop city pairs routes, as well as to the majority of 
connecting passengers. Parallel alliance partners are also expected to 
increase flight frequencies. 
While there is some evidence of increases in flight frequencies and market 
share resulting from alliance agreements, this does not automatically mean 
that there are more users. However, these rather limited in scope studies tend 
to conclude that alliances do impact positively on passenger traffic especially 
as far as complementary alliance routes are concerned. 
Using traffic volume data of all North Atlantic routes operated by four Trans- 
Atlantic alliance airlines (British Airways/USAir, Delta Air Lines/Swissair, 
KLM/Northwest Airlines and Lufthansa/United Airlines) during the period 
1992-1994 Ourn et al. (2000) looked at changes in traffic volumes on alliance 
and non-alliance routes. "The test results reveal that most of the partner 
airlines in the four major alliances have greater traffic increases on their 
alliance routes than on their non-alliance routes" (Oum, 2000). Specifically, 
alliance routes of the eight airlines studied showed traffic increases of 
between 6.8% and 66.8% for alliance routes. Non-alliance routes showed 
traffic decreases of as much as 3.2% and increases of up to 9.1%12. 
markets was effectively eliminated. This was possible as both airlines held dominant positions 
in their respective hubs. The finding is limited to equity alliances only and is based only on 
one alliance. They further assessed the impact on fares on a sample of 18 hub-hub markets 
and 59 intra-European city-pair markets showing that fares increased in non-stop markets 
served by an alliance relative to non-alliance non-stop markets and that the increase was a 
concentration-mediated effect. 
12 Ourn et al. study also evaluated the impact of airline alliances on productivity. Using a 
productivity index computed by dividing an airline's overall output index by its overall input 
index, their regression analyses showed a system-wide productivity gain of 1.7%. Analysing 
22 international airlines they showed further that alliances led to competitive pricing. Using a 
pricing index calculated by dividing total revenues by an overall output index, their regression 
results showed an average decrease of 1.3% in pricing (5.5% in the case of major alliances). 
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Table 6.1 
Previous empirical studies regarding the impact of alliance traffic volume 
Authors 
Youssef and 
Hansen(1994) 
Associates (1994) 
Dresner et al. 
(1995) 
Park (1997) 
US General 
Accounting Office 
(1995) 
Bissessur (1996) 
Oum et al. (2000) 
Analyses 
Case Study: 
simple linear 
regression 
Estimation of a 
discrete choice 
conditional logit 
model combined 
with a 
counterfactual 
study 
-- ........ . ... ............... Empirical: 
categorical 
variables 
Estimated 
econometric 
models 
Intensive 
interviews with key 
people 
Time series 
regression for the 
evaluation and 
cross section 
regression for 
identifying alliance 
success major 
factors 
Empirical 
regression 
Sample Study 
Swissair and SAS 1989-1991, 
2 years 
50 code sharing 1Q 1994 
markets regarding 
Northwest 
Airlines/KLM and 
British Airways/US 
Air 
Continental 
Airlines/SAS, Delta 
Air Lines/Swissair, 
KLM/Northwest 
Airlines 
Panel data of 
KLM/Northwest 
Airlines, Delta Air 
Lines/Swissair/ 
Sabena 
.... ...... ............ ........... .... ............. KLM/Northwest 
Airlines, 
USAir/British 
Airways, United 
Airlines/Lufthansa, 
United 
Airlines/Anseft, 
United 
Airlines/British 
Midland 
............... .... -1 ...... . .... 52 hub-hub routes of 
six major Alliances 
(EQA, Global 
Excellence), 
KLM/Northwest 
Airlines, 
SAS/Continental 
Airlines, British 
Airways/USAir and 
Iberia/Aerolineas 
Argentinas/ Viasa 
I., .......... I. - ........... -11 -- -11-1-- --. - Panel data of 4 
major alliances 
Increases in flight 
frequency: variation in 
fare levels 
. ............. ............. ...... . ........... .............. Market share increase 
due to the code 
sharing agreement 
1987-1991, Mixed successes with 
4 years traffic volumes. 
Comment: restricted to 
equity alliances 
between US and 
Europe. In general, 
alliances did not 
benefit partners 
................................. . - ... 1990-1994, . ... ................ I .................. - . Traffic increases at the 
4 years expenses of rival 
airlines. 
1994, All airlines in the 5 
1 year alliances enjoyed 
increased revenues 
and traffic gained at 
competitor's expense; 
no industry growth 
1983-1992, Traffic increases in 
9 years most cases and main 
factors ensuring 
alliance operation 
success 
1992-1994, Increased traffic on 
2 years alliance routes 
Adjusted from Morrish, S. C. and Hamilton, R. T. 
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Increases in traffic volumes were also found in Park's (1997) study in the case 
of complementary and parallel alliances. In addition, these increases were 
gained at the expense of rival airlines' 3. 
In order to obtain quantitative estimates of the impacts of code share, Gellman 
Research Associates developed an econometric market share model using 
US Origin and Destination Survey ticket sample data for the first quarter 1994 
and flight alternatives. The measurement of market share effect is then related 
on the estimation over a sample of city-pair markets of a discrete choice 
econometric model relating market share to the attributes that characterized 
the flights offering (such as fare, overall trip time, service quality, code share, 
online versus interline service, etc. ). The results indicated significant impact 
across the Northwest Airlines/KLM and the USAir/British Airways code share 
markets in the sample: lower market share by 8% points for the former and 
11.2% points for the latter under the counterfactual scenario (no code 
14 share) 
These studies support the non-econometric findings of General Accounting 
Office (GAO) analysis of US and foreign airlines' data indicating that strategic 
alliances, which involve code share on a vast number of routes so as to 
strategically link airlines' flight networks, have in several cases generated 
large gains for partners in terms of passengers. The three strategic alliances 
entered into at this stage - Northwest Airlines/KLM (formed in 1989), 
USAir/British Airways (1993), and United Airlines/Lufthansa (1994) - were 
producing large increases in the number of passengers travelling on these 
airlines because their alliances involved (1) code share on numerous routes 
covering a wide geographical area and (2) a great degree of operating and 
marketing integration. Northwest Airlines and KLM data showed that their 
annual number of passengers has increased by about 350,000 as a result of 
their alliance, producing an increase in their combined transatlantic market 
share from 7% in 1991 to 11.5% in 1994. Alliances that involve code share on 
a more limited number of routes, usually in one geographic region or between 
a few cities, have also resulted in increased passengers in many cases, 
though at much lower levels than the three strategic alliances. Although the 
13 Park showed also that fare levels increased or decreased depending on the type of alliance 
agreement. Using panel data over the period 1990-1994, he found that a complementary 
alliance (KLM and Northwest Airlines) led to lower fares while a parallel alliance (Delta Air 
Lines, Swissair and Sabena) led to increases. In essence, parallel alliances create cartels on 
certain routes that allow price increases. 14 Park and Cho (1997) produced similar results as far as code share is concerned. More 
specifically, they found that the market share increase effect of a code share alliance is higher 
for markets with fewer competing airlines while alliance impacts were more significant in 
flexible and growing markets than stable and stagnant markets. These results seem to 
suggest that for a specific route, alliance airlines' traffic increase to the detriment of non- 
alliance airlines. 
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traffic gains achieved by airlines through alliances have come largely at the 
expense of other US and foreign airlines, at least some of the gains have 
come from new traffic stimulated by increased competition among alliances 
and between alliances and other airlines, according to most US and foreign 
airline representatives and US DOT officials that the General Account Office 
interviewed 15 
. 
There is also evidence that traffic gains can occur whether airlines re-aligned 
their strategies or not. Dresner et al. (1995) studied the outcome of three 
equity alliances (1 988-Continental Airlines/SAS, 1989-Delta Air 
Lines/Swissair and 1989-Northwest Airlines/KLM) in order to see whether or 
not they have led to changes in airline route structure and to determine 
whether they were successful in generating traffic or increasing market share 
on international routes. Using before and after alliance data regarding years 
1987 and 1991, the analysis indicated that in only one of three agreements 
have the airlines increased their trans-Atlantic traffic volume and increased 
their load factors after realigning their route systems to take advantage of the 
alliance. More precisely, it showed that both KLM/Northwest Airlines and 
Continental Airlines/SAS re-aligned strategies but only the former achieved 
some successes. On the other hand, Delta Air Lines/Swissair gained 
increased traffic and load factor despite not having re-aligned their strategies. 
Whether these results can be generalised is uncertain because the study was 
limited to equity alliances on the Trans-Atlantic routes. They concluded that 
alliances do not appear to guarantee success in the very competitive North 
Atlantic environment. 
In his attempt to evaluate alliances' impact on passenger traffic, Bissessur 
(1996) has estimated a traffic model, which relates traffic volume to real GDP, 
capacity, fares and the degree of competition using the stepwise regression 
procedure. The time span covers the 1982-1992 period while the sample 
studied includes 52 inter-hub routes and six major alliances (EQA, Global 
Excellence, British Airways-USAir, KLM-Northwest Airlines, SAS-Continental 
Airlines and Iberia-Aerolineas Argentinas-Viasa). The results indicate that in 
10 cases, real GDP (and the alliance factors as well) is found significant in 
explaining the variation in hub-hub passenger traffic, indicating that these 
markets have not yet reached maturity. By comparing the induced by real 
GDP traffic change to the actual level of traffic change between the pre and 
15 Although consumers benefit from the conveniences - such as decreased layover times - 
that alliances provide, insufficient data exist according to GAO to determine (1) what effect 
alliances have had on fares in the short term and (2) whether alliances will reduce or increase 
competition in the long term and thereby lead to higher or lower fares. US DOT officials 
however do believe that competition among alliances and between alliances and other 
airlines is resulting in lower fares, thereby stimulating new traffic. 
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post alliance period, a positive impact for these routes has been found ranging 
from 14,500 (Vienna-Copenhagen) to 94,702 (London Gatwick-New-York) in 
absolute numbers, except for Copen hagen-Zu rich (-20,263). In one case 
(Vienna-Geneva), traffic is observed to depend exclusively on GDP, implying 
it was unaffected by alliance formation. For the remaining 40 routes, which 
were not influenced by real GDP, the only change in traffic was mainly a 
consequence of alliance strategies. Further, Bissessur concluded that the 
main factors of alliances' operational success are: the partners' network size 
and the compatibility of these networks, the frequency of service between the 
hubs of the partners, the flight connection time at the hub and the level of 
competition on their networks 16 . 
Section 6.2 Modelling the airline alliance impact on traffic 
The second section is dedicated to the presentation of a traffic regression 
model on which the methodology used to determine and measure the impact 
of alliances on passenger traffic relies. 
6.2.1 Passenger traffic model specification: Determinants of demand 
A simple way to model traffic demand is to relate passenger traffic exclusively 
to real economic activity, reflected by the per capita GDP in constant prices 
(RGDPPC), by capacity (CAP) as a proxy of airline frequency and by fares in 
real terms (RY). Consequently, the proposed model of passenger traffic 
should have the following form 17: 
Passenger Traffic =f (RGDPPC, CAP, RY) 
RGDPPC > 0, 
f CAP > 0, f RY <0 
(1) 
16 See also Bissessur and Alamdari (1998). 
17 A major disadvantage of using load factor when measuring the alliance success is that the 
latter is highly affected by service frequency. Any alliance is likely to be accompanied by an 
increase in service frequency, due to the partners' attempt to integrate their networks and 
gain market share, which in turn will affect negatively load factor given that traffic is likely to 
respond gradually to any increasing frequencies. 
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A. Disposable income 
Any development in personal income affects the level of the purchasing 
power and the propensity to undertake leisure travel in general and air travel 
more specifically. As income increases two things take place. First, a greater 
part of the disposable income is spent on non-necessary consumer goods 
including air travel. Second, air travel, which constitutes a more expensive, 
but also, a more convenient means of transport for longer distances, 
becomes more accessible and more competitive (Lansing and Blood, 1984). 
Therefore, greater income results to an increase of expenditure on leisure 
travelling, but also to air transport being favoured over other competitive and 
alternative means of transport, especially for longer destinations. 
Taking into account that the data relative to disposable income are not always 
available but also that the way of measuring it differs from country to country, 
the use of GDP, as a proxy measure is considered as essential. 
At the same time, the use of GDP is considered as the most appropriate 
measure for at least two reasonS18. On the one hand, it does constitute a 
measure index of national income and wealth and is included among the 
major determinants of leisure travel. It is a fact that as real GDP increases, 
people tend to have more income to consume (Kanafani, 1983), while at the 
same time the improvement of living standards leads to changes of consumer 
habits, changes that favour certain categories of goods and services, such as 
leisure activities, including travelling, which present high demand/revenue 
elasticities. On the other hand, it does constitute a measure index of business 
activity and therefore wealth, and is included among the major determinants of 
business travelling'9. 
"3 The choice of per capita GDP as an approximation of personal disposable income does 
entail certain risks and restrictions as it assumes a homogeneous allocation of income. 
19 The demand for business travel is not directly related to the disposable income of the 
business travelers themselves but to the needs of the businesses they work for. These needs 
are however directly related to the economic activity, and thus to national income and wealth. 
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Figure 6.1 
Comparison of World Air Travel Growth and World GDP 
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Any increase in population also leads to an increase in passenger traffic with 
the exception of the less developed countries, for which this relation does not 
apply totally, if at all, given that a large part of the population simply cannot 
afford air travel. 
RGDPPC as an explanatory variable presents many advantages, given that it 
is a composite variable that combines real GDP and population, two important 
explicative determinants of passenger traffic, as mentioned above, while it 
permits the avoidance of a third one, that of exports. Furthermore, it can be 
considered as totally independent of the alliance formation. 
The high correlation characterising the growth rate of the world real per capita 
GDP weighted by market exchange rate and the world rate of change of total 
number of passengers carried (67.5%) during the 1974-2001 period shows 
that income and economic activity are among the main determinants of traffic 
volume. 
B. CapacitY 
Likewise, capacity presents a satisfactory correlation to passenger traffic 
(76.2%). Seat kilometre available as an index measure of capacity and proxy 
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of frequency entails a positive impact on passenger traffic for two reasons. 
First, any increase of available seats for any given level of demand can lead 
to a higher supply and fares' decrease, which could stimulate passenger 
traffic. Second, any increase in frequency can lead to the improvement of 
service quantity, which in turn could be able to attract more passengers and 
convince them to use airplanes over the alternative and competitive means of 
transport, especially in relation to short haul and domestic flights, provided 
that air fares remain affordable. Increased service frequency can also 
stimulate traffic as more flights are offered at convenient timeS20 . At the level 
of specific airlines or routes there is certainly an additional argument that 
renders frequency/capacity a significant parameter: increases in service 
frequency can increase the market share of an airline in relation to that of its 
competitors as conceptualised in the genera Ily-accepted S-curve variation of 
market share with frequency (Taneja, 1981 )21. 
In a way, CAP can be considered as an index of the improvement of the 
quantity of service, and contrary to RGDPPC, it can be considered as an 
alliance factor since it can change dramatically following the formation of the 
airline alliance (Youssef, 1992)22. 
20 An implicit assumption of the traffic regression model is that the cause-and-effect 
relationship, if any, between traffic and frequency/capacity is unidirectional: The explanatory 
variables are the cause and the dependent variable is the effect. It seems however that in the 
particular case of traffic and capacity, such a one-way cause-and-effect relationship is not 
meaningful. This occurs because traffic is determined by frequency/capacity, and some of 
frequency/capacity is, in turn, determined by traffic. As a matter of fact, higher 
frequency/capacity can stimulate traffic, but at the same time, a rising demand resulting from 
an increase in GDP can lead to an increase in frequency/capacity to accommodate the higher 
number of passengers. In short, this simultaneous relationship makes the distinction between 
dependent and explanatory variables of dubious value, and the least-squares estimators are 
not only biased but also inconsistent since the endogenous explanatory variables become 
stochastic and are correlated with the disturbance term of equation in which it appears as an 
explanatory variable (Gujarati, 1995). In order to overcome the problem of simultaneous- 
equation bias, one could proceed to the estimation of a simultaneous two equations model, 
one for each of the jointly dependent variables, but before, it is necessary to test the 
hypothesis of mutual dependency. In this regard, the pair wise Granger causality test ran for 
three different time periods (1950-2001,1970-2001 and 1974-2001) do not lead to any clear 
conclusion, while the results obtained are very sensitive to the lags chosen. As a matter of 
fact, they do not permit at any level of significance to determine if passenger growth Granger 
caused capacity growth, and therefore, do not statistically support the hypothesis of mutual 
dependency. Broadly speaking, a variable y is said to be Granger-caused by x if current and 
ast information on x helps improve the forecast of y (Granger, 1969). 1 Taneja (1981) argued that the variation of market share with frequency share is in fact not 
linear, but is in the form of an S-curve, the location of which depends on the number of 
competitors in the market. From this variation, one can deduce that the airline with the higher 
frequency share attracts more than a proportional share of the traffic. 22 Youssef (1992) showed, when studying the SAS-Swissair alliance, that on the whole the 
alliance had led to an improvement of the quantity of service, with quantity including the 
number of destinations served, the number of city-pair markets served, service frequency, 
and average market service frequency. 
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Figure 6.2 
Comparison of World Air Travel Growth and World Available Seat Km Growth 
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With the aim of examining the tenability of the suggested model of passenger 
traffic, its empirical evaluation for the period 1974-2001 on a world level basis 
was attempted. The econometric results confirm the statistical significance 
and the explanatory power of the two aforementioned exogenous variables. 
More specifically, the combination of RGDPPC and CAP explains more than 
75% of the variability of passenger traffic. Furthermore, the parameters under 
estimation point out that passenger traffic presents greater reaction to the 
changes of economic conjuncture given that passenger traffic increases 
(reduces) by 1.14% for an increase (decrease) of 1.0% of economic activity 
and by 0.69% for an equivalent increase (decrease) of the available seats. 
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Model 1: World Traffic estimation, 1974-200 123 
Traffic growth = 1.137 RGDPPC growth + 0.694 CAP growth 
(2.942*) (6.256*) 
R2=0.6821 
R2 aj .=0.6699 
SEE = 2.1276 
F= 27.89 
Durbin-Watson: 1.7670 
Jarque-Bera normality test: 13.9571 
Ramsey reset test (lag 1): F=1.5310 
White heteroskedasticity test: nR 2=2.1567 
The figures in parentheses are the t statistics 
*Significant at the 1% level 
First order serial autocorrelation in the disturbances and heteroskedasticity hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% level of significance while the overall significance of the regression model 
is accepted at the same level of significance. Further, the model seems to be well specified. 
Finally, one can reject the hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed. 
The intercept was not statistically significant and thus it was ornitted 
In order to capture and neutralize the impact of any exceptional economic or 
political events, which surely affect traffic levels, a dummy variable (D) is 
introduced in the regression model. This Dummy variable takes value one for 
1980-81 (Second oil shock), 1991 (Gulf war) and 2001 (World Trade strike) 
23 The IF test, which constitutes a measure of the overall significance of the estimated 
regression, is also a test for the significance of R2. In other words, testing the null hypothesis 
that all regression coefficients are zero is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that R2 is 
zero: if the F value exceeds the critical F value, the null hypothesis is rejected at the chosen 
level of significance. The Ramsey reset test is a general specification error test (omitted 
variable, incorrect functional forms and correlation between the exogenous variable and the 
disturbance): If the computed F value exceeds the critical F value at the chosen level of 
significance, one can accept the hypothesis that the model is miss-specified. The purpose of 
the White General Heteroskedasticity test is to detect the presence of Heteroskedasticity, 
in which case one can no longer rely on the conventionally computed confidence intervals 
and the conventionally employed t and F tests: if the computed chi-square does not exceed 
the critical chi-square value at the chosen level of significance, the conclusion then is that 
there is no Heteroskedasticity. The Jarque-Bera test of normality is an asymptotic, or large 
sample test, based on OLS residuals: if the computed JB statistic exceeds the critical chi- 
square value at the chosen level of significance, the null hypothesis that the residuals are 
normally distributed can be rejected. 
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and value zero in all the other years. The results below confirm D's high 
importance from a statistical point of view while the various regression 
performance measures, especially F, adjusted R2 and SEE present significant 
improvement. 
Model 11: World Traffic estimation, including dummy variable, 1974-2001 
Traffic growth = 0.964 RGDPPC growth + 0.755 CAP growth - 2.588 D 
(2.716**) (7.342*) (-2.625**) 
R2=0.7508 
R2 aj .=0.7309 
SEE = 1.9211 
F Stat = 25.11 
Durbin-Watson = 1.9608 
Jarque-Bera normality test: 0.8865 
Ramsey reset test (lag 1): F=6.486 
White heteroskedasticity test: nR 2= 17-55 
The figures in parentheses are the t statistics 
*Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 2% level 
First order serial autocorrelation in the disturbances and heteroskedasticity hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% level of significance while the overall significance of the regression model 
is accepted at the same level of significance. Further, the model seems to be well specified 
and the hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed can be accepted. 
The intercept was not statistical significant and thus and thus was omitted 
C. Fares 
Even if they explain an important part of the traffic passenger, the previous 
selected exogenous variables cannot be considered as exhaustive as the 
value of the adjusted R2 indicates. Apart from income and capacity, price is 
another variable that might have a major impact on air travel demand. 
Obviously, air travel prices are expected to have a negative impact, since 
price and demand usually move in opposite directions. If fare goes up, 
demand is expected to fall, and vice versa. Given that low fares, or a limited 
change of fares, are likely to stimulate demand particularly in the leisure 
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market24' it is necessary to include them in the regression model25. Moreover, 
it would be illogical not to ascribe part of the dynamic development of 
passenger traffic during the last 27 years, both to the moderate evolution of 
nominal fares and the downward trend of real fareS26. 
Figure 6.3 
World Traffic and Nominal Yield (1974: 100) 
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The previous studies on the issue of traffic have made use of airline yield as a 
good approximation of fare levels (Morrison and Winston 1990), which 
indicates the passenger revenue per passenger-kilometre, i. e. the ratio 
revenue to passenger-kilometres. 
24 Of course, fares are not expected to influence business and leisure travel in a uniform way. 
Since business travellers do not pay for their own travel, their demand would be relatively 
insensitive to fare changes and their price elasticities would be lower than those of leisure 
travellers. An examination of price elasticities in some studies shows this to be true 
ýStraszheim, 1969). 
5 As a matter of fact, the omitted variable test applied to the model 11, regarding 
2 
the absence 
of real yield, shows that the inclusion of fare growth lead to an increase in the R value since 
its incremental contribution is statistically significant at a 5% percent level of significance 
ýF(1,24)=5.444 with the p value being =2.83%). 
6 67.6% increase and 74.5% decrease as far as the world nominal and real fares are 
concerned comparing with a 282.7% rise in world traffic. 
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Figure 6.4 
World Traffic and Real Yield (1974: 100) 
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The choice of yield instead of fares is due to the various problems arising 
from the use of ABC Guides that constitute the most official and sole 
information source. First, available data are not very reliable in that they do 
not give the actual fares being paid. Indeed, owing to various unofficial 
discounts, the fares paid by consumers differ often widely from the published 
fares. In addition, the fare data are very complex with many different fare 
classes. A second restriction associated with the use of fares is that the 
available guides do not list fares for all destinations. The only fares that are 
consistently listed are those between the major hubs. On the whole, what 
characterizes all routes are the almost non-availability of data, their relative 
unreliability and the ensuing difficult and time-consuming data processing 
required in order to obtain complete and consistent time serieS27. 
2' in many cases, missing values for one or continuous years as well as a great degree of 
inconsistency (non logical annual changes combined with irrational fluctuations) are 
observed. In order to make up for the missing data, provided that these do not concern the 
initial part of a series, forecasting can be used through autoregressive or moving average 
models. On the contrary, the elimination of the non-logical values can be effected through the 
normalization process, that is, through the conversion of the initial series as follows: (xi-p)/a 
where p and and a indicate respectively the mean and the standard deviation of the variable 
X. 
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In any case obviously, yield has to be adjusted for price inflation so as to 
establish the real cost of air travel in relation to other goods or services and to 
assess correctly the role of air travel priceS28. 
Figure 6.5 
Rate of Changes of World Air Travel Growth and World Real Yield 
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As expected, the results show that real yield (RY) growth constitutes a 
statistically important determinant of passenger traffic, even if it exhibits a 
lower degree of significance compared to the other regressors (5% vs. 1% for 
CAP growth and 2% for RGDPPC growth) and correlation coefficient (-20.9% 
versus 76.2% for CAP growth and 67.5% RGDPPC growth). Obviously, its 
introduction strengthens the overall goodness of fit of the regression model 
(77.1% compared with 67.0% and 73.1% for models I and 11) and reduces 
further the standard error of estimate (1.7702 compared with 2.1276 and 
1.9216 for models I and 11)29. 
28 The real yield is defined as the nominal yield in US$ deflated by the World inflation rate in 
US$ (annual average change of rate of consumer price index). OECD inflation rate in US$ 
terms has been preferred since it can be considered as more representative instead of the 
IMF World measure. The latter gives an equal weight to emerging economies inflation and 
therefore tends to overestimate the world inflation rate. 
29 In order to deal with the common problem of spurious relationship and artificially high R2 
when the time series involved exhibits strong trends (sustained upward or downward 
movements), the usual practice is to introduce in the regression model a trend variable T. As 
a result, the effect of trend is removed both from the traffic growth and the selected 
exogenous variables. The obtained regression coefficients are therefore assumed to 
represent the net (or detrend) influence of regressors on passenger rate of change. The 
results seem to confirm the adequacy and the whole explanatory power of the model (and of 
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The income elasticity of demand for international air travel however is lying 
once again under unity, rejecting the findings of Wheatcroft (1994), who 
obtained higher values of approximately 2. 
Both the t test regarding the individual significance of CAP growth and the F 
test concerning the joint significance of all the exogenous variables tend to 
support once again the high explanatory power of the rate of change of 
capacities. The omitted variable test performed shows equally that the 
inclusion of CAP growth in the traffic model is totally justified from a statistical 
point of view since it leads to a significant improvement of the explained sum 
of squareS30. 
each explanatory variable individually), while they indicate that time is not statistical significant 
at any conventional significance level: 
Traffic growth = 0.916 RGDPPC growth + 0.696 CAP growth - 2.389 D-0.211 RY growth 
(2.785**) (6.352*) (-2.416***) (-2.562***) 
- 0.040 T 
(-1.066ns) 
R2 aj. = 0.7727 SEE = 1.7652 F= 18.63 Durbin-Watson = 1.6641 
The problem of spurious or non-sense regression can also occur whenever a non-stationary 
time series is regressed on a non-stationary time series. In that particular case, the usual 
statistical properties of least-squares do not hold and the classical t tests, F tests, etc. are not 
anymore valid. Broadly speaking, a stochastic process is said to be stationary if its mean and 
variance are constant over time, and the value of covariance between two time periods 
depends only on the distance or lag between the two time periods and not on the actual time 
at which covariance is computed. Usually, the Dickey-Fuller (or the augmented Dickey-Fuller) 
unit root test is ran for checking this assumption (Dickey-Fuller, 1979). One of the simplest 
versions of this test is based upon the estimation of the model Ayt =c+PT+ 6yt-, + ut where 
T is the time variable and ut is the stochastic error term that follows the classical assumptions, 
namely, it has zero mean, constant variance a2, and is non-autocorrelated. If 6 is equal to 0, 
the variable y is said to exhibit a unit root and to be a non-stationary time series. The 
performed Dickey-Fuller test shows that in absolute values the T (tau) statistic exceeds its 
McKinnon critical value for rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance for 
the CAP growth (4-986 vs 3.587), the traffic growth (3.860 vs 3.587), the RY growth (4.382 vs 
3.587) and at the 10% level of significance for RGDPPC growth (3.256 vs 3.228), which is 
another way of saying that the above time series do not exhibit unit root and are therefore 
stationary. 
30 F(1,24)=40.216 with the p value being 0.00 in the case of model 11 and F(1,26)=39.144 with 
the p value being 0.00 in the case of model 1. 
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Model III: World Traffic estimation, including yield, 1974-2001 
Traffic growth = 0.888 RGDPPC growth + 0.657 CAP growth - 2.801 D 
(2.701 **) (6.342*) (-3.067*) 
- 0.168 RY growth 
(-2.333***) 
R2=0.7969 
R2 aj . 0.7714 
SEE 1.7702 
F= 23.54 
Durbin-Watson = 1.6258 
Jarque-Bera normality test: 1.3792 
Ramsey reset test (lag 1): F=5.2727 
White heteroskedasticity test: nR 
2= 14.1602 
Chow test (break point 1983): F=2.5347 
The figures in parentheses are the t statistics 
*Significant at the 1% level 
"Significant at the 2% level 
*** Significant at the 5% level 
First order serial autocorrelation in the disturbances and heteroskedasticity hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% level of significance while the overall significance of the regression model 
is accepted at the same level of significance. Further, the model seems to be well specified 
and the hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed can be accepted. 
The intercept was not statistical significant and thus it was omitted 
A more detailed analysis indicates that the significance of fares as is reflected 
in the Passenger Revenue per Passenger Kilometre is not granted, as it 
changes from period to period. That is the reason why the estimation over the 
period 1982-2001 seems to suggest that RY growth is no more statistically 
significant. The latter cannot however lead to the conclusion that the structural 
stability of the model has to be rejected. As a matter of fact, the Chow test 
with 1982 as breakpoint year - which incidentally constitutes the beginning of 
the period of the econometric analysis on the individual routes - indicates that 
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the hypothesis of structural stability cannot be rejected at the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance (F(4,20)=2.581 with the p value being 0.0686)31. 
Figure 6.6 
Fitted and Actual World Traffic Rate of Change 
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Finally, one must indicate that, as in the case of capacity, fares are 
considered as alliance factors, given that alliance formation tends to affect 
them as both the empirical survey included in the present thesis and all 
32 
previous empirical studies conducted on the same issue conclude . 
Consequently, the employment of fares as well as that of capacity/frequency 
should be effected in a particularly careful way so as to avoid any miss 
31 The Chow test is used to check the structural stability of a regression over the entire 
observation period. More precisely, it tries to determine if there is any significant statistical 
difference in the estimated regression coefficient for any two sub-periods (1 974-t., and t-2001 
where t indicates the breakpoint year). If the F computed value exceeds the critical value at 
the chosen level of significance, the hypothesis that the regressions are the same for the two 
sub-periods is rejected, that is, no structural change in the traffic function has occurred over 
the two sub-periods. 
32 A brief review of the available empirical surveys shows that any improvement in terms of 
load factor and general productivity levels has, for the most part, been accompanied by fares 
reduction of similar magnitude and not by monopoly profits/higher fares (Bruekner and Whale, 
2000; Ourn et al, 2000), excluding the cases of parallel alliances (Park, 1997). On the other 
hand, Youssef's (1992) study finds a significant difference between the fare changes in 
alliance and non-alliance city pairs and shows that alliance markets experienced a 1.5% fare 
increase over non-alliance markets. 
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evaluations and erroneous conclusions in relation to the impact of alliances on 
traffi C33,34. 
Model 111: 1982-2001 Ordina! y Least Squares estimations 
Traffic growth = 0.6844 RGDPPC growth + 0.6860 CAP growth 
(2.125***) (5.840*) 
- 1.3053 D-0.1089 RY growth 
(-1.195ns) (-1.098ns) 
R2=0.8204 
R2 aj .=0.7845 
SEE = 1.3687 
F Stat = 27.41 
Durbin-Watson = 1.8206 
White heteroskedasticity test: nR 2=4.3743 
The figures in parentheses are the t statistics 
*Significant at the 1% level 
***Significant at the 5% level 
ns: non significant at the conventionally level of significance 
First order serial autocorrelation in the disturbances and heteroskedasticity hypothesis can be 
rejected at the 1% level of significance while the overall significance of the regression model 
is accepted at the same level of significance 
The intercept was not statistically significant and thus was omitted 
33 A complete and correct approach presupposes the use of the rectangularisation method, 
which requires the evaluation of two additional models, one for fares and one for capacity, 
and the subsequent introduction of their residuals in the multivariable model of the passenger 
traffic. 
34 Bissessur (1996) has opted for the inclusion of fares among alliance factors considering 
that fares depend exclusively on the alliance factor. This choice is not totally satisfactory since 
it omitted many equally important explicative factors of fares, such as inflationary pressures, 
fuel prices, any productivity increase not due to the alliance, changes in competition and cost 
saving, etc. 
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D. Conclusion 
Based on the above conclusions, the third regression model seems to be the 
most appropriate in order to explain world traffic variability. And that will be 
the one, which will inspire the regression model used in the attempt to model 
and evaluate the impact of alliances at a route level35. 
Of course, traffic for any given route tends to arise from the complex 
interaction of a much larger set of factors that affect the different market 
segments differentially. Two main categories of factors can be distinguished 
(Doganis, 2002). The first one includes those factors affecting all markets and 
the second one the factors affecting only particular routes but may be totally 
absent on others. 
Table 6.2 
Factors affecting passenger traffic 
Factors affecting all markets Factors affecting particular routes 
Level of personal disposable income 
Level of tourist attraction: 
Scenic/ climatic/ historical/ religious Supply conditions: attributes Fare levels Adequacy of tourist infrastructure Speed of air travel Comparative prices Convenience of air travel Exchange rate fluctuations 
Level of economic activity/trade Travel restrictions 
population size and growth rate Historical/ cultural links 
Social environment: Earlier population movements Length of paid holidays Current labour flows 
Attitudes to travel Nature of economic activity 
Source. - Doganis (2002) 
Section 6.3 Identification and measurement methodology of 
alliance impact 
The methodology used in order to measure the alliance impact relies on a 
time series estimation of a traffic regression model, which includes among the 
explanatory factors, RGDPPC, CAP, D and RY. It is mainly based on the 
comparison of traffic variation induced by non-alliance factors, i. e. RGDPPC, 
and observed traffic variation during the post alliance period. 
35 In developing a model for empirical analysis, one should pay attention to the appropriate 
theory underlying the phenomenon under study so that all theoretically relevant variables are 
included in the model. If such relevant variables are excluded, the model is "underfitted" or 
underspecified", and therefore any hypothesis testing conclusions are of dubious value. 
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The goal is to provide an econometric support to the qualitative and 
quantitative conclusion drawn by the survey, which has shown that global 
strategic alliances tend to influence positively passenger traffic. 
6.3.1 Model Specification 
Consider the following multiplicative traffic model: 
PASSijt =A RGDPPCjt 
b CAPjjt c RY, jt 
d1 o(eD) (2) 
where PASSjjt = Passenger Traffic for the airline pair i, route j and 
year t 
RGDPPCjt = Real GDP per Capita of the origin country for the 
route j and year t expressed in local currenCY36 
CAPjjt = Capacity for the airline pair i, route j and 
year t 
RYijt = Real yield for pair i, route j and year t. As a proxy of real 
yield, the US$ world nominal yield converted in local currency 
and deflated by national inflation rate is chosen, local and 
national referring to the origin country37 . The US$ denominated 
world Passenger Revenue per Passenger Kilometre is used as a 
measure of nominal yield 38 
D=A dummy variable which takes value one for 1980-81 
(Second oil shock), 1991 (Gulf war) and 2001 (World Trade 
strike) and value zero in all the other years 
The previous relation may alternatively be expressed as: 
LogPASSijt =a+b LogRGDPPCjt +c LogCAPijt +d LogRYjjt +eD (3) 
36 As far as the hub-hub and the hub-non hub routes are concerned, one might argue that an alternative 
formulation of economic growth should have been tried in order to deal with the problem of connecting 
passengers. This phenomenon is of particular importance in the case of European hubs. The reason is 
that they tend to attract passengers from other European countries for intra and extra continental trips 
(especially the most active ones such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London, Madrid and Paris), and as a 
result, the traffic observed might not entirely depend on the domestic economic situation given the high 
proportion of connecting passengers. In that case, it could be stressed that it would be most appropriate 
to include a Pan-European GDP measure instead of a country one. Given the high correlation between 
each single country's economic activity and the Pan-European one (exceeding 70%), apart from the UK 
and the Scandinavian countries ex Sweden, but also the fact that European hubs serve mainly a 
domestic originating clientele and constitute very often the final destination, the choice of a domestic 
income measure seems to fit better. 
37 On the contrary, Bissessur (1996) has opted for a slightly modified measure of RY, defining 
it as the ratio of total revenue of the airline pair i to total RPK of the pair i in year t expressed 
in US$. 
38 It is acknowledged that the use of a global measure of nominal yield could lead to a mis- 
estimation of the price variable impact and as such increase the chances of finding a non- 
significant price impact. 
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where Log( ): log to the base 10 
a= LogA 
6.3.2 Isolation of the alliance impact by separating alliance and non- 
alliance effects 
Given that traffic is explained by alliance and non-alliance factors, alliance 
impact can be deducted by neutralizing the influence of the latter. In other 
words, the evaluation of the alliance impact relies on the isolation of the 
RGDPPC effect, and therefore, on the comparison of observed traffic variation 
and traffic variation induced by RGDPPC during the post alliance period. It is 
best described with reference to Figure 6.7, which considers for simplicity 
reasons that traffic varies only with RGDPPC. 
Figure 6.7 
Isolation of alliance impact 
Pre alliance Period Post Alliance Period 
Passenger traffic 
Actual traffic 
increase 
Alliance effect 
............ 
.............................. ........... 
................................. 
........... 
GDP-induced 
traffic increase 
Alliance Formation Time 
Source: Bissessur (1996) 
Suppose that passenger traffic is a function of RGDPPC according to the 
equation below: 
LogPASSt =a+b LogRGDPPCt (4) 
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It follows that parameter b represents the elasticity of traffic with respect to 
RGDPPC, given the fact that the endogenous and the exogenous variables 
are expressed in logarithmic terms: 
PASS t- PASS t-, 
PASSt-j 
RGDPPCt - RGDPPC t-, 
RGDPPCt-, 
(5) 
In the particular case of an autoregressive traffic regression model, that is one 
where the lagged value of the dependent variable appears as an explanatory 
variable on the right-hand side of the equation, b represents just the RGDPPC 
short term impact on traffic. Its long term or total impact is then given b Y39: 
bLT ": 
b 
(6) (1 -estimated coefficient of PASSt-1) 
Considering that the percentage variation in RGDPPC from alliance formation 
(t) to post alliance period (t+) is g%, it follows that the induced by RGDPPC 
passenger traffic change will be bg% (or bLT9%)- If the observed percentage 
traffic variation during the given period is k%, then the percentage change in 
traffic brought about by the alliance formation can be approximated by 
(k-bg)% (or (k-bLT9)%). An approximate value of the absolute change in traffic 
that results from the alliance formation is then given by r((k-bg)/100) 
(or r((k-bL'rg)/l 00) where r indicates the passenger traffic level at (t). 
Given that the airlines have mentioned in the previous survey and interviews 
that any given impact on traffic is generally observed quite immediately i. e. in 
the next two years after their adherence to the alliance, t+ is set arbitrarily to 
t+2 and k% is equal to: 
PASSt+2 - PASSt 
PASSt 
(7) 
One of the main weaknesses of this methodology is that it assumes that the 
alliance impact is equal to the observed variation in traffic volume, i. e. k%, 
39 The same applies obviously for capacity and fare variables. 
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whenever the RGDPPC is found to be non-significant (b=O). The reason is 
that RY and CAP are considered as alliance factors while RGDPPC is a non- 
alliance factor. This can lead to misestimating of the alliance impact on 
passenger traffic insofar as fares and capacity do not depend exclusively on 
alliance strategies given that they are obviously influenced by a set of other 
factors independent of alliance formation 40 . 
6.3.3 The alliance formation date 
In order to proceed to the econometric evaluation of the alliance impact, one 
has to define the alliance formation date. Four alternatives can be suggested: 
a. The official alliance creation date 
b. The date each partner joined his respective alliance 
c. The date the two partners signed their first bilateral agreement whether 
the latter covers the whole route network or not 
d. The date the agreement was extended to the route under 
consideration. 
As is obvious, the first one has to be rejected insofar as many airlines joined 
their respective alliance once the latter was created. The same applies for the 
second alternative given the fact that to be a member of any alliance doesn't 
mean necessarily that cooperation between the new member and the old 
ones existed. For these reasons, the last two definitions of alliance date 
formation seem more reliable. 
By using the third definition, it is possible to determine whether the conclusion 
of a cooperation agreement between two members of an alliance can be 
beneficial in terms of traffic for both of them. By using the fourth definition on 
the contrary, one is able to see whether the outcome of the alliance 
membership for any given airline on a specific route depends on the existence 
of a bilateral agreement on that route. 
40 A fare and capacity model should have been estimated in order to quantify exactly the 
impact of an alliance on these variables, i. e. which part of their changes during the post 
alliance period is due to the alliance and which are not. Let us assume that (p and w indicate 
respectively the part of the variation of fare and capacity which is not due to an alliance, then 
the alliance impact is equal to (k-bg-(pdf-wcv)% when b*0 or (k-9df-U)cv)% when b=0, 
where f0/6 and v% represents respectively the variation of fares and capacity over the t+2 and 
t period. The approach used above supposes explicitly that (p and w are zero. it can be shown 
there is overestimation of the alliance impact on traffic whenever ((Pdf)% > -(wcv)% and 
underestimation whenever ((pdf)% < -(wcv)%. 
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6.3.4 Estimation method and data 
As follows from the previous discussion, the semi-log statistical model is: 
LogPASSijt =a+b LogRGDPPCjt +c LogCAPijt +d LogRYjt +eD+ uijt (8) 
Uijt is a random error term introduced in order to capture, on the one hand, the 
combined effect of all other unobserved influences on passenger traffic other 
than the influence of included exogenous variables, and on the other hand, 
any approximation error that arises because the functional form assumed may 
be only an approximation of reality. The disturbances are assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, and to be serially 
non-correlated. 
A. Ordinary Least Squares 
The parameters will be determined by time-series linear regression using 
Ordinary Least Squares unless the detection of heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation or both, require the use of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
in order to obtain efficient estimators and to make the usual hypothesis-testing 
procedure valid. In the first case, the White's heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance, matrix is chosen in order to produce consistent coefficient's 
standard errors. In the second, the estimated Generalized Least-Squares 
(EGLS) is required 41 but one can also simply introduce the one-period lagged 
dependent variable among the explanatory variableS42. 
The time span is the pre alliance period (1982 to t). The main problem is that 
the pre alliance period is often quite short to allow consistent econometric 
results. This is especially true in the case of partnerships that began in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. 
41 yt =c+b xt + put-, + Et or (yt - pyt-1) = c(l -p) +b (xt - pxt-1) + F-t since the disturbances are 
supposed to follow a first order autoregressive process AR(l) error model Ut = PUt-1 + Et where 
Et is independent and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance and serially 
not correlated. 
42 Serial Correlation in the errors may be the evidence of specification errors such as an 
excessively restrictive specification. Sometimes, adding improperly excluded variables to the 
regression can eliminate the serial correlation (Rao and Griliches, 1969). It can also be the 
sign of the phenomenon of spurious (non-sense) regression. As Granger and Newbold (1974) 
have suggested an R2> DW is a good rule of thumb to suspect that the estimated regression 
is of dubious value, that is, involving economic time series that "look good" in the sense of 
having high goodness of fit and significant t-statistics, but which, in fact, have no real 
meaning. This outcome can occur when a non-stationary time series is regressed on another 
one or when time series involved exhibit strong trends (see footnote 19). 
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The main tests used in order to assess the quality of the estimation are the 
adjusted R2 statistics which gives a measure of the goodness of fit and the F 
statistics which constitutes a measure of overall significance of the estimated 
regression (joint test that all the regression coefficients are zero). 
Furthermore, some additional tests will be used in order to check whether 
some important assumptions of the classical linear regression model are 
fulfilled in order to obtain BLUE estimators (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators). 
More specifically, the hypothesis that disturbances are homoscedastic (White 
test) and uncorrelated (Durbin-Watson test) has to be controlled for43 . 
In the 
particular case where the lagged dependent variable will appear among the 
exogenous variables, the h-Durbin test has to be used in order to test the 
error serial autocorrelation of order one". 
In all cases, the e-Views software package is used in parallel with SPSS. The 
latter has been chosen in order to proceed to step-wise regression which aims 
to determine the most significant of all the explanatory variableS45. 
B. Data 
The passenger and capacity data have been obtained by the series "Traffic by 
flight stage" published by ICA046. In particular cases of missing data, such 
43 Running standard OLS, and using classical testing procedures, despite heteroscedastic 
and serial correlated error terms, Gan lead to very misleading inferences. As a result, it is no 
longer possible to rely on the conventionally computed confidence intervals and 
conventionally employed t and F tests since the estimators are no longer efficient (minimum 
variance). 
44 The Durbin-Watson d statistic should not be used to detect (first order) serial 
autocorrelation in autoregressive models, because the computed value in such models 
generally tends towards 2, which is the value of d expected in the absence of AR(1) error 
process. Hence, there is a built-in bias against discovering (first order) serial autocorrelation. 
For that reason, Durbin (1970) himself has proposed a large sample and alternative test of 
first order serial correlation in autoregressive models, called the h statistic. The latter is 
defined as follows: h= p* [n/(l-nvar(a*))] 1/2 where n represents the sample size, var(a*) the 
variance of the coefficient of the lagged independent variable, p* the estimate of the first order 
serial correlation p and is given by p* =1- 1/2 d. The decision rule is then: 
i) If h>1.96 one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no positive first order 
autocorrelation at the 5% significance level 
ii) If h< -1.96 one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no negative first order 
autocorrelation at the 5% significance level, but 
iii) If h lies between -1.96 and 1.96, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no first 
order (negative or positive) autocorrelation at the 5% significance level. 
45 The stepwise regression method involves the sequential computation of a series of 
regression equations. At each step, an independent variable is added to the equation and 
others removed until the explanatory power of the equation does not improve significantly. 
The criterion of entering and removing an independent variable in the SPSS software 
package is based on the F statistic. Independent variables producing F values less than 1.0 
are removed and those with F values exceeding 1.5 are entered into the equation. 
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data have been obtained directly from the airlines (Air Canada year 1997) and 
the US DOT (KLM-Northwest Airlines years 1999-2001, American Airlines- 
Finnair years 1996-1997, Aeromexico- Delta Air Lines year 2000, Air France- 
Delta Air Lines year 1997 and SAS-United Airlines year 1991). Due to the fact 
that the US DOT does not publish data on a one-way basis but on a round trip 
basis, data for any specific year, for which data are missing, have to be split 
based on each one-way route's past average percentage of total traffic47: 
For five additional routes, data regarding traffic and capacity were not 
available for some specific yearS48 . Theoretically, the most adequate way to 
deal with this problem is the estimation of an autoregressive, or/and moving 
average model, over the period preceding the year for which data is missing, 
and then forecasting. This solution could not be applied for three reasons. 
First, the estimation period is too short, lower than 10 years in all cases. 
Second, the first observations present low levels of traffic because of the 
young existence of the given routes, a fact that tends to underestimate 
forecasted data. Third, the time series data considered has to be stationary. 
Therefore, an alternative method has been preferred: 
Yajt = Ybjt (Yaj / Ybj) (7) 
where Yajt and Ybjt represent data for airlines a and b, on route j and in 
year t regarding variable Y. t represents the year for which data 
is not available and Y,, jt the missing data 
Yaj ý Yajt-I + Yajt., and Ybj = Ybjt-l + Ybjt+l 
Whatever method is followed, one has to keep in mind that the estimation of 
non-available data tends to exacerbate the problem of measurement error, a 
phenomenon frequently met in econometrics. 
46 ICAO traffic data cannot be considered as the most accurate since they tend to present 
some substantial and unexplained errors. For example, information about passengers carried 
does not often match with flight frequency and airplane capacity. However, ICAO is the only 
available source and the airlines themselves refer to it for comparison reasons. 
47 That was the case of New York-Mexico-New York (Aeromexico-2000), Paris-New York- 
Paris (Air France-1997), Amsterdam-Chicago-Amsterdam (KLM-1999/2000), Amsterdam-Los 
Angeles-Amsterdam (KLM-1999/2000), Amsterdam-New York-Amsterdam (KLM-1999/2000), 
New York-Helsinki-New York (Finnair-1996/1997), Paris-Chicago-Paris (Air France-1997), 
Miami-Mexico-Miami (Aeromexico-2000) and Merida-Miami-Merida (Aeromexico-2000). 
48 London-Madrid for 1986 and Iberia, Fran kfu rt-Stockholm for 1991 and SAS, Copenhagen- 
Frankfurt for 1991 and SAS, Bangkok-Copenhagen for 1991 and SAS and Copenhagen- 
Bangkok for 1991 and SAS. 
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Real GDP per capita was available from the International Monetary Fund 
World Economic Outlook Database. All GDP series are expressed in local 
currency. 
The US$ denominated world Passenger Revenue per Passenger Kilometre is 
given by ICAO Financial Data Commercial Airlines. Regarding national 
inflation rates (Consumer Prices Index change of rate), data are obtained from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook Database 49,50 . Regarding both national 
inflation rates and cross-currency exchange rates, annual average measures 
instead of year-end measure are used. 
C. Observation period 
The time span is covering the period beginning in 1982 and ending the year of 
alliance formation 51 . 
Of course, there are some cases of routes for which the 
observation period will begin after 1982 because of data non-availability. One 
can indicate for example SkyTeam for which data are available since 1985. 
As far as date formation is concerned the fourth option has been selected. 
Whenever, the cooperation agreement has taken place in the first semester of 
year t, year t is considered as the alliance formation date. In the contrary 
case, the t+1 year is supposed to be the alliance formation date. 
D. Sample 
124 routes compose the sample under examination. They include hub-hub, 
hub-non hub and non hub-non hub routes served by airlines, which are 
members of the major four global airline alliances, i. e. "Wings", Star Alliance, 
oneworld and SkyTeam. 
49 As far as the Swedish inflation rate is concerned, data from Statistika Centralbyran has 
been used in order to correct some anomalies detected in the IMF series. 
50 The only exception was the Brazilian currency for which data were obtained from the 
National Central Bank (Banco Centrale do Brazil). In that particular case, one has to mention 
that, due to multiple devaluations, the national currency has changed six times in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Cruzeiro 1970, Cruzado 1986, Cruzado Novo 1989, Cruzeiro 1990, 
Cruzeiro Real 1993 and Real 1994). Therefore, additional computation was needed in order 
to construct a single and homogeneous exchange rate data time series. 
51 Digest of Statistics on the Traffic by Flight Stage Series arranged by flight stage are 
available since 1969, but for the pre-1982 period, data have been only published for the four 
selected months of March, June, September and December. Series containing aggregate 
annual data are only available since 1982. That is the major reason why the observation 
period began in 1982. 
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Only routes with consistent and sufficient data are included in the analysis 
given that the aim of the data collection process was to minimize potential 
sources of measurement error bias, which could affect the econometric results 
and lead to misspecification problems. In any case, special attention has been 
given to the selection of routes so as to retain the representative character of 
the sample regarding the degree of cooperation and the type of routes for 
each global strategic alliance. 
Table 6.3 
Number of selected routes by alliance and type of routes 
Hub-Hub 
Hub- 
Non Hub 
Non Hub- 
Non Hub 
Total 
0 10 0 10 
"Wings" 
(0) (1,22Z 255) (0) (1,222,255) 
........... - ............. .... Star Alliance ...... ........... ................... .... 44 ....... ....... 46 ... . ........................................... . ...... - 2 .................... ............ 92 
...................... ............ I. 
(8,240,293) 
........................... .................................... ..... 
(4,568,748) 
.............. ..... . . 
(91,796) (12,900,837) 
oneworld 
4 . .. . .............. ....... .............. 4 - ................ I ............... - 0 ........................ .............. ............. 8 
.................... .................................... 
(1,409,335) 
...... ................................. I ............................. 
(316,727) (0) (1,726,062) 
SkyTearn 6 ................... ................ 6 ........ ............. ............ ........... 2 ............ ........... . ...... 14 
(1,697,388) (663,506) (51,416) (2,412,310) 
Total 
54 66 4 124 
(11,347,016) (6,771,236) (143,212) (18,261,464) 
() passengers carried in 2001 
As it becomes clear from table 6.3, the sample is mainly dominated by hub- 
hub and hub-non hub routes, which represent 96.8% of the total number of 
routes analysed (43.6% and 53.2% respectively) and 99.2% of the total 
passengers carried during the year 2001 (62.1% and 37.1% respectively). 
Moreover, Star Alliance tends to be ove r-rep resented, while the other three 
major alliances are under-rep resented compared to their respective weights in 
the total traffic of the four global strategic alliances taken together. This fact is 
related mostly to: 
" the belated entry of certain airlines in a given alliance. 
" the late start date of cooperation between two airlines within a given 
alliance. 
" the late start of some flights which began during the 2000's. 
" the availability of relevant data. 
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Figure 6.8 
Definition of different types of O-D routes 
Hub-non hub 
Hub-beyond point 
non hub-non hub 
hub-hub routes (1), hub-non hub routes (2) and non hub- 
non-hub routes (3) 
Table 6.4 
Traffic weight of each Global strategic alliance (2001) 
In respect to the total In respect to the overall traffic of 
traffic sampled the 4 strategic alliances 
"Wings" 6.7% 9.4% 
..... ...... -- -- ... ......... ................ ...... . ... ... ........ ---------- - ........... ....... Star Alliance 70.7% 37.6% 
- .... . ..... .... ............. --. - ............ - .............. . ......... ........ . .......... ...... ....... ......... oneworld 9.5% 25.9% 
-.. 1. ... " . -. 1- - ....... . .... . .......... . ......... ...... ......... ............ --.......... . ........ . ... . .... .... . ............ SkyTeam 13.2% 27.9% 
Section 6.4 Econometric evaluation of the alliance impact on 
passenger traffic 
The econometric results tend to indicate that strategic alliances lead on 
average to a clear improvement in passenger traffic. In this regard, the 
conclusions of the survey and interviews conducted are confirmed. 
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6.4.1 Results 
The results of the linear regression are given in Appendix F. Overall, the 
models are very satisfactory, all having high goodness of fit and consequently 
high explanatory powers, apart from for some routes. As a matter of fact, the 
explained variance of passenger traffic represents more than 90% of total 
variance in 69.2% of the cases, while it exceeds the 70% level in 93.1 % of the 
cases. Although, the stepwise regression method was used in order to obtain 
the best specification, i. e. that which includes the most significant set of 
exogenous variables and guarantees the highest goodness of fit, significant 
results couldn't be achieved for 9 routes. That was the particular case of 
Madrid-New York (63.5%), New York-Madrid (56.9%), Stockholm-Hamburg 
(69.1%), Hamburg-Stockholm (61.7%), Oslo-Hamburg (28.5%), Copenhagen- 
DUsseldorf (47.4%), San Francisco-Guadalajara (67.5%), New York- 
Amsterdam (64.8%) and Atlanta-Amsterdam (59.6%) for which the adjusted 
multiple coefficient of determination does not exceed 60%. One probable 
explanation for the low explanation of these models could be the short 
observation period and the small number of data points upon which the 
regressions were based (except for Madrid-New York-Madrid). In any case, 
one can conclude that for those routes the selected set of explicative variables 
cannot be considered as a major and significant determinant of passenger 
traffic. 
Further, the models also have high F-statistics ascertaining their validity and 
the significance of retained exogenous variables, at least for 96 routes. 
Independent Variables have all high t-statistics implying that the probability of 
them actually being zero is null at the 5% significance level. On the other 
hand, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that serial autocorrelation of 1st 
order of the disturbance was a quite serious problem for 68 routes. So a 
correction has been necessary, whether by introducing in 24 cases the lagged 
dependant variable (PASSt-1) or by estimating a EGLS in 44 cases supposing 
that the errors follow an AR(1) or an AR(2) proceSS52. 
In all cases, the heteroskedasticity was not a major problem, but whenever it 
was detected it was automatically corrected by the White method, namely by 
the estimation of a consistent covariance matrix. 
As expected, the CAP has been revealed as the most important factor in 
explaining the variation in passenger numbers, since it appears in the majority 
of the models (97.6% i. e. 121 routes) and exhibits a high degree of statistical 
52 AR(l): ut = plut-I + Et and AR(2) -. Ut = PlUt-1 + PA-2 + F-t or ut = PA-2 + Et where p, and P2 
indicates the autoregressive parameters (or autocorrelation coefficient). 
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significance 53,54 , while the RGDPPC seems to have a more reduced impact 
being significant in almost half of the cases (46.8% i. e. 58 routes). That tends 
to indicate that these markets have not yet reach maturity. These routes tend 
to include mostly non North-American originating routes. As a matter of fact, 
RGDPPC is not significant for US and Canadian originating routes. The short 
term elasticity of traffic to RGDPPC lies in a wide range from 0.16 (Bangkok- 
Copenhagen) to 3.72 (Los Angeles-Frankfurt), while it varies between 0.5 and 
2.0 in 69.4% of the routes (71.8% when one takes into account as well the 
long term elasticity). These values are satisfactory considering that Bissessur 
(1996) obtained a similar range of values, but it exceeds the value obtained 
previously for the income elasticity of demand for international air travel traffic 
(0.9 to 1.1). Finally, one can conclude that for 53.2% of the selected routes 
the alliance impact is equal to the traffic variation observed during the post 
alliance period given that the methodology used supposed that whenever 
RGDPPC is found to be non-significant, traffic variation induced by RGDPPC 
is null. 
As indicated above, the capacity provided by the alliances is present in nearly 
all the models. This tends to demonstrate that any change in capacity by an 
alliance is very likely to affect the traffic it carries and therefore the network 
economies, which might result. In one third of the cases, the coefficient is less 
than unity which means that any change in alliance capacity results in a lower 
than proportional increase in traffic. 
As far as the real yield is concerned, the results were quite disappointing 
given that the price variable does not appear in many regressions. It seems to 
influence significantly the passenger traffic for only 14 routes (11.3% of the 
total routes). This contradicts the previous finding which pointed out a 
negative and statistically significant price elasticity of demand for international 
passenger traffic. One possible reason is that the price variable retained is a 
global one, i. e. one which measures the world trend of fares. Even if fares 
listed in the ABC World Airways Guide would have been used, there would be 
a lot of chances that the same problem would have appeared as Bissessur 
(1996) has pointed out since these fares are not the actual fares which 
passengers are required to pay owing to the widespread practice of 
discounting. Regarding the hub-hub routes, one additional reason is that often 
they do no represent the passengers final destination but an intermediary 
53 This result is in line with the strong correlation found between traffic and capacity on the 
route level since the correlation coefficient exceeds 80.0% for 87.9% of the routes 
considered. 
' One should indicate that the Granger causality test performed on the route level does not 
support, as was the case on the world level, the hypothesis of a two-way relationship between 
CAP and PASS revealing that passenger traffic does not Granger-cause capacity. 
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point to their final destination. In that case, the fares paid are those of the 
origin country and not those of the hub country. That is certainly valid also for 
the hub-non hub routes but not for the non hub-non hub routes. 
The coefficient for the dummy introduced in order to capture and neutralize 
the consequences of war or/and recession have the expected negative sign in 
all the models where it appears (38 routes, i. e. 30.6%). On average, the 
coefficient lies between -0.012 and -0.098. This means that adverse events 
had reduced traffic by 2.7% to 27.2%55. 
6.4.2 Alliance impact: Removal of GDP effects 
As was stated earlier, the alliance impact is given by the traffic variation 
observed during the post alliance period, which cannot be attributed to non- 
alliance factors. So it is necessary to remove the RGDPPC effect in order to 
obtain this impact at least for those routes, which are affected by RGDPPC. In 
a total of 124 routes, 58 were affected by both alliance and non-alliance 
factors (GDP). For the rest, one can conclude that the change in traffic is 
mainly due to alliance strategies. Appendix G gives the estimated alliance 
impact for the whole set of routeS56, while table 6.5 presents the results for 
each global strategic alliance separately. 
A. Global impact 
All in all the impact of global strategic alliances is on average significant and 
positive. The computation gives an estimated passenger increase of 9.7% 
which implies an additional traffic of 1.5 millions. The main part of this effect 
appears however by the second year of the alliance formation since in the first 
one the traffic increase is just 2.5% compared with 7.0% for the second (table 
6.6). 
55 Using the device of Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), one can obtain the relative change in 
mean traffic even for dummies variables by taking the antilog (base 10) of the estimated 
coefficient and subtract 1 from it. 56 The RGDPPC effect to remove, and therefore the estimated alliance impact, are computed 
using the long term elasticity of traffic in respect to RGDPPC whenever the one-period lagged 
dependent variable is included among the explanatory variables. 
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Table 6.5 
Alliance impact for each global strategic alliance 
Alliance Additional Traffic (vol. ) Traffic increase 
SkyTearn 250,614 12.2% 
....... .... ........... -1 .......... ... oneworld -42,202 . ..... . ... .............. -2.3% 
- ................. ................................................... ... Star Alliance ............. . ... ......... . ............... .......... ......... .............. ............. .. 1,282,190 ......... 11.7% 
.... ........ -.. - ....... .... ..... ..... - ........ ..... .. "Wings" ................ ............. .... .......... .......... .... .... ... 43,327 ......... . ........... 4.7% 
Total 1,533,929 9.7% 
Table 6.6 
Traffic impact during the post alliance period 
Alliance 1 st year effect 2nd year effect 
SkyTearn -2.3% 14.7% 
- ............. - ........................ . .... oneworld ...................... ... ....... -. -- ......... 2.7% . ..... . ..... . ...... -4.8% 
I ...... ....... ..... -- -- .................... . Star Alliance - ----- . ...... ...... . ... . .............................. .. 3.9% . ....... 7.6% 
I ........... ................ .-........ ............... "Wings" ....... . ... .. I-- ........... . -3.0% 
------- 7.9% 
Total 2.5% 7.0% 
B. Impact by global strategic alliance 
Two of the strategic alliances considered, i. e. Star Alliance and SkyTeam, 
present a traffic increase due to alliance formation which exceeds the average 
observed: 11 . 7% and 12.1 
% respectively. 
The results are quite different for the two other alliances. "Wings" presents a 
half lower rise than the average estimated (i. e. 4.7%), while oneworld a 
substantial decrease (i. e. A. 8%). The lower impact as far as the former 
alliance is concerned can be explained by the fact that the given strategic 
alliance is only constituted of two airlines, which cover mainly the transatlantic 
area, and also by the fact that the sample is exclusively composed of hub-non 
hub routes since the hub-hub routes (Amsterdam-Detroit, Amsterdam- 
Minneapolis and Amsterdam-Memphis) began with the alliance formation 
(1993). One can indicate the positive impact found in the case of "Wings" hub- 
non hub routes which shows that the strategic alliance has positive benefits 
for the entire flight network, and not only for hub-hub routes, and that the 
existence of antitrust immunity acts in that way. The negative impact as far as 
oneworld is concerned is due to several reasons. One can say that two of the 
major members, American Airlines and British Airways, didn't manage to 
extend their cooperation as they would have wished, due to the non-approval 
by the US DOT of antitrust immunity for anticompetitive reasons. This has 
excluded the possibility of any code shares regarding the transatlantic routes 
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and between US and European hubs. Besides, the two mentioned airlines 
start to develop quite late code share practices in behind-beyond flights. 
These facts have obviously affected equally the other alliance members, since 
American Airlines and British Airways constitute the main alliance decision 
makers, and more especially Iberia in which the two airlines have a 10% 
stake. 
On the opposite side, the high alliance impact for Star Alliance seems to be 
due the existence of an extended network in which 17 airlines participate 
(October 2003), and to the antitrust immunity of the two core members of the 
alliance (Lufthansa and United Airlines). The same seems to be valid in the 
case of SkyTeam since it presents an extended and complementary network 
due to: i) the worldwide geographical coverage which Air France and Delta Air 
Lines, the core members, offer, ii) the existence of two of the most efficient 
hubs (in Europe and in United States) in terms of traffic and connections 
provided (Charles de Gaulle and Atlanta), and iii) the tighter cooperation due 
to the change in 1998 in the bilateral agreement between France and the USA 
(more flights connecting the two countries have been permitted). 
C. Impact during the post alliance period 
As the table 6.5 indicates, a more in depth analysis of the alliance impact 
period reveals that the alliance had led to a reduction of traffic for both 
SkyTeam and "Wings" during the 1st year of the post alliance period. This 
negative impact is apparently due to the fact that the selected routes sampled 
cover airlines which can be characterized as founding members: Air France, 
Delta Air Lines and Aeromexico as far as SkyTeam is concerned; KLM and 
Northwest Airlines as far as "Wings" is concerned. This tends to show that the 
alliance needs time in order to produce any positive benefits in terms of higher 
traffic. Further, Air France and Delta Air Lines used to cooperate with other 
airlines before the alliance formation. For example, Delta Air Lines was a 
member of Atlantic Excellence having a partnership with Swissair. So time 
was certainly needed in order to overcome the change of partner, but also in 
order to achieve network harmonization, to transfer Delta Air Lines European 
hub activities from Zurich to Paris, and for Delta Air Lines passengers to get 
familiarized with new partnerships. Additionally, it is commonly acknowledged 
that any strategic alliance needs more time to produce positive results than a 
simple type of cooperation. 
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As far as "Wings" is concerned, this might be due to Northwest Airlines bad 
financial situation in that particular period and to the exclusive analysis of hub- 
non hub routes. 
By contrast, Star Alliance, which seems to be the most successful global 
alliance among the four, considered here, presents a positive and increasing 
impact during the two years following the alliance formation: 3.9% the first 
year and 7.6% the second one. 
D. Impact by type of routes 
One could expect that hub-hub routes would have shown a larger impact 
given the airlines will forward a greater percentage of their traffic through 
hubs. It seems that it is not the case since an equivalent positive impact for 
hub-hub and hub-non hub routes is found: 9.7% and 9.7% respectively57 . Two 
reasons can explain this peculiar result. First, it can be due to the existence of 
a large number of US (New York, Dallas, Boston and Chicago for example) 
and European final and non-hub destinations, which can be reached directly 
without necessarily passing through hubs. Secondly, it can also be due to the 
fact that the hub-hub system needs time in order to function efficiently. It is 
quite obvious that the creation of a common network, pricing and scheduling 
policy but also the harmonization of terminals and IT systems (for example 
CRS) cannot be achieved rapidly in order to forward behind beyond 
destinations passengers through hubs. In addition, certain hubs such as 
London-Heathrow and Frankfurt were already important business centers and 
had therefore significant traffic, on top of that these airports are seriously 
congested with little space for expansion. That's what the decomposition of 
the impact within the post alliance period indicates since it shows that during 
the first year the traffic increase is 1.0% while in the second it reaches 8.6% 
(versus 4.9% and 4.6% for hub-non hub routes). 
The non hub-non hub routes present as well a positive increase in traffic due 
to the alliance formation, but this result cannot be considered as a significant 
one given the very limited number of routes (4) included in the sample 
studied. 
57 In absolute numbers of course, the impact for hub-hub is twice as large as that of hub-non 
hub given their larger traffic. 
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Table 6.7 
Traffic impact by type of routes 
Type of route % 
Hub-Hub 9.7% 
I ........................... I ........................... I ............ ......................... --.. '-_--'.. -- .......................... Hub-Non Hub 9.7% 
- ...................... . -. - - .................................... ................................................ _ ............................. . .. Non Hub-Non Hub 11.6% 
Finally, one can state that alliances have important spill over effects by 
influencing positively airlines traffic on their entire network. 
E. Impact by type of cooperation 
The greater impact by far is found for strategic alliances with and without 
antitrust immunity: 14.8% and 10.1% respectively. A Strategic alliance with 
antitrust immunity presents however a higher increase, since it makes 
possible a common scheduling/pricing policy and network. This result 
confirms that the simple entrance to any given alliance is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition regarding traffic improvement and that the tighter the 
cooperation is the higher are the benefits in terms of traffic. 
Table 6.8 
Traffic impact by type of cooperation 
Type of cooperation % 
FFP 5.9% 
................. ................................... - ............ ............................................................. ................................................. . .... .. I.............. I .......... I ...................... Code share 1.0% 
. ......... -- ................ .................. .................. ................ ...................... ........................ - .............. ............... ....................................... ................................................. ............ Strategic alliance without antitrust immunity 10.1% 
I--. 1 ............ -. 1-1 - ................. -- ................. ............................................. .............. ýI............. -- ................ ................... I ............ ........................ Strategic alliance with antitrust immunity 14.8% 
A quite surprising result is that of code share since the estimated increase in 
traffic is almost insignificant (1.0%) and well below that of FFP the simplest 
type of cooperation. This is entirely due to the negative impact on Star 
Alliance code shares routes (-2.1% versus 6.9% for oneworld the other 
alliance for which code shares routes are considered in the selected sample). 
The more plausible reason for this paradox is that the sample under 
examination included routes on which there is virtually no competition, and 
therefore there was no additional traffic to gain over from other competitors. 
FFP on the other hand tends to register a more significant increase since the 
customers gain more tangible and immediate benefits from FFPs, such as 
mileage, than from code share. 
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In comparison with FFP, which is a costless and timeless type of cooperation, 
strategic alliances seem to present a more pronounced positive impact the 
second year of the post alliance period, since they need obviously more time 
to produce their benefits. This conclusion agrees with Gallacher's statement 
(1997) that FFPs' ability to influence business class travelers has made them 
more important to global alliances than code share. 
F. Impact by route distance 
As expected, the larger impact is observed for long haul flights in comparison 
with short haul (12.1% versus 7.7%) since a larger part of passengers with 
behind beyond destinations prefers to travel with allied airlines which offer 
better scheduling and connection times. Another reason might be the lesser 
competition, which characterized these type of routes given the cooperation 
between allied airlines. 
Table 6.9 
Traffic impact by distances of routes 
Route distance % 
Long haul 12.1% 
..... . ........... - ....... ....... - .................. ............ . ..... . ......... . .......... ........ ...... Short haul 7.7% 
However, the short haul routes present in the short term, and more particularly 
in the first year of the post alliance period, a greater increase in traffic since 
they constitute in many cases final destinations or tourist or/and business 
centers especially in the case of Europe (Paris, London, Amsterdam and 
Frankfurt). By contrast, the greater impact for long haul is observed the 
second year of the post alliance period, given the positive effect of tighter 
cooperation in an increased number of behind/beyond points, network 
harmonization and the entrance of new airlines into the alliance. 
Short haul routes register less increase because these routes have more 
options in terms of fares, face increased competition from low-cost airlines 
and alternative means of transport. On long haul routes customers seek more 
benefits in terms of mileage and quality of service. 
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Conclusion 
On average, it seems that strategic alliances lead to a significant increase of 
traffic. 
As expected, the impact was high in the case of hub-hub routes given the 
airlines increasing interest to serve behind/beyond points passengers through 
their hubs by the creation of an efficient hub-and-spoke system. Equally 
important is the fact that a similar increase, even though slightly lower, was 
observed for hub-non hub routes. This means that alliances tend to influence 
positively airlines extended networks and not only hub-hub routes. 
The more strategic type of cooperation produces the greater impact given the 
tighter links and the opportunity provided for common scheduling, pricing 
policy, etc. 
Further, long haul routes lead to better results in terms of additional traffic 
since the competition in those routes tends to be limited or even non-existent, 
and since the partners tend to offer a worldwide coverage. 
However, any alliance impact has more chances to be apparent two years 
after the after alliance formation. 
Finally, global strategic alliances which can be characterized by a great 
number of allied airlines and thus an extended network, by the existence of 
antitrust immunity, at least between the core members, and by an efficient and 
productive hub-and-spoke system (Star Alliance and SkyTeam for example) 
tends to take more advantage of alliance formation. 
The above conclusions confirm those drawn previously by the survey. A quick 
comparison tends to show that global strategic alliances lead to an increase in 
traffic all others things being equal in the next two years after the alliance 
formation, since 64% of the interviewees answered that the alliance impact 
exceeded 6%, while 43% of them has indicated that this effect was apparent 
in the first two years of the alliance formation. Of course, the survey has 
shown that half of the interviewed airlines believed that the impact is of same 
importance for each of the first two years of the post alliance period, while the 
econometric analysis has shown that the impact during the second year of the 
post alliance period is double. 
As expected, the survey has concluded that the long haul routes are those for 
which the impact is the greater (62.5% of the interviewees). 
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Table 6.10 
Survey results by Global strategic alliance 
Up to 5% 6/15% Above 16% 
"Wings" 0% 
... ... 
0% 100% 
Star Alliance 
........ ...... 
25% 
.............. . ... . ... - ........... -- -. - ..... ...... 
. 62.5% 
...... - 
...... 12.5% 
oneworld 
.................... 
67% 
.. -.......................... .................... 
... 0% ............ 33% 
SkyTearn 33% 50% 17% 
It corroborates also the results obtained for each alliance since the greater 
impact was found for SkyTeam and Star Alliance. The only exception seems 
to be "Wings" for which 100% of the interviewees indicated that the impact 
exceeds 16% while the econometric analysis has shown a limited one, i. e. 
4.7%. This is certainly due to the fact that the latter covers only hub-non hub 
routes, since the hubs began their activities/functioning with the alliance 
formation. 
However, a divergence appears between survey and econometrics since their 
respective impact classification by type cooperation does not coincide. More 
particularly, the table 6.11 shows a clear difference, which should be analyzed 
further, since it indicates that code share is the most beneficial way of 
cooperation in the survey, while econometrics indicates that strategic alliance 
with antitrust immunity is the most profitable one. One possible reason is that 
the econometric sample does not include an extended number of code 
shares, while the code share is one of the most popular ways of cooperation 
with quite immediate results, especially in comparison with strategic alliances. 
Table 6.11 
Importance of different type of cooperation 
Survey Econometric 
results results 
FFP 33 
. ........... ............ ..... .. -..... ........ ...... - .... . ...... ............. . ...... ............... ................. Code Share 4 
.......... . .... I ................. ..................... . .......... ..................... ................ . ... ........ ..... .... . .......... . ....................... .............. - ------- Strategic Alliance without antitrust immunity. 42 
- .... - .... ... ... S .. tra te gicA 11 ian ce with an tit rU St immu nity 2 1, 
Also, one has to mention that the econometric analysis was not able so far to 
conclude to a significant higher alliance impact for hub-hub in comparison with 
hub-non hub as it is commonly admitted and as the survey has previously 
shown. This might be due to the fact that the econometric estimation of the 
alliance impact was based to a short post alliance period (two years) in 
comparison with the interviewees, who were able to judge the alliance effect 
on a longer time period basis. In this regards, it is quite obvious that on a long 
term, the hub-hub will tend to benefit more since the airlines will continue to 
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forward traffic through them by eliminating some direct routings (for example, 
SAS stopped Copenhagen-Athens-Copenhagen in 1999 replacing it by a 
Copenhagen-Frankfurt-Athens-Frankfurt-Copenhagen flight. The Copenhagen 
-Frankfurt leg is operated by SAS while the Athens-Frankfurt leg is operated 
by Lufthansa). 
Moreover, the econometric results tend to corroborate those of at test the aim 
of which is to check if the changes in traffic were not caused by the alliance 
but by other factors in the economic environment. To test whether the 
variation in traffic volume observed in the post alliance period (between t and 
t+2) can be traced back to the formation of alliances, comparison of variable 
means is made between two time periods, one that experienced alliance 
formation (t+2) and one that did not (t). A difference in means significant at the 
1% level is found and allows rejection of the null hypothesis that alliances are 
not responsible for the traffic increase observed for the whole strategic 
alliance considered. On a more disaggregate level however, the results of the 
t test indicate that an alliance is strongly significant in explaining the traffic 
variation experienced by oneworld and Star Alliance (at a 1% level of 
significance), while it is weakly significant in explaining that of SkyTeam and 
"Wings" (10% or slightly lower level of significance). Regarding the type of 
routes, the alliance is found to be a significant factor explaining the traffic 
increase observed as far as hub-hub and hub-non hub routes are concerned 
(at a1% level of significance), while it is not at all as far the non hub-non hub 
routes are concerned. 
Table 6.12 
Testing the statistical significance of alliances as a major cause of 
passenger traffic change observed between t ant t+2 
Degrees of freedom t value 
Global 123 6.109 
By Alliance 
"Wings" 9 1.806 
Star Alliance 91 5.630 
oneworld 7 3.101 
SkyTearn 13 1.736 
By route 
Hub-hub 53 4.839 
Hub-non hub 65 3.274 
Non hub-non hub 3 0.542 
Finally, one should stress that the study performed above goes significantly 
beyond that of Bissessur (1996) since it differentiates itself on several major 
issues/points: 
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The considered sample includes a broad and extended set of 
European, Asian, North and South American originating routes (15 
versus 10 countries, 34 versus 14 airports, 17 versus 10 airlines, and 
124 versus 52 routes). It covers therefore airlines still in service, while 
the Bissessur sample was covering airlines, which do not exist any 
more (Viasa, Swissair). 
The observation period extends till 2001 including therefore the entire 
1990s, while the Bissessur study has only covered the 1982-1994 
period. In particular, the Bissessur estimation of traffic regression 
models was performed over a very short time span (1982-1992), and 
as a result, the number of degrees of freedom was extremely limited 
rending his statistical inference increasingly less reliable. 
All the current global strategic alliances are studied, while the 
Bissessur econometric attempt has focused itself on alliances, which 
apart from "Wings", have disappeared (British Airways-USAir, EQA, 
Global Excellence, SAS-Continental Airlines and Iberia and Aerolineas 
Argentinas). 
Apart from alliance impact on hub-hub traffic, the effect on traffic of 
hub-non hub and non hub-non hub routes is analyzed as well, while 
Bissessur has focused exclusively on non-stop hub-hub routes since 
he assumes that the effects of cooperation between airlines and 
network integration will be primarily observed on this type of routes. 
Population is included in the traffic regression models, through the per 
capita income/economic activity measure, while it does not appear as a 
significant determinant of passenger traffic in any Bissessur' 
regressions. 
The alliance formation date is different for each airline pair no matter 
their respective alliance in order to take into account the exact date 
each one has begun effectively to cooperate within any given global 
strategic alliance, while Bissessur has opted for a common alliance 
date formation for each alliance studied (1989 for EQA, SAS- 
Continental, Global Excellence, Iberia-Aerolineas Argentinas-Viasa; 
1991 for British Airways-USAir because they became operational in 
1992). As a result, both the post and pre alliance periods were different 
for each pair. 
The post alliance period is taken as t+2 based on the responses given 
in the survey conducted, while Bissessur has opted for common post 
alliance period (1994) given that the latest traffic data available was for 
that year. Further, the pre alliance period coincides with t, the alliance 
formation date, while Bissessur has choosen t-2. 
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The main goal here is the assessment of alliance success through the 
evaluation of alliance impact on passenger traffic, while Bissessur' aim 
was to determine mainly the factors affecting alliance success. 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis proposed is composed both by an 
econometric analysis and a survey based on the opinion and beliefs of 
the involved persons. 
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The air transport industry is by its very nature more cyclical than most 
industries, which means that it is extremely vulnerable to the instabilities and 
uncertainties of the international economy. As the growth in the demand for air 
transport is proportional to GDP growth (Agusdinata, De Klein, 2001), the 
sector is substantially affected by any change in the global economy. At times 
of recession, when demand decreases potential customers get more and 
more price sensitive. On the other hand, at times of economic upturns 
customers will be more service sensitive. This means that the competitive 
environment will demand other qualities from airlines during a period of 
economic upturn. Thus, in the age of globalisation, the world's airlines are 
under extra pressure to both offer seamless global service and enter new 
markets and be flexible enough and ready to adapt quickly to the economic 
environment and to the changing customer needs. Airlines have proceeded to 
the creation of alliances, which have radically changed the air transport 
industry structure, so as to enable themselves to cope with the inherent 
instability of the sector and to reap as many benefits as possible. 
The present work has examined both the airline alliance phenomenon in 
general - in the four first chapters - and the impact of these alliances on one 
of the most important parameters the airlines themselves use to measure and 
assess the alliance impact and this is traffic - in the last two chapters. The 
theoretical approach attempts to explain how and why airlines have been led 
to the establishment of such cooperative agreements. Then, the empirical 
approach determines and quantifies the impact alliances have had on traffic. 
This is achieved by collating and comparing the results of the survey, which 
examined the opinion of the airlines themselves, and those of the econometric 
model, which used the data available. 
There have already been some researches (those of Ourn and Bissessur) 
that have attempted to quantify the alliance impact on traffic, but this is the 
first that has been carried out after the 1 1th September 2001 attack and its 
adverse repercussions on airlines. What distinguishes however, this study, 
above all, is that it does not examine alliance impact on traffic by isolating it on 
specific regions, that is intra-European or transatlantic, or by focusing on the 
traffic of the major partners. It is the only research in which the quantification 
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effort is effected on a substantial number of routes (124), on different kinds of 
routes (hub-hub, hub-non hub and non hub-non hub routes) and on a global 
scale, that is among partners from all geographical regions. This research is 
one of the first that has examined all four strategic alliances. And this 
contributes significantly to the study of airline alliances as alliances configure 
their networks so as to increase their market share in all regions and in a way 
that all routes create a unified and as far as possible mutually profitable 
network. 
In the first chapter it has been shown, through a general and cross-industry 
overview of alliances, that alliances have become increasingly popular and 
will continue to grow in importance because they are, through the combination 
of skills and resources, the most effective way available for firms in any sector 
to exploit new opportunities and to increase their competitive advantage of 
surviving and prospering in a highly competitive environment. A strategic 
alliance - which can be defined as a long term partnership between two or 
more firms who attempt to enhance competitive advantages collectively vis-6- 
vis their competitors by sharing risks and resources, market access capability, 
improving product quality and customer services and thereby, profitability - is 
above all a growth facilitator, which means that the majority of companies 
enter into alliances to gain growth. This growth may take several forms such 
as domination in home markets, the acquisition of greater market share and 
critical mass, the establishment in markets outside the firm's own markets, the 
access to and control of technological know-how and innovation, the 
development of marketing spread. 
This does not mean that alliances do not present problems, they do and 
among them the most serious are the need for continuous attention and 
planning, the unequal contribution and/or commitment of resources and the 
contrast of partners' culture, style and level of trust, which can all lead to bitter 
conflicts and break up. If these problems are overcome though, the allied 
partners fulfil their initial goals and reap the fullest possible benefits. 
There are certainly other ways available to firms to achieve these goals, 
mainly mergers, takeovers and acquisitions. But still firms opt for alliances. 
The key attraction of alliances is their two-fold flexibility. First, depending on 
the situations firms have to deal with and the goals they are trying to achieve, 
alliances take different forms to fulfil the needs of the partners. The allied firms 
decide upon and determine themselves the scope of their cooperation, the 
extent of resource and skill sharing and the degree of integration. Secondly, 
alliances are popular because they are much more flexible than mergers and 
flexibility is what is required within a turbulent and uncertain market, the tool 
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that enables firms to achieve the highest benefits possible with the lowest cost 
and risk. 
Airlines have resorted to alliances for the same reasons: it is a flexible 
organizational form offering rapid growth potential. In the air transport 
industry, growth takes the form of increased network coverage and entrance 
to new markets. But in such a capital-intensive industry the size of resources 
required to build an extensive and worldwide network are enormous and 
highly uncertain, thus alliances remain the best way available to deliver 
quickly, safely and inexpensively a world-wide network and access new 
markets. 
The air transport industry faced however, an external factor that was peculiar 
in this industry only and this was the regulatory framework. This factor has 
acted as a dissuader of mergers preventing airlines from even considering the 
possibility of merging and has somehow forced them to opt for alliances to 
achieve growth. Alliances cannot be examined to the exclusion of the wider 
political and regulatory context and chapter two identifies the ways in which 
intergovernmental agreements have affected the character and course of 
alliances in the air transport sector. Since 1944 and for sixty years the air 
transport industry has been governed by the Chicago Convention rules that 
imposed that only the designated airlines in the bilateral agreements (ASAs) 
between two countries could fly on specific routes at specific frequencies and 
capacities. For an airline to be designated it had to be "substantially owned 
and effectively controlled by nationals" of each of the countries concerned. 
The most important development towards easing the restrictive nature of the 
industry has been deregulation in the US and liberalisation in Europe. The 
European Union countries now enjoy a common aviation market in which 
bilateral agreements have been superseded by multilateral arrangements. But 
the European single market has not brought about a complete 
"denationalization" of European airlines, much less the complete withdrawal of 
government from the regulation of air transport. 
Even though liberalised, US and EU airlines were looking for ways to secure 
the support of their governments either to secure their position in the domestic 
markets or to secure access to new markets through alliances and "open 
skies" agreements. The national or regional authorities then came to grant 
their approval to the alliance efforts. Their approval has been almost invariably 
linked to the granting of concessions. The US has pressed towards more 
liberal ASAs known as "open skies", which provide for access to all routes 
between the two countries with unrestricted designation and remove 
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restrictions on capacity, fares and frequencies but maintain the ownership 
rules. 
One way or the other, liberalisation in the air transport industry has been the 
catalyst for the formation of airline alliances. Without liberalisation it would 
have been impossible for airlines to cooperate closely so as to find the 
common ground that would enable them to reap mutual benefits. Full 
deregulation in the European Union in combination with open skies 
agreements have enabled airlines to access new markets, which was 
absolutely impossible and unfeasible within the Chicago bilateralist regime. 
The antitrust immunity and exemption granted by the US DOT and the 
European Commission respectively have enabled airlines, apart from 
indirectly accessing new markets, to enter into strategic cooperation and to 
obtain, through common scheduling/network, pricing, etc., significant benefits 
in terms of traffic increase, revenue enhancement and customer loyalty. 
Even with complete deregulation, European Union airlines are operating 
under a divided regulatory regime - one governing flights within the European 
Aviation Area, the other governing international aviation outside the European 
Union still governed by a regulatory regime based on rigorous tests of 
nationality. The current negotiations between the European Union and United 
States on TCAA will signal the starting point for more radical changes in the 
air transport industry as it will further liberalise the two biggest air transport 
markets of the world and will make possible the consolidation of the sector 
through mergers, acquisitions or takeovers, at least on an intra-continental 
level. 
The third chapter starts out by citing the various airline alliance definitions 
available. All of them, to lesser or larger extent, stress their multilateral and 
multinational character, the combination of their respective networks and their 
promotion as a common marketing brand. Airline alliances are divided into 
marketing alliances and strategic alliances. The former focus on the 
improvement of the product being offered to consumers and may take the 
following forms of cooperation: interline/pro-rate agreements; lounge access 
and mutual ground handling that aim at making the travel experience more 
convenient; FFPs which aim at selling more seats and thus increasing the 
market share of the participating alliances and reducing the potential for 
competition; CRSs that give a lot of benefits to the allied airlines because the 
list of code shared flights are shown twice and at the top part of the screens; 
joint engineering/maintenance; code share that is the practice through which 
an airline permits a second airline to use its airline designator code on a flight. 
Code share is the simplest form of alliance and the benefits they entail include 
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traffic synergy which in its turn results in revenue enhancement, cost savings 
and economies of scale. 
A strategic alliance is on the other hand one where the partners mingle their 
assets in order to pursue a single or joint set of business objectives and it is 
the higher level of commitment and the higher degree of coordination that 
makes an alliance truly strategic. Strategic alliances are characterised by 
exclusive membership and a joint marketing entity, and may involve 
coordination of networks/schedules, equity involvement, joint venture flights, 
franchising, IT sharing and development. Certainly, strategic alliances include 
most types of marketing cooperation types. Airline alliances have evolved 
from being a loose form of cooperation between airlines to becoming one of 
the most important strategies to be competitive. 
Through their cooperation in an alliance, airlines enjoy the benefits of size 
which may lead to a decrease in cost through fleet commonality, labour cost 
reduction etc; the benefits of network size, that gives to the allied airlines the 
possibility to exploit the larger network created through the alliances such as 
marketing advantages, branding, reduced costs to enter new markets; and 
finally the benefits of network configuration through which airlines by 
combining networks via rationalisation and optimization manage to control 
hubs, create barriers to entry and ensure the loyalty of their customers. An 
added benefit is that airlines reap benefits in the form of learning and 
specialisation. 
At the same time, alliances do have certain negative effects due to the fact 
that alliances may result in the partners' losing their independence and 
identity. The partners have conflicting agreements that they may be unwilling 
to give up and may cause some increase, at least initially, in cost, and may 
bring about conflicts because of different expectations and aspirations. 
These problems are further heightened by the asymmetry between the 
partners and the inherent instability both of alliance as cooperative structures 
and of the airline industry in general. This "what if' instability makes them 
prefer to reap only limited benefits -in the form of revenue- by the alliance but 
to maintain their ability to act independently if the alliance breaks apart or if 
the wider environment changes. 
Finally, the last section of the third chapter addresses the issue of the 
horizontal, vertical and external alliances concluded by airlines in the effort to 
increase their profitability. The most important is the alliances with railways, 
which clearly indicates again that the effort of alliances concentrates on 
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networks, as railways are acting as the shortest spokes that feed traffic to the 
hubs. 
This chapter has shown that airline alliances can take different forms and that 
the deeper the cooperation and integration, the more the benefits available for 
partners to reap. The form and depth of the alliance a firm will opt for 
however, depends on many factors and above all a firm, when joining an 
alliance, considers what part of its independence it is willing to concede, 
whether it desires to have exclusive membership and what are its own 
strengths and weaknesses in relation to its size, geographical position and 
what it is expects to achieve by joining an alliance. 
The fourth Chapter summarises the developments and policies behind the 
formation and dissolution of the first alliances in the early 1990s. These past 
alliances are EQA, founded by Swissair, Austrian Airlines, SAS, and Finnair 
and joined at a later stage by Sabena, was the very first European alliance 
and was clustered around Swissair since SAS and Finnair retreated. In 
parallel with EQA, Swissair established together with Delta Air Lines and 
Singapore Airlines the first global strategic alliance, Global Excellence. Global 
Excellence was a purely commercial agreement not a strategic alliance, as 
the members focused primarily on joint marketing that is FFP, joint ground 
handling, pro-rate revenue agreement and interlining. The Alcazar Project was 
an attempt to create a powerful all European alliance if not a mega-carrier. 
Upon the disbanding of EQA and of Global Excellence, Swissair with Delta Air 
Lines, Sabena and Austrian Airlines established the Atlantic Excellence 
Alliance which enjoyed the benefits of antitrust immunity, permitting the 
participant airlines to offer identical fares and to establish common yield 
management operations. Swissair, Sabena and Austrian Airlines, apart from 
Atlantic Excellence, also set up Qualiflyer, a purely European alliance which 
provided for a joint purchasing program. Finally the short-lived agreement 
between KLIVI-Alitalia was one of the very few attempts to establish a joint 
venture company in the air transport industry. 
Strategic airline alliances account for at present 56% % of world RPK. "Wings" 
is the oldest strategic alliance made up of KLM and Northwest Airlines which 
have established joint ventures on all their flights. Star Alliance is the largest 
alliance with 17 members and offers a more extensive network than all other 
alliances. oneworld is formed around British Airways and American Airlines, 
but this alliance has not proceeded yet to deeper or more strategic 
cooperation as their petition for antitrust immunity and exemption has not yet 
been approved by the competent authorities that are the US DOT and the 
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European Commission. SkyTeam is the most recent alliance, whose main 
asset is that five out of its six members have been granted antitrust immunity. 
Finally, there are certain airlines that remain outside of alliances because 
either they have not decided which alliance to join or they have chosen to 
remain unaligned. 
The creation of airline alliances have come across many obstacles as many of 
the first alliances established have not survived. It seems that at the time they 
were attempted, in the early 1990s, the air transport industry and the national 
governments were not ready to accept such developments. The other reason 
behind their dissolution was the erroneous choice of alliance partners as well 
as the overly ambitious strategies. The first alliances centered mainly around 
Swissair, which based its strategy on the reciprocal exchange of equity among 
the partners (Delta Air Lines and Singapore Airlines) or on acquiring 
significant stakes in the airlines it was cooperating with. Their dissolution has 
proven that it is the equity exchange or the one-way investment that bound 
the partners together. The partners equity swap and the airlines' withdrawing 
from one alliance to join another has made evident the inherent instability of 
the first alliances as well as the desire of airlines to remain independent. 
Towards the end of the 1990s', the conclusions of open skies agreements that 
had been promoted by the US Authorities in combination with full liberalization 
within the European Union and the experience airlines had acquired by their 
mistakes of the past, led to the creation of alliances that had moved away 
from a cooperation focusing on purely marketing issues and proceeded to 
strategic cooperation. The airlines were assisted in such a move by the 
experience they have gathered through their competitors' mistakes in the past 
and by the fact that the looming presence of the financial crises made them 
realize that only an in-depth and multi-tier cooperation (IT, common schedule 
and network planning) could help them weather their shrinking profitability. 
Thus, airline alliances having as core a US and one - at least - European 
airline planned their network configuration and their expansion to other areas 
with promising growth potential (Asia, Oceania, Central and South America). 
The fifth chapter reports the results of the survey, which approached the 
airline alliance phenomenon from the perspective of the parties directly 
involved. Within the framework of the survey, the airlines themselves were 
contacted and were asked to evaluate their alliance experience. The survey is 
made up of interviews and a questionnaire. The interviews record the beliefs 
and the opinions on alliances of all the airlines participating in alliances at the 
time of the survey. It is complemented with interviews with the central 
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management of alliances and with the opinions on alliances of the 
international aviation authorities (ICAO and IATA), regulatory bodies 
(European Commission and US DOT) and finally of the experts of the air 
transport sector. The questionnaire on the other hand, focuses on the impact 
of airline alliances on traffic as this is quantified by the responses of airlines 
themselves. 
In the interviews the airlines have all agreed that alliances enable them to 
create a global network without the airlines incurring extra cost and help them 
increase the loyalty of their customers. This increased network coverage 
results in traffic and revenue increase, which constitute the criteria that all 
airlines use to evaluate alliance success. 
The revenue benefits in terms of traffic increase appear within the first two 
years from the establishment or joining of the alliance. There is a consensus 
that the major financial benefits originate from marketing and that cost 
benefits have been rather limited, which indicates that alliances have a long 
way to go before they manage to reap wider and deeper synergy benefits and 
become truly strategic alliances. They all concur that alliance benefits will 
continue in the future with cost reduction remaining a long term objective, 
whose potential has not been exploited to the full. 
The majority of airlines mention that they value highly their independence and 
two thirds of the respondents believe that alliances are the final destination of 
the collaborative efforts between airlines. Only European airlines mentioned 
that airline alliances are the transitional stage towards mergers and 
consolidations. This means that airlines want to maintain their independence 
and are not willing at the present phase to proceed to mergers first because of 
the regulatory complications that would arise in relation to traffic rights and 
second because of the high risk involved with such a move. 
Almost all airline executives have stated that the factors that play a key role 
for the success of an alliance are mainly the commitment, trust and 
cooperation, the existence of common ideas and finally the complementarity 
of networks and the compatibility of IT systems while slow decision-making 
remains the main alliance disadvantage. 
An interesting point of the interviews was that the participants confirmed 
almost totally the reservations that the extremely literature on the negative 
aspects of alliances have pointed to. Alliances do present serious problems 
and this must be the primary reason why the partners have not moved to the 
deeper integration that promises to bring the much sought after and much 
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needed fruit of cost reduction. Despite the interdependencies and the 
recognition that they need alliances, the interests of those participating in 
multi-carrier network cooperation remain to a large extent divergent. The first 
primary aim of all partners is survival and preservation of its identity and work 
for the benefit of the superstructure The soft aspects of alliance cooperation, 
that is cultural clashes, inability to reach consensus, power imbalances, 
absorption threats, tend to be underestimated, perhaps because it is difficult 
to quantify these mostly non-tangible negative effects of alliances. Airlines 
seem not to believe that there are benefits, or more exactly equal benefits, for 
all. It seems that larger airlines do have influence over the smaller carriers in 
the alliance, and these small carriers feel that if they give in they will 
eventually become absorbed and jeopardize their independent existence. This 
unwillingness might even imply that and there have been disappointments in 
creating the benefits alliances strive for. 
The challenge for alliances is to find the best model to enhance benefits 
across the whole networks, to strike the right balance between risk and 
tightness of integration in to the alliance. They need to convince their 
members that autonomy and dependence are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive in a partnership because there might be dependence in some 
domains and autonomy in others. Alliances as co-operative relationships need 
to be constantly renegotiated and subject to bargaining. 
The central alliance management mentioned that alliances aim at the 
establishment of a mutually profitable cooperation, which can offer to alliance 
members satisfactory benefits. The central management does not intervene in 
the administration and management of individual airlines. The aviation experts 
agree that the main aim behind the formation of alliances is the creation of a 
global network. 
The questionnaire analysis indicates that both passenger traffic and load 
factor of all airlines show clear increase. This in return, has positively 
impacted on revenue, while the impact on cost, even though positive, remains 
comparatively limited at least on a short term basis. The impact on passenger 
traffic is relatively substantial and has been experienced within one to two 
years since the inception of the alliance cooperation. Mixed results are 
registered only in relation to the impact on fares as some airlines claim that 
there has been reduction in fares and others an increase in fares. 
96% of the respondent airlines consider airline alliances as a very successful 
cooperation agreement. The most pronounced positive effect has been 
located in the area of passenger traffic and 64% of the airlines state an 
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increase amounting to more than 6%, with the greatest increase being 
experienced on hub-hub routes (45% of the airlines state an increase of more 
than 16%) which seems fairly reasonable given that hubs are the centres 
around which airlines that participate in the alliances develop all their code 
share and schedule optimisation strategy. In addition, long haul routes have 
recorded the most positive effects because these are the routes that offer the 
global networks and unite the continents and form the basis of the radial 
spoke networks and of the complementary allied network. 45% of the 
respondent airlines state that load factors have increased by more than 6%; 
as for costs 82% stated that they have experienced a reduction ranging from 1 
to 10%. Finally 16% of airlines mentioned an increase in revenue exceeding 
16%. The type of cooperation that leads to more positive results on traffic is 
code share followed by FFP and strategic alliance with antitrust immunity. 
On the level of the individual alliance evaluation, it is "Wings" that has 
experienced the most positive benefits in all areas (traffic, load factor and 
revenue increase, and cost reduction), which proves the theoretical principle 
that the deeper the integration, the better the results. At the same time it might 
indicate a paradox of airline alliances. Many airlines are needed to achieve 
global coverage, which "Wings" does not offer and explains why it will be 
disbanded and will become integrated into SkyTeam. It seems also that 
effective coordination and integration can be achieved only among a few 
partners. This is something that airlines need to consider. 
Star Alliance has experienced the most positive impact on traffic (75% of the 
responders mentioned an increase by more than 6%) and revenue (66% of 
the responders mentioned an increase by more than 6%), a result fairly 
reasonable as it is the alliance that has the largest number of airlines. Despite 
its impressive magnitude, this alliance may be experiencing some overlapping 
between its partners' networks, which impacts negatively on the efficiency of 
the alliance and may lead to conflicts and its very magnitude may result in 
rigidity and slow decision making. SkyTeam has had the greatest positive 
impact on cost and the greatest decrease of fares, which could possibly 
indicate that there is deeper integration among the partners, a noteworthy 
aspect of this alliance given that it was the last to be formed. The low scores 
reported by oneworld on all levels confirm the importance of antitrust 
immunity and exemption for the operation of alliances. Another drawback of 
oneworld is that this alliance is essentially a limited marketing cooperation 
between the two core members. If they do not decide to set aside their 
individual interests and move on to a really strategic cooperation, they will not 
be in a position to reap the benefits the other alliances are enjoying and even 
more importantly it might have to deal with the dissatisfaction and the possible 
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defection of the other allies. As the survey has clearly indicated the other 
members of the alliance are waiting the developments between American 
Airlines and British Airways. It is the alliance with the most untapped potential 
and in case it does obtain antitrust immunity, it has much potential to become 
the most effective and powerful alliance as it is the alliance that has the most 
global coverage, serving the most destinations. It links up some of the best 
and most powerful airlines in the world - for example American Airlines is the 
biggest airline in the world, British Airways controls through London-Heathrow 
the transatlantic market, Qantas has an exclusive control over the Oceania 
market, Cathay Pacific has high service standards - and on top of that they 
have a common cultural Anglo-Saxon background. Given that the Bermuda 11 
agreement will be maintained however, it is difficult for this deeper 
cooperation to become a reality. 
On the size level medium airlines have been most positively impacted as far 
as traffic (71% of the responders mentioned an increase by more that 6%), 
load factor and cost are concerned, while medium and small airlines have 
been equally affected in terms of revenue (26% of the responders mentioned 
an increase by more that 16%). These results show clearly that airline 
alliances have a positive effect on all sizes of airline. The impressive thing is 
that medium and small sized airlines had a greater increase in terms of 
revenue compared to major airlines. 
On the geographic level, it is the Central and South American airlines that 
have experienced the greatest increase in traffic (75% of the responders 
mentioned an increase by more that 16%), load factor and revenue, while 
European airlines have experienced the greatest reduction in cost. The 
geographical area of Central and South America based on IATA data is the 
area with the highest increase in 2002 and also is the area that was less 
affected by 1 1th September 2001. Also, the airlines from this area are new 
members in the alliances and they are experiencing the benefits from the first 
years of participation and the small number of airlines. 
The overall substantial conclusion arising from the survey is that alliances, 
despite the form of cooperation chosen and established among the partners, 
entail numerous benefits for the airlines as they bring about an increase in 
passenger traffic with a parallel increase in load factor and some a reduction 
in cost. Thus, a clear improvement of revenue is observed, a fact resulting 
from the combination of the increase in traffic and the decrease in cost. The 
greatest benefits from alliances result from the more advanced and integrated 
forms of cooperation, which is characterised by the existence of antitrust 
immunity and the establishment of a joint venture. Most alliances however, 
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remain "strategic" only in name, at least at their present stage, basing their 
cooperation on code share and FFP coordination and have not proceeded to 
deeper integration. 
In the final chapter the econometric analysis of alliance impact is effected. All 
previous empirical studies undertaken on traffic volume have indicated that 
alliances have resulted in an improvement in connecting services and flight 
frequencies and that alliances impact positively on passenger traffic. The 
regression model used in this research to measure the impact of alliances on 
passenger traffic uses as factors real GDP per capita, capacity and real yield. 
The method used for the estimation of alliance impact relies on the isolation of 
real GDP per capita and therefore comparison of the observed traffic to that 
induced by non-alliance factors. 
The econometric results tend to indicate that global alliances lead on average 
to an improvement of traffic as the computation gives an estimated passenger 
increase of 9.7%, which creates an additional traffic of 1.5 million passengers. 
It is Star Alliance and SkyTeam that have experienced the greatest increase 
(11.7% and 12.2% respectively); which clearly shows that strategic alliances 
with antitrust immunity have the biggest increase. Both hub-hub and hub-non 
hub routes record an equivalent increase (9.7%) that show that alliance 
impact is important in all kind of routes and not only as is natural on hub-hub 
routes. Finally long haul routes produce higher impact (12.1%) in relation to 
short haul (7.7%), that is the basis of complementary networks. 
Overall Conclusions 
It is only in these last months that the sector is experiencing some alliance 
mobility after two years of virtual alliance inactivity. Ever since the 1 1th 
September 2001 events, there have been little movements as far as alliance 
alignments, realignments and entries are concerned. Airlines had been 
focusing on dealing with the effect of the crisis on their own affairs and have 
set aside alliances. The last major alliance announcement, prior to Swiss Air 
Lines joining oneworld in September 2003, was Alitalia joining SkyTeam in 
September 2001. It is perhaps now that allied airlines are considering to 
further expand their networks and to strengthen their ties and the so far 
unattached airlines are considering which alliance to join so as to secure their 
own survival and to enter a viable organisation. This new mobility may be 
indicative of the fact that airline alliances have achieved a certain equilibrium 
as far as the major groups are concerned. 
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There are many claims that Europe has too many airlines for the area, a claim 
intensified by the rather short haul flights needed to cover the four corners of 
the continent. Even if European airlines were considering merging among 
themselves, the problem for the major European airlines is that, liberalization 
or not, the Chicago Convention's "citizenship" rules are still valid for all flights 
outside the European Union. They depend heavily on long-range routes for 
much of their traffic (a relic of their imperial origins and a reflection of the close 
competition between surface and air transport in Europe). Though the 
Chicago regulatory system offers some protection for routes and no airline 
can be forced to surrender the external routes that it has obtained through 
bilateral Air Services Agreements, it offers no guarantees of survival or profit 
for airlines operating on these routes. On routes within the European single 
market, the Chicago regime does not even protect access to routes, and it is 
on their ability to cope with competition on these routes that the airlines of 
smaller Member States most depend. With privatization and liberalization 
governments are becoming somewhat less glued to the interests of national 
"flag carriers". If faced with a dilemma of having to deal with the 
consequences and the political cost of their flag carrier going bankrupt and 
accepting its survival even if this means a reduced role in an alliance and at a 
last resort merger or takeover, they will certainly opt for the second. 
Governments do not need to see their national airlines disappear if the 
alternative is a continuing high-price monopoly sustained by an alliance with 
foreign airlines. As these airlines become more involved in the single air 
transport market, their managements will probably have to face some difficult 
trade-offs between the appeals of independence and the profits - and 
economies - offered by strategic alliances. 
Future developments 
It is highly improbable that the airlines that form the core of the three by now 
alliances will break up their links. There might be realignments, desertions, 
new entries in all alliance groups but these will concern the middle or lower 
tier partners. There will not be a major change that could shake the entire 
alliance configuration. There will certainly be new entries and realignments. 
The most imminent ones will concern the three Chinese airlines joining 
alliances and - most probably Air China, China Southern and China Eastern 
will join respectively Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and oneworld - and on the 
possibility of a series of mergers or virtual mergers within Europe. The three 
alliances, as Star Alliance's CEO has stated, are interested in recruiting 
Middle Eastern partners but it is not a priority. 
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Another major development that we will probably see will be mainly in the 
area of the internal operation of the alliances, at least in the two that have 
established a deeper integration of cooperation. It is quite probable that more 
responsibilities and decision-making will be handed over to the central alliance 
management given that the greater the number of partners, the more difficult 
and time-consuming the decision-making process will be. No company and no 
alliance can afford the luxury of long negotiations and consensus decisions in 
a rapidly changing competitive environment. A most interesting parallelism 
was drawn by Mr. Puffer who compared alliances with the European Union 
and pointed out that, just as the European Union countries are conceding 
more competencies to the European Commission, the same will be done with 
the airlines and their central management. 
Beyond the above developments, which can be predicted with almost 
certainty, proceeding to longer term developments that may shape the 
alliance scenery is like ball-gazing. The two major factors that will influence 
the future development of alliances is the relaxation of the regulatory 
framework and the continuing economic downturn. As far as the first is 
concerned, as things stand at the moment, it seems that there will not be any 
major change since even the ambitious TCAA negotiations are moving rather 
cautiously. Regarding the economic crisis, it has to be admitted that since it is 
this that will determine the viability of many airlines, it will play a major role 
both in the alliance group participation and in the concessions national 
authorities are willing to make in terms of the relaxation of foreign control 
rules. 
Even if mergers occur, these will be within the boundaries of the same 
alliance as is happening in SkyTeam with Air France merging with Alitalia and 
with British Airways talking about closer links with Iberia, which could be 
followed by a similar announcement regarding Lufthansa, SAS and/or 
Austrian Airlines. A major development that can be predicted with some 
certainty is that even if there will not be mergers or takeovers, the future 
scenery of the air transport is "mega carriers" plus niche carriers. The second 
trend is that toward the creation of airline alliances in which the major airlines- 
Lufthansa, Air France, American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, British Airways - will 
control the larger part of intercontinental traffic - and the larger part of the 
profit pie - while all other carriers will be attached to them and their role will be 
to provide feed to the hub airports used (and typically dominated) by the major 
alliance partners and at the same time to divert traffic from other minor 
national carriers when the latter are members of rival alliances. Thus, what 
seems to be emerging is a hierarchy of major and minor European airlines, 
linked to larger alliance systems. Through a range of devices, the larger 
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airlines have both created alliances among themselves and have attached the 
smaller airlines to themselves as "clients" feeding traffic into a set of 
international hubs. Such a hierarchy is intentionally exclusive in character: it is 
intended to exclude upstarts such as easyJet and Virgin Express from 
competing on regional routes (in this case, those within Europe), and to 
exclude rival alliances from central hubs by starving them of feeder traffic for 
their international services. 
As far as the operation of alliances is concerned it seems that their next area 
of focus will be cost reduction and reduction of on-the-ground time for 
connecting passengers. If airlines cannot reduce travel time significantly, they 
will make sure that the time is more entertaining and productive for 
passengers. Airlines will expand the range of entertainment available on 
board and on the ground, which will certainly add new costs and pressure on 
the flimsy finances of airlines. 
A major factor in the deeper integration and even survival of alliances is the 
threat that they seem to create to competition on international routes. There 
are many observers who believe that alliances will soon come up against 
concerted opposition from competition authorities. The recent, long drawn-out 
battle over the proposed British Airways-American Airlines alliance suggests 
that the slogan on the side of Virgin Atlantic's aircraft - "No way BA-AA" - 
may be prophetic for other alliances. The latest developments have been 
within SkyTeam with KLM, member of "Wings" alliance, proceeding to a 
merger with Air France, in combination with the fact that Northwest Airlines 
has already in place a trilateral alliance with Delta Air Lines, core member of 
SkyTeam, and Continental Airlines has changed the alliance alignments. 
Despite the statements of Northwest's CEO that the cooperation between 
KLM and Northwest Airlines will continue as it is, it is quite possible that 
'Wings" will be disbanded and will become integrated into SkyTeam. For this 
to happen, the US DOT and the European Commission will have to grant their 
approval, which will not be very easy since if this alignment does happen, it 
will mean that three US airlines will be under the SkyTearn umbrella. If they 
don't get this approval, it will mean that they will join the alliance but they will 
not be able to proceed to a closer cooperation, which may be in itself a white 
elephant. 
Regarding traffic per se, there will certainly be a continuing increase, which 
will originate from the expansion of the network through the entrance of new 
members, the deepening of the cooperation among the existing members and 
the end of the recession. Will the airline industry sustain the impressive 
growth rates it has historically enjoyed or will it soon join the ranks of more 
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mature industries with more modest growth? Is traffic levelling off? It seems 
by now that the traffic airlines have to deal with is not new traffic but traffic that 
one alliance takes from the other. Alliances are not generating new traffic. It is 
quite possible that alliances will experience some stabilisation of traffic in 
absolute numbers. Only a major economic upturn can create new traffic but 
this new traffic will not necessarily be high-yield business traffic. 
It seems that the domestic markets at least are indeed maturing. Most future 
growth will occur on international markets. The rapid increase in non-frills, 
point-to-point service in the United States and the European Union domestic 
market have sparked a new surge in air travel meeting the needs of low- 
paying leisure travellers. 
It is the international markets that hold the greatest potential for growth 
because of the expansion of world trade and the rapid economic growth 
occurring in many foreign countries because more and more people have the 
time and the time needed for international trade. There is no viable alternative 
to air travel over long distance. Another reason for the bullish outlook for 
international travel is that international service is likely to be less regulated in 
the future. That will lead to more services, more competition and lower fares 
on many routes. None of this will happen quickly. Regulation dies hard but 
over the long run international aviation will be less restricted. 
Policy recommendations 
Airlines have stated that it is difficult to quantify how much of the increase in 
traffic is indeed generated by alliances. This research can be used as a 
reference for these airlines as it will help them evaluate the impact of alliances 
not only through the survey in which they can see how their allies and their 
competitors have experienced in terms of impact on traffic but also through 
the econometric model so as to determine 1) the exact positive impact from 
alliances 2) which routes, 3) which kind of cooperation, 4) which type of route 
distance, 5) which size of airline, 6) which type of continent and 7) which 
alliance has recorded better results. 
And all the above will help them to 1) determine whether they need a new 
partner and if yes, based on the above results what size and from which 
continent, 2) determine what they need to improve and in which areas 3) 
locate the problems and difficulties they need to overcome 4) adapt their 
strategies to new situations and 5) examine the possibility and plausibility of a 
closer cooperation or even merger between airlines. 
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At this point it should be mentioned that the Vice President Alliances of Air 
France, upon receiving a copy of the ATIRS presentation of the questionnaire 
survey forwarded it to all his counterparts in SkyTeam. 
Apart from the airlines participating in alliances, this survey is equally 
important for all airlines considering their entrance in an alliance so as to see 
the benefits they might experience from such a participation and which 
alliance they should choose. 
Suggestions for further research 
Based on this research, future analyses should concentrate on: 1) other 
routes/city pairs so as to come up with an even more accurate result, 2) 
covering a larger time period than the t+2 of the present study so as to see 
whether alliances experienced traffic increase only in the first year of the 
alliances as they have stated in their interviews or this increase continues 
after this booming period, 3) examining and analyzing the impact on traffic 
through the entrance in the alliance of more airlines, 4) the impact of the 1 1th 
September 2001 events on alliances and more specifically on traffic, 5) 
conducting a new survey with the airlines to examine the positive opinion 
about alliances continues after the lapse of more years, 6) the role the 
creation of a common transatlantic aviation area (TCAA) will play on the 
transatlantic area but the impact of similar relaxation in areas such as Asia, 7) 
the possibility of mergers between the airlines and how they will impact on 
the operation and the future of alliances and 8) the Air France-KLM case and 
how it will affect the future of airline alliances. 
A complete study of the repercussions on all those fundamental criteria of 
performance, as they have been identified by the companies themselves, 
such as revenues, costs, productivity as well as profitability, becomes 
essential in order to make possible a full evaluation of the airline alliances 
impact. One of the main questions yet to be soundly answered is to what 
extent strategic alliances may in fact improve partner firms' economic 
performance and, particularly their competitiveness and bottom-line 
profitability, a fact which eventually constitutes the desired outcome for every 
allied airline. Essentially, the matter in hand is to examine and test the extent 
to which alliances are indeed, as it is usually claimed by allied airlines 
themselves, the ideal answer to the crisis plaguing the industry these past few 
years, which is in fact a crisis characterized by fierce competition and the 
existence of overcapacities. In any case however, it becomes indispensable to 
identify the sources of profitability improvement since the latter may stem from 
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productivity increase, price reduction or both productivity and pricing patterns. 
Directly correlated with this problem that needs to be examined in future 
researches is to determine whether the traffic increase confirmed by the 
present study is indeed new traffic or traffic diverted from one of the other 
routes of the alliance partners on the routes that have been examined under 
this model. If this happens, then the overall traffic gain might be less than 
estimated, which might substantially influence the partners' profitability as well 
as the allied network configuration. And if this is new traffic, the increase of 
around 10% is indeed enough to secure the profitability of airlines. 
As far as the methodology employed is concerned, one could examine the 
possibility to extend the set of explanatory variables with additional ones such 
as the speed of air travel among factors affecting all markets and/or degree of 
competition, level of tourist attraction, travel restrictions, etc., as well as route 
specific factors, even if the selected group has demonstrated a high 
explanatory degree of traffic variability. At the same time, greater care should 
be given to fares, and particularly to their measurement, since they were 
surprisingly proven to be non statistically significant, a fact which contradicts 
previous empirical studies findings, theoretical suggestions and also the 
estimation of a world traffic model. Moreover, one might consider the 
opportunity to relax the very restrictive assumptions, which assume the fares 
and capacities as alliance factors and lead to alliance traffic impacts miss 
estimations. Given the fact that, changes in fares and capacity are not 
exclusively the result of alliance formation, a major problem arises when it 
comes to disentangling the alliance and non-alliance effect. In order to 
overcome this particular issue, it is necessary to proceed to the estimation of 
two additional and separate regression models, one for fares and one for 
capacity, in order to be able to determine that part of fares and capacity 
variability caused by alliance formation, or to include the relevant disturbances 
among traffic explanatory variables in place of fares and capacity. As far as 
the capacity is concerned, one should deal with an additional problem, which 
originates from the ambiguity around the direction in the causality between 
capacity and traffic by estimating a triple equation model in order to take into 
account both the aforementioned two-way relationship and the need to treat 
fares and capacities as endogenous (for example not only as alliance factors). 
Such a methodology will allow to obtain not only consistent estimates but also 
a pertinent evaluation of alliance impact on traffic. 
Finally, an extensive analysis of factors affecting the operational success of 
strategic airline alliances, as is measured by the change in the level of 
partners' traffic due to the alliances' formation, seems essential in order to 
identify the main determinants ensuring alliances' success. The aim would be 
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to update the conclusion of a previous study conducted by Bissessur and 
Alamdari (1998) by extending the scope of the study to the current global 
strategic alliances and subsequently, trying to model the airline alliance 
outcome by selecting a set of variables, such as network, service and 
competition-related factors, all of which are thought to contribute to the 
increase of the level of partners' traffic. 
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FIRST FREEDOM 
To overfly one country en-route to 
another 
Home Country Country A Country B 
SECOND FREEDOM 
To make a technical stop in another ý Z 
country A 
ý ýd 
Home Country Country A Country B 
THIRD FREEDOM 
To carry passengers from the home 
country to another country 
Home Country Country A 
FOURTH FREEDOM 
To carry passengers to the home 
country from another country 
Home Country Country A 
FIFTH FREEDOM 
To carry passengers between two 
countries by an airline of a third 
country on route with orig i n/desti nation Home Country Country A Country B 
in its home country 
SIXTH FREEDOM 
To carry passengers between two 
countries by an airline of a third 
country on two routes connecting in its Country A Home Country Country B 
home country 
SEVENTH FREEDOM 
To carry passengers between two 
countries by an airline of a third 
country on two routes connecting in its Home Country Country A Country B 
home country 
EIGHT FREEDOM OR CABOTAGE 
To carry passengers within a country ----------- 
by an airline of another country on a I 
route with origin/destination in its Home Country Country A 
home country 
TRUE DOMESTIC 
To carry passengers within an airline's ----- 1 ------- home country 1 ,, I 
Home Country 
I 
Country A 
Source: Association of European Airfines 
Except for Fifth Freedom, whose applicability has always been heavily restricted, 
these bilateral agreements referred to traffic between two contacting countries. The 
term "Sixth Freedom" was coined to describe the combination of Third and Fourth, 
reflecting the reality of hub-and-spoke system networks. More recently, seventh and 
eight Freedoms have been quoted as potential opportunities for liberalisation. 
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Questionnaire - Interviews 
General 
1- What is an alliance aiming at? What are the airlines participating in an alliance 
aiming at? What do they hope to gain? What are the reasons that might lead an 
airline to enter an alliance? What are the goals of an alliance? size, network etc. 
What capabilities does the alliance fill, the non-allied airlines cannot fill? List the 
benefits and disadvantages of alliances 
2. Is there any agreement in relation to the duration of the alliance? 
3. What was the decision to join/build an alliance/to partner with the specific 
partners based on? Do you think that the choice of your airline to participate in 
the alliance you are a member now over another one has been the right one? 
4. Have you had to change/adapt the initial framework/structure of the alliance? 
How much independence does an airline have when participating in an alliance? 
The performance of alliances 
1. From your experience so far, how do you think alliances are performing? Do you 
see any development or other benefits for your airline resulting from your 
participation in the alliance? Are these results the ones that you expected when 
you entered the alliance? Are there any benefits different from the ones you were 
aiming at when you entered the alliance? Are alliances offering to the allies what 
they were expecting from their participation? 
2. If there are problems, what is the nature of these problems? Are they due to poor 
planning, unexpected developments, lack of commitment cultural differences or 
other? Are there any problems you had not expected? Has the alliance produced 
negative effects or problems in a specific area? 
3. How are you measuring this performance? How are you assessing financial 
returns? What are the variables you use to assess the performance of your 
airline? Do the same variables apply to the success of the alliances? 
4. Do you think that these gains are short-term ones or that they will continue in the 
future? Do you think that these cost savings are short-term ones and will or that 
they will continue in the future? What have you achieved so far through the 
alliance, cost saving or revenue gains/generation? What is more important for the 
long -term success of the alliance? Which do you think is the most important 
factor for the success of an alliance? 
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5. If there are financial benefits arising from the participation of your airline in the 
alliance, in which fields have these benefits been manifested? 
Marketing 
Labour costs 
Productivity 
Cost savings 
Other (specify) 
6. Name the barriers you have come up with so far: 
FCultural barriers/differences II 
Conflicting network strategies 
Incompatibility of IT systems 
Different suppliers, ground handling operators, aircraft maintenance etc 
If other please specify 
7. Is the alliance beneficial to all the alliance members? 
8. Are the gains/benefits allocated equally to all the alliance members? 
9. Product conformity: Is the standard of service offered the same for all the alliance 
members? (seat pitch, lounge, meals, in-flight entertainment etc)Can this 
influence traffic in a positive or negative way? 
10. How close and smooth is your relation with the members of the alliance? 
Evolution of alliances 
1. What is the difference between participating in a global alliance and participating 
in an alliance with only another airline? 
2. Present the different phase of the evolution of an alliance by referring to the 
evolution the alliance you participate in has undergone. 
3. Given that your airline is one of the core members of the alliance participating in it 
since its establishment, how do you judge its evolution in time? Have your initial 
expectations being achieved? 
4. How has antitrust immunity (ATI) influenced the performance of your alliance? 
5. Why has your airline chosen to proceed to alliances within the USA in order to 
strengthen their position instead of using other means, such as mergers/ 
acquisitions and expansion? 
6. Has alliances proven profitable so far? Or do you think that airlines should use 
other means to achieve their aims? Do you foresee a return to the old model of 
operating as single carriers? (tactical cooperation) 
7. What is the contribution of your airline to the alliance? 
8. How do you decide what routes are going to be code shared? 
9. Is there any increase/decrease to certain types of passengers (low yield-high 
yield)? 
10. Which was the catalytic date for the appearance of positive effects from the 
alliance? 
11. Is an alliance the final destination of the cooperation/partnership of airlines or is it 
a transitional period leading to mergers? 
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Specific aspects of alliances 
1. What is the impact of aircraft acquisition on airlines after the participation in the 
alliance? 
2. What is the role of ground handling in airline alliances/hubs? 
3. Do alliances accelerate market development? Do they stimulate demand? 
4. How much important is traffic as a parameter of the alliance impact? 
12345 
Not important Extremely important 
5. Does your airline pool out/pool in to same routes? 
Yes 
No 
6. We have noticed many times that within an alliance framework some allies give 
up certain routes in favour of the other alliance partners, Is that to the benefit of 
each carrier? 
Effects of the current recession 
1. Will the current crisis accelerate or halt the evolution of the alliances? Will this 
recession make airlines more unwilling to undertake the costs involved in the 
harmonization of the allied partners? 
Mergers 
1. What is the difference between mergers and alliances? Are there any benefits a 
merger has and an alliance cannot offer? Since alliances offer the benefits of 
network optimisation, increased market power, new marketing growth and 
improved alliance position why should alliances choose to proceed to mergers 
and incur all the merger costs? 
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Questionnaire 
1. What is your opinion in general about your alliance cooperation so far.? 
Negative E-1 Neutral F-1 Good F-1 Excellent 71 
2. In regard to alliance, is there any evidence to suggest the following changes: 
Traffic increased 
Load Factor increased 
Revenue increased 
Fare increased 
Cost reduced 
Yes No 
3. How has the alliance membership affected your airline in the following areas. Please score the impact 
from 1 (no impact) to 5 (significant impact). 
Area Score 
Traffic 
Load Factor 
Revenue 
Fare 
Cost 
4. How immediate was the observed impact of alliance membership on your airline traffic? 
lyear F-I 1-2 years Eý >2 years Fý 
5. What has the impact of the different type of cooperation been on traffic? Please indicate the kind of 
impact 
No impact 
Some Significant 
Impact* Impact* 
FFP I 
Code Share 
Strategic Alliance without antitrust immunity 
Strategic Alliance with antitrust immunity 
*In case of a positive impact please insert a (+), in case of a negative impact please use a 
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6. For which type of cooperation was the positive impact of alliance on traffic, if any, more pronounced? 
Please score the impact from 1 (no impact) to 5 (significant impact): 
Area Score 
FFP 
Code Share 
Strategic Alliance without antitrust immunity 
Strategic Alliance with antitrust immunity 
7. Please give an estimation of the impact of the alliance on the following areas: 
Traffic <0% FJ 0/5% El 6/10% El 11/15% [: ] 16/20% El >21 % [: ] 
Load Factor <0% Fý 0/5% 1: 1 6/10% El 11/15% El 16/20% [: ] >21 % 
Cost >0% El -5/0% El -6/-10% 
[: ] 
-11/-15% 
[: ] -16/-20% El -21 % 
Revenue <0% 0 0/5% [: ] 6/10% M 11/15% El 16/20% >21 % 
Fare -21 % El -20/-11% F-I -10/0% [: ] 1/10% [: ] 11 /20% >21 % El 
8. What has the impact of alliance been on traffic for each type of international route? 
No impact . 
Some Significant 
impact* impact* 
Hub-Hub 
Hub-Non Hub 
Non Hub-Non Hub 
*In case of a positive impact please insert a (+), in case of a negative impact please use a 
a. Please give an estimation of the magnitude of this impact 
<0% 015% 6110% 11-15% 16-20% >21% 
Hub-Hub 
Hub-Non Hub 
Non Hub-Non Hub 
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b. Please indicate which of the following areas have had a positive impact on traffic on a scale from 1 
(no impact) to 5 (significant impact)? 
Area Score 
Lower fares 
Global FFP 
Less competition 
Better global network (flights coverage-beyond routes) 
Better scheduling (shorter connection times) 
9. What was the impact of the airline alliance on fares on the different types of routes? 
Increased Decreased No change 
Hub-Hub 
Hub-Non Hub 
Non Hub-Non Hub :1 
10. Which type of routes has produced better results? 
Route type Traffic Yields 
Long Haul (inter-continental) 
Short Haul (intra-continental) 
Neutral 
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A 
1 
0 
0 .. m 0 
cl CL 
Z CL 
>% 9 
CL 0 
>N 0 C) 
5 F Z -0 < F- u CK «a 
"Wings" 
Amsterdam-Chicago HUB-NON HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Chicago-Amsterdam NON HUB-HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Amsterdam-Los Angeles HUB-NON HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Los Angeles-Amsterdam NON HUB-HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Amsterdam-New York HUB-NON HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
New York-Amsterdam NON HUB-HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Amsterdam-Atlanta HUB-NON HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Atlanta-Amsterdam NON HUB-HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Amsterdam-Houston HUB-NON HUB 1993(2) KUNW ATI L-H 
Houston-Amsterdam NON HUB-HUB 1993(2) KL/NW ATI L-H 
Star Alliance 
Fran kfu rt-Toronto HUB-HUB 1996(2) AC/LH woATI L-H 
Toronto-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1996(2) AC/LH woATI L-H 
Chicago-Toronto HUB-HUB 1995(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Toronto-Chicago HUB-HUB 1995(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Montreal-New York HUB-NON HUB 1997(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
New York-Montreal NON HUB-HUB 1997(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
San Francisco-Toronto HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Toronto-San Francisco HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Chicago-Vancouver HUB-HUB 1995(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Vancouver-Chicago HUB-HUB 1995(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Toronto-Los Angeles HUB-HUB 1996(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Los Angeles-Toronto HUB-HUB 1996(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Miami-Montreal HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Montreal-Miami HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Toronto-Miami HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Miami-Toronto HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Los Angeles-Calgary HUB-NON HUB 1996(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Calgary-Los Angeles NON HUB-HUB 1996(2) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Toronto-Boston HUB-NON HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Boston-Toronto NON HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
Toronto-New York HUB-NON HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
New York-Toronto NON HUB-HUB 1998(l) AC/UA woATI S-H 
London-Cologne HUB-NON HUB 1997(l) BD/LH C-S S-H 
Cologne-London NON HUB-HUB 1997(l) BD/LH C-S S-H 
Fran kfu rt-London HUB-HUB NO BD/LH FFP S-H 
London-Frankfurt HUB-HUB NO BD/LH FFP S-H 
Hanover-London NON HUB-HUB 1999(l) BD/LH C-S S-H 
London-Hanover HUB-NON HUB 1999(l) BD/LH C-S S-H 
Stuttgart-London NON HUB-HUB 1999(l) BD/LH C-S S-H 
London-Stuttgart HUB-NON HUB 1999(l) BD/LH C-S S-H 
Copenhagen-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Fran kfurt-Copen hagen HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Frankfurt-Oslo HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
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Oslo-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Copenhagen-Hanover HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) LH/SK AT[ S-H 
Hanover-Copenhagen NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Frankfurt-Stockholm HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Stockholm-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Hamburg-Stockholm NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Stockholm-Hamburg HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Munich-Copenhagen HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Copenhagen-Munich HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Copenhagen-Stuttgart HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Stuttgart-Copenhagen NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK AT[ S-H 
Copenhagen-Hamburg HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Hamburg-Copenhagen NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Oslo-Hamburg HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Hamburg-Oslo NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Copenhagen-Dosseldorf HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Dasseldorf-Copenhagen NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) LH/SK ATI S-H 
Bang kok-F rankfu rt HUB-HUB 1995(2) LH/TG C-S L-H 
Fran kfu rt-Bang kok HUB-HUB 1995(2) LH/TG C-S L-H 
Atlanta-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Fran kfu rt-Atlanta HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Chicago-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-Chicago HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Dusseldorf-New York NON HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
New York-Dosseldorf NON HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-Los Angeles HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Los Angeles-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-New York HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATi L-H 
New York-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-Miami HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Miami-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-San Francisco HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
San Francisco-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-Dallas HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Dallas-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Fran kfu rt-Boston HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Boston-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) LH/UA ATI L-H 
Frankfurt-Rio de Janeiro HUB-HUB 1993(2) LH/RG C-S L-H 
Rio de Janeiro-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1993(2) LH/RG C-S L-H 
Chicago-Mexico HUB-HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Mexico-Chicago HUB-HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Guadalajara-Los Angeles NON HUB-HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Los Angeles-Guadalajara HUB-NON HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
San Francisco-Guadalajara HUB-NON HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Guadalajara-San Francisco NON HUB-HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Los Angeles-Mexico HUB-HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Mexico-Los Angeles HUB-HUB 1997(2) MX/UA woATI S-H 
Copenhagen-Bangkok HUB-HUB 1995(2) SK/TG C-S L-H 
Bangkok-Copenhagen HUB-HUB 1995(2) SK/TG C-S L-H 
Copenhagen-New York HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
New York-Copenhagen NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
New York-Stockholm NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
Stockholm-New York HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) SK/UA AT[ L-H 
Copenhagen-Seattle HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
Seattle-Copenhagen NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
Oslo-New York HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
New York-Oslo NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) SK/UA ATI L-H 
Miami-Rio de Janeiro HUB-HUB 1997(2) UA/RG C-S L-H 
Rio de Janeiro-Miami HUB-HUB 1997(2) UA/RG C-S L-H 
320 
oneworld 
Madrid-New York HUB-NON HUB 1998(2) AA/IB C-S L-H 
New York-Madrid NON HUB-HUB 1998(2) AAAB C-S L-H 
Miami-Madrid HUB-HUB 1998(2) AA/IB C-S L-H 
Madrid-Miami HUB-HUB 1998(2) AA/IB C-S L-H 
Helsinki-New York HUB-NON HUB 1999(l) AA/AY C-S L-H 
New York-Helsinki NON HUB-HUB 1999(l) AA/AY C-S L-H 
London-Madrid HUB-HUB NO BA/lB FFP S-H 
Madrid-London HUB-HUB NO BA/lB FFP S-H 
SkyTeam 
Merida-Miami NON HUB-NON HUB 1997(2) AM/DL woATI S-H 
Miami-Merida NON HUB-NON HUB 1997(2) AM/DL woATI S-H 
Mexico-Miami HUB-NON HUB 1997(2) AM/DL woATI S-H 
Miami-Mexico NON HUB-HUB 1997(2) AM/DL woATI S-H 
Mexico-New York HUB-HUB 1996(2) AM/DL woATI S-H 
New York-Mexico HUB-HUB 1996(2) AM/DL woATI S-H 
Atlanta-Paris HUB-HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Paris-Atlanta HUB-HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Chicago-Paris NON HUB-HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Paris-Chicago HUB-NON HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
New York-Paris HUB-HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Paris-New York HUB-HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Los Angeles-Paris NON HUB-HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Paris-Los Angeles HUB-NON HUB 1998(2) AF/DL woATI L-H 
Notes: 
FFP: Frequent Flyer Program 
C-S-. Code Share 
woATI: Strategic Alliance without antitrust immunity 
ATI: Strategic Alliance with antitrust immunity 
L-H: Long haul route 
S-H: Short haul route 
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T"I 
To compound the list of selected routes (Appendix C), the following procedure 
has been followed: All the routes between airlines participating in alliances in 
1999 were selected, since, as it has already been mentioned, the econometric 
analysis need a minimum of a two-year post alliance period to arrive at 
reliable results Then, each route was examined separately so as to have 
continuous data from 1982 to 2001. Finally, based on the ABC/OAG Guides, a 
research was carried out to ascertain when the cooperation between the two 
airlines began on the specific route. 
The present appendix presents a sample on how the selection for the routes 
between Lufthansa and United Airlines (members of Star Alliance) was 
effected. The white area and bold letters indicate the routes included in the 
econometric model while the grey area indicates those not included in the 
study and explains the reason why. 
LUFTHANSA-UNITED AIRLINES 
City pair Type of route Alliance date 
Atlanta-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Boston-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Chicago-Dusseldorf HUB-NON HUB 1996(l) 
No sufficient data 
- - - Chicago-Frankfurt HUB-HUB T 1 994(2) 
Chicago-Munich _ HUB-HUB 1995(l) 
No sufficient data 
Dallas-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Detroit-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1999(1) 
No sufficient data 
Dusseldorf-Chicago NON HUB-HUB 1996(l) 
No sufficient data 
Dusseldorf-New York NON HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
Frankfurt-Atlanta HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
Frankfurt-Boston HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
Fran kfurt-C h icago HUB-HUB 1994 (2)_ 
Fran kfurt-Dallas HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
Frankfurt-Detroit HUB-NON HUB 1999(l) 
No sufficient data 
Frankfurt-Houston HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
No sufficient data 
Frankfurt-Los Angeles HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Frankfurt-Miami HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Frankfurt-New York HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
Frankfurt-Philadelphia HUB-NON HUB 1999(1) 
No sufficient data 
322 
Frankfurt-San Francisco HUB-HUB :: Ej: 9: 9: 4::: (2) 
Frankfurt-Washington HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
No sufficient data 
Houston-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994 (2) 
No sufficient data 
Los Angeles-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Miami-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
Munich-Chicago HUB-HUB 1995(l) 
No sufficient data 
Munich-New York FRUB-NON HUB -1994(2) 
No sufficient data 
- Munich-San Francisco HUB-HUB F T1 996 (1) 
Route began with the formation of the alliance 
Munich-Washington I HUB-HUB T-1 998 (1) 
Route began with the formation of the alliance 
New York-Dusseldorf NON HUB-NON HUB 1994(2) 
New York-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
New York-Munich NON HUB-HUB 1994(2) 
No sufficient data 
Philadelphia-Frankfurt NON HUB-HUB 1999(1) 
No sufficient data 
San Francisco-Frankfurt HUB-HUB 
San Francisco-Munich HUB-HUB 1996(l) 
Route began with the formation of the alliance 
Wash ington-Frankfu rt THUB-HUB 1994(2) 
No sufficient data 
- Washington-Munich T HUB-HUB 1998(l) 
Route began with the formation of the alliance 
323 
Cranýeld The Impact of Airline Alliances on Partners' Traffic \1ý I K11 II 
W1is! 11r-__. 
Because of the huge volume of the data base used in the econometric model, 
it is impossible to attach them in their totality; therefore, a sample of a city-pair 
route is presented below. 
UNITED AIRLINES-LUFTHANSA 
Chicago-Frankfurt 
Year PAX LOAD CAPACITY GDP Dummy Dummy Dummy FACTOR Alliance Recession war/crisis 
1982 74853 61.34 122035 21192.5 0 0 0 
1983 76733 62.52 122735 21910 0 0 0 
1984 80353 68.97 116500 23296.5 0 0 0 
1985 74592 69.73 106977 23979.3 0 0 0 
1986 72178 64.86 111277 24574.3 0 0 0 
1987 70951 75.59 93857 25183.2 0 0 0 
1988 70429 74.95 93970 25996.5 0 0 0 
1989 69955 74.45 93961 26656.7 0 0 0 
1990 106658 67.44 158157 26848.5 0 0 0 
1991 107725 71.11 151494 26433.4 0 0 1 
1992 119926 65.84 182144 26942.4 0 0 0 
1993 139843 70.26 199028 27355.9 0 0 0 
1994 149353 75.80 197047 28184.8 0 0 0 
1995 178080 81.04 219748 28668.6 1 1 0 
1996 203455 80.27 253467 29421.3 1 1 0 
1997 235235 79.13 297292 30433.2 1 1 0 
1998 293911 78.37 375014 31437.4 1 0 0 
1999 312808 78.23 399882 32466.2 1 0 0 
2000 331883 77.74 426910 32764.2 1 0 0 
2001 293084 72.64 403502 32778.1 1 0 1 
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